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Abstract 
The objective of this study was to use the emerging discipline of futures studies through the 
application of social science methodologies to generate foresight about the plausible manifestation 
of information warfare in the 2030s as an upcoming national security threat. Interdisciplinary 
theories from futures studies and international relations in conjunction with methodologies from 
business and futures studies (environmental scanning, causal layered analysis, a Delphi study and 
a scenario exercise) were used.  
Information warfare is an emerging threat which is on its way to develop into a significant global 
challenge. The definition proposed for information warfare encompasses three manifestations, 
namely netwar, psychological operations and cyber warfare. The differentiation between the three 
manifestations is elucidated by a cognitive-technology continuum. Critical realism, which regards 
all knowledge as conjectural, served as basis for the philosophical approach in this study. 
According to critical realism there are both an external world independent of human consciousness 
and, at the same time, a dimension that includes humanity’s socially determined knowledge about 
reality. Transformation, networking and the impact of technological innovation in all the 
environments investigated were highlighted as central to the manifestation of information warfare in 
the present as well as in the future. These drivers influenced not only the entities involved in power 
relations in society, but also enhanced the potential influence and power of small and marginalised 
entities in society. New forms of network-related actions were identified as of particular use for 
information warfare in the future. A model to address information warfare as an upcoming national 
security threat was developed.  
The two most significant driving forces were an increase in integration and polarisation that will 
contribute to systemic stresses, and information communication technology (ICT) embedding itself 
as a crucial part of society. This resulted in four plausible scenarios. The “Shango Rejuvenated” 
scenario foresees rapid technological advances, boosted by high levels of social integration 
stimulated by swift advancement in communication technologies. Information warfare is a preferred 
tool for power projection and consolidation but takes place in the context of relatively advanced 
cognitive and technological capacities. The “Gaunab Rising” scenario anticipates low levels of 
social cohesion combined with high levels of technological participation resulting in a potentially 
volatile society providing opportunities for authoritarian elites to expand control. Information 
warfare remains rife and is expanding on all societal levels. The “Inkanyamba Reduced” scenario 
foresees that the combination of low social cohesion and low levels of technological participation 
will magnify dissent, resulting in high levels of conflict and competition for resources. The 
technological part of information warfare in the form of cyberwar is limited, but the cognitive 
aspects in the form of netwar and psychological operations remain high. In the “Tsunigoab 
Revived” scenario high levels of social integration with low levels of technological participation 
ensure relative stability but also limit the potential value that technology could add to society. The 
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intensity of information warfare is lower but information warfare continues to be an instrument for 
power enhancement in society. Polarisation poses a significant future risk in terms of leveraging 
information warfare as a national security threat. 
Key words: Causal Layered Analysis, Cyber warfare, Delphi Study, Environmental Scanning, 
Futures Model, Futures Studies, Information Warfare, Netwar, Psychological Operations, Scenario 
Study, 2030 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The Information Age is bringing to the fore a new generation of national security threats and 
challenges, intermingled with the threats of the past. The most significant security-related events 
during the Industrial Age was the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then efforts 
to manage and control the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons have been at least successful 
in preventing the use of these weapons again in a conflict situation.  
Since the Information Age is only in its infancy, the question remains as to what would be the 
upcoming national security threats that governments will face in the future. Successful 
management of these threats builds upon the capability of government leaders to adjust to a fast-
changing global security environment.  
While security threats associated with the earlier agricultural and Industrial Ages remain relevant, 
the identification of emerging threats to national security in the Information Age remains a 
challenge. Unfortunately, the lead time that decision makers once benefited from to analyse and 
respond to these challenges is diminishing. Conventional long-range planning models, with their 
reliance on historical data and inward focus, do not empower decision makers to foresee changes 
to the environment and assess their impact on national security (Teece, 2010:174). In this regard 
the study of a phenomenon currently referred to as “information warfare” does hold some promise, 
especially if the exponential global growth of networking, boosted by rapidly developing information 
communication technology (ICT) and rapid societal transformation, is taken into account. 
1.2 INFORMATION AS GLOBAL INSTRUMENT FOR POWER 
Generally, the term information warfare is still associated with high-technology weapons and 
broadcast images of drones destroying military targets with apparently assured accuracy and 
computer hackers taking down a country’s power grid by gaining control of the power supplier’s 
mainframe computer. Unfortunately, this armchair view of the sometimes confusing capabilities 
made possible by high technology and information technology has created a simplistic and 
sanitised vision of information warfare in which, to paraphrase Toffler (1990), the mindless fist is 
replaced by the congealed mind. The media’s early focus on guided missiles and intelligent 
warfare systems, the tangible element of the so-called digital battle space, masked the potentially 
deeper societal implications of virtual warfare strategies and global power projection (Cronin & 
Crawford, 1999:257). Of specific interest for further study is the additional intangible role that 
information and communication play in terms of success in this new unfolding conflict environment. 
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It is suspected that this aspect might become a major determinant of potential future political and 
economic supremacy.  
Information is increasingly linked to power. How a government uses that power progressively 
controls how effectively a country may be influencing world politics and national security. In the 
past, the elements of power included mainly military, economic and diplomatic factors. However, in 
the 21st century, information is rapidly assuming a key position in foreign and security policy. It can 
potentially fulfil many roles, such as being a force multiplier, a tool for influencing decision-making 
and/or an instrument for manipulation. Information has evolved into a significant power projection 
instrument for the state. However, as much as it presents an offensive power projection capability 
to the state, it also poses a potential momentous threat to the state (Armistead, 2004:231).  
The constantly changing national security environment is linked to the shifting basis of state power. 
As the foundation of global civilisation evolved from agriculture to industry and then to the 
information sector, the power structures within states also changed. At its core, the transformation 
to an information-based society represents a shift from manufacturing to knowledge, where the 
creation, application and dissemination of knowledge, rather than the production of manufactured 
goods or agricultural products, is becoming the central defining activity of modern society and 
governance (Mazarr, 1997:25). This shift has a direct impact on how national security is being 
viewed by some governments. At the same time, there has been an increase in the number of 
countries studying innovative ways to endeavour to gain an advantage by changing the way in 
which conflict is managed and power is projected. The information society brings new and 
revolutionary technologies and means, which demand change in the way state security is managed 
(Lin, 2000). This has a broad impact on modern society, changing risk and threat analysis in most 
human endeavours. 
Regardless of shifting global power structures, a coherent national security strategy is an important 
instrument for any state. All states, even those with limited resources, have a broad range of tools 
at their disposal to advance their interests. These tools, whether diplomatic, economic, 
informational or military, provide the means by which they seek to achieve their security objectives. 
A national security strategy provides a rational framework for specifying interests in a 
comprehensive and methodological way (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2005:1). While many 
governments have developed strategic security frameworks as national security strategies, this 
remains largely limited to the developed world countries. Even in the case of countries addressing 
information-related threats the focus remains largely limited to cyber security. However, the threat 
from the information environment is broader than the cyber dimension. The pervasiveness of 
information in modern society makes it a key factor in the construction of a global information 
society (Chadwick, 2006:209). 
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Already in the 1990s the potential threat posed by information warfare was identified as a 
significant national security threat in the future (Waltz, 1998:13). A significant question to be asked 
is whether the information dimensions, especially in terms of their comprehensive implication for 
national security, are adequately addressed by a regional power such as South Africa. While a 
significant amount of work has been done on efforts to define information warfare and related 
concepts, this is taking place mainly in the developed world. In general, information warfare has 
not been regarded in a comprehensive manner as a significant part of the national security threat 
perception in the developing world. Larger developing countries such as China and India are 
exceptions. This leads to the problem statement for this study.  
1.3 RESEARCH FOCUS 
1.3.1 Problem statement 
What plausible scenarios can be identified that focus on the manifestation of information warfare 
as a national security threat confronting South Africa during the 2030s? A multi-disciplinary 
approach, supported by futurist methodologies, has the capacity to create knowledge provide 
insight regarding this problem statement. Plausible scenarios on how information warfare will 
manifest as a national security threat in South Africa during the 2030s are identified. Deriving from 
the results of this study, propositions are also identified that are applicable to the probable 
information warfare threat against South Africa in the 2030s.  
In this study, the 2030s are set as the timeframe for the development of scenarios because of 
various reasons. As this study was conducted during the period from 2008 to 2015, the 2030s 
provides a time horizon of minimum 15 years, which is short enough to fit comfortably in the 
lifespan of individuals involved and interested in the question of how information warfare might 
influence society, but long enough to feel confident that significant changes in this regard could 
occur over this time period. At the same time, South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) 
2030, drafted in August 2012 by the National Planning Commission, contains a series of proposals 
to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. A wide range of challenges have been 
identified which would hinder the achievement of sustainable development in South Africa. 
Although information warfare is not specifically identified as a challenge, the external drivers 
identified, namely international and domestic political developments, globalisation, Africa’s 
development and technology change, all are closely interrelated with the expected rise of 
information warfare as a significant national security threat (National Planning Commission, 
2011:7-9). Molitor (1977:5) stated that anticipating specific public-policy relevant developments 
looking ten years ahead is possible with a very high degree of accuracy. However, the aim of the 
study is not predicting the future. 
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 1.3.2 Aim of the study  
This study is not aimed at proving a hypothesis. In this study an emerging discipline (futures 
studies) is used through the application of social science methodologies to generate knowledge 
and foresight about a major future concern. Interdisciplinary theory from futures studies and 
especially international relations in conjunction with methodologies from mainly the domains of 
business studies and future studies (environmental scanning, causal layered analysis, Delphi study 
and a scenario exercise) are used to develop plausible futures regarding the potential threat 
information warfare will pose to South Africa by the 2030s. Specific propositions are identified 
applicable to the decision makers in government who will by the 2030s be confronted by both 
international and domestic information warfare – related national security threats. Propositions 
relevant to creating a preferable future scenario in terms of information warfare as a national 
security threat are also identified. 
It is not endeavoured to lay claim to an exact conclusion or statement of truth in this study. Rather 
the study is positioned to deliver on what it was designed to achieve, namely an exploratory study. 
The research topic is fluid and difficult to contain within a national or organisational context, as it is 
a globally dispersed and layered problem. The security threats are therefore multi-layered, 
emerging in disruptive ways and not limited to traditional national security paradigms. 
Consequently these futures are developed based on an analysis of a definition of information 
warfare and relevant concepts, the identification of a broad theoretical framework, and an 
environmental analysis of dynamics creating change and impacting on the concepts information 
warfare and national security. Central to the study is an analysis of the changing nature of power in 
the Information Age and its changing role in terms of national security in the future.  
1.3.3 Thesis statement 
The thesis statement was formulated as follows: 
The South African government will by the 2030s need to make significant adjustments to its 
national security threat assessment and national security policy management to effectively cope 
with the challenges that information warfare will pose to national security at that stage.  
1.4 PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 
This study use critical realism as epistemological approach, which is implemented through a 
qualitative research design. The philosophical approach for this study was sourced from different 
social science fields, mainly from futures studies and international relations theory, but also from 
other relevant social sciences such as sociology and political science.  
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Scientific observations and theories are always concept-dependent but not concept-determined. 
Science should be regarded as a practical social activity, which is carried out under similar 
conditions to other forms of social practice. This means that questions on method are primarily 
practical questions, which must always be considered in relation to the character of the object of 
investigation and the purpose of the investigation (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 
2005:39). Thus scientists blend approaches in different ways and to differing degrees for different 
problems. In addition, nearly all scientific approaches have something positive to offer, as long as 
their application is not carried to an extreme (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010:259).  
Critical realism forms the foundation of assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge, and 
provides: 
 The philosophical assumptions about what constitutes social reality (ontology); 
 A description of what is accepted as valid evidence of that reality (epistemology); 
 The means by which that context is investigated (methodology); and 
 The means by which evidence is gathered (methods).  
 
According to critical realism the central problem of science is that knowledge of reality is always 
filtered through language and concepts that are relative and changeable in time and space. This 
has resulted in doubts about any possibilities of acquiring valid knowledge of reality, and 
sometimes even doubts about the objective existence of reality. However, in opposition to cognitive 
relativist and idealist positions, critical realism postulates that there is a reality independent of our 
knowledge of it, and that science, like all other practices, offers an opportunity to obtain more or 
less truthful knowledge of this reality. At the same time, contrary to “naive objectivism” and 
empiricism, it is also stated that reality cannot be studied by neutral empirical observations alone 
(Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005:39). 
Any possibility of “objectivity” in social science is refuted by critical realism (Whitham, 2014:12). 
Bhaskar (2008:46-49) identified reality as consisting of three domains: firstly, our experiences of 
events in the world; secondly, the events as such (of which we only experience a fraction); and, 
thirdly, the deep dimension where one finds the generative mechanisms producing the events in 
the world. Further, it is the business of science to establish the connections between these three 
domains. Thus critical realists accept the sceptical belief that humanity cannot have certain 
knowledge, if we define knowledge as justified true belief. However, neither can humanity abandon 
efforts to know and understand. Knowledge is redefined as “conjectural knowledge”, allowing for 
the possibility of the fallibility of their conjectures (Bell, 2007:210). 
Critical realism provides insight regarding the shift of emphasis from experience and events to 
mechanisms. To obtain such knowledge about underlying causal mechanisms influencing the role 
of information and information warfare on the global terrain, it is necessary to provide an overview 
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of specific international relations and related theories. However, the capacity of existing 
international relations theory to adequately explain future security related issues and conflicts 
remains limited, necessitating gleaning insights from associated theoretical sources. This is in 
particular the case because of the growing significance of the information revolution and the impact 
of globalisation on community, enterprise, national and international security (Burchill & Linklater, 
2005:23).  
Combining different theories may lead to epistemological difficulties, but critical realism attempts to 
provide a framework within which a synthesis of more than one position is possible (Smith, 
2013:12). Niiniluoto (2002:21) stated that critical realism turns out to be compatible with a 
surprising variety of philosophical positions. Although the theories used in this study come from 
different but related fields, at the end an integrated approach to the problems of information 
warfare as a current and future national security threat remains the central aim. The meta-
theoretical framework in this study is provided by critical realism. The meta-theoretical framework 
provides space for the investigation of broader philosophical approaches from which useful 
theoretical insights can be obtained.  
Wight (1991) identified the main international political traditions as the realist, rationalist and 
revolutionist traditions. Each of these traditions embodies a wide variety of doctrines about 
international relations, among which there sometimes exists only a loose connection. These 
traditions, however, incorporate a set of distinctive questions and assumptions about the basic 
units and forces in international relations (Keohane, 1989:2). The first condition is that no political 
superior is acknowledged and a multiplicity of independent sovereign states accepts the use of 
military force and warfare ultimately as a method to regulate relationships. This is the basis of the 
realist worldview regarding international relations. The second condition identified is that diplomacy 
and commerce form the basis of international and institutionalised interaction between sovereign 
states. Rationalists tend to emphasise and concentrate on the element of international interaction, 
which focuses on the role of measures to create and enhance order in the anarchic world as well 
as investigate the concept of an international society. Thirdly, the concept of a society of states, or 
family of nations, brings with it certain moral and psychological as well as possibly even legal 
obligations. Revolutionists tend to concentrate on the concept of a society of states or an 
international society but they can be defined more precisely as those who believe passionately in 
the moral unity of a society of states. 
The challenges posed by the Information Age have produced some theoretical shortcomings to 
adequately address the growth of information as an instrument of power. The changing nature of 
national security and the role of information in this context highlight shortcomings related to the 
advancement of the role of information in the modern world, which transcends the boundaries of 
realist, rationalist and revolutionist worldviews. Theoretical work done in terms of critical realism 
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within international relations theory and theory focusing on the power of symbolism done by 
Baudrillard (1983) is of value in this regard. 
In addition to the understanding gained from international relations theory, the theoretical insights 
obtained from the emerging discipline of futures studies provide assistance for judgements in terms 
of the assumptions and methodology followed in this study. Bell (2005:73) defined the main 
purposes of futures studies as “to discover or invent, examine and eva luate, and propose possible, 
probable and preferable futures”. Futures thinking is thus based on three interrelated inquiries into 
the future with the objective to determine the truth about the future (Spies, 2015). These inquiries 
are: (1) measuring the future to obtain knowledge about the future; (2) imagining the non-existing 
future; and (3) purposefully designing or making the future. Measuring, imagining and making 
sustainable alternative futures should be the preferable outcome of holistic futures thinking and 
requires active interventions to realise. This study is primarily focused on the measuring and 
imagining dimensions. 
Since time immemorial, thinking about the future has been an ingrained part of human civilisation. 
As humanity desires some insight into the future it consequently endeavours to form adequate 
“images of future realities (futura)” (De Jouvenel, 1967:40). Futures studies is multi-disciplinary in 
its research approach and trans-disciplinary in its intellectual tradition with efforts since the late 
1990s to have a knowledge base defined (Inayatullah & Wildman, 1996:725). Despite its historical 
roots, futures studies remains a relatively recent academic discipline and intellectual tool. 
The future is not specified or prearranged. A multitude of futures remains possible, but only one 
can manifest in the end. Futures studies promotes inquiry into how current activities (or lack 
thereof) will become the reality of the future. This includes endeavours to analyse the causes, 
sources and patterns of stability and change with the intention of creating foresight and even 
different futures. Despite technological progress being an integral part of our society today, 
civilisation is seemingly racing itself into a “pathologically short attention span”, according to one 
author, a trend which, he claims, is “... boosted by the acceleration of technology, the short horizon 
perspective of market driven economics, the next election perspective of democracies, and the 
distractions of personal multitasking” (Brand, 1999:2). 
Futures studies takes the longer view. It is largely focused on understanding social realities or 
“constructs” which build the future. For futures studies the development of sustainable future-
oriented visions which can motivate individuals and bodies is also essential (Slaughter, 1999:305). 
Futures studies thus provides the means to investigate the practical attainment of more preferred 
futures. Social reality in all its complexity can be described as consisting of structures (how things 
are interconnected), processes (how things are being done), ordering (how things are kept 
together), context (influence of the environment) and outcomes (why things are done) 
(Gharajedaghi, 2006:29). 
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In general, a futures-orientated philosophical approach also subscribes to the worldview of critical 
realism in which it concurs with the notion that the absolute truth of knowledge is untenable. When 
focusing on science it includes a concern about the logical structure and coherence of statements, 
and also a special concern about the utility in manipulating the world to achieve human goals, as, 
for example, in the conscious process of using known cause-and-effect relationships to create 
desired ends (Bell, 2007:207).  
Science rests on the supposition that although many aspects of reality may always remain beyond 
the human facility to discern and understand, how the world really is, plays a decisive role in the 
achievements of science. Truth can be known within the limits of human senses and intellect. Even 
though truth “… is not absolute and is fallible, conjectural, conditional, corrigible, tentative, 
qualitatively judgemental, and presuppositional; warranted assertability is possible; some 
assertions are true and some are false, and we can frequently justify our beliefs, empirically or 
logically, about which is which” (Bell, 2007:207-208). Another crucial futurist relevant theoretical 
perspective includes the use of systems approaches to analyse the varied relationships of the 
many aspects of the social world, thus operating against piecemeal analyses of the social world. 
The systems approach tends to regard all aspects of socio-cultural systems in process terms, 
especially as networks of information and communication (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004:314-315). The 
horizontal dimension of systems, especially the layered view of systems, proves to be constructive 
in enhancing understanding.  
Our knowledge of the future is notoriously meagre compared with our knowledge of the past 
(Swinburne, 1966:166). Concepts like prediction, forecasting and foresight are generally used to 
refer to knowledge of the future. It remains important to distinguish between these concepts in 
order to understand the boundaries and limitations of futures studies.  
The nature of society as an open system makes it impossible to make predictions as can be done 
in natural science. But, based on an analysis of causal mechanisms, it is possible to make well-
informed arguments about the potential consequences of mechanisms working in different settings 
(Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005:2). The aim of forecasting is based on the 
implicit desire to make the world more stable and to influence or even control the future. The 
assumption behind forecasting is that with more information, particularly more timely information, 
decision-makers can make wiser decisions. Having more information at hand is especially 
important presently since the rate of technological change has significantly increased (Inayatullah, 
2005b). 
The term foresight, which takes forecasting further, is the capacity to think ahead and consider, 
model, create, and respond to future eventualities. Foresight is the process of developing a range 
of views on possible ways the future could develop, and understanding these sufficiently well to be 
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able to decide what decisions can be taken today in order to create the best possible tomorrow 
(Horton, 1999:6). 
Slaughter (1995:1) stressed that foresight is not the ability to predict the future; instead, it is a 
human attribute that allows humankind to weigh up pros and cons, to evaluate different courses of 
action, and to invest possible futures on every level with enough reality and meaning to use them 
as decision-making aids. The simplest possible definition of foresight is: “opening to the future w ith 
every means at our disposal, developing views of future options, and then choosing between 
them”. The significance of foresight is further strengthened by its additional dimensions such as 
acting with provident care as well as the innate human ability to develop foresight to ensure long 
term survival (Suddendorf, Addis, & Corballis, 2009:1322).  
Foresight thus can act to promote knowledgeability in humans, and as such it operates as a 
“higher order” language. Truly understanding the present is part of such a knowledgeability. 
Acknowledging that many of the prior actions of foresight have served the interests of those in 
power is also part of such a knowledgeability. This includes the understanding that language and 
technology should not be regarded as neutral, and endeavouring to view the present outside the 
confines of a short-term approach. Instead of seeking stability, understanding surprise, limits, 
disturbance, consciousness and transformation is likewise part of such a knowledgeability 
(Hayward, 2005). 
A multitude of methods can be used to produce the knowledgeability that underlies insight. This is 
done through the application of a research design following a phased use of social study methods.  
1. 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Qualitative research methodologies have been followed in this study. In this regard the study drew 
extensively on descriptive research, qualitative text analysis, and the use of business science and 
futures studies methodologies. The research process was conducted by following six qualitative 
research phases, namely the definition of concepts, an environmental scan, the development of a 
futures model inclusive of causal layered analysis (CLA) for information warfare (by way of 
grounded theory), a Delphi study, and a scenario exercise. Lastly, propositions are provided on the 
plausible manifestation of information warfare in the 2030s. Qualitative inquiry is aimed at 
improving the description and explanation of complex, real-world phenomena pertinent to 
information warfare, while futures methodology assists in providing insight into the plausible future 
manifestation of information warfare as an upcoming national security threat. The study was 
conducted in the period 2009 to 2015. 
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1.5.1  Qualitative text analysis 
In some senses, data is always qualitative since it refers to essences of people, objects and 
situations (Miles & Huberman, 1994:9). In this study, the focus is on data in the form of words; thus 
language in the form of extended text. The words are based on documents, analysed text, Delphi 
questionnaires and observation. The data collection activities were carried out by the researcher in 
Pretoria and Beijing. Some data is not immediately accessible for analysis, but requires some 
processing (Miles & Huberman, 1994:9). Data analysis requires astute observation, questioning, a 
relentless search for answers and active recall. It is a process of piecing together data, of making 
the invisible obvious, of distinguishing significance from insignificance, of linking seemingly 
unrelated facts logically, of fitting categories with one another, and of attributing consequence to 
antecedents (Morse, 1994:25). 
Processing and analysis in this study are done with qualitative text analysis. Kuckartz (2014:33) 
stated that qualitative text analysis is a form of analysis in which an understanding and 
interpretation of the text play a far greater role than in classical content analysis, which is more 
limited to the so-called manifest content. In contrast to some computer-assisted statistical 
analyses, which sometimes use automatic dictionary coding and which ignore ambiguities, 
qualitative content analysis presents an interpretive form of analysis in which the coding is 
completed on the basis of interpretation, classification and analysis. Moreover, text analysis and 
coding are not done exclusively by computer, so they are linked to human understanding and 
interpretation (Kuckartz, 2014:33-34). Kuckartz (2015) confirmed that the best results are obtained 
by using qualitative text analysis on documentary source material.  
Open coding is used as the qualitative text analysis of choice. Open coding is defined as “... the 
analytic process through which concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions 
discovered in data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998:101). Thus, open coding is the process during which 
the researcher starts to investigate, compare, conceptualise and categorise data. It “opens” the 
analysis by processing the data carefully and by developing preliminary concepts and their 
dimensions (Kuckartz, 2014:23).  
Generally, during open coding, data is broken down into discrete elements, intimately examined, 
and compared for differences and similarities. Events, happenings, substance and 
actions/interactions that are found to be conceptually similar in nature or related in meaning are 
grouped under more abstract concepts termed “categories”. Closely examining data for both 
differences and similarities allows for fine discrimination and differentiation among categories 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998:102). 
As the research focuses on theme-related issues associated with the current and future 
manifestation of information warfare, thematic qualitative text analysis is focused on the text itself, 
notably based on the text in its entirety. Even after categories have been assigned, the text itself, 
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i.e. the wording of the statements, is relevant and also plays an important role in the preparation 
and presentation of results (Kuckartz, 2014:66). 
The basic process of thematic analysis focuses on seven steps, as illustrated below (see Figure 
1.1 for a brief explanation of the process).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Thematic qualitative text analysis process 
Source: Kuckartz, 2014:70. 
Step 1 of the analysis process focuses on the initial text, highlighting text passages. During Step 2 
the main thematic categories are developed. Step 3 centres on the first coding by utilising the main 
categories. During Step 4 and Step 5 all of the text passages that belong to the same main 
category are compiled, and sub-categories are created based on the data. During Step 6 the 
second coding process is executed, coding all the data using the complete category system. 
Finally, during Step 7 a category-based analysis takes place in which the relationships between the 
sub-categories and categories are highlighted (Kuckartz, 2014:71-84). During the coding exercise, 
coding software called Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT), developed by the University of Pittsburgh, is 
used to assist in the qualitative text analysis process. 
1.5.2 Methodology outline 
The outline for the mentioned six qualitative research phases is explained above: 
i) Define key concepts including the definition of information warfare for which no general 
acceptable definition exist. 
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ii) Conduct an environmental scan focused on the Technological, War/Conflict, Economic, 
Political and Social (TWEPS) macro-environmental hexagon.  
 
iii) Use grounded theory to create an information warfare futures model, in which CLA is also 
applied to the output of the environmental scan in order to identify the driving forces 
applicable to information warfare as a national security threat. 
iv)  Prioritise and validate driving forces critical to the future manifestation of information warfare 
as a national security threat in the 2030s by way of Delphi studies. 
 
v) Develop four scenarios on the plausible manifestation of information warfare in the 2030s. 
 
vi) Formulate propositions on the plausible manifestation of information warfare in the 2030s.  
 
1.5.3 Phase 1: Definition of concepts 
In this study two central concepts need clear definitions, namely information warfare and national 
security.  
Although the information revolution and growing global integration are ensuring that information 
warfare1 is destined to become one of the most significant national security challenges in the 
future, diverse and sometimes even contradictory definitions have complicated the debate about 
this phenomenon (Van Vuuren, 2009:177). 
In this study the term information warfare is used in its contemporary and futurist contexts, but it is 
also acknowledged that the phenomenon has strong historical links. While some aspects related to 
information warfare are as old as humankind, many aspects as to how it is being applied in our 
contemporary information driven world are new (Jones, Kovacich & Luzwick, 2002:5). In order to 
facilitate a broader discussion on information warfare, an initial working definition of information 
warfare is proposed. Provisionally, information warfare refers to actions influencing the information 
networks of the state and society in general for power projection aims. However, despite the 
common use of the term the lack of consensus on its meaning in both academia and the mass 
media necessitates finding a more exact definition to assist in understanding this concept in its 
current and futurist contexts. 
In this study information warfare is understood in the context of two broad categories. One 
category refers to the more intangible sphere of perceptions, deception, decisions, influencing and 
                                               
1  As on 12 August 2015 a Google Boolean search for the term “information warfare” indicated references to 470 000 
documents. 
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knowledge, and the second refers to the more tangible sphere of digital networks, critical 
infrastructure protection and computer software and hardware. These two categories cannot be 
completely separated from one another. However, the study will focus more strongly on the 
contemporary manifestation, as well as the anticipated manifestation by the 2030s. 
National security has been seriously debated since the end of the Cold War in particular, with 
some scholars and policy-makers calling for the expansion of its scope. This expansion of scope 
remains significant for this study but, in general, the theoretical aspects regarding national security 
as representing real and potential threats against the state are investigated. Additionally, the 
Information Age has a significant influence on national security with the contemporary challenge of 
how to meet national security needs in this new and ever-changing technology environment 
(Goldman, 2004:11). This is especially significant as the control and use of information and 
knowledge are increasingly central driving forces dominating human activity and progress. 
1.5.4 Phase 2: Environmental scanning 
After clarity is established regarding the key phenomena of information warfare and national 
security, the question remains as to what appropriate methodologies exist to evaluate the current 
milieu within which information warfare manifests with the capacity to also provide some level of 
insight into how a plausible future might manifest. For this purpose the appropriate futurist or 
business research methodology identified is an environmental scan.  
Environmental scanning has proved its value to explain the current environment as well as its use 
as a futures methodological tool to investigate uncertainties about the future in a systematic 
fashion (Heinonen, 2008:53). Furthermore, it has the capacity to function on a higher level of 
knowledge creation rather than a lower level of information creation (Naude, 2016:14). Therefore, 
scanning the horizon is always prudent to identify new developments that can challenge past 
assumptions while it also provides new perspectives to future threats or opportunities (Gordon & 
Glenn, 2003:3). Information is gathered from the macro-environment with the aim to develop a 
better understanding of those factors and forces that may have a bearing on the way possible, 
probable and preferable futures take shape (Roux, 2007:1). This futures-orientated nature of 
environmental scanning is of particular value because an important effect of scanning is to 
increase and enhance communication and critical thought about future-oriented issues in general 
(Choo, 1999). The environmental scan is mainly focused on issues that directly influence 
information warfare as a national security threat.  
The planned multi-disciplinary environmental scanning consists of a literature review, qualitative 
text analysis aimed at coding and focused on the current manifestation of information warfare, and 
the identification of the driving forces and trends influencing the future manifestation. 
Environmental scanning is the acquisition and use of information about events, trends, driving 
forces and relationships that form part of the external environment of any given phenomena. 
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Knowledge of this would assist in identifying the future development of the phenomenon (Choo, 
2001).  
At its broadest level, namely the macro environment, the focus is normally on the Social, 
Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political (STEEP) sectors (Kurian & Molitor, 
1996:814). After critically evaluating the applicability of the STEEP sector for this study, the 
environmental sector is replaced by the war and conflict environment, thus creating a 
Technological, War/Conflict, Economic, Political and Social (TWEPS) macro-environmental 
hexagon. 
The outcome of the environmental scan needs to be evaluated in order to identify the most 
significant driving forces which will influence the future manifestation of information warfare. The 
outcome of the environmental scan, however, is one-dimensional and does not necessarily take 
into account the full dynamics and complexity present in the macro environment. For this purpose 
a futures model opening the opportunity to enhance the depth of evaluation is useful.  
1.5.5 Phase 3: Development of futures model inclusive of CLA 
The environmental scan lays the basis for the identification of the crucial driving forces that will be 
central to the manifestation of information warfare in the future. A futures model developed from 
the qualitative coding of the environmental scan serves as a roadmap to assist in identifying the 
driving forces influencing the future manifestation of information warfare as an upcoming national 
security threat. Such a model provides a tool for visualisation and understanding to add value to 
the analysis of the environmental scan output. However, additionally multi-level analysis as a 
methodology for the analysis of information with complex patterns of variability is needed. This is 
especially important with the underlying assumption being that information shows a hierarchy that 
cannot be neglected in such an analysis (Russo, 2009:64). 
The grounded theory method is a systematic methodology in the social sciences involving the 
discovery of theory through the analysis of data (Martin & Turner, 1986:141). Grounded theory was 
proposed as a methodology with the aim of creating theory by way of systematically gathering and 
analysing data. The theory is a product of continuous interplay between analysis and data 
collection, and evolves during the research process itself. It furthermore requires the recognition 
that facts should be viewed as both theory laden and value laden, and that enquiry is always 
context bound (Goulding, 2002:42). In traditional social science, the researcher enters a research 
situation with an a priori theory, and the purpose of data collection is to “confirm” or “refute” that 
theory, hence the phrase confirmatory approach to science. In grounded theory, data is not used to 
test an a priori theory; rather, data is used to evolve a theory. Typically, the data is collected by 
means of qualitative methods (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010:256). Knowledge is regarded as actively 
created with meanings of existence only relevant to an experiential world. Essentially, this 
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methodology is mostly applied with the aim to generate theory to provide a fresh slant on existing 
knowledge or where little is currently known (Baszanger, 1998:354). 
In this study the aim of using grounded theory is not to create a theory but to assist in formulating a 
model that could be of value to focus the outcome of the environmental scan regarding the future 
of information warfare. The specific aim of the model will be to provide a framework to evaluate 
driving forces stemming from the TWEPS macro-environment hexagon. In order to provide 
magnitude to the insights and macro-driving forces within the model, causal layered analysis (CLA) 
is used within the model. CLA is a futures methodology which has the potential to bring depth to a 
research endeavour (Bussey, 2014:45). It is used as a mapping strategy to identify the main 
driving forces identified by way of an environmental scan (Inayatullah, 2014b). CLA is especially 
useful for generating new images of the future, given its focus on imagery and metaphor (Voros, 
2006:51). 
Using CLA evaluation takes place on four levels, namely the litany, social causes, 
discourse/worldview, and myth/metaphor levels. The litany level refers to the highly visible but 
largely unquestioned data and headlines which attract attention. The social cause level focuses on 
systemic approaches and situations underlying the visible litany level. The worldview level refers to 
the different ways of knowing. The last level refers to the myths, metaphors and narratives which 
are central to all views, actions and situations under scrutiny (Inayatullah, 2014a). The challenge is 
to conduct research that moves up and down these layers of analysis and is thus inclusive of 
different ways of knowing (Inayatullah, 2000). 
Although CLA is a futures methodology it is less concerned with predicting a particular future than 
opening up the present and past to create alternative futures (Inayatullah, 2005a:50). As a 
methodology, CLA seeks to integrate empiricist, interpretive, critical and action learning modes of 
knowing (loosely, science, social science, philosophy and mythology). It is also useful for 
developing more effective, deeper, inclusive and longer term policy (Inayatullah, 2000). However, 
in this study the CLA aim is more restricted as it assists in integrating the driving forces produced 
by the environmental scan and later provides depth to the developed scenarios.  
All of these methodological approaches provide the output for identifying the driving forces 
applicable to information warfare as a national security threat. These driving forces are developed 
within the TWEPS macro-environmental hexagon. Each driving force is described in terms of how 
and why it will affect information warfare as a national security threat. These driving forces are 
formulated to be both predictable and unpredictable. Identifying these driving forces is attempted 
from a range of disciplines with the aim to gain a holistic or systemic view based on these different 
insights.  
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1.5.6 Phase 4: Delphi study 
The value of the information warfare futures model or CLA-derived insights is enhanced when it is 
scrutinised, integrated and validated by a panel of local and global experts knowledgeable about 
the environments identified as relevant to the future of information warfare. Given the lack of 
statistical data and concrete information on the future orientation of driving forces, expert opinion is 
used to assist in validating and prioritising these driving forces. A structured group method, namely 
the Delphi technique, is especially appropriate to be utilised in this regard (Keeney, Hasson, & 
McKenna, 2011:1). 
The Delphi methodology was originally developed as a systematic, interactive forecasting method 
which relies on a panel of experts. This is useful in assisting to identify the main driving forces vital 
to the manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat in the 2030s. Through the 
Delphi technique, independent insights and forecasts are obtained from an expert panel over two 
or more rounds, with summaries of the anonymous inputs (and reasons for them) provided after 
each round (Armstrong, 2001:776). In using the Delphi method, it is possible to manage the 
exchange of information between anonymous panellists over a number of rounds (iterations), 
taking the average of the estimates on the final round as the group judgment (Rowe & Wright, 
2001:125).  
This method benefits from being a democratic and structured approach that harnesses the 
collective wisdom of participants (Powell, 2003:381). The Delphi study does not call for expert 
panels to be representative samples for statistical purposes. Representativeness is assessed on 
the qualities of the expert panel rather than its numbers (Powell, 2003:378). According to research 
conducted by Rowe and Wright (2001:125), Delphi groups are substantially more accurate than 
individual experts and traditional groups, and somewhat more accurate than statistical groups 
(which are made up of non-interacting individuals whose judgements are aggregated).  
A Delphi study is thus conducted as the most suitable method for arriving at expert consensus on 
the most appropriate driving forces influencing the manifestation of information warfare as a 
national security threat by the 2030s. Delphi study users suggest that experts should be chosen for 
their work in the appropriate area and credibility with the target audience (Powell, 2003:379). The 
Delphi study focuses on experts from all the domains covered in the environmental scan, namely 
social, technological, economic, political and war/conflict (TWEPS) environments. However, the 
core study is the pilot study focusing on the South African security environment (encompassing 
individuals knowledgeable and experienced on the TWEPS macro environments). In order to 
compare the South African outcome with more general expert opinion, a domestic and global 
expert Delphi study is also performed.  
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The outcome of the Delphi study is a validated and prioritised list of driving forces relevant to the 
manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat in South Africa by the 2030s. This 
serves as substantial input for the development of scenarios on this issue.   
1.5.7 Phase 5: Scenario analysis 
Next, a scenario-building exercise is conducted creating plausible information warfare scenarios 
with the aim of developing strategic insights into the manifestation of information warfare as a 
national security threat by the 2030s. Scenario analysis provides a method of developing 
alternative futures based on diverse combinations of assumptions, facts and driving forces. 
Scenarios are not about predicting, but rather about perceiving futures in the present (Schwartz, 
1991:38). Scenarios present excellent mental frameworks for exploring new ideas and thinking. 
Part of this analysis entails identifying the two driving forces on two axes, assessing each force on 
an uncertain/(relatively) predictable and important/unimportant scale (University of Arizona, 2006). 
Four scenarios are developed, presenting a series of differing views of the environment within 
which information warfare will manifest as a national security threat by the 2030s. 
Inayatullah (2005d:156) explained the full spectrum of scenario outcomes as being possible 
(irrespective of laws of the universe), plausible (more realistic, structural considerations), probable 
(given historical trends and quantitative data) and preferred (what participants desire, the vision of 
the organisation). The purpose in this study is to create plausible scenarios within which the 
manifestation of how information warfare could develop as a national security threat in South Africa 
by the 2030s could be evaluated. 
1.5.8 Phase 6: Formulate propositions 
Once the scenarios are compiled, they provide the necessary insight and knowledge to formulate 
specific propositions applicable to interested parties who will by the 2030s be confronted by both 
international and domestic information warfare related national security threats. This provides 
insights into appropriate strategies, and new initiatives for strategic action to address information 
warfare as a national security threat.  
1.6 LITERATURE SURVEY 
Sources of information included both primary and secondary sources. The study is focused on the 
qualitative social research as evidenced by the literature survey below. The literature used is found 
mainly in books and journals, in diverse fields of management and business studies, futures 
studies, international relations, strategic studies and sociology. 
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1.6.1 Theoretical literature 
The first category is theoretical literature on the broader worldview in which information warfare 
manifests as a national security threat. In this context, there is significant literature relevant to 
critical realism, international relations and futures studies. Critical realism forms the foundation of 
the assumptions on the nature of reality and knowledge. Critical realism is built on the work of 
philosophy of science scholar Bhaskar in A Realist Theory of Science (2008).  
Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1973), Waltz’s The 
Balance of Power in International Politics (1987), Nye’s Soft Power (1990b), Wight’s International 
Theory: The Three Traditions (1991), McGrew’s Conceptualizing Global Politics (1992), Bull’s 
Order and Anarchy in International Society (1992), Wight and Joseph’s Scientific Realism and 
International Relations (2010) and Nye’s The Future of Power (2011) are examples of major works 
on international relations. It is, however, obvious from analysing international relations literature 
that the capacity of existing international relations theory to adequately explain future security-
related issues and conflicts remains limited, necessitating a broader approach to identifying 
international relations theories useful for this study. Therefore, theoretical work undertaken by 
postmodernist Baudrillard (1983) provides valuable insights into the power of symbolism and 
information in the Information Age. 
The second category is the futures study literature, which provides the futurist context in which 
information warfare as a future national security threat can be viewed. Bell’s seminal work on 
futures studies – An Overview of Futures Studies (2005) and both volumes of Foundations of 
Futures Studies: Human Science for a New Era (2007) – provide a comprehensive overview of 
future studies.  
The rationale for futures studies and the role of the futurist are extensively described by futurist 
thinkers such as Brand (1999), Slaughter (2005), Inayatullah (2008a) and Spies (2015). Foresight 
remains a vital futures tool for opening the future with every means, developing views of future 
options, and then choosing between them (Slaughter, 1995:1). In Thinking about the Future: 
Guidelines for Strategic Foresight, Bishop and Hines (2013) provide an overview of the widely 
scattered professional knowledge and capability on strategic foresight in a way that provides useful 
insight into its application for futures studies.  Foresight also highlights the need for creativity which 
requires divergent thinking (Van der Laan & Yap, 2016:70). Additional futures theoretical insights 
useful for the study of information futures includes the systems approach as proposed by Easton 
(1965), Waltz (1979) and Senge (1990); the futures map as formulated by Malaska and Virtanen 
(2009); and the CLA approach developed by Inayatullah (2000) and enhanced by Voros (2006). 
The collection of studies regarding the last mentioned method in CLA 2.0: Transformative 
Research in Theory and Practice edited by Inayatullah and Milojević (2015) shows that CLA can 
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also be used to reconstruct the future by creating worldviews and narrative solutions to the 
complex problems humanity faces. 
1.6.2 Information warfare and national security literature 
The third category of literature focuses on information warfare and national security. Information 
warfare futures have not been the primary focus of any other scholarly study. Information warfare 
in terms of its modern meaning is also a fairly recent concept with the 1991 Gulf War refocusing 
the importance of information superiority especially in the realm of high-technology weapons in a 
modern conflict. This war was regarded as the first information war (Campen, 1992:vii). The origins 
of concepts and practices relevant to information in conflict, however, go back much earlier and 
can be identified in the seminal works Art of War by Tzu (translated 1963) and On War by Von 
Clausewitz (translated 1989). Where the legacy works focus on the role of information and 
knowledge in the successful conduct of war, the modern concept of information warfare remains 
closely linked to the exponential growth of digital and ICT capabilities and their role in enhancing 
political power projection.  
Since 1991 extensive literature on information warfare theory and practice, much of which is in the 
public domain, followed (De Landa, 1991; Libicki, 1995; Schwartau, 1996; Waltz, 1998; Denning, 
1999; Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Ventre, 2009 & 2011; Singer & Friedman, 2014 and Green, 2015). 
While the literature does provide a comprehensive description of information warfare 
manifestations, no consensus exists on defining information warfare. However, the fundamental 
common elements and characteristics of information warfare have been identified (Vlahos, 1998; 
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Bishara, 2001; McLendon, 2008 and Schneier, 2008).  Some scholars 
such as Grey (2007) argued conflicts in the history of humankind have been defined by the use of 
asymmetries that exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, thus leading to complex situations involving 
regular/irregular and conventional/unconventional tactics. Similarly, the rise of information warfare 
has according to him not fundamentally changed the nature of warfare, but expanded its use in a 
new dimension. 
Official and international publications served as important components for the collection, research 
and analysis processes. While information warfare and related concepts are fairly recent 
developments, the nature of this theme is largely internet friendly with many of the studies and 
official publications available on the World Wide Web (WWW) and the rest of the internet. A major 
challenge in evaluating these materials was the significant United States of America (USA) bias in 
available material on information warfare. Since the mid-1990s writers from Europe, Australia, 
Israel and to a lesser extent China and India have also been focusing on relevant themes. A 
developing world perspective on this issue is, however, nearly completely absent. This issue has 
been a high priority focus in China but only a fraction of material in Mandarin has been translated. 
Even here the main interest is again from a Taiwanese and USA perspective. The researcher 
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critically evaluated relevant published and unpublished works, studies, policy documents, journals 
and electronic resources on information warfare issues. 
Coupled with challenges brought about by globalisation and the Information Age, national security 
also needed to adapt to this new and ever-changing technology environment (Goldman, 2004:11). 
The changing nature of national security is addressed to include additional non-military issues, for 
example economics, the environment and human rights have increasingly forced their way onto the 
global security agenda (Sheehan, 2000:471). A United Nations (2004) report on Threats, 
Challenges and Change helped to fundamentally shift the focus of National Security by 
emphasising that states’ security threats do not respect national boundaries – from invasion, war 
and conflict within states they extend to poverty, infectious diseases and environmental 
degradation. Scholars also started to focus on works about the security implication of technology 
(Rappert & Croft, 2007). Additionally the rise of the Copenhagen School of thought increased 
coexistence and competition on what national security entails as the notion that the individual and 
not the state should be the primary beneficiary of national security. The Copenhagen School 
places particular emphasis upon the social aspects of security (Mcsweeney, 1996:82). 
1.6.3 Methodological literature 
The fourth category is the literature on methodologies (environmental scanning, Delphi studies and 
scenario studies), qualitative text analysis methods, qualitative coding and model building by way 
of grounded theory used in this study. Environmental scanning is elucidated by Coates’ Issues 
Identification and Management: The State of the Art of Methods and Techniques (1985), Choo’s 
The Art of Scanning the Environment (1999), Molitor’s Molitor Forecasting Model: Key Dimensions 
for Plotting the “Patterns of Change” and Morrison’s Environmental Scanning (1992). 
Kurian and Molitor in the Encyclopaedia of the Future (1996) raised the use of STEEP (Social, 
Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political) sectors in environmental scanning. As 
various futurists use different systems to uniquely classify the focus area of their studies 
(Haberman, 2013), for the purpose of this study the environmental sector is replaced by a 
conflict/war sector as this reflects to focus area of this study closer. Thereby creating the social, 
technological, economic, political and war/conflict (TWEPS) environments. Most literature on 
environmental scanning refers to its role in business contexts, but the future-orientated nature of 
environmental scanning is of particular value because an important effect of scanning is to 
increase and enhance communication and critical thought about future-oriented issues in general 
(Choo, 1999). 
The qualitative text analysis and the qualitative coding are provided by Kuckartz in Qualitative Text 
Analysis: A Guide to Methods, Practice and Using Software (2014) and Charmaz in Constructing 
Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis (2006). These publications also 
provide practical guidance with the qualitative coding process. Computer assistance in coding is 
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provided by using the Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT) software developed by the University of 
Pittsburgh’s Qualitative Data Analysis Program (QDAP) (University of Pittsburgh, 2015).  
Assisting in the visualisation of system elements, modelling is used as a mental tool to represent 
reality. Here Jaccard and Jacoby’s Theory Construction and Model-Building Skills: A Practical 
Guide for Social Scientists (2010) provides valuable insights. Grounded theory is utilised in this 
regard as presented by Martin and Turner (1986), Strauss and Corbin (1998), Goulding (2002) and  
Charmaz (2006). Although grounded theory is generally used to develop theory, in this study it is 
used to assist in developing a model for information warfare futures. 
The framework for developing such a model is provided by the futures map (Kuusi, Cuhls & 
Steinmüller, 2015), causal layered analysis (CLA) (Voros, 2006 & Inayatullah, 2008c) and systems 
layered explanation of reality (Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur & Schley, 2008). Modelling is a 
visualisation and mental tool developed to add value to the analysis of the environmental scan 
output. 
The Delphi method is used to scrutinise, integrate and validate the driving forces identified in the 
environmental scan, and processed in terms of the information warfare model. Extensive 
background information and practical advice are provided by Rowe and Wright (2001), Linstone 
and Turoff (2002), Gordon (2003), Powell (2003), Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) as well as Keeney, 
Hasson and McKenna, 2011:1) on the techniques and applications of the Delphi method. Literature 
provides sufficient insight to utilise the Delphi method with the aim to achieve the goals set. 
The literature on scenario planning models and methodologies is found mainly in books and 
journals, chiefly in the field of management and business. The following works serve as leading 
examples: The Art of the Long View: The Path to Strategic Insight for Yourself and Your Company 
by Schwartz (1991), Scenario Planning: The link between future and strategy by Lindgren and 
Bandhold (2003), Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversations by Van der Heijden (2005), 
Foresight: The Art and Science of Anticipating the Future by Loveridge (2009) and Scenario 
Planning in Organizations: How to Create, Use, and Assess Scenarios by Chermack (2011). 
1.7 ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS 
In this study, the researcher is committed to protecting the rights, privacy, dignity and well-being of 
the persons who took part in this research. This applied in particular to the conduct of the Delphi 
studies in which local and foreign experts participated.  
As the Delphi studies might present some ethical challenges these were carefully managed to 
ensure that they remained a low-risk endeavour by abiding to the following principles: 
- Possible participants were provided with the background, potential benefit and aim of 
the study. 
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-     Participants were informed that participation is voluntary, and individuals were free to 
stop participating at any stage. 
-     Participants were informed that their identities would not be revealed to other members 
of the study or identified in the thesis; their privacy was respected and it was confirmed, 
where appropriate, that organisational approval had been granted for their participation. 
 
The Departmental Ethics Screening Committee of the University of Stellenbosch Business School 
(USB-DESC) reviewed the researcher’s application for the Delphi studies, and the research as set 
out in the ethics application was approved on 23 June 2014. 
The pilot study was conducted with a South African foreign security panel providing a cross-
environmental perspective on the proposed driving forces. In January 2014, the relevant state 
entity responsible for South African foreign security related issues granted permission for the 
researcher to proceed with a Delphi study, provided that no members participating were identified 
and no organisational information was revealed in the study. As anonymity is one of the criteria for 
a Delphi study and as classified information is not the focus of this study, these provisos had no 
negative impact on the outcome of the pilot study. In line with the request the name of the intuition 
is also not revealed in this study. The pilot Delphi study was conducted from August 2014 to 
February 2015. A second Delphi study was conducted from February 2015 to September 2015 in 
which domestic and international experts participated. 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
To provide a response to the problem statement and to reach the aim of this study, sub-problems 
were formulated. These sub-problems have been addressed in line with the stated research 
outline.  
This study consists of nine chapters. See Figure 1.2 for a visualisation of the research outline. 
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Figure 1.2: Visualisation of the research outline 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter which sets out the identification, demarcation and formulation 
of the research problem. An overview of the study aims, thesis statement, philosophical approach, 
methodology, a core literature survey, the ethical requirements and an outline of the structure of 
the study are provided.  
In Chapter 2 the following sub-problems are dealt with: What are the epistemological approaches 
followed in this study and how does international relations theory provide insight into information 
warfare as an upcoming national security threat? The critical realist worldview is elucidated and 
theoretical underpinnings in terms of international relations theory are provided.    
Chapter 3 deals with the second sub-problem: What is futures studies’ contribution in providing 
insight into the future of information warfare? The focus is on futures studies, its rationale, systems 
approach, the futures map and layered analysis tools. Foresight can act to promote 
knowledgeability in humans, and as such it operates as a “higher order” language. 
Chapter 4 deals with the third sub-problem, namely: What do the concepts information warfare and 
national security represent? Both information warfare and national security are defined and 
explained. A brief overview of the manifestation of information warfare is provided. 
The fourth sub-problem is dealt with in Chapter 5. How does information warfare manifest in the 
current environment taking into account factors influencing its future manifestation in the 2030s? 
The environmental scan is focused on events, developments and manifestations related to 
information warfare and national security within the TWEPS macro-environmental hexagon. This 
multi-disciplinary environmental scanning focuses on literature with the aim to identify current 
manifestations, but also to recognise possible trends and driving forces flowing from this. 
In Chapter 6 the fifth sub-problem is answered, namely How can the output of the environmental 
scan be processed to assist in providing foresight into the future manifestation of information 
warfare as a future national security threat? The output from the TWEPS macro-environment 
hexagon is processed using qualitative text analysis coding and grounded theory to develop a 
futures model. CLA is integrated into the model with the aim to assist in identifying the key driving 
forces underlying the future manifestation of information warfare.  
The sixth sub-problem is dealt with in Chapter 7. What are the main driving forces which will 
influence the shaping of the future of information warfare as a national security threat? Expert 
opinion by way of a Delphi study is used to prioritise and validate the driving forces identified in the 
environmental scan. 
The seventh sub-problem is the focus of Chapter 8. What are the plausible scenarios in which 
information warfare would manifest as a national security threat for South Africa? The four 
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plausible scenarios according to which information warfare could manifest by the 2030s are 
provided.  
In Chapter 9, the conclusion, the final problem relevant to the study will be answered and the 
outcome of the research will be provided. What propositions can be identified applying to the 
plausible information warfare threat against South Africa in the 2030s? Propositions are identified 
which could provide interested parties with insights into the driving forces that would be critical in 
the creation of these scenarios. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INFORMATION AS STRATEGIC POWER INSTRUMENT:   THEORETICAL 
APPROACH 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information in all its manifestations from data to wisdom has been central to institutional power 
since the dawn of humankind. The technological efficacies brought about by the digital revolution 
and the enhanced global networking activities have boosted the role of information in national 
power. Technological development catapulted information to the centre of most human 
endeavours, although high levels of inequality persist as manifested in the so-called digital divide. 
However, innovation does have the potential to address at least some aspects of inequality in the 
future. The digital and information revolutions have enhanced the impact of information globally, 
with significant implications for the phenomenon of information warfare, which is likely to pose a 
significant risk to global society on many levels in the future.  
Since information warfare is a relatively new concept it has not been adequately addressed in 
social science theoretical frameworks. Focusing on the challenge that information warfare poses to 
national security in the future, the starting point for the theoretical framing of this phenomenon is in 
the appropriate social science disciplines. Such a systematic reflection will need to take note of 
issues such as integration versus disintegration, nationalism versus globalism, and conflict versus 
cooperation, which are simultaneous but divergent trends that underlie the transformation of 
contemporary international relations and the security environment. These sometimes divergent 
trends and forces influencing national security in the international system require an integrated use 
of theoretical insights. The aim in this chapter is to highlight the theoretical frameworks against 
which information warfare as a security threat can be analysed. The philosophical approach for this 
study is sourced from different social science disciplines, mainly from futures studies and 
international relations theory, but also from other relevant social sciences such as sociology and 
political science. 
The worldview and theory within which these phenomena can be understood, explained and 
foresight generated need to be presented in a systematic way. Before a more precise definition of 
information warfare as a national security threat can be presented in Chapter 4, the macro-
theoretical framework within which this study is embedded must be elucidated. Thus, this chapter 
is centred on the theoretical approaches followed in the study, while the theoretical and practical 
link with futures studies and foresight is highlighted in the next chapter.  
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Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1997:15) defined theory as “systematic reflection on phenomena, 
designed to explain them and to show how they are related to each other in a meaningful, 
intelligent pattern, instead of being merely random items in an incoherent universe”. By creating 
the mental order, theory fulfils useful roles in endeavouring to understand and explain the world. 
However, there is another view of theory, namely that theories “constitute” the world on which they 
are focusing. According to this view, theories can never be separate from the world; thus they are 
an intrinsic part of it. Therefore, there can never be a “view from nowhere”, and all theories make 
assumptions about the world, both ontological ones (what features need understanding or 
explaining) and epistemological ones (what counts as understanding or explanation). All theories 
are located in space, time, culture and history, and there is no possibility of the separation from 
these (Smith, 2013:9). 
2.2 CRITICAL REALISM AS OVERARCHING THEORY  
One of the reasons for the development of critical realism is the critique of the positivist approach 
which has dominated many of the social sciences since the 1930s (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen 
& Karlsson, 2005:2). Positivism is a philosophy of science based on the view that information 
derived from logical and mathematical origins and reports of sensory experience is the only source 
of all authoritative knowledge (Macionis & Gerber, 2011:79). Critical realism is being associated 
with the British philosopher Roy Bhaskar (Judd, 2003:14). Bhaskar’s critical realism has since been 
expanded on and used in academic disciplines such as sociology, economics, psychology, future 
studies and international relations.  
Bhaskar (2008:46) provided an “ontological map” which distinguishes between three ontological 
domains: the empirical, the actual and the real. The empirical domain consists of what is 
experienced, directly or indirectly. It is separated from the actual domain where events happen 
whether it is experienced or not. That which is observed is not the same as what happens in the 
world. The domain of the actual is in its turn separated from the domain of the real. In this domain 
there is also that which can produce events in the world, that which metaphorically can be called 
mechanisms. See Table 2.1 for a breakdown of critical realism’s ontological map. 
Table 2.1: Critical realism’s ontological map 
 Domain of the real Domain of the actual Domain of the empirical 
Mechanisms √   
Events √ √  
Experiences √ √ √ 
(Source: Bhaskar, 2008:47. 
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Bhaskar (2008:46) argued that events must occur independently of the experiences in which they 
are apprehended. Structures and mechanisms are real and distinct from the patterns of events that 
they generate; at the same time events are real and distinct from the experiences in which they are 
held. 
These three levels of reality are not naturally or normally in phase, but it is the social activity of 
science which makes them so. Experiences, and the facts they cause, are social products. The 
conjunctions of events, when held in experience, provide the grounds for causal laws. These are 
also social products. Underlying the implicit ontology of critical realism is that it is an implicit human 
endeavour in which facts and their conjunctions are seen as produced by humankind or given by 
nature (Bhaskar, 2008:47). The empirical domain, which in scientific contexts contains humanity’s 
“facts” or “data”, is always theory-laden. Practically all data produced arises in connection with 
some theory, and thus an individual does not experience the events in a direct way, which is what 
the empiricist research tradition claims. Individual theoretical conceptions are always mediating 
data (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005:5). 
Consequently, even the rather common expression “the empirical world” is misleading. It 
represents what Bhaskar (1978:36) calls “the epistemic fallacy”, because it reduces the three 
domains to a single one. It reduces what can be known about it. Scientific work should rather 
investigate and identify relationships and non-relationships between, respectively, what individuals 
experience, what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the 
world (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005:21). Although mechanisms, events and 
experiences are distinct, value can be obtained by moving focus between these levels in order to 
enhance the analytical process. This is explored further in Chapter 3, which focuses on futures 
studies and especially a layered analysis system approach.  
Within philosophy, critical realism involves a switch from epistemology to ontology, and within 
ontology a switch from events to mechanisms. This is the core of critical realism, and it reflects a 
metatheory with consequences for scientific work. What Bhaskar (2008:13) emphasised here is the 
fundamental question in the philosophy of science: “What properties do societies and people 
possess that might make them possible objects for knowledge?” This ontological question must be 
the starting point for a philosophy of reality, not the epistemological question of how knowledge is 
possible, which in the past has mostly been the case (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 
2005:5). 
Another significant contribution by critical realism is the switch from events to mechanisms, which 
means switching the attention to what produces the events, not just to the events themselves. 
Reality is thus assumed to consist of experiences, events and mechanisms. Mechanisms 
sometimes generate an event. When they are experienced they become an empirical fact. If one is 
to attain knowledge about underlying causal mechanisms, it is necessary to focus on these 
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mechanisms, not only on the empirically observable events (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & 
Karlsson, 2005:5-6). This is especially relevant from a futurist perspective as the underlying 
mechanisms directly influence the driving forces. 
Furthermore, rather than following the pattern in some critical literature, for example on information 
technology as instrument of freedom versus information technology as instrument of oppression 
where discussion of causation is avoided entirely on the grounds that it is an essentially positivist 
pursuit, critical realism allows the researcher to “reclaim” causal analysis for the critical traditions 
(Whitham, 2014:15). Critical realism thus “assumes that causal relationships exist outside of the 
human mind” (Cook & Campbell, 1979:29). 
The point of departure in critical realism is that the world is structured, differentiated, stratified and 
changing (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005:5). Bunge (2009:366-368) highlighted 
the following implications, namely that: 
- Reality is arranged in levels; 
- Something qualitatively new can emerge from a lower level (emergence); and 
- There is a distinction between a real world and a conceptual one.  
 
Critical realism also provides an answer to the serious dichotomy of realism versus anti-realism, 
where the fundamental question is whether there exists a world independently of human 
consciousness. According to critical realism there exists both an external world independently of 
human consciousness, and at the same time a dimension that includes our socially determined 
knowledge about reality (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005:5-6). Thus critical 
realism is “realist” because it assumes that a reality exists quite apart of human constructions of it. 
This is known as “ontological realism”. It is a belief “that the world of which we have  knowledge 
exists quite apart of human constructions of it” (Skagestad, 1981:77-78). 
It is also important to understand the relations between practice, meaning, concept and language. 
In this context the decisive differences between the objects of natural science and social science 
should be noted. These differences, among other things, lead to the situation that whereas 
experiment is seen as the main method of the natural sciences, the focus in social science practice 
is on conceptualisation through conceptual abstraction (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & 
Karlsson, 2005:40). 
When focusing on science, it includes a concern about the logical structure and coherence of 
statements and also a special concern about the utility in manipulating the world to achieve human 
goals as, for example, in the conscious process of using known cause-and-effect relationships to 
create desired ends (Bell, 2007:207). Science rests on the supposition that although many aspects 
of reality may always remain beyond human facility to discern and understand, how the world really 
is, plays a decisive role in the achievements of science. Truth can be known within the limits of 
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human senses and intellect. Even though truth “… is not absolute and is fallible, conjectural, 
conditional, corrigible, tentative, qualitatively judgmental, and presuppositional; warranted 
assertability is possible; some assertions are true and some are false, and we can frequently justify 
our beliefs, empirically or logically, about which is which” (Bell, 2007:207-208). 
Although critical realism will be the overall philosophical approach, insights from various 
international relations theories are relevant to the manifestation of information warfare as a national 
security threat currently and in the future. Contributions are made from realism, rationalism, critical 
realism in international relations theory, critical security studies and postmodernism in this regard.  
2.3  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
Critical realism provides the insight regarding the shift of emphasis from experience and events to 
mechanisms. To obtain such knowledge about underlying causal mechanisms impacting the role of 
information and information warfare in the global terrain, it is necessary to provide an overview of 
relevant international relations and related theories.  
The capacity of existing international relations theory to adequately explain future security related 
issues and conflicts remains limited, necessitating a broader approach to identify international 
relations theories useful for this study. This is in particular the case because of the growing 
importance of the information revolution and the impact of globalisation on national and 
international security. This trend towards a multi-disciplinary approach has manifested even within 
international relations theory (Burchill & Linklater, 2005:23). Combining different theories could 
lead to epistemological difficulties, but critical realism attempts to provide a framework within which 
a synthesis of more than one position is possible (Smith, 2013:12). Niiniluoto (2002:21) stated that 
critical realism turns out to be compatible with a surprising variety of philosophical positions.  
Similar to the broader situation with theory, it is not possible to simply add up these various 
accounts of international relations to get one overarching theory. Theories are part of the social 
world; they can never be separate from it, and thus they constitute the social world in which we 
live. Each defines the problems to be examined differently, and may well def ine how we know 
things about those problems in different ways. Thus the social location of the observer will 
influence which theory is regarded as the most useful, simply because that location will predispose 
that observer to define some features of international relations as key and others as less relevant 
(Smith, 2013:11). 
Classically, the study of international relations has focused on the analysis of the causes of war 
and the conditions of peace. Such an agenda seemed particularly pertinent in the 20th century in 
the aftermath of two World Wars. However, the study of the use of force continues to motivate 
international relations scholars even now “... as we move well into the second decade of the 
twenty-first century” (Smith, 2013:1). The social world is one in which individuals exist within 
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powerful economic, political, social, racial, gendered, moral and linguistic structures (Smith, 
2013:3). Theories offer accounts of why things happened, and the fact that they offer a wide range 
of reasons for action reflects the fact that they have very different assumptions (Smith, 2013:3). 
None of this means that the traditionally dominant mainstream approaches are outdated or 
peripheral to an explanation of international relations. 
So, although many of the mentioned theories are absolutely central to explain aspects of 
international relations, equally importantly, they are not sufficient to explain the complexities 
associated with information warfare as global and national power projection phenomena on their 
own. Wight (1991) identified the main international political traditions as the realist, rationalist and 
revolutionist traditions. Each of these traditions embodies a great variety of doctrines about 
international relations, among which there sometimes exists only a loose connection. These 
traditions, however, incorporate a set of distinctive questions and assumptions about the basic 
units and forces in international relations (Keohane, 1989:2). Such paradigms2 or worldviews 
represent the main traditions of political thought, a description of the nature of international 
relations and a set of prescriptions about international conduct (Bull, 1987:93). These traditions 
represent comprehensively normative views of international relations, which are relevant to 
debates about security within contemporary international relations. The interaction and dialogues 
created between the traditions are conducive for efforts to explain the dynamics of international 
relations.  
Wight (1991) described these traditions as related to three interrelated political conditions which 
comprise the main subject matter of international relations. The first condition is that no political 
superior is acknowledged and a multiplicity of independent sovereign states accepts the use of 
military force and warfare ultimately as a method to regulate relationships. This is the basis of the 
realist worldview regarding international relations. Realism explains and interprets world politics in 
terms of power (Basu, 2012:171). Realists stress power and interest rather than ideals in 
international relations. Realism is basically conservative, empirical, prudent, suspicious of idealistic 
principles, and respectful of the lessons of history. It is also more likely to produce a pessimistic 
rather than an optimistic view of international relations. Realists regard power as the fundamental 
concept in the social sciences (such as energy in physics), although they admit that power 
relationships are often cloaked in moral and legal terms. Realists view theories as rationalising, 
rather than shaping, events. They criticise the utopian approaches to international relations for 
preferring visionary goals to scientific analysis (Carr, 1964:40). According to the realists a state’s 
ideological or ethical preferences are neither good nor bad but what matters is whether its self-
interest is served (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1997:23). 
                                               
2  A paradigm is a mixture of beliefs, theory, preconceptions and prejudices that shapes ideas of how the 
international system works, generates expectations and prescribes appropriate behaviour (McCgwire, 2001:777). 
The term was coined by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) and used by him in a more formal way. 
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The second condition identified is that diplomacy and commerce form the basis of international and 
institutionalised interaction between sovereign states. Rationalists tend to emphasise and 
concentrate on this element of international interaction. The focus is on the role of measures to 
create and enhance order in the anarchic world as well as the concept of an international society. 
Emphasising how people ought to behave in their international relationships rather than how they 
actually behave, rationalists usually spurn balance of power politics, national armaments and the 
use of force in international affairs. Instead, they stress international legal rights and obligations, 
the natural harmony of national interests as a regulator for the preservation of international peace, 
a significant reliance upon reason in human affairs, and confidence in the peace-building function 
of the “world court of public opinion” (Carr, 1964:40). Rationalists thus argue that an element of 
order is maintained in the international society despite the absence of a central authority 
commanding overwhelming force and a monopoly of the legitimate use of it (Bull, 1992:590). 
Thirdly, the concept of a society of states, or family of nations, brings with it certain moral and 
psychological as well as possibly even legal obligations. Revolutionists tend to concentrate on the 
concept of a society of states or international society but they can be defined more precisely as 
those who believe passionately in the moral unity of a society of states. This view is strongly 
influenced by an ideological or extremist religious worldview. Revolutionists postulate a 
transcendental source of authority behind political structures, social interaction and government. At 
first revolutionists endeavour to explain the overall structure of the global system, within which 
behaviour takes place. In this regard the tracing of the historical evolution of systems is especially 
of value. In general, the revolutionists assume that mechanisms of domination exist that keep 
disadvantaged people as well as nations from development, and that this contributes to world-wide 
inequalities (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999:399-400). The revolutionist’s paradigm provides a framework for 
opposing this situation and foresees a deterministic solution to these problems (Van Vuuren, 
2003:23). Although the influence of this paradigm has diminished since the end of the Cold War it 
has again become relevant since the 2014 rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq and 
extremist activity in Africa (Roggio, 2014). 
The challenges posed by the Information Age have already identified some theoretical 
shortcomings to accommodate the challenges posed by the growth of information as instrument of 
power. The changing nature of national security and the role of information in this context do 
highlight shortcomings related to the advancement of the role of information in the modern world, 
which transcends the boundaries of realist, rationalist and revolutionist paradigms. Theoretical 
work done in terms of critical realism within international relations theory and specifically theory 
focusing on the power of symbolism done by Baudrillard (1983) are of value in this regard.  
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2.3.1 The realist tradition  
2.3.1.1 The central role of power 
Realists in the context of international relations theory have a high regard for the value of national 
security, state survival, and international order and stability. In general, they believe that there are 
no international obligations in the moral sense of the word (i.e. bonds of mutual duty) between 
independent states (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003:103). 
In the mind of the realist, power plays a central role in this word view. Realists postulate that any 
political unit (such as a state) will act in such a way as to maximise its power, which is defined 
mainly in terms of the security of its territory (Edwards, 1969:69). Political power can be seen as a 
psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. Those 
who exercise power gain control by actions which have an impact on the minds of those over 
whom it is exercised. The impact derives from three sources, according to Hans Morgenthau 
(1973:28), namely “… the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, and the respect or 
love for men and institutions”. Power may be exerted through orders, threats, the authority or 
charisma of a person or of an office, or a combination of any of these.  
Traditionally, the power exercised by states within the international system is viewed as the 
aggregate of many attributes, including economic, technological, cultural, diplomatic, ideological 
and military factors. Two groups of factors that form the basis of power are identified by 
Morgenthau (1973:112-113); those that are relatively stable, and those that are subject to constant 
change. Some of the more stable factors underlying a state’s power include geography and natural 
resources. Less stable factors include industrial capacity, military preparedness, national morale, 
the quality of foreign policy management, as well as the quality of government. The information 
dimension3 of power can be regarded as part of the growing but also less stable factors underlying 
state power. Despite a growth in what is termed “soft power” in international relations, “hard power” 
such as military power and the capacity to use violence for the protection, enforcement or 
extension of authority are instruments which the vast majority of states still find impossible to totally 
dispose of (Howard, 1970:115). States are also confronted with the dilemma of finding a balance 
between security versus defence needs. 
The struggle to increase power by strengthening, for example, military capabilities has negative 
consequences for the security of other states. Each state must look to itself to guarantee its 
security against (potential) threats from other states. At least in terms of security, states are locked 
into conflict, and the security of one or some is often obtained at the expense of the insecurity of 
others. This is because of what is known as the security dilemma. It is often difficult, if not 
                                               
3  The information dimension refers to the role of information in maintaining and expanding the power instruments of the state. 
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impossible, to distinguish between offensive and defensive military capabilities. Capabilities that 
make one state feel secure are regarded by other states as threatening, and vice versa (Bromley, 
2004:108). 
Most realists focus their analytical efforts on the behaviour of the national state because they 
believe that the state has remained relatively more powerful than other types of transnational 
entities and forces, such as international organisations, multilateral corporations or capitalist 
markets, non-state actors, religions and cultures. However, realists are clear that their propositions 
are supposed to apply to groups in general and that a dynamic of competitive, relative power can 
be found in the behaviour of all types of groups throughout history (Sterling-Folker, 2006:16).  
2.3.1.2 Stability through the balance of power 
Significant inequalities in the power between states increase possible insecurities experienced in 
the international political system. In this regard equilibrium between states in the form of a balance 
of power remains a useful means of denoting contemporary and possible future strategies for 
security.4 Such a balance of power includes a balance of all the capacities, including physical force 
which states choose to use in pursuing their goals (Waltz, 1987:100).  
The aim of a balance of power system is thus to create equilibrium to promote stability. The 
concept of “equilibrium” as a synonym for “balance” is commonly employed in many sciences, 
including physics, biology, economics, sociology and political science. It signifies stability within a 
system composed of a number of autonomous forces. Whenever the equilibrium is disturbed, 
either by an outside force or by a change in one or other element composing the system, the 
system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium (Morgenthau, 
1970:167-168). Thus, a balance of power system is generally in equilibrium because usually the 
territorial integrity and physical survival of states are not in question (Twitchett, 1971:24). 
The balance of power embodies the belief that any state’s survival is best assured by reliance on 
its own military strength, allied where and when necessary to the military strength of others. The 
main objective of the balance of power is to preserve the security of states, particularly the larger 
ones. It is thus focuses on preserving the state system or international stability (Berridge, 
1997:166). 
Stemming from stability, peace has since the advent of nuclear weapons become an objective of 
the balance of power. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons have merely raised the finite political price 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
4  The balance of power theory has been criticised by many theorists including realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau, describing i t 
inter alia “... as a crude, unsophisticated, naively simplistic, or obsolete theory of international politics” (Dougherty & Pfalzgraff, 
1997:26-28). It, however, remains a useful concept to make sense of the power relationship between states and other entities even 
in the Information Age. 
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that states are prepared to pay for peace within the balance of power; there is no evidence that 
they have raised this price to infinity itself. The values and passions attached to independence, not 
peace, remain the primary objectives of the balance of power (Berridge, 1997:167). The 
Information Age influenced the way in which the balance of power manifests. 
2.3.1.3  Balance of power in the Information Age 
Even in the Information Age the traditional measures of military force, gross national product, 
population, land, minerals and energy continue to dominate discussions of the balance of power. 
These power resources still matter and governments continue to depend on them but the 
information dimension of these resources as well as information in its own right are growing in 
significance. Information power remains difficult to categorise because it cuts across all other 
military, economic, social and political power resources, in some cases diminishing their strength, 
in others multiplying it (Nye & Owens, 1996:xviii). Nye and Owens (1996:2), in highlighting the soft 
power attributes of contemporary power, contended that “… soft power is passing from the capital 
rich to the information rich”.  
According to Gompert (1998:5), information technology is the sine qua non of both power and 
globalisation as it is integrating the world economy and spreading freedom, while at the same time 
becoming increasingly crucial to military and other forms of national power. Information technology 
thus accounts both for “power and the process that softens and smooths power”. Technological 
development enhances two trends that change the role of the state, having implications for national 
security, increasing the role of non-state entities and increasing internationalisation. Two central 
conflicts reveal the nature of the ongoing redistribution of power: first, the notion that the 
information revolution empowers new forms of international actors, such as NGOs and activists, 
thus challenging the state’s status as the major player in the international system, and second, the 
idea that the emergence of a global e-commerce market would inevitably challenge the state’s 
economic influence as companies increasingly become global citizens and as economic 
boundaries no longer correspond to political ones. Both of these trends have particular implications 
for states’ freedom of action to manoeuvre when it comes to security (Rothkopf, 1998:321-356). 
Mayer-Schoenberger and Brodnig (2001:27) stated that information power shifts among and 
between the key stakeholders in international relations, namely governments, corporations and 
NGOs are occurring. It is possible to attribute these power reconfigurations to shifts of control over 
the underlying information infrastructures, strengthening the non-governmental sector’s power 
position. The contrary view is also held that technological innovation strengthens and not weakens 
the state’s power to control and secure its position in terms of potential security threats (Morozov, 
2011:xvii). Some authoritarian governments actively censor content and regularly disrupt internet 
service, with limited direct evidence that digital activism has succeeded in opening closed regimes. 
However, social media and the internet in general are in fact important instruments for the purpose 
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of pressurising authoritative regimes to relinquish control for the betterment of the individual, 
society and global civilisation (Stanko, 2013:16-17). It can be expected that the role of social media 
will become a power flashpoint in the future.  
While military power still remains dominant in the positioning of states, the impact of information 
related power raises potential for the future. Global inequality remains a problem and a factor 
inhibiting the power position of weaker states. The decreasing cost of technology, however, makes 
it possible to acquire asymmetric capabilities by jumping certain development phases. Technology 
thus ensures that the capacity for national power will change. These changes would probably be 
exponential. A combination of old and new capacities could also result in the growth of asymmetric 
power capacity, which could enhance a state’s power or ensure that the power profile of states 
change significantly in a relatively short space of time.  
Information warfare can thus be added to the realist’s existing assortment of power instruments. 
While this dimension has been part of the traditional power instruments in the past, it can be 
expected that the expansion in scope, sophistication and role of information networked systems 
will increase significantly in the future. Chapter 5 will provide an overview of how information 
warfare has recently manifested globally. 
2.3.1.4  Criticism of realism 
The state is the centrepiece of realist thought. While the state remains a major force in 
international relations this situation is changing. General criticism against the views of realists is 
that they ignore other actors and other issues not directly related to the maintenance of state 
security. Non-state actors such as multinational corporations, NGOs, financial institutions and 
terrorists are mostly excluded, downplayed or trivialised in the realist perspective. The lack of 
viewing the world outside the realist’s relatively narrow national security prism result in issues, 
such as the global socio-economic inequality and environmental concerns, not forming part of the 
realist’s national security threat perception (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999:84-85). 
The main question remains: To what extent can realism really explain the changing nature of the 
international environment in which globalisation and interdependence have grown sharply? The 
timeless quality of international relations, its repetitious nature and cycles of war and conflict, and a 
world in which the strong do as they will and the weak do as they must, dominate the realist image 
(Viotti & Kauppi, 1999:86). Although it could be argued that this realist image does reflect an 
element of even the contemporary global security environment, the changes brought about by the 
information revolution and globalisation have resulted in some change in the international 
environment. 
The state may still be the main actor in the international security environment as the nature of the 
state and the patterns of relations among states are the most important determinants of the 
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character of international relations at any given moment. This, however, does not presume that 
states always need to be the central actors, nor does it presume that the nature of the state always 
need to be the same and that the contemporary national state is the ultimate form of political 
organisation (Gilpin, 1984:302). Taking current trends into account, it is also increasingly possible 
that this dominance of the state is changing. 
2.3.1.5  Prospects for the realism worldview in the future 
The end of the Cold War and the increasing impact of globalisation have already brought into 
question if political realism does fully reflect the realities of the security dilemma now and 
especially the future. Even before the end of the Cold War, military power has been overtaken by 
other, “softer” forms of power in world politics (Nye, 1990a). Another subtle but increasing 
important aspect of power in the new era is the ability of a system, or society, to sense the need for 
change and to adapt (Gompert 1999:65). 
This is not to say that all aspects of realism will prove to be non-applicable. Will the bases of power 
in terms of realism – namely military might, resources, population and level of development – 
remain deterministic factors that will ensure only slow change in terms of state capacity and 
ensuring equilibrium? The changing role of non-state actors and multi-lateral role-players remains 
a major factor impacting on the lack of realism’s capacity to address all concerns regarding new 
challenges posed to national security. 
Realism became more responsive to criticism in the late 20th century to remain relevant with 
competing thoughts, by the further refinement of realism in terms of neo-realism5 and structural 
realism6. Despite these refinements, it can still be postulated that to explain the role of information 
warfare in terms of national security in the future, it will not sufficiently fulfil that role but continue to 
highlight the significance of the role of power in international relations. Thus, while power is not the 
only driving factor in security relevant behaviour, it remains a significant factor underlying conflict in 
the international environment.  
Keohane and Nye (2000) proposed complex interdependence as a new account of international 
relations to run alongside realism, and set out three key differences between the two approaches. 
First, complex interdependence assumes that there are multiple channels of access between 
societies, including different branches of state apparatus as well as non-state actors as opposed to 
the unitary state assumption characteristic of realism. Second, complex interdependence assumes 
that for most international relationships, force will be of low salience as opposed to the central role 
that force is given in realist accounts of the world. Finally, under complex interdependence there is 
                                               
5  Neo-realists recognise that economic actors are significant in the international system and are not just details on the edge of the 
serious matter of power politics (Nicholson, 2002:96). 
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no hierarchy of issues; any issue area might be at the top of the international agenda at any 
particular time, whereas realism assumes that security is everywhere and always the most 
important issue between states (Brown, 2005:35-36). Complex interdependence stipulates that 
states confront multiple issues simultaneously, not serially and sequentially. The hierarchical 
division of high and low politics posited by realism is supplanted by “… a horizontally defined 
agenda with multiple, conflicting, and interconnected trade-offs” (Kolodziej, 2005:155).  
In terms of complex interdependence, states and other non-state actors cannot entirely separate 
their own interests from those with whom they closely interact. Actors may thus be sensitive to the 
acts of others to the extent that they feel the effects of those acts (Nicholson, 2002:98). This 
connects with the second broad view of international relations namely, rationalism. 
2.3.2 The rationalist tradition  
2.3.2.1  The central role of international cooperation 
According to Brown (2005:5), physical violence and overt conflict as manifestations of power 
projection are nowhere near as central to international relations as the traditional description of the 
subject would suggest. Brown said that most countries, most of the time, live at peace with their 
neighbours and the world at large. Such views are important for rationalism which provides an 
alternative broad explanation of international relations. In contrast to the realist views, rationalists 
are of the opinion that order is not maintained in the global system primarily only through states 
and the balance of power (McGrew, 1992:20). The discussion on realism pointed to the fact that 
the absence of a central government on the international scene creates a power vacuum, which is 
used by realists to explain the vital value of sovereignty and efforts by states to secure this 
sovereignty. Rationalists, however, argue that an element of order is maintained in the international 
society despite the absence of a central authority commanding overwhelming force and a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of it (Bull, 1992:590). Rationalists focus on international cooperation 
or the potential for such cooperation as the basis of their international relations worldview.  
Rationalists argue that, as is the case in domestic society, order is maintained, inter alia, through 
commonly accepted values, a recognition of a high degree of interdependence between national 
societies, and the existence of accepted rules and norms of behaviour, as well as the existence of 
accepted institutions or processes of governance. Order is thus achieved and maintained through 
a complex web of crisscrossing governing arrangements which bind states and societies together 
(McGrew, 1992:20). However, there are also traits in modern international society that fall outside 
the structure of rules itself, encouraging the politically competent groups and elites to agree to 
these rules. These include mutual deterrence, fear of unlimited conflict, force of habit or inertia, and 
                                                                                                                                                            
6
  Structural realists are basically neo-realists who state in order to understand the behaviour of the international system, it would be 
necessary to start with the system and move down to the individual actors rather than the other way round as traditional real ist 
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the long-term interest of elites in preserving the system of collaboration, whatever their short-term 
interest in destroying it (Bull, 1992:590-591). This shift away from power politics reflects not so 
much an idealist faith in abstract principles as the recognition that, when power is widely 
distributed, competition tends to be self-defeating. As a result rationalists tend to argue that, in an 
increasing interdependent world, the tendency towards cooperation and integration will ultimately 
prove to be irresistible (Heywood, 2002:130).  
For the rationalists, the central cohesive element of international relations is the concept of 
international society. The idea of international society forms a powerful image of world politics. Its 
power derives from the wide and now general acceptance that a society of states or international 
society does actually exist. It underpins the idea of an international community with society and 
community often being used interchangeably (Wight, 1966:93). For Wight (1991:30), international 
society “… is prima facie, a political and social fact, attested by the diplomatic system, diplomatic 
society, the acceptance of international law and writings of international lawyers, and also by a 
certain instinct of sociability”. 
The image of international society is one in which states articulate and agree upon rules, based 
upon their mutual recognition as sovereign states of acceptable behaviour. It depicts states as 
acting in concert to achieve international order and as laying down criteria for the determination of 
which states are to be accepted as legitimate members of international society. Those that are so 
regarded are then entitled to be treated according to the norms and rules of the society. It is a view 
of political relations between states in which states are capable of creating and maintaining order in 
their relations (international order) without an overriding authority standing above them (Keal, 
2000:61).  
From the security perspective, one of the main implications of the rationalist view is that it impacts 
the central concept of sovereignty, which is a fundamental concept in the realist point of view. 
Based upon the primacy of a conception of unrestricted national sovereignty, the international 
system would not long have survived unless states actually accepted and acted upon a set of well-
understood though limited and conditioned restraints. These limitations on state action, 
acknowledged by all (or at least most) governments as the price they pay for continued viability of 
the global system, are only partially formalised. They rest to a large extent upon tacit agreement 
and the force of practice (Said, Lerche [Jr.] & Lerche [III], 1995:135). If states violate a rule, they 
risk a countervailing and costly reaction from other states, potentially damaging to their interests 
(Kolodziej, 2005:159). 
Globalisation has an impact on the traditional view of sovereignty. The capacity of each state to 
direct the political loyalties of its citizens has been weakened by an increasing popular awareness 
                                                                                                                                                            
have done (Nicholson, 2002:97). 
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of the problems faced by humanity. The state cannot prevent its citizens turning to a range of sub-
national and transnational agents to secure their political identities and promote their political 
objectives. Sovereignty is no longer an automatic protection against external interference called 
“humanitarian intervention”. Decision making on a range of issues, including the security field, has 
become internationalised, rendering national administration often much less important than 
transnational political cooperation (Burchill, 2005:82). International cooperation or the potential for 
such cooperation can increasingly impact international relations and national security. Growing 
interdependence because of globalisation has strengthened the role of international cooperation.  
Despite these changes, there are also counter-trends which can be identified. A number of 
important powers are retained by the state despite globalisation, including monopoly or control of 
the weapons of war and their legitimate use, and the sole right to tax its citizens. Only the state can 
still command the political allegiances of its citizens or adjudicate in disputes between them. It is 
still only the state which has the exclusive authority to bind the whole community to international 
law (Burchill, 2005:82). 
It is not that sovereignty is totally negated by the rationalist scholars. It is, however, not regarded 
as the core foundation of the international system as is the case with realist viewpoints. Associated 
with sovereignty is the concept of national interest. In realist terms it is seen as attaining security 
by maximising power but in rationalist terms it is viewed as “an abstraction that summarises the 
perceived purposes of a certain state at a certain moment in time” (Bonkovsky, 1980:157). This 
view is broadening the scope and importance of international interaction and influences in 
developing the national interest but also boosted a shift from emphasis on human rights to that of 
social responsibilities. 
For the international system to survive, the constant adoption of new technological, political and 
economic trends is necessary, according to rationalist views. The assumption flowing from this 
perception is that as the interactive processes grow and expand, and as individuals and groups 
increasingly interact across international frontiers, they will be more prone to adjust their 
differences rather than resort to conflict which might destroy the system (Holsti, 1980:25). 
2.3.2.2   The role of rules, international organisations and international law 
Any kind of sustained interaction leads to the development of rules that define roles and assign 
rights and responsibilities to them (Sandholtz, 1999:195). The function of rules is to provide a 
sense of common interests in elementary goals of social life and thereby to provide guidelines in 
international society as to what behaviour is consistent with these goals. The status of these rules 
differs and includes international law and moral rules based on prudence, etiquette or custom, or 
established practice, or they may even be merely operational rules or “rules of the game”, worked 
out without formal agreement or even without verbal communication. It is not uncommon for a rule 
to emerge first as an operational rule, then to become established practice, then to attain the status 
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of a moral standard and finally to be incorporated in a legal convention on international level (Bull, 
1992:593). 
Rules, however, do not stand alone; they are linked in clusters, or institutions. Organisations are 
the subset of institutions. International organisations were developed to serve as collective 
problem-solving entities but also bargaining forums (Sandholtz, 1999:196). The growth in the 
number of these international organisations reflects the general expansion of transnational links. 
The development of international and transnational organisations has led to important changes in 
the decision-making structure of world politics. New forms of multinational politics have been 
established and with them new forms of collective decision-making involving states, 
intergovernmental organisations and a whole variety of transnational pressure groups (Held, 
1989:232).  
Furthermore, rights and duties are recognised in international law, which transcend the claims of 
nation states and which, while they may not be backed by institutions with coercive powers of 
enforcement, have far-reaching consequences (Held, 1989:234). In the absence of a world 
legislature, international law draws on a number of sources: treaties, custom, general principles 
(such as respect for territorial integrity), and legal scholarship accumulated by the international 
courts. Traditionally, rationalists have placed a strong emphasis on international law, seeing it as a 
means of establishing order through respect for moral principles, which makes the peaceful 
resolution of international conflicts possible (Heywood, 2002:154).     
The problem with information warfare as a security threat is that it is largely of an intangible nature. 
Industrial related threats, such as nuclear weapons, are tangible and do provide the scope for 
international cooperation because of the physical dimensions of this threat, namely highly 
radioactive material for which credible containment and management processes could be 
negotiated. This is not the case with information warfare. While rules and norms could be 
developed, the application thereof will be challenging. Countries such as the Russian Federation 
are campaigning for the creation of a disarmament/arms control related treaty covering this issue; 
this has not achieved any significant support (Johnson, 2002:442). The practical verification and 
monitoring mandated by such a treaty would be virtually impossible because of the nature of 
information warfare. The expected escalation of information warfare (see Chapter 5 for an 
overview of how information warfare has recently manifested globally) might thus place additional 
strain on the rationalist approach to develop global rules in terms of the control of this 
phenomenon. The active role that sub-national entities are playing in terms of information warfare 
will further complicate any such efforts. 
2.3.2.3  Criticism of rationalism 
Despite endeavours to incorporate some of the challenges posed by the Information Age within the 
rationalist view (also the realist view), it remains difficult to account for all implications. Here, 
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information warfare opens up significant challenges such as the role of sub-national entities which 
can now seriously threaten global stability supported by global media coverage and the 
proliferation of social media. Information warfare makes it possible to attack a country 
geographically distant from the aggressor. Potential security threats transcending the traditional 
geo-strategic paradigms are becoming quite common. These traditions do not for example 
sufficiently provide the theoretical context for the two battle spaces of information warfare, namely 
cyberspace and mind space. Taking into account the rapid technological driven change of the past 
few decades with the likelihood of exponential change in the future, the realist and rationalist views’ 
limitations are even more apparent.  
2.3.2.4   Critical realism in international relations theory 
The application of critical realism to international relations theory is related to efforts explaining 
complexity and the fast-paced global political, economic, technological and social transformation. 
In the mid-1980s, international relations theory moved into what is known as its post-positivist 
phase (Wight & Joseph, 2010:1). In recent years, Kurki (2008), Wight (2006), Patomäki (2002) and 
Roach (2013) have all made important theoretical contributions to international relations theory in 
this regard. 
Similar to critical realism’s work at the level of philosophical critique, it challenges some of the 
philosophical assumptions of contemporary international relations theory and in so doing it also 
introduces important epistemological and ontological insights in its own right (Wight & Joseph, 
2010:1). Roach (2013:172) stressed the ongoing struggle to develop a relevant critical theory of 
international relations that can accomplish two aims: (1) explain the shifting empirical dynamics of 
governance, and (2) allow the understanding of the social genesis of norms and events/crises. He 
further argued that critical international relations theorists have made important strides towards 
realising and formulating the normative and social requirements of a critical theory of international 
relations.  
Most critical realist philosophies of international relations accept the same basic principles in terms 
of the discipline. Such thinking maintains (or at least does not deny) the following views (Wight & 
Joseph, 2010:2-3):  
- There is a social reality which consists of multiple forces that condition individuals’ lives. 
- Some of these forces may well be unobservable but remain real nonetheless. 
- These forces are structured by forms of internal and external relations, power structures 
and social roles. 
- It is not possible to capture the nature of causal forces in the social sciences merely 
through empirical investigation.  
- Social and political sciences are fundamentally social and political in nature and reflect, in 
part, the inquirer’s position in social reality.  
- The interaction of agents, structures, material and abstract forces is a significant question 
to be settled empirically and not by theoretical determination. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
42 
 
The agent-structure problem is a much discussed issue in the field of international relations. A 
significant international relations and security causal insight is generated from critical realism. 
According to critical realism, structures and agents have distinct properties and powers. Social 
structures have visible but also deeper and invisible effects on activity. While structures may 
depend upon human actions for their reproduction, these actions are already conditioned by the 
structures in a way that the actors are seldom aware of. Therefore, the model proposed here is that 
agents act consciously within (positioned) practices, but that the effect of this is generally the 
unconscious or unintended reproduction of deeper social structures that the agent is largely 
unaware of (Wight & Joseph, 2010:20-21). The potential of social structures influencing behaviour 
is especially relevant in the domain in which information warfare takes place, which is constrained 
by the technological environment as well as the cyber-cultural aspects that influence behaviour.  
The potential of social groups to transform society is also highlighted by critical realism. These 
powers and liabilities derive from the structural location of these groups and the powers and 
potentialities conferred upon them. Usually social transformation only takes place under 
exceptional conditions when structural crisis occurs. Moments of structural crisis tend to throw the 
process of unconscious reproduction into question, and change agents become more aware of the 
situation confronting them and the possibilities open to them. At the same time, if some agents 
may become aware of their transformative capabilities, then certain other agents will attempt to 
resist this. The process of transformation encounters resistance from those who have an interest in 
maintaining the structure as it is. They will engage in an act of conservation. Thus struggles will 
break out over transformation and the conservation of structures. These struggles can be called 
hegemonic struggles where agents, through their practices, act to preserve or transform a given 
set of relations (Wight & Joseph, 2010:21-22). Creating conditions for trust, fostering particular 
values and symbols, and forging collective identities and cooperation presupposes power and may 
create new resources for subsequent actions. On the other hand, domination and organised 
violence also presuppose power as transformative capacity (Patomäki, 2002:199). The influence of 
grouping using social media and information warfare techniques in order to advance their interests 
is a growing phenomenon (Chadwick, 2006:201).  
An additional contribution to the debate around agents and structures has been the manner in 
which it highlights the impossibility of maintaining the disciplinary boundary between domestic and 
international politics. In fact, the agent-structure problem makes the breaching of disciplinary 
boundaries seem not only honourable but necessary. When viewed from an agent-structure 
perspective, the distinction between domestic and international structures seems untenable and 
agents are seen to be located within a plurality of structural constraints and enablements, some 
domestic, some international. Accordingly, the interests of agents can be seen to differ according 
to the agents’ structural milieu, and since agents face differing structural contexts they acquire 
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differing identities and interests. In this respect, artificial boundaries between politics and 
international politics represent real barriers to analytical progress (Wight, 2006:292). The 
information and digital revolutions have transcended borders and are increasingly influencing one 
another.  
Suganami (1997:149) stated that causation, narration and explanation are seen to be inextricably 
intertwined both in relation to events in nature and with reference to historical events in the social 
world. Kurki (2008:10) called for broadening and deepening the conception of cause at work in 
dominant strands of social science, and invoked Aristotle’s Four Causes7 as a more useful model 
to investigate. Kurki (2008:27) stated that critical realism can create more complex and plausible 
causal relationships by drawing upon the Aristotelian concepts of “formal” causes (ideational 
factors in the name of which social action takes place, such as discourses and ideologies) and 
“material” causes (the limits to what is socially possible set by the pre-existing material conditions 
in which social action takes place, such as resource availability). Layered views of causes can 
assist to obtain deeper insights into phenomena (Inayatullah, 2004:8).  
2.3.2.5   Critical security studies 
Critical realism in international relations theory also contributed to the creation of critical security 
studies. The central aim of critical security studies, which emerged in the mid-1990s, is to develop 
an imminent critique of security policy and strategy; more concretely, to show how traditional 
mainstream approaches suppress cultural, social, historical and humanistic elements in 
international security (Roach, 2013:182). Here, the focus shifts to the role of states in oppressing 
populations. Nonetheless, as long as dogmatism and orthodoxy continue to exist, so too will the 
need for critical theory to expose the traits of these oppressive discourses in international relations 
(Roach, 2013:183). Globalisation results in two opposing outcomes in terms of security. It can 
open up emancipator struggles beyond the nation state while it can also challenge the 
development of solidarity and political unity which is necessary for promoting deliberation and/or 
deliberative democracy (Pensky, 2005:9). This includes addressing issues related to cyberspace 
and the implications of information technology for state power. 
                                               
7        In Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2, Aristotle offered his general account of the four causes. This account is general in the 
sense that it applies to everything that requires an explanation, including human action. Here, Aristotle recognises four types of 
things that can be given in answer to a why question:    
- The material cause: “that out of which”, e.g. the bronze of a statue. 
- The formal cause: “the form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g. the shape of a statue. 
- The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change or rest”, e.g. the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue, the man 
who gives advice, the father of the child. 
- The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g. health is the end of walking, losing weight,  purging, 
drugs, and surgical tools” (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2006). 
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Cyberspace is omnipresent in today’s world and it has significant implications not only for global 
economic activity but also for transnational social relations and international relations. Theoretical 
focus also started to address the “cyberization” of international relations, the growing dependence 
of actors in international relations on the infrastructure and instruments of networking and the 
internet, as well as the penetration of cyberspace into all fields of their activities. The intricacies 
and broad meanderings of the relationship between information technologies and global politics 
are still being developed with the way the spread of information technologies is shifting power and 
the locus of authority away from the state (Singh, 2002:2). 
Critical security studies can gain from some of the insights attributed to postmodernism, especially 
in terms of issues related to information8 and the impact of information on politics and international 
relations. 
2.3.3 Postmodernism in international relations  
2.3.3.1   The information society in international relations 
Much of the political interest which is discussed in terms of international relations theory revolved 
around issues such as power politics, international society, and the contest over the distribution of 
the gains from the increase in productivity that capitalist industrialisation created. The Information 
Age created new challenges and rules pertaining to international relations, which have not yet from 
a theoretical viewpoint been fully taken into account by existing theory. Therefore, while 
international theory still needs to be developed and adopted to fully analyse the role and impact of 
information on the international relations field some direction can be found in postmodernist 
thought. 
Postmodernism, however, poses theoretical challenges to the social scientist. These challenges 
are more related to form than to substance. In rejecting grand narratives, postmodernists are 
rejecting most of what is usually regarded as social science. Contrary to the realist and rationalist 
worldviews and to an extent also critical realism theory, postmodernists do not offer these grand 
narratives but rather fragments of ideas that often seem to contradict one another (Ritzer & 
Goodman, 2004:609). Furthermore, postmodernists are in general unwilling to define themselves 
in any precise way; consequently, there are many different strands of thought (Nicholson, 
2002:117-118).  
Postmodernists are critical of what they call “modernity”. Modernity is used to describe the rise of 
notions of objective science. It is especially critical of the industrial revolution and the rise of 
technology. Postmodernists argue that modernity has made rationality an end in itself, and far from 
being a progressive force, this has resulted in outcomes such as the Holocaust and nuclear 
                                               
8   Information is organised and collated into sets of data in context (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001:1).  
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weapons. This is in part because the drive to find technical solutions to problems has largely 
sidelined moral and political questions (Nicholson, 2002:118).  
Postmodernism actively seeks to upset what is taken for granted and to reveal how discourse 
imposes meaning and hence a value structure that is both socially constructed and historically 
arbitrary (Sterling-Folker, 2006:158). As a tool of social and political analysis, postmodernism 
highlights the shift away from societies structured by industrialisation and class solidarity to 
increasingly fragmented and pluralistic information societies in which individuals are transformed 
from producers to consumers, and individualism replaces class, religious loyalties and ethnic 
loyalties (Heywood, 2002:65).  
Within postmodernism meaning is always assigned through an oppositional arrangement in which 
some symbols, ideas and values are elevated and others subordinated. Truth itself then becomes 
a function of this discursive oppositional arrangement. Individuals take for granted certain ideas 
and activities as naturally good or bad when such judgements are actually products of specific 
knowledge-producing systems and hence specific historical circumstances (Sterling-Folker, 
2006:159). Postmodernism does not seek to replace the meta-narratives by utilising alternative 
methodologies, and in so doing, “… it accepts inconsistency and contradiction, feeling no need to 
reconcile opposition or to choose between them” (Rosenau, 1990:86).  
Postmodernism delivers critical insight relevant to the theoretical perspective. According to 
postmodernism, social science is not neutral; rather, it is historical, cultural and political, and 
therefore biased. There is no neutral, impartial or independent standpoint to decide between rival 
empirical claims. Knowledge is not at all immune from the workings of power (Smith, 1997:165-
190). These insights enrich and strengthen arguments for the potential impact of information 
warfare as a national security threat. 
2.3.3.2   Criticism of postmodernism  
Before explaining specific insights obtained from postmodernism, it is necessary to caution against 
postmodernism as its relativism, which is a basis of postmodernism, poses some danger. Extreme 
postmodernism can result in paralysis seeing that certainty regarding all knowledge is challenged. 
There is, however, a moderate postmodernist view (similar to critical realism) that is premised on 
the notion that our ideas and theories about the world always contain elements of both subjectivity 
and objectivity. The subjective element is tied to an individual’s adherence to different values and 
concepts and the inescapable fact that each and every person views the world from his or her own 
personal standpoint. The objective element is tied to the fact that people can actually agree on 
substantial insights about what the real world is like. This is aligned with critical realism, which is 
the point of departure of this study. Specific postmodernist thought relevant to the role of 
information warfare in society includes the insights offered by Stiegler (1998) and Baudrillard 
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(1983), which includes the concept of retention in the Information Age and the rise of signs, 
symbols and simulacra. 
2.3.3.3   Retention in the Information Age 
With the advent of the information society, the transfer of knowledge and culture values between 
generations in particular are fraught with challenges. While institutions like culture, education and 
national entities responsible for this transfer are dynamic, in general, they maintain a similar in 
approach to methods used in the past. Stiegler referred to the concept of retention within the 
Information Age, which will result in fundamental and even exponential change between 
generations.  
Stiegler referred to tertiary retention, which plays an important part in the creation of generations. 
Tertiary retention is experiences of people, selected by their culture and then distributed by their 
prevailing communication technology. As long as culture controls the tertiary retention, it is 
transferred within a society; however, control by the global market is increasingly globalising these 
transfers. One of the implications of the proliferation of information related technologies is that 
future tertiary retention will ensure that generations are much shorter lived but also much more 
fluid than in the past (Rossouw, 2002). 
2.3.3.4   The rise of signs, symbols and simulacra 
According to Baudrillard’s analysis of contemporary society, it is no longer dominated by issues 
such as production, but rather by the “media, cybernetic models and steering systems, computers, 
information processing, entertainment and knowledge industries, and so forth” (Kellner, 1989:61). 
Originating from these models and systems is an absolute explosion of signs. Society has moved 
from being dominated by the “mode of production” to one controlled by the “code of production”. 
The objective has shifted from exploitation and profit to domination by the signs and the systems 
that produce them (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004:607-608). 
Accordingly, Baudrillard argued that since the late 20th century in “global” society the excess of 
signs and of meaning have caused a (quite paradoxical) effacement of reality. In general, people 
no longer believe in ideological worldviews such as liberal or Marxist utopias. Baudrillard argued 
that the world is currently easily petrified by even the smallest event. Baudrillard stated that as the 
“global” world operates at the level of the exchange of signs and commodities, it becomes ever 
blinder to symbolic acts such as terrorism. In Baudrillard's work the symbolic realm is seen as quite 
distinct from that of signs and signification. Signs can be exchanged like commodities; symbols, on 
the other hand, operate quite differently: they are exchanged, like gifts, sometimes violently, as a 
form of potlatch. Baudrillard, particularly in his later work, regarded “global” society as without this 
“symbolic” element, and therefore symbolically (if not militarily) defenceless against acts such as 
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the Rushdie Fatwa or even the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the USA and its 
military establishment (Kellner, 2007). 
The world is characterised by simulations, and Baudrillard (1983:4) declared that we live in “the 
age of simulation”. The process of simulation leads to the creation of simulacra, or “reproductions 
of objects or events” (Kellner, 1989:78). With the distinction between signs and reality imploding, it 
is increasingly difficult to tell the real from those things that simulate the real. For example, 
Baudrillard (1983:55) talked of “the dissolution of TV into life, the dissolution of life into TV”. 
Eventually, it is the representations of the real, or the simulations, which become predominant. 
Society is in the thrall of these simulations, which “form a spiralling, circular system with no 
beginning or end” (Kellner, 1989:83). With the advent of social media the dissolution of life into the 
internet has become a potential challenge for modern times. The potential for manipulation of 
these simulacra remains significant, and with the exponential development of technology coupled 
with social media they become a growing potential threat to society.  
2.3.3.5   International relations theory and information warfare 
An integrated view of international relations theory’s macro relationship with informat ion warfare is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. Insights relevant to the manifestation of information warfare obtained from 
these different theories include: the centrality of power, the growing influential role of networking in 
international relations, complex and multi-layered transformation of the domestic and international 
society, the increased influence of non-state actors, the dynamics of future tertiary retention as well 
as growing significance of symbolic, information-related phenomena which are increasingly 
impacting on the real world.  
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Figure 2.1: International relations framework influencing information warfare 
These insights are, however, also linked to the macro historical environment. In the Industrial Age, 
realism was closely linked to the Cold War global political stand-offs, while rationalism focused on 
efforts to expand international political and economic relations within the global community (Smith, 
2013:4). Information Age concerns, as described by critical realism and postmodernism, reflect 
increased diversity, inconsistency and contradictions in human activity. These Information Age 
related theories highlight some trends relevant in human activity, namely renewal, relationship 
shifts, modernisation, continuous modernisation, growing complexity and interconnectness. The 
dominance of any one theory is the result of a prior assumption about the main issues in world 
politics that need explaining. However, all of these theoretical insights play a role in assisting the 
systematic reflection on information warfare in its global context. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
As information warfare is a relatively new concept, it has not been fully addressed in a social 
science theoretical framework. In this chapter critical realism is proposed as the overarching theory 
framework within which international relations theory and philosophy are proposed as providing the 
main body of theoretical insights relevant to the manifestation of information warfare as national 
security threat. The futures study theoretical elements are addressed in the next chapter.  
The realist worldview explains many of the national security threats related to national security 
during the Industrial Age. Maximising power without any consideration for the interests of other 
states was part of catastrophic conflicts during the 20th century. The rationalist worldview 
acknowledges the existence of an international society sustained by the role of growing 
international interdependence and integration as a reality closely interlinking states globally. 
Cooperation between states facing up to national security related issues is part of this worldview 
but at the same time the scope of national security threats expanded to include issues such as the 
environmental and human security.  
The start of the Information Age, globalisation and the explosion in ICT development, however, 
also opened new dimensions in the national security perspective. Critical realism in international 
relations theory and postmodernism provide some insights into the significance of the manipulation 
of the global information sphere. This is done by creating opportunities for information warfare to 
exponentially grow from a still upcoming issue in terms of national security to becoming a 
substantial national security threat in the future.  
Thus all of these worldviews add value to the understanding of the broader framework within which 
information warfare manifest as a national security threat. Elements of realism, rationalism and 
critical realism in international relations theory as well as postmodernism can be used to provide 
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insight into the manifestation of information warfare. While realism was the dominant worldview 
during the Cold War, the other views also became prominent since then.  
These worldviews are not representing completely mutually exclusive perceptions about 
international relations and security but are highlighting diverse insights regarding the role of 
information warfare in international security relations. While these worldviews provide insights into 
the context of information warfare as national security threat, it is probably not sufficient to 
systematically explore its possible medium to long-term future manifestation. Futures studies as an 
instrument of foresight is the focus of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FUTURES STUDIES AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR FORESIGHT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Futures studies is a relatively new emerging discipline endeavouring to develop a future 
consciousness as well as seeking a systematic and pattern-based understanding of the past and 
present with the aim to determine the likelihood of future events and trends (Princeton University, 
2015). Thinking about the future has been part of the human civilisation since the earliest times. De 
Jouvenel (1967:40) described humankind as beings who need the future and subsequently strive 
to form adequate images of future realities (futura) that inhabit the future domain.  
Futures studies as a focused intellectual exercise directed at the future is, despite its historic roots, 
a much more recent phenomenon (Bell, 2007:6). The basis of futures studies is diverse and 
includes the earliest science fiction writing, strategic planning during and after the Second World 
War, the centrally planned development strategies of states and think tanks’ initial work on future 
challenges. All of these diverse strands resulted in the development of futures studies as field of 
study. Futures studies provides a unique perspective on the social sciences. It provides an 
opportunity for researchers to create useful information about the future, especially in the light of 
constant change, instability and uncertainty (Kristof, 2006:263).  
The topics and methods of futures studies include the possible, probable and preferred variations. 
Futures studies covers a broad field of inquest and combines the insights of a range of disciplines 
to provide a fresh outlook on the future. While futures study methodologies are not necessarily 
going to stop policy mistakes from being made, they do provide individuals and entities with the 
capacity to think about the future in a more structured and focused way (Van Vuuren, 2011:240). 
Traditional disciplines have a doxa – a certain collection of classic, acknowledged texts that must 
be read and that explain the basics of the discipline. Futures studies in general and futures 
research in particular largely still lack a doxa and clear boundaries. Futures studies is multi-
disciplinary in its research approach and trans-disciplinary in its intellectual tradition with only fairly 
recent efforts to have a knowledge base defined (Inayatullah & Wildman, 1996:725). These 
challenges call for a brief evaluation of time perceptions, the rationale of futures studies, the 
manifestation of the future, the role of foresight, the systems approach within the discipline, the role 
of futures maps and the layered approach, especially causal layered analysis (CLA).  
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The future is not specified or prearranged. A multitude of futures are possible but only one can 
manifest in the end. Futures studies promotes enquiry on how current activities (or lack thereof) will 
become the reality of the future. This includes endeavours to analyse the causes, sources and 
patterns of stability and change with the intention of creating foresight and even different futures.  
3.2 TIME PERCEPTION CHALLENGES TO FUTURES STUDIES 
Time, like space, is an inevitable aspect of individual experience and social interaction. Everything 
occurs at some time and in some space. Although at quite different rates, nearly everything 
changes from one time to another (Bell, 2007:5). Conceptions of time and the future also exist in 
every known society (Bell, 2005). While the understanding of time and future differs from culture to 
culture, some general observations can be made about time.  
The differences between the past, present and future are important, but these three views of time 
are also significantly interconnected. Human understanding, focus and perception in the present 
are affected by the history, achievements and identity of the past. This, in turn, influences planning, 
projects and future aims. As the flow between these connections is multidirectional, such links are 
even strengthened. Many decisions that are taken are influenced by both the past and future. 
These decisions arise partly from the historical and cultural paradigms in which the decision-
makers find themselves. Consequently, the boundaries between past, present and future are, in 
reality, open and fluid. In practice, this indicates that the decision-maker is not necessarily trapped 
in a constricted present, but there are other resourceful and intellectual choices, which require 
easy and relatively unrestricted movement between past, present and future (Slaughter, 2005a). 
Thus, even without a specific futures orientation, the future inevitably plays a role in decision 
making.  
Although futures studies established itself in the intellectual and practical milieu globally, it 
experiences significant perception challenges. While one would expect exponential technological 
progress, growing networking and globalisation to enhance the popularity and use of futures 
studies to develop futures-orientated strategies, the contrary is sometimes more prevalent. 
Futures-orientated thinking is sometimes negated by the very developments directly related to the 
high level of advancement globally. According to the Clock of the Long Now Project’s summary: 
“Civilization is revving itself into a pathologically short attention span. The trend might be coming 
from the acceleration of technology, the short-horizon perspective of market-driven economics, the 
next-election perspective of democracies, or the distractions of personal multitasking” (Brand, 
1999:2). Ironically, as humankind is facing more and more challenges, short-term thinking remains 
prevalent. Fortunately, significant work has been done theoretically as well as practically in all 
human endeavours focused on the future and the implications of the future.    
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3.3 THE RATIONALE FOR FUTURES STUDIES AND THE ROLE OF THE FUTURIST 
Futures studies is primarily concerned with the understanding of the social constructs that shape 
the future and the development of viable forward-looking views to inspire and lead societies and 
organisations (Slaughter, 1999:305). Bell (2007:73) defined the purposes of futures studies as 
follows: “The purposes of futures studies are to discover or invent, examine and evaluate, and 
propose possible, probable and preferable futures.” Futures studies can be undertaken at different 
levels. This includes at a superficial level extrapolating trends, at a pragmatic level which tends to 
be quite empirical and focused on particular problems, or at deeper epistemological or critical 
levels focusing on the assumptions that frame particular worldviews (Slaughter, 1999:145). The 
focus in this study is ultimately on a practical level, but initially attention is directed to the broader 
practical and theoretical framework in which futures studies function.  
The question remains as to whether futures studies provides a unique set of methodologies for 
knowledge creation, which could be of value for the policy-maker and individual in general in order 
to counter the mentioned short-term approaches. Before proceeding to the theoretical and practical 
application of futures studies, it is important to distinguish futures studies from the futurist element 
present in most social sciences. Bell (2005) identified a number of specific futures assumptions 
that, although some may be shared by other fields, taken together, are a distinctive part of the 
futures studies perspective: 
-    “Time moves unidirectional and irreversibly from the past (seen in terms of a continuous 
momentary present) toward the future. There are a number of different arguments that 
support this assumption, such as: biological development (people grow older with time, 
never younger); the second law of thermodynamics (entropy always goes in one 
direction); wave motion (radio waves, for example, are never received before they are 
sent); the history of the universe (residual galactic radiation supports the idea that time 
has a beginning, sequence, duration, and direction); and traces of the past (the fossil 
record remains in the present as evidence of the past). 
-     Not everything that will exist has existed before or does exist now. Thus, the future may 
contain things that have never existed before. These may invite new thoughts, new 
understandings, new developments and new reactions. 
-    The future is not totally predetermined. This assumption explicitly recognises the fact 
that the future does not already exist. The future is thus still ‘open’. 
-     Futures thinking is essential for human action. Reaction might be possible without 
futures thinking, but not action, because to act requires anticipation. Thus, images of 
the future (goals, objectives, intentions, hopes, fears, aspirations) are part of the causes 
of present action. 
-     To some extent, future outcomes can be influenced by individual and collective action, 
and by the choices people make. 
-     Global interdependence invites a holistic perspective and a multidisciplinary approach. 
Futurists view the world as so interrelated that no system or unit can be viewed as 
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totally isolated. Rather, futurists argue that every unit that is the focus of futures 
research should be considered to be an open system.” 
 
Expanding on these assumptions, Slaughter (2005) identified four key rationales for a futures 
approach:  
-  Some decisions have long-term consequences. 
When following a futures consciousness approach it has significant implications for decision-
making. Each decision made implies a potential change in direction with potential noteworthy 
future consequences. Some decisions are trivial and turn out to be insignificant in the context of 
larger events, while others are strongly conditioning the present and the future.  
-   Future alternatives imply present choices. 
As humans become conscious of diverse future alternatives, it is possible to gain access to new 
preferences in the present. Should an unacceptable futures scenario be detected appropriate 
action can be taken to avoid this. Similarly, if a preferable future scenario is identified, action can 
be set in motion with the view towards creating it. The possibility of future alternatives implies 
present choices, because it takes time to focus effort on and mobilise the resources involved to 
achieve a particular outcome or avoid undesirable consequences. 
-  Forward thinking is a preferable alternative to crisis management. 
While it is not possible to predict the future state of affairs of social systems, it is possible to take a 
strategic view, to explore alternatives and options, to anticipate eventualities, and to prepare for 
contingencies. Forward thinking is a structural alternative, especially for societies in transition. This 
remains preferable to crisis management as the latter is wasteful and expensive.  
-  Further transformations are certain to occur. 
The potential changes over the next 100 years are probably as significant, if not more significant, 
than those which have occurred over the last 1 000 years. This is especially the case with 
assessments of the role of technology in future development. Technological change is no longer 
merely linear but increasingly exponential (Kurzweil, 2006:12). However, it must be made clear that 
the future is a mental construct. On a basic level it derives from the way humans interpret the past 
and the present. The future also drives action. Humanity’s individual and collective actions are not 
reacting in a one-on-one fashion to incoming signals. Instead, available cognitive systems 
intermediate, and the mental constructs that are called ‘‘futures’’ play an important part in this 
process (Van der Heijden, 2004:208). 
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In understanding the assumptions and rationale of futures studies, the role of the futurist needs to 
be defined. Thuraisingham (2005) defined the futurist’s role as strategic, namely one of 
contributing to and adjusting the belief systems, worldviews and paradigms of our society.  
Bell (2007:238) took this further by stating: “Futurists focus on the transformation of hindsight into 
foresight. On the one hand, they speculate, think laterally, intuit, reason counterfactually as well as 
factually, cogitate linearly and dialectically, entertain outrageous – and even despised – notions, 
and creatively invent in order to unveil possible and probable futures. On the other hand, they 
specify past and present data using a multitude of standard and special methods, collecting, 
analysing, and interpreting evidence in order to make posits about possible and probable futures 
and to construct surrogate knowledge as reliably and validly as they can. Their candidates for 
surrogate knowledge of the future are based on patterns of reasoning and marshalling evidence, 
and they can become justified belief if they remain unrefuted after being subjected to serious 
efforts to falsify them.”  
Expanding on why the futurist should be performing these tasks, Bell (2005) identified the 
maintenance or improvement of the welfare of humankind and the life-sustaining capacities of the 
earth itself as a major purpose of the futurist. Futurists do this by systematically exploring 
alternative futures. Engaging in prospective thinking is an important part of this task to create new, 
alternative images of the future – visionary explorations of the possible, systematic investigation of 
the probable and moral evaluation of the preferable. Some futurists strive for more than institutional 
change by focusing on consciousness change (Inayatullah, 2008b). 
Futures thinking is based on three interrelated inquiries into the future with the objective to 
determine the truth about the future (Spies, 2015). These inquiries are: (1) measuring the future to 
obtain knowledge about the future; (2) imagining the non-existing future; and (3) purposefully 
designing or making the future. Measuring, imagining and making sustainable alternative futures 
should be the preferable outcome of holistic futures thinking, and requires active interventions to 
realise. This study is primarily focused on the measuring and imagining dimensions. 
3.4  FORESIGHT AS AN OUTCOME OF FUTURES STUDIES 
Despite many futurists agreeing on the rationale, role and aims of futures studies, approaches to 
futures studies differ significantly.9 The approach to futures studies in this study is trans-disciplinary 
and action-orientated. The attainment of foresight remains a core principle.  
When focusing on knowledge of the future, more than one term can be used. Since the meanings 
of these terms do differ, it remains important to distinguish between the concepts of prediction, 
forecasting and foresight in order to understand the boundaries and limitations of futures studies. 
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Humans have an instinctive competence for speculation, prediction, foresight, modelling and 
deciding between alternatives as humanity is not trapped in a deterministic world (Slaughter, 
1994:1078). With astrology and prophecy being given less credence in the modern world, 
forecasting has become the preferred technique of planners, economists and social scientists 
(Inayatullah, 2005b). A forecast is a prediction or estimate of an actual value in a future time period 
(Armstrong, 2001:783). Stated differently, a forecast is a declaration of what is expected to happen 
in the future, especially in relation to a particular event or situation (Saffo, 2007). Forecast, 
prediction and prognosis are typically used interchangeably (Armstrong, 2001:783). 
The aim of forecasting is based on an implicit desire to make the world more stable and to 
influence or even control the future. The assumption behind forecasting is that with more 
information, particularly more timely information, decision-makers can make wiser decisions. 
Having more information at hand is especially important presently since the rate of technological 
change has dramatically increased (Inayatullah, 2005b). Forecasting is thus a significant tool for 
use in planning. However, planning and forecasting are not necessarily intertwined. Planning is 
concerned with what the world should look like, while forecasting is about what it will look like 
(Armstrong, 2001:2). Planners can use forecasting methods to predict the outcomes for alternative 
plans. If the forecasted outcomes are not satisfactory, they can revise plans, then obtain new 
forecasts, repeating the process until forecasted outcomes are satisfactory (Armstrong, 2001:2-3). 
The term foresight, which is generally used in futures studies, takes forecasting further. Foresight 
is the capacity to think ahead and consider, model, create, and respond to future eventualities. It 
encompasses the process of developing a range of views on possible ways the future could 
develop, and understanding these sufficiently well to be able to decide what decisions can be 
taken today in order to create the best possible tomorrow (Horton, 1999:6). Slaughter (1995:1) 
stated that foresight is not the skill to predict the future: “It is a human attribute that allows us to 
weigh up pros and cons, to evaluate different courses of action and to invest in possible futures on 
every level with enough reality and meaning to use them as decision making aids …The simplest 
possible definition [of foresight] is: opening to the future with every means at our disposal, 
developing views of future options, and then choosing between them.”  
According to Slaughter (1995:48), foresight is a competence or a trait. It is a process that 
endeavours to widen the boundaries of perception in four ways, namely by: 
-     Identifying and avoiding problems before they transpire (guidance and early warning); 
-     Assessing the implications of present decisions, actions and events (consequent 
assessment); 
-    Taking into account the current implications of possible future events (pro-active 
strategy formulation); and 
                                                                                                                                                            
9  See for example the diverse views of 108 futurists on future study methods and visions in Volume 2 of the Knowledge Base of 
Future Studies (Inayatullah, 2005b). 
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-     Envisioning aspects of wanted futures (normative scenarios). 
 
Successful foresight requires three consecutive stages: Stage 1 consists of the collection, collation 
and characterisation of available information, and results in the production of foresight knowledge. 
Stage 2 comprises the conversion and elucidation of this knowledge to produce comprehension of 
its implications for the future from the particular point of view of a specific environment. Stage 3 
comprises the assimilation and evaluation of this understanding to generate a commitment to 
action in a particular environment (Horton, 1999:6). 
Some individuals challenge the viability of prediction, forecasting or foresight. These individuals are 
of the opinion that the very idea that someone can predict the future or have foresight, let alone 
shape the future, seems absurd. Hence, they regard the future as a random occurrence of events 
– unknowable and untouchable until these events occur, and only fully understood in hindsight 
(Canton, 2007:8).  
In terms of prediction, it is possible to agree with these assertions as the complex nature of change 
means that predicting events is in many cases impossible, and is quite likely to be dangerous, as it 
entails inflexibility. This implies the need to become locked into one specific prophecy (Van der 
Heijden, 2004). However, knowledge about factors shaping the future is possible. What is needed 
is finding insight and understanding about the things and patterns shaping the future, and their 
possible consequences for the future. The development and nurturing of foresight, namely the 
ability to make decisions that are good not only now but also in the long run remains a priority 
(Roux, 2006: Slide 25). Foresight is the process of developing a range of views on possible ways 
the future could develop, and understanding these sufficiently well to be able to decide what 
decisions can be taken at present in order to create the best possible future (Horton, 1999:5). In 
this study the identification of four plausible scenarios how information warfare possibly might 
manifest by the 2030s rest upon foresight and knowledgeability. 
Foresight can act to promote knowledgeability in humans. As such, it operates as a “higher-order” 
language. Truly understanding the present is part of such a knowledgeability. Acknowledging that 
many of the prior actions of foresight have served the interests of those in power is also part of 
such a knowledgeability. This includes the understanding that language and technology should not 
be regarded as neutral, and endeavouring to view the present outside the confines of a short-term 
approach. Instead of seeking stability, understanding surprise, limits, disturbance, consciousness 
and transformation is likewise an element of such knowledgeability. Noting the bias of many 
institutions against foresight is also part of such knowledgeability (Hayward, 2005).  
3.5 SYSTEMS APPROACH 
As indicated in Chapter 2, critical realism served as overarching theory for this study. Similarly, a 
futures philosophical approach in general also subscribes to a critical realist worldview which 
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concurs with the notion that the absolute truth of knowledge is untenable. In this regard critical 
realism can provide a satisfactory philosophical approach for the study of information warfare in a 
futurist context. While science is regarded as a body of linguistic or numerical statements about the 
nature of reality, this also includes an interest in the activities of scientists and the history of 
science and its institutions (Bell, 2007:207). 
Critical realism accepts the sceptical belief that humanity cannot have certain knowledge, if we 
define knowledge as justified true belief. However, nor can humanity abandon efforts to know and 
understand. Knowledge is redefined as “conjectural knowledge”, allowing for the possibility of the 
fallibility of these conjectures (Bell, 2007:210). Popper (1962:37) argued that science must have a 
falsifiable hypothesis. He stated that the measure of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. A critical realist view assumes both that there is a reality 
that exists and that humanity can test many hypotheses about it to see whether they are most 
likely true or false (Bell, 2007:207-208). 
The insights produced by critical realism are enhanced by the international relations worldviews 
evaluated in Chapter 2, especially where these worldviews have implications for the analysis of the 
phenomenon of information warfare as a future national security threat. These worldviews showed 
that the relationships between all social entities and their environments are the source of 
complexity and interdependence. The challenge is that traditional analytical approaches to societal 
problems in general tend to ignore this dynamic nature (Dostal, Cloete & Járos, 2007:12). 
In order to accommodate these dynamics, especially when possible futures are investigated, a 
systems approach offers a solution. Systems theory can serve as a useful instrument to identify the 
dynamics playing a role when information warfare as future national security threat is studied. 
Currently and even more so in the future, systems thinking is needed because humanity is 
becoming overwhelmed by complexity. As Senge (1990:69) put it: “Perhaps for the first time in 
history, humankind has the capacity to create more information that anyone can absorb, to foster 
greater interdependency than anyone can manage, and to accelerate change far faster than 
anyone’s ability to keep pace.” Systems thinking provides an opportunity to delve into any problem 
on different levels of complexity. 
A system can be defined as a set of interacting units. At one level, a system consists of a structure, 
and the structure is the systems-level component that makes it possible to think of the units as 
forming a set, distinct from a mere collection. A system thus consists of interacting units (Waltz, 
1979:40). A system remains a discernible whole that interacts purposefully with its environment 
and is comprised of interacting and interrelating parts that are organised for a purpose (Dostal, 
2007). See Figure 3.1 for a representation of a simplified model of a system in the context of a 
society.  
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Connections are being established and broken within and among systems, keeping the world in a 
state of constant change (Cornish, 2004:49). Any system also consists of parts, which are systems 
themselves, which can be referred to as sub-systems (Dostal, Cloete & Járos, 2007:7). Systems in 
this context refer to constructive rather than natural systems (Young, 1967:31). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: A simplified model of a system in the context of a society 
Source: Own compilation based on Easton, 1965:32. 
To create a futurist relevant theoretical perspective, the logic of a systems approach is especially 
useful in order to assist in the analysis of the varied relationships of the many aspects of the social 
world, thus operating against piecemeal analyses of the social world. The systems approach tends 
to regard all aspects of socio-cultural systems in process terms, especially as networks of 
information and communication (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004:314-315). Systems thinking is a 
dominant worldview of the Information Age as information is now abundant and synergistic. Such 
synergy provides competitive advantages, while information also allows win-win solutions. 
Information introduces complexity to the world while it also drives technological development 
(Dostal, 2007: Slide 6). 
Systems thinking is therefore a way of seeing and understanding how the world is organised and 
how people behave in it. A systems perspective highlights important patterns and relationships 
which if not viewed through a systems perspective may seem to be insurmountably complex and 
chaotic (Robinson, 2005). Systems thinking implies that there are two types of complexity, namely 
the detail complexity of many variables and the “dynamic complexity” when “cause and effect” are 
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not close in time and space and obvious intentions do not produce expected outcomes (Senge, 
1990:364).  
The systems approach can suggest the sort of things to expect, providing a useful way to 
understand what is happening in the world around us, especially as it focuses attention on 
relationships rather than on things. These relationships tend to shape events more than the things 
themselves (Cornish, 2004:49). Of especial importance is that a systems approach assists in 
understanding relationships that exist across space, time and domains (Cornish, 2004:50). On a 
macro level, there are essentially two systems – one of nature and the other being the world that 
interacts with nature. At a meta-level, systems thinking is holistic thinking whereby it is 
endeavoured to understand the world in all its diversity as being essentially interconnected and 
whole (Robinson, 2005). Of specific interest for this study is the interaction between human social 
systems, especially related to power within the system. 
Social systems have a history and are in constant motion, evolving through time. Humans are 
positioned in these social systems, and these social systems influence human behaviour but are 
also influenced by human behaviour. In terms of a systems approach there is an appreciation of 
dynamic interaction not reducible to reified and static categories of social life and structure, a 
contrast to orthodox social science, which is founded on social facts that stand on their own with 
claims to general universality. Social reality is understood as a dynamic and systemic phenomenon 
(Flood. 2001:140). 
Velamoor (2005) provided a summary of the systems approach, focusing on the various elements 
as follows:  
1. System: This framework views humanity and its environment as major constituents of a 
hierarchical system comprised of sub-systems and sub-sub-systems that are interacting 
continuously, both vertically and horizontally.  
2. Control: An underlying principle of such a system is that not any part of an internally 
interactive system can have unilateral control over the remainder of any other part.  
3. Symbiosis: Symbiosis has shaped the features of many structures. It represents the union 
of two or more structures and yields what is, in essence, a new structure. This is applicable 
to entities within systems. 
4. Stability: The tendency in evolution has been to establish stratified stability. The 
stratification of stability remains fundamental in dynamic systems, and it explains why 
evolution has a consistent direction in time.  
5. Punctuated equilibrium: Evolution does not need to be regular but can be staggered or 
result in interrupted equilibrium. Punctuated equilibrium refers to stasis interrupted by brief 
bursts of evolutionary change. 
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6. Non-linearity: Linearity, locality and immediate cause and effect have been conveniently 
used as the fundamental assumptions in pursuing reductionist science, explaining the 
remaining unexplainable as chance. In modern terms, the Western perspective has 
regarded nature as a linear phenomenon in which what happens at a given place and time 
is determined exclusively by what has occurred in nearby places immediately beforehand. 
The holistic view assumed nature to be non-linear so that non-local influences predominate 
and interact with one another to form a complicated whole. 
The systems approach is introduced to highlight the critical role of systems’ elements such as the 
hierarchy of systems, the problem of control, symbiosis, stability in systems, and non-linearity; all 
elements relevant to later understand the complexity associated with the manifestation of 
information warfare. Within the context of exponentially increasing complexity due to the ubiquity of 
information, a systems theory approach is the only way to overcome complexity. 
Using a systems approach, a futures map can be created within which possible future scenarios 
can be presented. This is also a popular approach applied to long-range planning in order to 
produce a roadmap that shows the path to the future (Smith, 2005:1).  
3.5.1 Futures map 
A futures map provides a conceptual frame that helps to evaluate how futures researchers have 
proceeded in the promotion of the purposes defined by Bell10 and formulated by Spies (2015) as 
measuring, imagining and designing the future. 
Malaska and Virtanen (2009:68) have introduced the concept of a futures map as follows: 
“… a map is a source of information about the scenery, a symbolic replica of some 
characters of it. There is a relationship between the map’s designs and symbols and the 
real scenery at some level of coarseness and vagueness … In geographical mapping the 
elementary symbols and patterns of the map represent different elements of the scenery, 
e.g. trees, lakes, meadows…In the same way a futures manifold (or map) is a symbolic 
representation of the future…” 
A futures map is a generic design of the various futures and a symbolic representation of what 
might unfold or be comprehended by human interventions in the material world (Malaska & 
Virtanen, 2009:69). A futures map is thus the all-inclusive description of the outcomes of a futures 
research process. It comprises all applicable pictures of the future identified during the process and 
all relations between these pictures and between them and the present state as well as 
assessments about the time frames, desirability and possibility of these pictures (Kuusi, Cuhls & 
Steinmüller, 2015:61). 
                                               
10
    Wendell Bell (2007:73) defined the purposes of future studies as follows: “The purposes of future studies are to discover or invent, 
examine and evaluate, and propose possible, probable and preferable futures.” 
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In a futures map the mapping horizon refers to the scenario options which might be relevant during 
the future, while the planning horizon is linked to a proposed roadmap to the future (Kuusi, Cuhls & 
Steinmüller, 2015:61). See Figure 3.2 for a graphical presentation of a futures map.    
The futures map will be especially appropriate for the global security environment as it is 
undergoing a qualitative change resulting in higher complexity. This necessitates changes in 
decision making culture, especially related to taking a more proactive approach and enhancing the 
networked nature thereof. Here, the futures map provides a visualisation tool, which can leverage 
numerous internal and external contributors, driving a “strategic conversation” across all levels, 
and linking strategy, intelligence and learning (Heathfield, 2008:596). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Futures map 
Source: Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller, 2015:63. 
An additional analytical element from the systems perspective is to not only focus on the horizontal 
dimension, but to also take into account the vertical complexity of systems. In terms of the vertical 
dimension a layered view of systems proves to be constructive. 
3.5.2 Layered systems approaches as analysis tools 
Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur and Schley (2008:173-176) proposed a four-level systematic 
explanation of any issue. The first level identifies a specific event or concern. The second level 
goes beyond the immediate event by viewing the event in a longer timeframe. The focus is on 
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identifying the patterns or trends within which the event occurred. The third level looks at the 
deeper forces driving these patterns or trends. This is the systemic structures which are underlying 
the dynamics driving the trends and patterns. The fourth level refers to the mental models, which is 
the core thinking within the system, especially related to the authoritative granting of values by the 
decision-makers within the system (see Figure 3.3).  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Layered systems explanation of reality 
Source: Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur and Schley, 2008:174. 
In terms of information warfare, a layered systems approach allows for the translation of events 
into their broader patterns and trends. This will provide the opportunity to move away from the 
need to immediately react to a representation in which the ability to anticipate events will be 
stronger. Going down one more level puts the focus on the systemic structures underlying the 
manifestation of information warfare. This provides an opportunity for insight into the underlying 
dynamics influencing the manifestation of information warfare as well as the ability to design 
possible futures. On the next level, the view is on the mental models underlying the manifestation 
of information warfare. Understanding the mental models assists even in the transformation 
according to which the future can be narrowed to the preferred. These insights are particularly of 
value to conceptualise a model that will enhance knowledgeability in terms of the future 
manifestation of information warfare.  
3.5.3 Causal layered analysis 
The four-level system explanation of reality already provides a basis for using a layered approach 
to the analysis of information warfare. In this regard, a complementary futures-orientated layered 
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method that can add value is causal layered analysis (CLA). CLA is a method to categorise 
concerns about futures and/or different views, and then to use these concerns to assist thinking 
about futures far more productively (World Future Society, 2005:4). See Figure 3.4 for a 
representation of CLA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Causal layered analysis (CLA) 
Source: Inayatullah, 2008c:1. 
According to CLA, the mode in which a problem is framed changes the policy solution as well as 
the actors accountable for creating change on the way to find a solution to the problem. CLA 
presupposes that there are different ways of viewing and understanding reality and assists in 
identifying trends. CLA is made up of four levels of knowing, namely the litany, social causes, 
discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor levels of knowing. What is challenging in terms of the 
application of CLA is that research must be conducted by moving up and down these layers of 
analysis. This ensures that research is “inclusive of different ways of knowing” (Inayatullah, 
2000:1). 
The first level is the litany level of knowing, namely quantitative trends, problems, sometimes 
overstated, often used for political purposes while it is generally presented by the news media. This 
represents mainly the official, unquestioned view of reality. On the litany level, issues, trends and 
events are not always connected and appear irregular. The result is often the promotion of a 
feeling of apathy or helplessness or calls for projected action. This level can be regarded as the 
conventional level of futures research and can easily create politics of fear. The causes and 
implications of the mentioned events, issues and trends are not adequately analysed and 
evaluated.  
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The second level is concerned with social causes, including political, economic, historical and 
cultural factors. The data of the litany level are explained and questioned at the social causes level 
of knowing. In the case of quantitative data, interpretation is given. In general, policy institutes 
usually articulate this type of analysis. In some cases, the precipitating action is analysed. At this 
level, academic analysis as well as technical explanations are done. The role of the state and other 
interests and actors is also often investigated at this level (Inayatullah, 2005a:55-56). 
The third level goes deeper and focuses on structure and the discourse or worldview that supports 
and legitimises it. The undertaking is to find deeper linguistic, cultural and social structures that 
control or significantly impact on the actors. At this stage, it is important to revise or recast the 
problem but also the perceptions or deeper assumptions behind the issue being investigated. Now 
it can be investigated how different discourses (cultural, social and economic) do more than 
mediate or cause the issue but construct it, as well as how the discourse that the observer uses to 
understand is complicit in the outline of the issue. Discrete alternative scenarios can be derived on 
this level based on the varied discourses. The value of such scenarios is that they could add a 
horizontal dimension to the layered analysis. 
The fourth analytical layer is at the level of metaphor or myth. These are the collective archetypes, 
the deep stories and the unconscious dimensions of the problem. This level offers an emotional or 
“gut” level experience to the worldview under inquiry: “The language used is less specific, more 
concerned with evoking visual images, with touching the heart instead of reading the head” 
(Inayatullah, 2000:5-6). 
CLA develops an in-depth dimension to the horizontal approach of scenarios. Focused on going 
from the litany (or the popular fear-based representations of the future) to the level of policy 
analysis (the think-tank trends dimension) to that of worldviews (of religion, economic systems or 
the grander paradigms), it concludes with an examination of the myths and metaphors that support 
current social and personal structures (Inayatullah, 2005e). CLA, however, does not give advantage 
to any particular level. CLA promotes going beyond the conventional way of framing issues. In 
general, scholarly analysis is inclined to focus on the second layer with sporadic forays into the third, 
but seldom will the fourth layer (myth and metaphor) be explored. As mentioned earlier, ideally 
research should be conducted by moving up and down these layers of analysis. Such an approach 
will be inclusive of different ways of knowing. In so doing, it will allow for the creation of integrated 
transformation and authentic alternative futures (Inayatullah, 2000:11-12). 
This method takes futures studies away from pure speculation and moves it to social inquiry. An 
investigation using such a method is enriched by other levels and layers. By being multi-
dimensional, it has a greater efficacious value (Inayatullah, 2005e). CLA is applied in this study in 
terms of evaluation of the environmental scan, as part of an information warfare futures model and 
in the compiling of the final scenarios. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
As information warfare is closely linked to technology futures and the changing manifestation of 
warfare and conflict, it is a subject already intimately related to the future. Although the 
interconnectedness of past, present and future complicates any definitive study of the future, an 
open-minded futurist approach requires insight into the dynamics between the past, present and 
future. The growth of short-horizon perspectives in terms of most current humanities-related 
activities has increased the need for a futurist perspective. This futurist perspective does not entail 
prediction of the future, but strives to provide insight and foresight with the aim to assist ( inter alia 
the policy-maker) in creating a preferable future.  
Although many futurists agree on the rationale, role and aims of future studies, approaches to 
future studies differ significantly. In this study the approach to future studies is trans-disciplinary 
and action orientated. The attainment of foresight, as core aim of future studies, remains a central 
part of the approach to the future. Foresight implies the capacity to have a notion of what is likely to 
manifest in the future and to be able to take the appropriate action to aid or avoid it. Foresight  can 
enhance knowledgeability in humans and is of significant value for decision-making impacting the 
future.  
Systems theory is especially useful in assisting endeavours to analyse the varied relationships of 
the many aspects of the social order and thus operates against fragmentary analyses of the social 
world. It also significantly assists in preventing the analyst from being overwhelmed by complexity. 
A system remains a discernible whole that interacts purposefully with its environment and is 
comprised of interacting and interrelating parts that are organised for a specific purpose. Constant 
change is maintained by connections being established and broken within and among systems. It 
has been shown in this chapter that it is constructive to view systems on different levels delving 
into increasing complexity and analytical levels in an effort to identify underlying causes and 
broader implications and understanding of events. 
Visualising the possible, probable and even preferable futures can be done by using a futures map, 
which provides a conceptual frame for futures-related research. As extremely swift changes cannot 
be predicted and may be considered random, the focus of futures studies is mainly the complex 
field.  
Additional analytical capacity, which is based on a systems perspective, can be gained by focusing 
on a layered approach. This takes into account the vertical complexity of systems. The futures-
orientated layered approach that is generally used is CLA consisting of four levels: the litany, social 
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causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor levels of knowing. By moving up and down these 
layers it is possible to integrate analysis and synthesis and horizontally integrate discourses, ways of 
knowing and worldviews, thereby increasing the range of the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4                                      
DEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
When working with dynamic concepts such as information warfare and national security a clear 
understanding of these concepts remains vital for the analysis of the possible future manifestation 
of these phenomena. There is a risk that all forms of warfare in the Information Age can be 
perceived as information warfare, while at the same time all human-related threats could be viewed 
as national security risks. As both information warfare and national security are later used in a 
futurist context, cognisance must also be taken of possible future changes and challenges that 
could influence the development of these concepts.  
 
Information warfare became a popular new post-industrial warfare and power projection concept, 
especially after the end of the Cold War. Initially, it was a USA military concept designed mainly to 
ensure continued USA military dominance in the post-Cold War era. This led to extensive literature 
on information warfare theory and practice, much of which is in the public domain (De Landa, 
1991; Denning, 1999; Libicki, 1995; Schwartau, 1996; Waltz, 1998). Although still mainly a concept 
analysed by the developed world, some writers from China, Russia and India have been focusing 
on information warfare related issues and manifestations since the late 1990s (Hauschild, 1999; Ji, 
1999).  
 
Predictably, the prevailing language, images and metaphors related to information warfare are still 
militaristic in character, blurring the fact that many of the underpinning principles and assumptions 
have significant national security applications well beyond conventional military contexts (Cronin & 
Crawford, 1999:257). In the context of national security threats, globalisation and the information 
revolution, this narrow militaristic view of information warfare has been transcended. At the same 
time, the traditional concepts of “military” and “warfare” are also increasingly being chal lenged in 
the environment of globalisation and technological advancement (Darnton, 2006:141). As 
information is progressively more drawn into systems of production, governance strategies and 
modes for power projection, it is quickly becoming a critical resource in the 21st century 
conceptions of power (Kilibarda, 2003:10). The role of information as instrument for power 
projection is central to evaluating information warfare as a national security threat, presently as 
well as in the future.  
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4.2 DEFINING DATA, INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE, KNOWLEDGE AND WARFARE 
 
As a starting point the differences between data, information and knowledge must be examined. 
Data, information and knowledge are somewhat ambiguous terms resulting in rather unclear 
boundaries between these concepts. However, an implied hierarchy of understanding remains 
evident, with data being the most basic unit, while knowledge is on a higher level than information, 
and, to take it even further, wisdom signifies a high level of learning combined with well-heeled 
experience and the capacity to apply both judiciously (Webster, 2005:187).  
 
The conventional way to define data, information and knowledge is in a linear way. See Figure 4.1 
for an illustration of the concepts and possible challenges associated with this arrangement. Data, 
which forms the lowest level and describes attributes of things (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001:1), 
includes individual observations, measurements and basic messages, including human 
communication, text messages, electronic queries or scientific instruments that sense phenomena 
(Waltz, 1998:1-2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Data, knowledge, information and intelligence continuum 
Source: Compiled from Hutchinson and Warren, 2001:2. 
 
Information is organised and collated into sets of data in context (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001:1). It 
is a resource created from two elements: phenomena (data) that are observed, plus the 
instructions (systems) required to analyse and interpret the data to give it meaning (Wilson, 
2007:2). The organisational process may include sorting, classifying or indexing and linking data to 
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place data elements in a relational context for subsequent searching and analysis (Waltz 1998:1-
2). 
A related but somewhat broader definition of information, namely the "content or meaning of a 
message", is used in this study (Mader, 1974:3). Information remains a central resource for 
competition, conflict and warfare in states (Waltz, 1998:49). Information, once analysed, interpreted 
in the light of experience and understood, becomes knowledge (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001:1). 
Understanding information provides a degree of comprehension of both the static and dynamic 
relationships of the objects of data and the ability to model the structure and past (also future) 
behaviour of those objects. Knowledge includes both static content and dynamic processes.  
In the national security context, this level of understanding is referred to as intelligence (Waltz, 
1998:1-2). Defined as “information relevant to a government’s formulating and implementing 
policy”, the intelligence role has traditionally emphasised the instrumental nature of information in 
support of a state’s power sources, primarily military and security (Shulsky, 1993:1). 
All of these concepts, which constitute the building blocks of information warfare, illustrate specific 
vulnerabilities which begin to allude to the possible destruction and/or manipulation of these 
elements for purposes of power projection. Measures against data, information, knowledge and 
context include a wide array of direct as well as indirect actions, resulting in the degrading of 
information and information systems. 
Warfare refers to all lethal and non-lethal actions undertaken to subdue the hostile will of an enemy 
or adversary. Warfare is not necessarily synonymous with "war". Warfare does not require a 
declaration of war, nor does it require the existence of a situation widely recognised as "a state of 
war". Warfare can be commenced by or against state-controlled, state-sponsored or non-state 
groups. Warfare is hostile activity aimed at an enemy or adversary (Szafranski, 1995). In the 
context of information warfare, the direct lethal consequence of warfare is excluded.  
In warfare, the conflicting parties perceive each other’s objectives as mutually exclusive and apply 
force and other means to achieve victory. Information warfare accentuates the operations that use 
the mentioned “other means” (Waltz, 1998:1). While this view contributes to the demarcation of 
information warfare, this still includes a significant range of actions which makes the identification 
of information warfare related actions problematic.  
While information warfare has a distinct meaning in the context of this study (which will be defined 
later), information has been part of warfare since the beginning of history. Although the term 
information warfare will be used in its contemporary and futurist contexts, it must still be 
remembered that it does have strong historical links, which will be briefly described. While some 
aspects related to information warfare are as old as humankind, many aspects of how it is applied 
in our contemporary information-driven world are new (Jones, Kovacich & Luzwick, 2002:5). 
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4.3 HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION AND NATIONAL WILL IN A NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONTEXT 
The roots of information in warfare are old and deep. Combatants as well as strategists have long 
recognised the role of information and knowledge in warfare. Indeed, the age-old warfare principles 
of surprise and security embody the creation and exploitation of an information differential (Okello, 
Ayres, Bullock, Erhili, Harding & Perdigao, 1996:1).  
The origins of concepts and practices relevant to information in conflict can be identified in the 
seminal work by Sun Tzu. This Chinese work recognises information as crucial in reducing the 
uncertainty of war (Magsig, 1995). Much of The Art of War (Tzu, 1963), popularised due to Tzu's 
holistic view of warfare, focuses on the role of information and knowledge in the successful 
conduct of war. Tzu made the following four assertions regarding information (Waltz, 1998:1-2):  
- Information is critical for purposes of surveillance, situation assessment, strategy 
development, and assessment of alternatives and risks for decision making. Tzu 
stated: “In respect of military method, we have, firstly, measurement; secondly, 
estimation of quantity; thirdly, calculation; fourthly, balancing of chances; fifthly, 
victory.” 
 
- Information in the form of intelligence and the ability to forecast possible future 
outcomes distinguishes the best warriors. Tzu said: “Thus, what enables the wise 
sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond 
the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.”  
 
- The control of some information communicated to opponents, by deception 
(seduction and surprise) and denial (stealth) is a contribution that may provide 
transitory misperception to an adversary. Tzu stated: “All warfare is based on 
deception (of the enemy)” and “O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you 
we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible”. 
 
- The supreme form of warfare uses information to influence the adversary’s 
perception to subdue the will rather than using physical force. Tzu declared: “In the 
practical art of war, the best thing is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact … 
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”  
 
Since the mid nineteen century, Carl von Clausewitz’s classic text On Warfare (1989) has 
dominated military thinking for a considerable time into the twentieth century. He regarded 
information as generally unreliable in war. This can be clarified by his focus on operational and 
tactical level issues, and his pre-Industrial Age frame of reference. However, Von Clausewitz so 
dominated earlier strategic or national security thinking that his bias against information (and 
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intelligence) continued and, in some cases, according to Magsig (1995), even undermined the 
acceptance of the precepts of information warfare. 
Von Clausewitz’s insight regarding national will in the context of conflict remains relevant in terms 
of how governments respond to national security threats in general. He referred to the nature of 
war as a “paradoxical trinity”, balanced by a combination of the public, government leadership and 
the military in a viable mutually supportive relationship. According to Crumm (1996:7), the often 
debated area common to all three forces represents national will. See Figure 4.2 for a graphic 
illustration of Von Clausewitz’s national security trinity and national will.  
In the current context, the military dimension can be replaced with the national security 
infrastructure of the state which includes national security assets such as the police, intelligence 
services and other security structures of the state. National will remains an important component in 
responding to national security threats and managing that response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Von Clausewitz’s national security trinity and national will 
Source: Crumm, 1996:6. 
Lonsdale (2004) after an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including 
the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), concludes that although the future 
will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by 
Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged. Information is regarded as just one dimension of 
strategy and as deficiencies in the technological dimension can be compensated for by other 
means, it can be done with information. A force without information dominance can still operate, 
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although it may be more vulnerable and less effective at the tactical and operational levels 
(Lonsdale, 2004:189). 
Despite Von Clausewitz’s and Lonsdale’s views on information in war, in general the importance of 
information and intelligence has been understood and practised by state leaders, commanders and 
military strategists since the advent of conflict and war. Actually, all of the cardinal principles 
related to conflict and applied since ancient times, relied on the acquisition, processing and 
dissemination of information. While these principles did not change, the means of acquisition, 
processing and dissemination have changed. The importance of information has been significantly 
boosted by the advent of electricity and even more so since the digital age. 
The increasing dependency on digital involves the management of large volumes of information, 
and the increasing value of that information has made the information itself a lucrative target and 
valuable weapon of warfare. These changes are revolutionising the role of information, the conduct 
of warfare and the projection of power in general (Waltz, 1998:2-3). As technology develops to fully 
exploit big data, this will provide significant future military, tactical and strategic advantages. Big 
data is a loosely defined term used to describe data sets so large and complex that they become 
awkward to work with using standard statistical software (Snijders, Matzat & Reips, 2012:1). 
4.4 DEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE 
4.4.1 Challenges in finding a definition 
Although information warfare is a recent concept, only being used since the early 1990s, a wide 
range of meanings have been attached to this concept and related concepts such as info war, 
cyber warfare, netwar, information operations, command and control warfare, sixth-generation 
warfare, hactivism, network centric warfare, operational net assessment, iWar, cyber terrorism, 
cyber vandalism and knowledge war. The differing and sometimes overlapping nature of all these 
concepts has also contributed to confusion on the exact scope of the phenomenon of information 
warfare. In this study, the term information warfare (in the USA, information operations is now the 
preferred term) will be used as an overarching term referring to related but also differentiated uses 
of information in a national power projecting context. Certain concepts or parts of concepts will, 
however, be excluded in an effort to focus on what is understood by the term information warfare.  
There is no single generally accepted definition of information warfare (Candolin, 2003). This is 
because information warfare represents a rapidly evolving and, as yet, imprecisely defined topic of 
growing interest for security academics, planners and policymakers. The most significant sources 
of both the interest and the imprecision in this field is the information revolution led by the ongoing 
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and rapid evolution of cyberspace11, microcomputers and associated information technologies 
(Molander, Riddile & Wilson, 1996:xi). 
As illustrated in the historic view of information in warfare, one of the aims of warfare has always 
been to destroy and affect an opponent’s information systems. In the broadest sense, information 
systems include every means by which an adversary arrives at beliefs or knowledge. A narrower 
view espouses that information systems are the means by which an adversary maintains control 
over, and direction of, power projection capacities. Taken together, information systems provide a 
comprehensive set of the beliefs, knowledge and the decision-making processes and systems of 
the adversary. At every level the outcome sought by information attacks is for the adversary to 
receive sufficient messages that persuade the adversary to stop resisting (Szafranski, 1995). 
Common understanding of the significance of information warfare has expanded beyond its initial 
primarily military application. It was realised that information warfare, as both a security threat and 
instrument for power projection, has potentially much wider implications for society at large in a 
networked age. Information warfare has also become a popular concept in the 
corporate/economic, community/social, and personal spheres. Certain information warfare 
concepts, strategies and applications are common to all these and the military settings although 
there are some interpretative differences as well as differences in the perceived legality, ethicality 
and social desirability of the outcomes pursued by different actors under different conditions 
(Cronin & Crawford, 1999:258). Another problem in finding a definition of information warfare is 
related to the scope of information warfare (Taipale, 2006: Slide 3). Does information warfare refer 
to the tactical or strategic domain of warfare? 
Existing definitions of information warfare have many limitations, such as being too broad or too 
vague. Unfortunately, information warfare has become such an expansive term that it threatens to 
become a tautology by encompassing nearly everything beyond the most primitive forms of combat 
(Dinardo & Hughes, 1995:4). The USA military-centric nature of the existing definitions also 
remains a serious stumbling block in the search for an appropriate definition.  
4.4.2 Broad definitions 
A broad definition focusing on the central role of information in strategic posturing is provided by 
Stein (1995:32): “… information warfare, in its largest sense, is simply the use of information to 
achieve our national objectives.” Using this definition, however, would make it impossible to 
                                               
11  Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997:41) described cyberspace as follows: “… is a bioelectronic environment that is literally universa l, it 
exist everywhere where there are telephone wires, coaxial cables, fibre-optic lines or electro-magnetic waves. This 
environment is inhabited by knowledge, existing in electronic form.” Cyberspace consists of two measurable elements: 
connectivity and content. Connectivity encompasses the physical hardware, software and connecting electromagnetic or 
cable media that permit the generation, transfer, storage and sharing of data. The second element of cyberspace is content 
which influences behaviour and decision-making (Campen, 2008). 
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exclude any diplomatic, military or international interaction from this definition, even if it is only 
routine and in line with most state practices through the ages.  
Denning’s effort (1999:12) to deepen the definition of information warfare to encompass 
“information in any form and transmitted over any media, from people and their physical 
environments to print to telephones to radio and television to computers and computer networks” 
identifies the modern technology environment within which information warfare could flourish. This 
definition does, however, not distinguish between normal messages communicated over these 
media and what could be interpreted as information warfare. 
Libicki (1995:1) was more specific on what could be construed as information warfare, but then 
included some tactical and strategic elements which would render any constructive effort to make 
generalised assertions on information warfare practically impossible. Highly divergent aspects are 
included in Libicki’s concept of information warfare. He identified seven distinct kinds of information 
warfare, namely: 
1. Command-and-control warfare (C2W), which has the objective of decapitating the enemy’s 
command structure from the body of the command. 
2. Intelligence-based warfare (IBW), which occurs when intelligence is fed directly into military 
operations (notably targeting and battle damage assessments) rather than being used as input for 
overall command and control. 
3. Electronic warfare (EW), which is the use of operational techniques – such as radio, electronic 
and cryptographic techniques – to degrade the physical basis for transferring information. 
4. Psychological operations (PSYOPS), which is the use of information against the human mind. 
5. Hackerwar software-based attacks on information systems, which refer to the computer-related 
disruption of IT networks and applications. 
6. Information economic warfare (IEW), which is an effort to cause information blockades and 
information imperialism. 
7. Cyber warfare, which is combat in the virtual realm, such as semantic attacks. 
Although concepts such as C2W, IBW, EW and IEW have elements related to information warfare, 
these are also specific military and strategic terminology encompassing a much broader range of 
actions than merely information-related activities.  
Another broad definition, especially formulated to include the non-military perspective, has been 
proposed by Jones, Kovacich and Luzwick (2002:5), namely information warfare “… is a coherent 
and synchronized blending of physical and virtual actions to have countries, organizations, and 
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individuals perform, or not perform, actions so that your goals and objectives are attained and 
maintained, while simultaneously preventing competitors from doing the same to you”. This 
definition potentially includes most of the actions that these mentioned actors perform and thus 
also actions that strive towards mutually beneficial outcomes, which could hardly be seen as 
information warfare. 
Curran, Concannon and McKeever (2008:6) described information warfare as a societal-level 
conflict waged, in part, through the worldwide interconnected means of information and 
communication. This definition does provide a useful insight into the broader scope of information 
warfare but does not refer to the aim of the mentioned conflict. It would be difficult to exclude 
issues such as business conflict and political contestation which would include subjects not directly 
relevant to the national security implications of information warfare.  
4.4.3 Definitions limited to the ICT component 
Some definitions of information warfare are limited or largely limited to attacks on the ICT 
infrastructure and capacities of countries and/or entities. According to Elbirt (2003:2-3), information 
warfare may be defined as an unauthorised and deliberate attack on an adversary’s information 
infrastructure through the use of computer intrusion techniques while preventing the adversary 
from performing (or making it extremely difficult for the adversary to perform) similar attacks upon 
the initiator’s information infrastructure. These attacks include information exploitation, denial of 
service, and the modification, manipulation, corruption or deletion of data. This definition only 
highlights the technology aspects of information warfare and excludes the potential strategic 
implication that it could be only the method for a larger objective to downgrade the decision-making 
potential and subsequent power of an adversary. The ICT-related conceptualisation of information 
warfare will be regarded as cyber warfare for the purposes of this study. 
4.4.4 Military definitions 
According to Kuehl (2007:10), information operations (which is the preferred term for information 
warfare in the USA military) are defined in the Information Operations Road Map published in 
October 2003 as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer 
network operations, military deception and operations security in concert with specified supporting 
and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision-making while protecting your own. While this definition is somewhat more focused than 
the Martin Libicki definition, in essence, it is a purely military perspective and similarly includes a 
broader range of actions than merely information-related activities.  
Alger (1996:12) described information warfare as “actions taken to achieve information superiority 
by affecting adversary information, information based processes, and information systems, while 
defending one’s own information, information based processes and information systems”. This 
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definition does provide the strategic aim of information warfare in a clear and concise manner. Its 
limitation is that it does not demarcate these mentioned actions more precisely. Even within the 
limitations facing the political or military leader in the past, information superiority has been vital in 
the successes and failures of strategic positioning and warfare. What thus needs to be further 
defined is what these actions entail.  
In this regard, Widnall and Fogelman added action elements by defining information warfare as "… 
any action to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions; protecting 
ourselves against those actions and exploiting our own military information functions" (Widnall & 
Fogelman, 1997). 
Hutchinson and Warren (2001:2-4) also contributed in this regard by conceptualising information 
warfare as an attack on the elements of data, context, information and knowledge (see Figure 4.1). 
Information warfare is explained by them as information operations conducted during times of crisis 
or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. It is 
the act of influencing civil or military decision making, operational capability and public opinion by 
using information and information processing both as a target and a weapon, and to protect 
oneself against such influence. Thus, information warfare has both an offensive and a defensive 
side. Information warfare can be carried out by civil, political, psychological, social, economic and 
military means on a strategic, operational or tactical level (Candolin, 2003). Most of the military 
orientated definitions also refer to the non-military environments in which information warfare could 
manifest.  
4.4.5  Synopsis of information warfare definitions 
Evaluating information warfare definitions identified three types namely broad, ICT related and 
military definitions.  Although all definitions highlight some relevant aspects of information warfare, 
not one of these definitions does justice to the full spectrum of activities, which could be regarded 
as information warfare. An important unifying factor in these definitions is that information warfare 
is therefore an attempt to bring together all facets of power projection to bear on an adversary in a 
synergistic manner to achieve objectives (Armistead, 2004:18). 
4.4.6 The relationship between information warfare and power 
An important factor not highlighted in many information warfare definitions is the relationship 
between information warfare and power. Many practical and theoretical activities related to the 
manipulation of data, information and knowledge do not directly diminish or influence the political, 
socio-economic and military power of governments and governing elites. These activities, which 
could be economic, social or criminal related, will not be regarded as information warfare in terms 
of this study.  
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National power is increasingly dependent on broad-based competitiveness in the creation and use 
of the dominant technology (Gompert, 1999:59). The advances in technology, particularly in 
telecommunications, information technology and media fields, have changed the worldview of 
power over especially the past two decades. The importance of information as an element of 
power lies in the use of information and its fungibility, which makes it different from the past. The 
ability to transform information, to move it or display its power all relates directly to its 
transferability. This is where technology has revolutionised the power structure. The merging of 
what were once stovepipe and separate areas has opened the access to power for everyone, 
through the use of information, and has given people a means to distribute it around the world 
(Armistead, 2004:13). 
Information has consequently evolved as an element of national power along with diplomatic, 
military and economic power while at the same time information has become woven through the 
other power elements since their activities also have an informational impact (Murphy, 2006:vii). 
However, the information revolution has not equalised power among states (Nye, 2005:233). The 
relationship between information warfare and the capacity of the state to maintain and expand its 
ability to project its power remains one of the key factors differentiating between information 
warfare as security issue and information warfare as societal phenomenon.  
4.4.7 Definition of information warfare 
Taking the above-mentioned evaluation of the different definitions of information warfare into 
account, a definition for the use of this term is proposed: 
Information warfare is defined as actions focused on destabilising or manipulating the core 
information networks of a state or entity in society with the aim to influence the ability and 
will to project power as well as efforts to counter similar attacks by an opposing entity 
and/or state.  
The focus of information warfare is thus on disrupting and manipulating an adversary’s decision-
making processes (Wilson, 2007:2). This can be done on two levels, namely on the cognitive and 
the technological levels. Flowing from this, information warfare manifests itself in two distinct but 
also related ways (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3). The distinction between the two manifestations 
of what is deemed to be information warfare is important in terms of this study since the 
implications of these phenomena in terms of the future impact on national security are to be 
investigated. One manifestation, which encompasses both netwar and psychological operations, is 
closely related to the state’s capacity/vulnerability in terms of networking, perceptions, deception, 
decisions, influence and knowledge. The second, cyber warfare, refers to the technical 
infrastructure supporting the state’s power capacity in terms of digital networks, critical ICT 
infrastructure protection, computer software and hardware. There are some similarit ies and 
commonalities between these two manifestations of information warfare but the main differential 
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lies on the cognitive-technical continuum identified within the broader concept of information 
warfare (see Figure 4.3). 
Table 4.1: Manifestation of information warfare 
Information warfare Type 1: Netwar / 
Psychological operations 
Type 2: Cyber warfare 
National security threat Yes Yes 
Sphere Networked relationships / 
cognitive level  
Human decision-making 
level 
Cyberspace technological 
level  
Target Networked relationships, 
decision-making processes 
by influencing perceptions 
Information systems, by 
altering data and 
information 
Aim Corrupt decision making / 
focus diverse forces on 
selected targets 
Corrupt / disrupt modern 
management processes 
Method Influence within networked 
societies, propaganda 
Cyber methods 
Approach Deception Disruption / destruction 
Strategy Asymmetric / symmetric Cyberspace operations  
Enablers Mass media / networked 
relationships 
Internet / ICT networks 
Counter Social networking; counter 
propaganda and public 
relations 
Network security 
Technology used Broadcasting / ICT / social 
networking 
ICT 
Timeline History / present / future Present (early stages) / 
future 
Scope   Largely strategic but also 
tactical 
Largely tactical (with 
strategic implications) 
Location Local – global Global 
Actors State and non-state Individual, non-state and 
state 
Prime drivers Human mind Technology 
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Training ground Higher education / 
experience 
Technical training and 
education / technical 
experience 
Battle space Mind space Cyberspace 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Components of information warfare 
Source: Own compilation. 
4.4.8 Netwar, psychological operations and cyber warfare defined 
Netwar is described by Arquilla and Rondfeldt (1997) as follows: “Netwar refers to an emerging 
mode of conflict at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in which the 
protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies 
attuned to the Information Age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed small groups 
who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a 
precise central command.”  
The spectrum of netwar may also seem broad at first glance, but there is an underlying pattern that 
cuts across all variations. This is the use of network forms of organisation, doctrine, strategy, and 
technology attuned to the Information Age (Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini, 1999:83). Mass and mobility 
will not necessarily decide the outcome of conflict. Instead, decentralised and networked forces 
with superior command, control and information systems will disperse the fog of war while 
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enshrouding the enemy in it. Historically, in the 12th and 13th century, Mongol armies for example 
successfully employed netwar doctrine12 (Magsig, 1995). A modern example in terms of netwar 
tactics in employing decentralised networked protests is the #feesmustfall student movement 
against increases in study fees at South African universities in October 2015 (Dasnois, 2015). 
Closely connected to the networking model of netwar is the concept of psychological operations. 
This refers to an intangible sphere, in essence the conflict area is people’s minds, and criteria for 
winning or losing are also heavily culture-dependent (Eriksson, 1999:58). Some scholars argued 
that strategic advantage does not lie in the concentration of facts and figures, but in “… the 
complementarily and singularity of the brains who interpret them”. National and widespread sense-
making capability matters more than electronic information highways, according to Baumard 
(1996). Psychological operations can also be conducted continuously to influence perceptions of 
opponents favorable to the source’s own strategic and tactical objectives (Goldstein & Jacobowitz, 
2002:4). Thus efforts to influence this sense-making encompass more than just using electronic 
and digital means in terms of both netwar and psychological warfare. Both of these are as old as 
warfare and conflict itself and have many historic examples. Advances in ICT have the potential to 
impact both of these phenomena in the 21st century.  
Cyber warfare (cyberwar) is a term used to describe a type of conflict that takes place in 
cyberspace (the virtual world and the internet) instead of in the physical world. This may include 
attacks on (Computerhope.com, 2007): 
 
 Government and/or military run websites gaining confidential or classified information, 
disrupting or disabling the agency from doing everything it was meant to do, and/or 
creating backdoors for future attacks 
 Individual or a collection of websites that prevent them from being accessed 
 Major utilities such as power, water and communication systems, causing disruptions or 
complete outages 
 Financial institutions, such as banks and stock markets, causing disruptions, outages 
and/or false information 
   Major backbones, routers or other sections of the internet, causing disruptions in all 
internet traffic. 
 
While information warfare is only in its early stages, it creates the probability that future adversaries 
might exploit the tools and techniques of the information revolution to hold at risk (not to destroy 
but to cause large-scale or massive disruption) key national strategic assets such as the initial 
elements of the national political will, decision-making processes, the capacity to communicate and 
                                               
12    The Mongols, a classic example of an ancient force that fought according to netwar doctrine, were organised more like a network 
than a hierarchy. More recently, the combined forces of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, a relatively minor military power that 
defeated a great modern power, operated more like a network than an institution. In both cases, the defeated opponents of the 
Mongols and the Vietnamese were large institutions whose forces were designed to fight set-piece, attrition battles (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 1995). 
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information processes within the national infrastructure sectors (Molander, Wilson, Mussington & 
Mesic, 1998:3).  
At this stage, some fundamentals of information warfare need to be identified with a view to serve 
as an introduction to the definition of national security. While different targets for information 
warfare can be identified, it is possible to recognise the common fundamentals underpinning all 
forms of this phenomenon. 
4.5 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
Taking cognisance of information warfare as an overriding term, while also noting the history of 
information in conflict as well as criticism on existing definitions, the following fundamentals 
endeavour to identify some common elements as well as significant characteristics of information 
warfare:  
 Information in especially a networking13 capacity is central to the information warfare 
concept with attaining information superiority as a tactical and strategic aim. 
 Information warfare refers to the cognitive and technological disruption linked to conflict and 
war but not to the kinetic aspects associated with war and terrorist activities.  
 Information warfare is linked to using information as instrument for manipulation, power 
projection, leveraging and creating an advantage. 
 The strengthening of network-orientated organisations and interactions, while consequently 
hierarchical orientated organisations and interactions are weakened because of the 
information revolution and expansion of global communications (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
2001:1). 
 The global network ecology is transforming itself from a purely communications medium to 
a social environment of growing political and security significance (Vlahos, 1998:77). 
 The exponential growth of technology, globalisation and increasing significance of 
networking are enhancing the future significance of information warfare. 
 Information warfare is in essence a transdisciplinary concept covering a wide array of 
interests, including the political, governance, technological, psychological, social, media, 
economic and military fields. 
 Both offensive and defensive roles are envisaged for information warfare.  
 Information warfare is not bound by geographic limitations. 
 The cost of conducting information warfare would in most cases be much lower compared 
to other forms of power projection. 
 It is widespread and available to any country, and, in most cases, to any individual or group 
that wants it (McLendon, 2008). Some technological skills barriers exist in the case of cyber 
warfare. 
 The increasing dual-use nature of especially information technology results in many 
technologies having both military and civilian applications (Schneier, 2008). 
                                               
13  A network can be understood very simply as a series of nodes that are connected. The nodes can be individuals, 
organisations, firms or computers, so long as they are connected in significant ways (Williams, 2001:66).  
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 Information warfare invokes asymmetric action. Asymmetry is about the qualitative 
difference in the means, values and style of opposing powers. Once a state or entity insists 
on superiority in power projection, its disadvantaged opponents resort to unconventional 
asymmetrical means to oppose it, avoiding its strengths and concentrating on its 
vulnerabilities (Bishara, 2001). 
 
These fundamentals of information warfare as well as the content of information warfare (netwar, 
psychological warfare and cyber warfare) are revisited in Chapter 5 where the consequences in 
terms of the environmental scan are evaluated. Now that the fundamentals of information warfare 
have been established, it is necessary to focus on defining and understanding national security. 
4.6 DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY 
4.6.1 Context for finding a definition for national security   
Security is a problem of a special kind. It embraces all those exchanges between humans and their 
agents, such as states, international organisations, companies, associations and other entities that 
have as their aim the pursuit of their preferred outcomes while also being prepared to use coercive 
intimidation and even violence in this process (Kolodziej, 2005:23).  
Trager and Simonie (1973:36) defined national security as “that part of government policy having 
as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the 
protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries”. Brown 
(1983:4) explained this on a more practical level when he defined national security as “the ability to 
preserve the nation’s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest 
of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions and governance from disruption 
from outside, and to control its borders”. Traditionally, security is conceived as “inherently politically 
conservative precisely because it emphasizes permanence, control, and predictability” (Dalby, 
1992:98). Security was regarded within narrow, almost exclusively military terms, and the Cold War 
definitions of national security use the national state as referent of security. Wing (2002:16) argued 
that this approach regards security as a burden that must be borne by national states.  
Traditionally, the threat or reality of interstate war was regarded as the primary cause of insecurity 
and most of the times the main priority for serious consideration by national security decision-
makers. However, since the mid-1980s (perhaps even since the oil shocks of the 1970s), this 
limited traditional concept of security has become increasingly untenable. While the thinking about 
security has changed throughout history, this has been boosted significantly since the end of the 
Cold War and the rise of globalisation (Wing, 2002:iii). Threats that have been largely 
overshadowed by the risks of nuclear war between the superpowers during the Cold War emerged 
more prominently (Jones, 1996:207). 
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Non-military issues such as economic, environmental and human rights related issues have 
increasingly forced their way on to the global security agenda (Sheehan, 2000:471). A United 
Nations (2004) report titled Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
states: “… security threats do not respect national boundaries – from invasion, war and conflict 
within states they extend to poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation.” Security 
threats also include “the spread and possible use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as 
well as terrorism and transnational crime”. One of the key driving forces in this expanding global 
security agenda is the role and implications of technological advancement. Most technologies 
occupy a rather problematic space by both enabling and undermining conditions of security 
(Rappert & Croft, 2007:7).  
The Information Age has a significant influence on national security. The contemporary challenge 
now is how to meet national security needs in this new and ever-changing technology environment 
(Goldman, 2004:11). The control and use of information and knowledge is a central engine driving 
human activity and progress. As individuals, organisations and states interact more and more in 
cyberspace, political, military and economic leaders are under increasing pressure to manage, 
deter and reduce the level of associated risks. Threats to cyberspace range from the systematic 
and persistent to the decentralised and dispersed and to the accidental and non-malevolent 
(Goldman, 2004:1). At this level, cyber warfare poses a significant national security threat. 
In addition, national security threats include both tangible and intangible threats. Security is not 
only concerned with the state of strategic affairs but also with a state of mind. Perceptions related 
to a sense of security are an important determinant of security policy in its own right (Mangold, 
1990:6). Society’s degree of confidence, clarity of purpose and level of trust in the leadership are 
all potential targets to undermine security (Durodié, 2007:193).  
The change from the traditional single focus of national security also created diversity in terms of 
the challenges posed by national security threats. It is useful to evaluate five basic dichotomies 
relevant to national security and to refer to the information warfare implications for all. These 
dichotomies are: security of the state versus security of humans; hard or direct versus soft or 
indirect interference; legality versus legitimacy; pre-emption versus prevention; and non-state 
actors versus states (Slaughter, 2004:2): 
State security versus human security 
Traditionally, national security was equated with state security. This referred to the capacity of 
sovereign states to defend against outside threats to their survival as states by way of military 
defeat, subjugation, or economic and political control (Slaughter, 2004:2). Dr Mahbub ul Haq first 
drew global attention to the concept of human security in the United Nations Development 
Programme's 1994 Human Development Report and sought to influence the UN's 1995 World 
Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen (UNDP, 1994). Since then, human security has 
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been receiving more attention, in particular from key global development institutions such as the 
World Bank.  
The UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report defined human security as freedom from want and 
fear. The UNDP argues that the scope of global security should be expanded to include threats to 
security in seven areas, namely economy, food, health, environment, personal, community and 
political (UNDP,1994:2). Growing dependency on networked information systems and ICT in 
managing these aspects of society also ensures that human security related issues remains 
relevant from an information warfare perspective.  
Hard versus soft interventions 
Options for intervention on national security have widened. In reality, the rising interdependence 
between states are leading to the gradual reduction of independence of states within the 
international system. Progressively, the international system endeavours to formalise this 
interdependence and thereby to generate globally accepted mechanisms for “soft” interferences in 
the affairs of the different states (Nye, 1990b:153-171). These interferences can be diverse, 
including accords limiting states’ freedom of action. These limitations can be implemented in 
different ways – from a more invasive evaluation of state actions to international sanctions and 
elaborate inspections that have to be applied (Bildt, 2004:37). The information realm also offers a 
wide array of possible soft power interventions which were not that feasible in the past. 
Legality versus legitimacy 
National security finds itself increasingly in the environment of new threats versus old rules. The 
international legal rules and institutions that form the basis of the world order were mostly 
fashioned after World War II in reaction to the political and economic trends that resulted in the 
Great Depression and two world wars. Security threats such as the 9/11 attacks and global radical 
religious terrorism severely challenge the strict interpretation of the legality of actions in terms of 
international law. An international commission appointed after the NATO intrusion in Kosovo 
without any earlier UN sanction in 1999 was deemed illegal but regarded as legitimate by the 
international community (Slaughter, 2004:5). The distinction between legality and legitimacy is part 
of the change from one legal order to another. It refers to bringing specific legal rules up to date in 
order to meet shifting economic and political conditions (Slaughter, 2004:6). This distinction is 
especially pertinent in terms of information warfare as the international law on this is still largely 
non-existent, creating many legal and legitimacy issues in terms of possible action regarding 
information warfare. 
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Pre-emption versus prevention 
The USA Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy unilaterally assured a greatly 
extended concept of the customary international pre-emption legal doctrine as a reaction to 
upcoming security threats. Another option more in line with international multi-lateral norms is a 
policy of prevention. According to Slaughter (2004:7), once a threat has materialised, whether it is 
imminent, near-imminent or potentially imminent, a pre-emptive strike is a meagre and likely 
unproductive alternative for a policy of thwarting its surfacing before it manifests. While military pre-
emption will probably not be accepted by most states, in the information environment pre-emption 
could possibly be more commonly used as it would be much easier to deny involvement and 
accountability. However, the challenge to identify perpetrators and actors also severely limits the 
effective identification of an imminent danger which may increase the possibility of pre-emptive 
actions against the wrong targets. Pre-emptive actions in an information warfare context could be 
manipulated and the potential for unintended consequences such as the serious escalation of 
tensions would be a real danger.  
State versus non-state actors 
Taking into account state versus non-state actors’ contestation, it is acknowledged that what are 
now regarded as non-state actors14 pose dominant threats to regions and the world in general 
(Slaughter, 2004:7). The non-state challenge has again regained focus at the turn of the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, because of three developments (Bailes, 2012:121): 
‐  the shift in overall frequency of major armed conflict worldwide to consist almost exclusively 
of intra-state conflicts, thus focusing attention on the agents of violence who typify such 
conflicts, and on the indirect as well as direct damage they cause for people, states, and 
global security 
‐  the perceived vulnerability of the developed states to non-state opponents exploiting new 
technologies and ‘transnational’ modes of recruitment, procurement, and operation. 
- the effects of globalisation in enhancing the relative power of all types of non-state or trans-
state actors, from multinational corporations through to violent extremists. Globalised 
conditions help non-state antagonists to access and attack both state and non-state 
targets, in virtual as well as physical space, both on home territory and abroad. This dark 
side of globalization is almost inextricable from the productive side: the risk comes as much 
from states’ and societies’ growing dependence on worldwide economic partnerships and 
communication lines, as from the ability of hostiles to exploit global reach and mobility. 
In the future, the challenges posed to national security by these dichotomies could potentially be 
overshadowed by the rise of non-linear15 challenges to national security. Information warfare is one 
                                               
14       Historically non-state actors included rebel movements, traders fighting among themselves or as proxies for states, and 
‘mercenary’ soldiers working for both state and non-state interests (Bailes, 2012:121). 
15
  Non-linear systems refer to the arrangement of nature – life and its complications, such as warfare – in which inputs and outputs 
are not proportional; where the whole is not quantitatively equal to its parts, or even qualitatively recognisable in its constituent 
components; and where cause and effect are not evident. It is an environment where phenomena are unpredictable, but within 
bounds, self-organising; where unpredictability frustrates conventional planning, where solution as self-organisation defeats 
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such non-linear challenge that can manifest in the future. Security has become a complex affair, 
pursued across three basic dimensions: physical space (territory, atmosphere and ocean), 
infrastructure (networks and systems that determine how societies are organised) and ideas 
(norms and perceptions that shape social action). As security is transforming, it could be expected 
to see changes in the way states and societies are organised to achieve security through space, 
infrastructure and ideas (Latham, 2003:6-7). 
4.6.2 Definition of national security 
As explained above, the contemporary national security environment contains elements of both 
continuity and change. Globalisation, the information revolution and technology’s influence on 
geopolitics are all factors accentuating change. From the perspective of any particular point in time, 
including now, the unique set of forces and events of the moment may seem to predominate the 
evolving system. It should, however, be taken into account that some forces that are seemingly 
unique in a narrow perspective appear less so when viewed within the general evolution of the 
international system (Snow, 2004:156). Both change and continuity underlie the security dynamics 
which the national security decision-maker faces. 
Taking into account the major fault line of continuity and change, the following definition for 
national security is proposed:  
National security refers to all government-sanctioned actions and measures driven by the 
application of national will16 and taken with the aim to create an environment in which the 
country’s population, state structures, territorial integrity, interests and sovereignty are 
protected.  
The growing complexity of today’s security environment results in governments’ increasingly 
having to deal simultaneously with multiple, often inter-related and yet distinct challenges, while the 
underlining economic and political changes are driven not only by governments but increasingly by 
“multinational corporations, state-owned enterprises, NGOs and even by super-empowered 
individuals” (Bremmer, 2006:66). 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
While certain aspects of information warfare are as old as human civilisation, the Information Age 
has created unique and new opportunities for information warfare to manifest as a national security 
threat. As a concept, however, information warfare is fairly new as it has only been used since the 
early 1990s. This resulted in diverse and sometimes contradictory definitions, with no consensus 
on the exact meaning of this concept. In this study, information warfare is defined as the 
                                                                                                                                                            
control; and where the bounds are the actionable variable, requiring new ways of thinking and acting (Alberts & Czerwinski: 
2002:xiii-xiv). 
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manipulation of networking communication by entities with the aim to influence power relationships 
between countries and the states’ governing capacity. Information warfare is taking place on a 
cognitive-technological continuum. Within the cognitive sphere, information warfare manifests as 
netwar and psychological operations. Cyberwar manifests within the technological sphere.  
Although information warfare can occur on all levels of society, this study focuses on the 
implications of information warfare for the security of the state. A range of information warfare 
fundamentals have been identified. As many of these fundamentals are related to the mind space 
and cyberspace environment within which information warfare takes place, these fundamentals 
provide a new dimension to power projection and security-related activities. With national security 
defined as the application of national will by the state with the aim to create an environment in 
which the country’s population, state structures, territorial integrity and sovereignty are protected, 
information warfare presents a plethora of potential threats and risks to the modern state. The 
rising scope of the non-state actor as a significant national security concern does present a major 
national security challenge. Non-state antagonists exploiting new technologies and ‘transnational’ 
modes of recruitment, procurement, and operation coupled with the advantages globalisation 
present in enhancing the relative power of such non-state antagonists to inter alia exploit 
information warfare as a power projection tool.  
In Chapter 5, an environmental scan will be used to evaluate the current milieu within which 
information warfare manifests, with the capacity to also provide some level of insight into the 
driving forces that will influence how information warfare might manifest in the future. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
16
  In this context, national will refers to the “paradoxical trinity” as formulated by Von Clausewitz (see Figure 4.2).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION WARFARE  
AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
After defining information warfare and national security, and providing the international relations as 
well as futures theoretical framework within which this phenomenon of information warfare is 
examined, the attention shifts in this chapter to the current manifestation of information warfare 
within the context of the multiple environments in which it occurs. 
An environmental scan refers to the informational process through which the scanner is attentive to 
the environment with the creative goal of discovering insights and reducing future uncertainty 
(Chalus-Sauvannet, 2011:103). This environmental scan is mainly focused on areas that have a 
direct bearing on information warfare as a national security threat. However, an environmental 
scan is not only of value to explain the current environment; it is especially useful as a futures 
methodological tool. This is because scanning the horizon provides a way to identify new 
developments that can challenge past assumptions as well as new perspectives on future threats 
or opportunities (Gordon & Glenn, 2003:3). As indicated in Chapter 2, scientific work should 
investigate and identify relationships and non-relationships between what individuals experience 
and what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world 
(Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2005:21). Environmental scanning provides a unique 
capacity in this regard. 
In this study environmental scanning is primarily used as a futures analysis method to investigate 
uncertainties about the future in a systematic fashion (Heinonen, 2008:53) with the aim to assist in 
identifying the main drivers relevant to the manifestation of information warfare as a national 
security threat by the 2030s. Information warfare is a phenomenon that includes cognitive as well 
as technological dimensions and the involvement of highly networked spheres while both tactical 
and strategic ranges are covered. Information is thus gathered from the broader environment with 
the aim of developing a better understanding of those factors and forces that may have a bearing 
on the way possible, probable and preferable futures take shape (Roux, 2007:1). 
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Environmental scanning has become increasingly useful for planners and analysts because of its 
value as functional tool for future studies, allowing for the analysis of information on specific topics 
of interest and on the environment influencing the area of interest (Masini, 1993:102). An additional 
element of futures thinking and environmental scanning is the concept of risk. Risks are primarily 
linked with the notion of uncertainty, which is an inherent quality of the future (Heinonen, 2008:53). 
In this chapter the focus is also extended to information warfare targeting as well as the current 
manifestation of information warfare. Next, the challenges presented by the future control and 
management of information warfare are highlighted. Some initial insights into how information 
warfare could manifest in the future are shared. This all informs the development of an information 
warfare future analysis model presented in Chapter 6. 
5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING CONCEPTUALISED 
Environmental scanning is the acquisition and use of information about events, trends, risks and 
relationships that form part of the external environment of any given phenomenon. This knowledge 
assists in identifying the future development of these phenomena (Choo, 2001). Breaking this 
down further, it is possible to identify in more detail what objectives should be pursued in an 
environmental scanning process. While environmental scanning is primarily focused on the current 
situation, already future-related thinking issues are raised. This future-orientated nature of 
environmental scanning is of particular value as scanning can increase and enhance 
communication and critical thought about future-oriented issues in general (Choo, 1999). 
The concept “environment” is defined by Armstrong (2001:780) as conditions surrounding a 
situation where the “environment includes information about the ranges and distributions of cues, 
the correlations among them, and the relations between the cues and the event being judged”. 
Most futurist definitions of environmental scanning are extremely narrow and only refer to the 
environment outside a commercial company. Often, environmental scanning is done with the view 
to advance and maintain a sustainable competitive advantage (Choo, 1999). In this study, a 
broader application of environmental scanning is used. At its broadest level, namely the macro 
environment, the focus is on the Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political 
(STEEP) sectors (Kurian & Molitor, 1996:814). Various futurists use different systems to uniquely 
classify the focus area of their studies (Haberman, 2013). As the focus of research is on 
information warfare, the applicability of the STEEP sectors would need to be critically evaluated. 
Haberman (2013) identifies the Environmental (Ecology) Scanning sector as encompassing the 
natural world around us and understanding how the nature affects humanity and how humanity 
affects nature. Issues of concern are inter alia global warming, clean water, air quality, agriculture 
and increasing severity of storms. While these phenomena do have a significant influence on the 
world currently and in the future, these phenomena do not significantly manifest in the information 
warfare domain. Additionally the absence of the phenomena such as war and conflict, which go to 
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the core role of information warfare in society as an additional fully-fledged sector, can be regarded 
as a significant gap. Therefore, the environmental sector is replaced with a War/Conflict sector 
creating the Technological, War/Conflict, Economic, Political and Social (TWEPS) macro-
environmental hexagon. See Figure 5.1 for a graphical representation of the TWEPS macro-
environmental hexagon.  
 
Figure 5.1: The TWEPS macro-environmental hexagon 
Source: Adapted from Spies, 2005. 
This type of model is popular due to its simple structure and application. However, this simplicity is 
also the model’s main drawback because its application often fails to generate a satisfactory 
degree of precision and comprehensiveness. The risk is that such analyses address no more than 
the usual surface phenomena (Pillkahn, 2008:86). In order to overcome this constraint a layered 
and systematic evaluation has been incorporated in the information warfare futures model used in 
Chapter 6 to identify the main driving forces emanating from this environmental scan. 
In scanning the environment of information warfare, it is important to analyse vast amounts of 
literature and to determine what lies within the ambit of information warfare, what remains outside, 
and what can transform it. While some of these outcomes are generally seen as unlikely, if they 
occur, they will have a significant impact on human endeavours. However, being merely unlikely or 
having a high impact are not sufficient conditions for the manifestation of, say, information warfare; 
there must also be causes, motivations and reasons why a particular issue is emergent. Emerging 
issues analysis searches for “small ripples that might one day become tidal waves” (Inayatullah, 
2005b). 
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Building on this, an environmental scan must be equally attuned to the speed, scope and 
significance (S3) of each challenge identified. Anticipating how, when and why different contexts 
may interact to disrupt society requires the development of “ripple intelligence” which could serve 
as an early warning system. Visualising the interactions of simultaneous events as ripples on a 
pond can help leaders to expect the unexpected and thus be more prepared to seize opportunities 
(Heidrick & Struggles, 2015:3). However, new concepts usually begin as undeveloped thoughts. 
Shaping these thoughts into coherent form, informal deliberations and oral discussions are 
necessary. Over time, new ideas find their way into more permanent media (Molitor, 2003:67). 
Masini (1993:83) explained that there appears to be a general awareness among decision-makers 
that the complexity of reality is such that it has become imperative to look into the future, beyond 
any one specific field of interest, taking into account national, regional and/or global contexts. 
Using Coates’ observations (1985), the following objectives of an environmental scanning method 
can be identified: 
- Detecting technical, scientific, political, economic and social events and trends 
important to the phenomena. 
 
- Defining the potential changes, opportunities or threats for the phenomena implied 
by the mentioned events and trends.  
 
- Promoting a futures orientation in the thinking regarding the phenomena under 
investigation. 
 
- Alerting policy-makers and other interested individuals to trends that are diverging, 
converging, slowing down, speeding up or interacting. 
 
Morrison (1992) identified four types of scanning which need to be considered: 
- Undirected viewing, which consists of reading a variety of publications for no 
specific purpose other than to be informed.  
 
- Conditioned viewing, which consists of responding to this information in terms of 
assessing its relevance to the user. 
 
- Informal searching, which consists of actively seeking specific information but doing 
it in a relatively unstructured way. 
 
- Formal searching, which is a proactive mode of scanning that entails formal 
methodologies to obtain information for specific purposes. 
 
As information warfare is a new phenomenon, conditioned viewing is the main approach followed 
in this study, with the researcher detecting events, trends and risks from the environment that are 
likely to influence information warfare as national security threat. The environmental scan is also 
attuned to especially the S3 (speed, scope and significance) of trends identified.  
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5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL SCANNING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
With the world confronting multidimensional challenges, environmental scanning is one way of 
managing this complexity. Factors facing humanity include changes in power structures because 
technology changes, economic contradictions, social and cultural polarisation, which have created 
new problems of control, understanding, choice and policy-making (Slaughter, 2005b). In order to 
assist sense-making and analysis, the environmental study is thus focused (as indicated in Figure 
5.1) on the TWEPS environments while also taking into account the fact that these environments 
are exceptionally linked and interdependent. The environmental scan is conducted within the 
context of the Information Age, in which a knowledge-based society surrounded by a high-tech 
global economy influences results in cross-cutting impacts of the different environments.  
Harknett (2004:18-22) identified at least five inescapable features that can be ascribed to the 
Information Age. They revolve around the occurrences of accessibility, availability, speed, 
affordability and recursive simplicity:  
- Accessibility: The increasing networking of individuals and computers has led in 
turn to the networking of individual networks. This high (and ever-growing) degree 
of connectivity has reduced significantly the obstacles to information retrieval. An 
important advantage brought about by the Information Age is that information 
retrieval became global and not primarily dependent on being in geographic 
proximity to the information storage depositories.  
 
- Availability: Cyberspace offers significant progress in availability by creating the 
opportunity for multiple concurrent retrieval of information. Access is also less 
geographically dependent, meaning that much more information is available than in 
the past. 
 
- Speed: There is an enormous increase in computational and communicative speed. 
What is distinctive about this age is that vast quantities of accessible information 
can be disseminated and processed in seconds. 
 
- Affordability: The resource base required to utilise the advantages of information 
technology is relatively low and decreasing rapidly. This does not imply that there 
are no skill-based or financial barriers, but it proposes that such barriers are 
becoming less and less significant for general access. Information technology is 
affordable in the broad sense. In general, it requires the investment of less time for 
training and money. 
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- Recursive simplicity: The final feature of the Information Age is the inherent 
recursive nature of computer technology, which supports a clear trend of ever-
expanding growth in access, availability and speed with a simultaneous reduction in 
cost and skill barriers.  
 
These features of the Information Age are impacting the general environment in which information 
warfare manifests and have become central themes through all environments under investigation. 
In order to ensure a focused approach, the environmental scan is not an all-encompassing 
collection of facts pertaining to the mentioned sectors, but centred on the current interrelated 
trends, changes, relationships and risks in the different environments that have a strategic bearing 
on information warfare as a growing security threat. 
A globalised interconnected future (in terms of the threats posed by information warfare) is 
awaiting South Africa. Borders have a negligible effect on the two most crucial identified aspects of 
information warfare, namely the cognitive and technological domains. As information warfare is an 
issue that transcends borders and other barriers, it is necessary to take an inclusive approach with 
regard to the environmental analysis. 
5.3.1 Technological environment 
Technology, in the context of this study, does not only refer to artefacts (devices, machines, 
equipment or material objects) but also to knowing how to achieve practical purposes in the world. 
It includes systems and methods which are the result of scientific knowledge being used for 
practical reasons. Material technologies are much more visible because their roles in change are 
more identifiable than social and intellectual technologies (laws, institutions and theories) (Cornish, 
2004:14-15). As humanity’s scientific understanding grows, so too does the ability to engineer 
instruments to manipulate the world (Rappert & Croft, 2007:5). Intellectual technologies do, 
however, play a significant role in the changes in society’s power structures and remain relevant in 
terms of the use of information as a power instrument in a world where there is increased 
consciousness of certain values such as human rights that cross national frontiers (Nye, 
2005:260). 
Technological progress provides a useful perspective to analyse the rapid phase of change 
currently experienced in global society. Over the last 100 years, there has been more rapid 
technological change than ever before in human history (Strange, 1996:7). The main driving force 
in recent socio-economic development seems to be the accumulation and use of technological 
knowledge. Therefore, changes in society have speeded up significantly due to rapid technological 
innovation and progress, which leads to substantial change in the economy, government and 
institutions of society (Cornish, 2004:20). Through the ages, technological development has been 
an indispensable trigger for change. In this regard, see Table 5.1 for a summary of the benefits, 
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uses and effects of the three major technological revolutions experienced by humanity, namely the 
Agricultural, Industrial and Information Ages. The Agricultural and Industrial Ages have not 
disappeared; they have become sequentially layered parts of humanity’s history of socio-economic 
and political evolution (Houle, 2013:13).  
Table 5.1: Three technological revolutions 
                                     Agricultural               Industrial                   Information 
Origin Near East, 9000 BC Britain, 1750 United States, 1944 
Catalytic 
technology 
Grain cultivation 
(wheat) 
Steam engine Computer 
Benefits More food per unit 
of land; grain 
storable and 
tradable 
Inexpensive, 
dependable source 
of power 
Fast, cheap 
decision-making for 
problems soluble by 
algorithms 
Uses Feeding people, 
safeguarding food 
supply, trading 
goods (functions 
like money) 
Mechanised pumps, 
machine-powered 
vehicles, power 
machinery in 
factories 
Mathematical 
calculations 
processing records, 
word processing, 
database 
management, 
telephone 
exchanges, etc. 
Effects Population increase, 
early cities, roads, 
shipping, 
accounting, metal-
working, wheeled 
vehicles, writing, 
scholarship, science 
Factory towns, 
urbanisation, 
railroads, 
automobiles, rising 
living standards, 
airplanes, surging 
demand for natural 
resources – metal 
ores, coal, 
petroleum 
Faster, cheaper 
information 
handling; better 
management of 
communications; 
tighter inventory 
controls; better 
distribution of 
goods; higher 
standard of living 
Source: Cornish, 2004:16. 
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The current age can also be called the "age of technology", but the more apt name is the 
Information Age. The idea of the Information Age comes from the writings of Toffler (1970 & 1980), 
whose “wave theory” of technological and civilization enhancing development argues that human 
history can be seen as the unfolding of three successive and overlapping technological revolutions 
or waves (i.e. the agricultural, industrial and informational). Currently, humanity is experiencing the 
ascendancy of the Third Wave, namely the Information Age, with its associated developmental 
transformations (Kilibarda, 2003). The benefits of pervasive technologies include economic 
productivity, e-commerce, global collaboration, efficiencies and change in government and society, 
information richness, data-rich scientific and technological advances, societal knowledge and 
political transparency (Pick & Sarkar, 2015:1). 
Increasingly, in the Information Age, technology and information are interdependent, with advances 
in one entailing and dependent on advances in the other. The expanding flow of information, the 
evolution of the global economy and the creation of the internet are all factors in development, 
boosting innovation and globalisation (Masini, 2005). ICT remains central to ongoing innovation, 
strengthening a global networked-based system.  
In a network-based system, computers communicate with computers. Information is stored digitally 
in electronic databases, and because the computers are connected, this means that every digital 
database in the world is, in principle, accessible from anywhere else in the world by anyone with 
the authority to access it. All this happens at a very high speed, so there are only insignificant lags. 
The locations of the individuals and the data have become irrelevant. In this “virtual world” 
consisting of the information and communication layer, proximity does not matter anymore. Delays 
remain minimal, with the binding economic constraint not so much how much information can be 
found, but rather how much information can be processed. Network-based information technology 
has considerably reduced transaction costs (Spence, 2010:227). Based on developments in the 
fields of the Internet of Things (IoT), additive manufacturing (commonly referred to as 3D printing) 
and computing everywhere, the merging of the “virtual world” and the “real world” is an upcoming 
trend (Carter, 2014).  
While computing devices are the most visible symbols of globalisation, ICT is also proving to be 
one of the most potent agents of change. No area of the world and no arena of politics, economics, 
society and culture are immune from the pervasive impact of computer technology (Kegley & 
Wittkopf, 1997:251). ICT can be regarded as a force multiplier. Miniaturisation, growing capacity 
and software innovation have propelled the rapid worldwide spread of computing devices. These 
devices owe their growth and impact to a phenomenon dubbed Moore’s Law (after Gordon Moore, 
the founder of Intel), which says that computing power and capacity double every 18 months. 
Hence, the cost of digital information processing and computing started a long and rapid decline 
(Spence, 2010:226). This exponential growth has led to the digital revolution influencing practically 
all spheres of life (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1997:251).  
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Although ICT and especially the internet are agents of a rapidly globalising world, significant 
differences exist in the ability of countries to shape (and be shaped by) a computer-driven 
technocratic world (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1997:252). Despite overall growth, a global digital divide 
remains pervasive. Worldwide, the geographic patterns of technology utilisation differ widely, with 
continents and countries having relatively high or low levels of information technologies. Likewise, 
within states, provinces and regions have uneven geographic distributions of information 
technologies (Pick & Sarkar, 2015:1). Although the digital divide is a problem throughout the world, 
developing states struggle far more than industrialised states because of the unequal distribution of 
digital infrastructure (Parks, 2013:8).  
Focusing on the immediate future, key ICT trends include ongoing innovation in integrated 
applications, storage, display technology, wireless transmission media, the omnipresence or 
pervasiveness of technology, and continuous innovation with software applications (Butler, 2008: 
Slide 11). Additional upcoming major developments include the expansion of mobile applications, 
big data17 analytics (ITWeb, 2014) and the expanding IoT. The IoT has been defined as a global 
infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical 
and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication 
technologies (ITU, 2015). In general, the effects of ICT trends and the Information Age are much 
more profound than just the explosion of the use of information. Today, ICT has a significant 
impact on most aspects of modern society and the economy. Intelligence will in effect spread to 
practically all human artefacts. The decreasing cost and increasing performing power of computing 
devices have led to the application of information technologies in virtually all corners of society 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997:52). Information technology presents humanity with a remarkable ability 
to network and to simultaneously localise and globalise (glocalisation), decentralise and centralise, 
fragment and integrate (Linstone, 2005).  
The information revolution is transforming the role that various types of actors play in international 
relations. The information revolution has altered the role and operation of governments and their 
policy-makers in four ways. First, more information is available to governments; indeed, 
governments may have access to too much information. Paralysis through information overload is 
a real and growing threat, urging policy-makers to prioritise. Second, global networks provide 
decision-makers with options to centralise or decentralise decision-making. Third, global networks 
erode the monopoly of information available to governments. Fourth, global networks advance 
transparency and accentuate global interest and involvement in issues such as environmental 
challenges, making it difficult for countries unilaterally to take national policy decisions when the 
problem is global (Aronson, 2001:549). Although states will remain the dominant actor globally, 
they will be challenged and they will find it increasingly difficult to remain in control. A much larger 
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part of the population, both within and among countries, has access to the power that comes from 
information, potentially challenging some governance functions traditionally controlled by 
government (Nye, 2011:114). 
While technological development, especially in the ICT/digital fields, is exponential, this should not 
be viewed from a technology determinism vantage point. Complexity and change are not all new to 
the contemporary world, but were already widely discussed in the 1960s and 1970s. Back then, as 
now, developments in the technical sphere continually seemed to outpace the capacity of 
individuals and social systems to adapt. Thus, the notion of “out-of-control” technology and fears of 
vulnerabilities due to dependency on technology are recurring themes in political and philosophical 
thought (Cavelty, 2007:21). Although fears of technology slipping out of human control now or in 
the near future are unfounded, technology is having a significant influence on human society in 
general. Enabled by technological change, humanity is experiencing a series of social, economic 
and cultural adaptations leading to a fundamental transformation of how the information 
environment is used by individuals, entities and governments (Benkler, 2006:2). The level to which 
information technology enhances the potential power projection potential of the individual, entity 
and government, present potential future challenges. 
Technology development in the Information Age frequently results in technology competitive 
disruptions when technological breakthroughs result in players changing the rules of competition. 
This can lead to hyper-competition and conditions that are analogous to warfare (Ashton & 
Klavans, 1997:56). This competition, coupled with the fragmenting consequences of technology, 
poses significant challenges to government and social harmony, if misused. Changes brought 
about by technology and especially ICT-related technologies have as mentioned earlier both 
globalising and fragmenting consequences. See Table 5.2 for the globalising and fragmenting 
consequences of transport, telecommunication, television and IT technologies. Despite the positive 
consequences of these technologies, there are also negative influences resulting in potential fault 
lines in society. This influences the nature of conflict and war in society.  
Table 5.2: Consequences of agents of globalisation 
Agent Globalising Fragmenting 
Technology, transport, 
military 
Shrinking distance 
nationally and then 
internationally 
Facilitating Hobbesian 
tendencies; facilitating 
terrorism and civil war 
Technology, Extending size and Social emulsification, 
                                                                                                                                                            
17  Big data usually includes data sets with sizes beyond the ability of commonly used software tools to capture, curate, manage and 
process data within a tolerable elapsed time (Snijders, Matzat & Reips, 2012:1). 
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telecommunication complexity of individual’s 
moral community; 
breaching authoritarian rule 
increased loneliness, social 
differentiation between 
those with and the majority 
without access; increased 
fear of surveillance; 
facilitating narrow and 
shifting patterns of 
relationships; auto-
manipulative personalities 
Television Informing; facilitates 
simultaneous shared 
images 
Desensitising, 
homogenising, stimulus 
overload makes superficial, 
encouraging passivity and 
intellectual laziness; 
alienating, reason-
destroying 
Technology, IT, computers, 
e-mail, game consoles 
Facilitating new institutional 
agents; convenience; 
abolishing distance; 
cyberspace and information 
highways; can be used as 
political force multiplier by 
poor and weak against rich 
and conventionally strong 
Huge increase in 
surveillance potential; 
trivialising communication; 
alienating, reason-
destroying games, 
desensitising, 
homogenising; excessive 
powers of processing 
information trigger feedback 
crises, especially in global 
electronics and financial 
markets; suppressed ability 
to identify key indicators 
Source: Prince, 2002:112-113. 
Technology developments, especially networking related technologies, are critical elements 
influencing the global security environment in the Information Age. Transformative power relations 
boosted by technology are coming to the fore to stimulate transformative social change (Dator, 
Sweeney & Yee, 2014:20). 
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It is expected that the disruptive and destructive potential of technology will play a noteworthy role 
in the future as individuals and entities explore the potential power projection value of these 
technologies. While the technological impact has a significant effect on all identified environments, 
the links between the technological and war/conflict environment are especially relevant for the 
manifestation of information warfare.  
5.3.2 War / conflict environment 
Changes brought about by the advancement of technology, especially during the Information Age, 
also had a profound effect on the war and conflict environment. As Toffler and Toffler (1993:3) 
stated: “A revolutionary new economy is arising based on knowledge, rather than conventional raw 
materials and physical labor (sic). This remarkable change in the world economy is bringing with it 
a parallel revolution in the nature of warfare.” 
Warfare is the management of violence, not merely its generation. With rare exceptions, it entails 
the organisation and orchestration of a diverse set of means to achieve definable and often 
measurable effects. Mobs and terrorists usually ignore these rules in seeking the unrestrained 
expression of passion or the creation of spectacle almost as ends in themselves (Libicki, 2007:95). 
While they are rarely a match for a professional military, should it come down to a confrontation 
this could change the future. 
Just as the development of technology was central to the three ages, these ages also resulted in 
different manifestations of conflict and war. Each age is defined by its primary source of wealth 
(Toffler & Toffler, 1993:21). The agricultural, industrial and information bases of wealth also decide 
how conflict is managed. This is so because the way wealth is created largely determines how it is 
distributed and how society is structured (Hammes, 2004:10). Linked to the ownership of wealth is 
society’s power structures and the potential fault lines for future conflicts.  
During the Agricultural Age, war was waged for control of purely local resources. The warriors were 
either members of the parties in direct control of the disputed land or resources, or, in the case of 
feudalism, conscripted tenants. However, instead of a tribal system where every person fought, the 
rise of civilisation led to a professional class of warriors. These warriors became experts in the 
application of violence to protect the wealth that agriculture allowed a society to produce. Often, 
another duty was to protect the ruling class from the rest of society (Hammes, 2004:10-11). 
Despite military innovations such as the use of metal, mobility and machinery, military resources 
were largely limited to what could be produced and sustained in an agricultural society. This did not 
prevent the largest military conquests in history such as the Roman Empire and the Mongol 
conquest from happening, but technology and control did limit the application of military power 
projection.  
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During the Industrial Age, which started around the middle of the 17th century, industrialisation 
allowed a major increase in wealth while simultaneously providing the ability to mass-produce key 
weapons of war (Hammes, 2004:11). The industrial revolution put society on a mass-driven 
footing. Larger sectors of the populace came to control resources and assets. This was also the 
case with the conduct of warfare. It became an attack of society against society, with the 
involvement of millions of people, including civilians, on each side (Toffler & Toffler, 1993:21). 
Coupled with this was a significant increase in the sophistication, destructive power and reach of 
weapon systems as well as the professional management of logistical support for the military. The 
high point of the Industrial Age was the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki illustrating 
the mass destruction potential of the Industrial Age. 
The Information Age brought with it an increase in management, precision and reaches into new 
domains of cyberspace and space. This has resulted in new opportunities to build capacity and 
capabilities based on infosphere developments and not only the traditional industrial power base. 
According to Grant (2008), the USA armed forces for example face “peer” adversaries in only one 
area, namely military cyberspace. Hammond (2001) argued that due to globalisation and the 
emergence of new weapon systems, the character of war is changing in a revolutionary way. The 
technological transformation in areas such as sensors, communication and computers, space 
assets, missiles, drone capacities and precision-guided munitions (PGM) is changing war and 
warfare. Changes impact the mentioned new arenas of conflict, namely space and cyberspace, as 
well as the way in which it is conducted, referring to the speed and weaponry of conflict. According 
to Hammond (2001:3), “We are in the process of transforming space, time, energy, matter and 
information of war and warfare”. The civilian as target of warfare is also a continuing issue 
(Downes, 2008:2). This is likely to be even more noticeable in future conflicts in which information 
warfare will play a greater role.  
While the core nature of warfare does not change, its character does (Tuck, 2008:116). It can also 
be expected that states will continue to pursue military technological advantage. However, 
evolutionary technological development will probably be punctuated by revolutionary departures. 
Offensive breakthroughs can dictate the pursuit of defensive countermeasures, and defensive 
advantages will compel the pursuit of offensive innovations. Technological developments will be 
both seemingly autonomous and directed. As new military technologies emerge, the global 
diffusion of weapons and military technology is bound to confront policy-makers (Ross, 1993:131). 
The notion that a single focus or one conventional military doctrine can guarantee victory in war or 
conflict is suspect. It is also important to distinguish between levels of war by dividing it into 
strategic, operative and tactical levels. The levels of war, however, do not only serve analytical 
purposes in order to understand a complex reality, but also have more direct and practical 
purposes. The levels of war usually coincide with levels of command, and are therefore a critical 
part of how armies organise and prepare for war. In this way, levels of warfare are not just a way to 
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analyse and understand war, but also a tool to plan and wage war (Angstrom & Widen, 2015:168). 
Military effectiveness may lie more with intangibles, such as the capacity to adapt relative to the 
opponent, than with technological tangibles, such as information systems or precision firepower. 
Military effectiveness, in terms of the capacity to defeat an enemy’s conventional capabilities, does 
not necessarily relate in a linear fashion to overall political success, which is the aim in most cases 
(Tuck, 2008:118-119). This assisted in a significant re-think of military integration of capabilities 
within a technological driven environment. 
The notion of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) has since the early 1990s gained popularity, 
especially in the USA strategic community. The RMA, it is claimed, is the result of the interaction 
between technological change, system development, operational innovation and organisational 
adoption (Larsdotter, 2005:135). RMA, which applies recent technological developments to the 
whole range of weapon systems, information-gathering, communication and surveillance, regards 
the global information environment as having become a “battlespace in which … technology is 
used to deliver critical and influential content in order to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and 
control behaviour” (Kuehl, 2004:4). 
Although RMA is a broader concept than information warfare, the two concepts are closely related. 
In terms of RMA and the hallmarks of the information revolution, such as the transparency of 
events and the global immediacy of coverage, the concepts of information warfare and cyber 
warfare play an increasingly important role to the extent that, for some “the most – perhaps only – 
effective weapon in this battlespace is information” (Kuehl, 2004:4). One of the changes in the 
conflict/war environment is the blurring of the boundaries between the civilian and the military 
realms (Cavelty & Brunner, 2007:7), especially regarding the infosphere.  
In line with these blurring boundaries, where wars traditionally have regular and irregular 
components in different areas of operation, modern “hybrid wars” have the tendency to combine 
these aspects. Hybrid war practitioners apply “conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and 
formations, and terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence, coercion, and criminal activity” 
simultaneously (Hoffman, 2007:8). In terms of this model, war takes place in a variety of operating 
environments, has synchronous effects across multiple battlefields, and is marked by asymmetric 
tactics and techniques (Hoffman, 2007:24). These tactics are difficult to defeat for militaries that 
lack the flexibility to shift mindsets on a constant basis, especially since the interconnected nature 
of modern society is such that hybrid war takes place on three distinct battlefields: the conventional 
battlefield, the indigenous population of the conflict zone, and the international community 
(McCuen, 2008:107).  
Contemporary thinking about militaries as systems has led to the emergence of two concepts: the 
“system of systems” and “systemic shock”. A system of systems is created through intense 
networking between systems, utilising new technology (especially digital communications) and 
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associated procedures to create a more unified whole out of the distinct elements. This allows 
information to flow much more quickly and efficiently, which, in theory, dramatically increases the 
speed at which decisions can be made and the tempo at which operations can be conducted. In 
this regard, see Figure 5.2 for an illustration of the RMA system-of-system argument. Conversely, it 
is possible to render enemy forces ineffective by destroying their capacity to function as a system, 
even if the enemy combat elements are still intact. It can be done by introducing systemic shock in 
the enemy: paralysing the ability of the individual elements in an army/armed group to function 
together. This can be achieved through a variety of related means, including disrupting enemy 
communications; attacking command-and-control infrastructure; undermining enemy decision-
making through high-tempo operations; denying the enemy information; and undermining their 
morale (Tuck, 2008:111). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The RMA system-of-system argument 
Source: Baker, 1997:10. 
The RMA emphasises the importance of quality intelligence and decision-making in military 
success. John Boyd developed the notion that conflict can be dissolved through “decision cycle 
dominance”. The decision cycle laid out by Boyd follows the sequence of “Observe – Orient – 
Decide – Act”. This became known as the OODA loop. The aim of decision cycle dominance is to 
get inside the opponent’s OODA loop and to conduct the decision cycle more quickly than the 
adversary, causing the opponent to lose situational awareness and to become more confused 
about what is happing. As confusion mounts, the enemy would become paralysed and unable to 
resist (Jordan, 2008:200-201).  
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A challenge posed to RMA and other views of the future of warfare is the ability to distinguish that 
which is transient from that which constitutes long-term change. This is reflected in the tendency to 
take current and specifically Western experiences, to extrapolate them into the future and to accept 
them generally as the “nature of future warfare”, ignoring the contingent character of warfare (Tuck, 
2008:115).  
The roughly 300-year period during which war was primarily associated with the state – first in 
Europe and then, following the latter’s expansion, in other parts of the globe as well – is coming to 
an end. If developments since the 1950s provide any guide, future wars will overwhelmingly be of 
the type known, however inaccurately, as low intensity. Both in terms of organisation and the 
equipment at their disposal the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to the 
situation by changing military doctrine, largely jettisoning heavy military equipment to become more 
like the police (Van Creveld, 1999: 36). The tendency is to predict the war that the military elite 
would want to fight in the future. It should be noted that since 1945 90% of conflicts have been civil 
wars fought with relatively simple weapons (Tuck, 2008:116). Confronted with the availability of 
large-scale nuclear weapons to major powers, interstate war has receded quite significantly (Van 
Creveld, 1999:33). Governments are thus considering the future of national defence forces based 
on the ideas of future “wars of efficiency” and “wars of destiny”. Wars of efficiency refers to 
gradually adjust to what evolves and adjust armed forces accordingly, while wars of destiny refers 
to choose future military involvement and prepare accordingly (Vreÿ, 2005:372).   
Victory in the modern conventional context still requires ground battles, with support from 
technology and air power. However, the technologies in land warfare are more sophisticated and 
fundamentally more effective as they combine arms warfare, dispersal, coordination, fire-and-
manoeuvre, and mission command (Tuck, 2008:112-113). In general, political leaders and military 
planners cannot fully comprehend the new technology with which they must work. The one 
consistent winner of modern warfare has been technology; the consistent loser has been humanity 
(Ziegler, 2000:19).  
Another way of evaluating change in terms of conflict and war is to look at the main target or 
Centre of Gravity (COG) of any conflict. An operational centre of gravity is generally an object 
towards which concerted military force is directed (Duyvesteyn, 2005:75). Hammes (2004) argued 
that the contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are symptomatic of a new “fourth 
generation” in warfare. First-generation warfare was horse-and-musket warfare, exemplified by the 
Napoleonic Wars. Second-generation warfare was the rifle-and-railway warfare that evolved from 
the American Civil War to the First World War. Third-generation warfare encompassed blitzkrieg 
and manoeuvre warfare. Fourth-generation warfare (4GW), on the other hand, represents an 
evolution in insurgency. Fourth-generation warfare is marked by a focus on the higher-level 
political decision-making of the enemy. Using political, economic and social networks, as well as 
military action, fourth-generation warfare seeks to undermine the enemy’s political will to fight 
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(Tuck, 2008:117). In this regard, see Table 5.3 for the evolution of warfare. In essence, these 
modern hybrid wars simultaneously combine conventional, irregular and terrorist components in a 
complex challenge that requires an adaptable and versatile military to overcome (Deep, 2015).  
Information has a leveraging role in almost all of the modern-day warfare trends, which significantly 
increases its impact in the war and conflict environment.  
Table 5.3: Evolution of warfare 
Generation Paradigm COG Leverage Strategy 
First-generation 
warfare 
Agrarian 
(classical) 
Manpower Massed 
formations 
Napoleonic 
Second-
generation 
warfare 
Industrial 
(pre-modern) 
Assets Massed 
firepower 
US Army: 
“Steel on 
target” 
Third-
generation 
warfare 
Nonlinear 
(modern) 
Control Manoeuvring United States 
Marine Corps 
(USMC): “Keep 
moving” 
Fourth-
generation 
warfare 
Chaotic 
(postmodern) 
Moral[e] Information Special 
Operations 
Forces (SOF): 
“Hearts and 
minds” 
Source: Taipale, 2006: Slide 9. 
Practically all developments and expected future advances related to warfare and conflict 
management emphasise the increasing role of system-based approaches and enabling 
technologies to strengthen information, intelligence and knowledge in conflict and warfare. The 
shifting COG reinforces the relevance of information warfare in the Information Age. In the end, the 
aim of war and conflict remains primary political. As Von Clausewitz (1989) stated, war is an act of 
violence to compel the opponent to fulfil your will, shifting the focus to the political environment. 
5.3.3 The political environment 
The political environment encompasses a wide range of issues concerned with the allocation and 
transfer of power in national governments. In this context, the role of information is crucial. Public 
policies, rules in the form of legislation and regulation, decision making, stability, allocation and the 
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arbitration of access to resources form the basis of government functions and constitute the broad 
political environment. Although there are similarities between the domestic and international 
manifestations of the political environment there are also differences. International political 
processes can be seen as the realm of fate, as an anarchic interplay among unequal powers, or as 
government activities in which some element of choice and consensus may be possible (Bromley, 
2004:128). This argument was central to the evaluation in Chapter 2 of the broad strategic 
international worldviews. The realist, rationalist, critical realist and postmodern worldviews are not 
representing mutually exclusive perceptions about international relations and security, but are 
highlighting diverse insights about the functioning of international relations. 
While the traditional principles of international relations have at least initially been common to all 
these worldviews, these principles have never been fully respected. Since the advent of the 
Information Age and end of the Cold War these principles seem to be increasingly under attack.  
These traditional principles of international relations include the following (Ziegler, 2000:118): 
-  A sovereign state is legally autonomous. It makes its own laws, decides its own 
legal cases, and is subject to no competing authority. 
-  A sovereign state has exclusive rights within its borders over its resources and 
over its population. 
-  Jurisdiction is territorial, i.e., laws apply to territory, not persons. 
-  Sovereign states cannot be entered without permission. 
-  Intervention in internal affairs of a sovereign state is not permitted. 
-  All international law is consensual. States can give up some sovereign rights but 
only by their own agreement. 
-  Consent to agreements can be revoked at any time. 
-  States may use any means necessary to defend themselves.  
Since the end of the Cold War these challenges have included the “extraterritorial application of 
law” (Ziegler, 2000:118), the impact of international terrorism and efforts by international entities to 
expand their jurisdiction at the cost of sovereignty. These changes include the following: 
-  Shifts from strategic geo-political priorities to geo-economic challenges 
- The movement from one-party states to the increasing introduction of multi-party 
democracies in many developing states 
  - Decreasing inter-state conflict and increasing intra-state conflict 
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  - Regional entities increasing their influence at the expense of national entities 
- A shift in the balance of power in the global system where collective security is 
becoming increasingly significant (ACCORD, 2004). 
- A change in the identity of the influential actors in international politics which 
increasingly includes non-state actions (Weltman, 1995:208). 
The initial hope entertained by the “hyper-globalists” actors that the security function of the state 
would increasingly be absorbed in a globalising world by a multilateral body like the UN proved to 
be illusory (Patman, 2006:24). The contemporary global political environment is characterised by 
the interaction of a multitude of actors with various interests in a world that is changing 
economically, politically and technologically, and that is increasingly becoming interconnected 
because of globalisation (Balaam & Veseth, 2001:203). According to Oman (1999:37), the core of 
globalisation is “growth, or more precisely the accelerated growth, of economic activity that spans 
politically defined national and regional boundaries”. This growing economic but also political, 
social and technological interconnectedness associated with globalisation creates security 
challenges.  
Globalisation has shown a tendency to empower some while marginalising others, and has at 
times heightened the combustible tension between individual and group identity. Although it 
contributes to a steady rise in shared economic interests between and among countries, 
globalisation provides no sure remedy for international rivalry and suspicions (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, 2010). The security debate associated with globalisation is increasingly about the 
effect of modern technology as well as the inequality of power. One of the most significant 
consequences are the large number of actors and overlapping layers of security policy that create 
more potential for conflict and make it more difficult to take decisive action in case of disagreement 
or against disruptive states and terrorist groups. The large number of actors who must be 
consulted slows down the taking of decisive action by states. Media coverage adds a disincentive 
to strong action because harm to civilians and innocent bystanders can easily and effectively be 
communicated. The loss of a single soldier, an everyday occurrence in war, can become a national 
or even international media event today. These circumstances can give disruptive states and 
terrorist groups greater room to manoeuvre, turning them into a different and potentially more 
serious threat to security than in the past (Balaam & Veseth, 2001:204). 
The ability of countries to build and sustain partnerships to combat discontent will increasingly 
depend on bolstering a country’s credibility with the broader global population and forging an ethic 
of common purpose (McHale, 2009:2). It can be expected that political credibility and international 
esteem will probably grow in political significance in the future. The Western model of political 
development and values was dominant up to the 20th century but is increasingly being challenged 
by the rise of Asia, especially China. The political democratic models as conceived and developed 
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by the West will not necessary represent the models for the political environment of the future. At 
the same time, questions about equality will continue to be raised.  
While the 20th century was characterised by war and confrontation, it is possible that the 21st 
century will be one of competition and marginalisation. All states, especially world powers, will be 
under increasing pressure to seize strategic opportunities and make sustainable development their 
top national priority, or face political marginalisation (Lai, 2009:4). At the same time, instant global 
communication is weakening most forms of vertical authority and strengthening the interests of 
networked communities. One of the human institutions being weakened is the nation state itself 
(Nye, 2005:249). National governments, including democratic ones, are losing some of their 
functional and constitutional importance. Even nation state power, which is concentrated in the 
free-market democracies, will experience losses to non-state actors, some of whom will exploit 
national vulnerabilities (Gompert, 1999:66). In the political environment, the role of information has 
become central, especially in terms of its role in networking.  
5.3.4 Social environment 
The communications and information revolution has transformed human interaction and the social 
environment. In the interconnected world, humanity is inundated with information and more 
engaged with the wider world than ever before (McHale, 2009:1). 
Mobility, expanded networks and information pervasiveness are underlying the social fabric of 
modern society – now and in the future. Mazarr (1997:11) reiterated that the most important 
technological advance in the future would be a revolution in information technology as profound as 
the one that has already taken place, namely a “pervasive knowledge network” in which people 
have anytime/anywhere access to voice or video communications and the internet or other 
networked computerised systems. This tidal wave of globalised information is expected to have a 
substantial influence on national and industry boundaries, autocratic organisations and 
governments as well as individuals. Disparity in wealth and access to the “pervasive knowledge 
network” will, however, continue to highlight the causes of social equality. 
Another social environment issue of strategic importance for the future is the rise of social media 
and social networking. Social media are media designed to be disseminated through social 
interaction, using highly accessible and scalable publishing techniques. Social media support the 
human need for social interaction with technology, transforming broadcast media monologues (one 
to many) into social media dialogues (many to many). This trend supports the democratisation of 
knowledge and information, transforming people from content consumers into content producers 
(Social-Media.com, 2009). 
The consequence of this development is that the following characteristics form the core of social 
media (Social-Media.com, 2009):  
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- Participation: Social media encourages contributions and feedback from everyone 
who is interested. It blurs the line between media and audience.  
- Openness: Most social media services are open to feedback and participation. 
These services encourage voting, comments and the sharing of information. 
Consequently, there are rarely any barriers to accessing and using content.  
- Conversation: Whereas traditional media is about “broadcast” (content transmitted 
or distributed to an audience), social media is seen as a two-way conversation.  
- Community: Social media allows communities to form quickly and communicate 
effectively. Flash as well as longer term communities sharing common interests are 
created locally and/or globally.  
- Connectedness: Most kinds of social media thrive on their connectedness, making 
use of links to other sites, resources and people. 
Social media have created changes where the significance of institutions is being replaced by the 
significance of processes. Where distribution was significant during the Industrial Age, distribution 
through the internet now makes content, conversation and community even more important (Stacy, 
2008). However, digital social developments are also linked to threats. Firstly, new digital 
technologies have a profound impact on everyday life, social relations, government, commerce, the 
economy and the production and dissemination of knowledge. People's movements and their 
purchasing habits, online searches and online communication with others are now being monitored 
in detail by digital technologies. Humans are increasingly becoming digital data subjects (Apple, 
Ball & Gandin, 2010:9). Secondly, every conflict or war is now also a social-media conflict or war 
(Ingram, 2012). Various threats, such as social media vulnerabilities, malicious code and social 
engineering, illustrate that social media is a tool that can be used offensively in information warfare 
(Van Niekerk & Maharaj, 2013:1177). 
The shift to participation and content creation has increased the significance and influence of the 
general public in terms of participating in the current political, conflict and economic dialogues. 
Efforts to control such interaction by governments are much more difficult, while the global 
opportunities for like-minded individuals to cooperate and agitate have been boosted significantly. 
5.3.5 Economic environment 
Just as the social environment has changed, the global economic environment is also being 
transformed with growing interdependence, automation, collaboration and globalisation as major 
trends. There is an emergent interdependence among states, especially in the economic spheres. 
This is a consequence of the rapidly growing transaction rates between societies worldwide. Closer 
and multidimensional contact between societies and entities constitutes one of the fundamental 
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forms of recent system changes (Holsti, 1980:23). According to Naisbitt (2009), this global 
integration could lead to national economies eventually being integrated into the global economy.  
These trends are causing a fundamental shift in the global economic order. The changes in the 
global economic order is said to produce a new multi-polar world with more mid-level powers from 
various regions. One of the dominant features of the new multi-polar world is the dramatic increase 
in the diversity of cultures, religions, worldviews, economies, political regimes and legal systems. 
The new order will increasingly require, and be reflected in, a change in existing institutions and 
how they operate, as well as the creation of new institutions. Although the rise of new powers has 
often resulted in war in the past, there are some grounds to hope that this time will be different. But 
even if military conflict between old and new powers is avoided, a new vision for a more equitable 
world, combined with feasible development agendas, is urgently needed to ensure a more just 
world in which global resources and burdens are more fairly shared by all (Peerenboom, 2011:43). 
Economic integration and the opening up of international trade have helped many countries to 
grow more quickly. International trade continues to assist countries in which exports drive 
economic growth. Export-led growth was key to the industrial policy that resulted in lifting millions 
of people in Asia out of poverty. Globalisation has reduced isolation in the developing world and 
has provided many people with access to knowledge which is unprecedented in history (Striglitz, 
2002:4). This growth has been diminishing since the economic crisis of 2008, calling the 
sustainability of this approach to growth into question. 
Globalisation also comes with negative economic consequences. A growing divide between the 
haves and the have-nots is leaving an increasing number of people in the developing world in dire 
poverty, living on less than a dollar a day. Despite repeated promises of poverty reduction, made 
since the last two decades of the twentieth century, the number of people living in poverty (with an 
income of less than US$2 a day) is 2.2 billion (2011 statistics) (The World Bank, 2015). According 
to the UK charity Oxfam, the richest 1% now has as much wealth as the rest of the global 
population combined (BBC News, 2016). This continuing inequality will result in a change in the 
identity of the economic powerful and a change in their relative position due to uneven economic 
development. It is likely to increase the propensity of conflict (Weltman, 1995: 220). Thus, 
globalisation has not succeeded in reducing poverty; neither has it succeeded in ensuring 
sustained stability (Striglitz, 2002:6). The digital divide between the developed and developing 
world continues to endure. Despite some progress, a high level of inequality persists in access to 
ICT: 82% of people in the developed world use the internet compared to 35% in the developing 
world and 10% in the least developed countries (LDCs) (itu4u, 2015). 
Pressure will mount on the multi-lateral level to promote sustainable equality and stability globally. 
The marginalisation of many countries in the global economy, particularly those in Africa, and the 
question of coherence in global economic policy-making between the global financial institutions, 
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such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), constitute key challenges confronting the international community in the 
context of an integrating global economy and multi-lateral participation in efforts to restrain global 
environmental challenges. 
Economic vulnerabilities have also increased. Robb (2007:14-15) observed that guerrillas or 
terrorists now possess “the means to bring a modern nation’s economy to its knees and thereby 
undermine the legitimacy of the state sworn to protect it. Furthermore, attacks can derail the key 
drivers of economic globalisation: the flow of resources, investment, people and security.” Those 
who adopt this form of warfare are global guerrillas who represent “a broad-based threat that far 
exceeds that offered by terrorists or the guerrillas of the past”. Many of these mentioned capacities 
are within the information domain. 
The most globally advanced economies have made two parallel shifts that, paradoxically, reduce 
the limitations that market-based production puts on the pursuit of the political values central to 
tolerant societies (Benkler, 2006:14): 
- The first shift has been in the making for more than a century. The centre of the 
global economy is shifting to be based on information (such as provided by science, 
accounting, financial services and software) and cultural production (such as 
provided by films, fiction and music). The manipulation of symbols is increasingly 
becoming a significant part of the contemporary economy.  
- The second is the shift towards cost-effective communication technologies, built on 
inexpensive processors with high computation capabilities and interconnected in a 
pervasive network, such as is currently the case with the internet.  
The second shift has strengthened the role of non-market production in the information and cultural 
production sector, which is organised in a radical and more decentralised pattern than during the 
20th century. The first shift means that these new patterns of production, namely radically 
decentralised and non-market orientated production, will emerge at the core rather than at the 
periphery, especially in the more advanced economies. This will enable social exchange and 
production to play a much larger role alongside market-based and property-based production than 
ever before (Benkler, 2006:14-15). The collective outcome of trends such as growing 
automatisation, digitalisation, stagnant wages, the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and 
globalisation will all potentially contribute to unemployment becoming a significant future challenge 
(Ford, 2015:24).  
This greater reliance on the information economy and its cyber elements have increased the 
vulnerability of most of the advanced economies as well as emerging economies such as South 
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Africa. These vulnerabilities will be impacted by the increasing manifestation of information 
warfare.  
5.3.6 Enhancement of the power of networks, innovation and transformation 
Three cross-cutting trends have been identified that are fundamental to all five environments. 
These three trends are substantially different in the contemporary world compared to anything in 
past human experience. These trends also adhere to the identified speed, scope and significance 
requirements to warrant their identification as “ripple intelligence” issues. The first cross-cutting 
issue is the level of integration of the world community and the rise of networks, especially social 
networks. The second issue is rapid innovation, especially in the spread of technology, which has 
resulted in the simultaneous emergence of a host of new middle-ranking military, political and 
economic powers across the world, while at the same time generating significant inequality 
between states, groups and individuals (Harvey, 2003:10011). The third issue is accelerated 
societal change which is resulting in transformation being a constant reality that affects nearly all 
social entities.  
Decentralised non-hierarchical information systems are becoming more prominent after centuries 
in which centralised bureaucracy has been in the ascendant. As shown in the environmental 
analysis, this is largely because of ever-expanding global digital communication networks. The 
centralised model had all the advantages within an environment in which communications are slow 
and unreliable. In the hierarchical design, limited connecting links exist between any two nodes in 
the network. The distributed model, on the other hand, may require many more intermediate links 
(hundreds or even thousands) to connect a given pair of nodes. When all communication has to 
pass through a central node, the system gets congested at the command point. In contrast, 
distributed structures in a flat network can form, emerge, perform their mission, and disappear in a 
short time span (Bodissey, 2007). 
Even within the distributed network, certain individuals and entities in the network remain 
significant. Key issues impacting the centrality of the individual and/or entity in the network include 
the number and quality of ties to other actors; the notions of closeness and distance based on 
communication paths among the actors in the network; the notion of cohesive sub-groups; the 
extent to which the relationships and transactions within the network are regulated by explicit or 
tacit rules; and the diversity and number of actors within the network (Williams, 2001:67). Taking 
into account the asymmetric nature of information warfare, as explained in the previous chapter, 
the nature of the network remains significant for the manifestation of information warfare. In this 
regard, the rhizome18 network manifestation is relevant.  
                                               
18  Deleuze and Guattari first used the term “rhizome” as an analogy for patterns of human organisation.  
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The rhizome approach to networks offers a useful model for the future manifestation of information 
warfare. Rhizome takes its name from botany, namely from plants such as bamboo, aspen and 
ginger that spread via a connected underground root system. Deleuze and Guattari (1980:29) used 
rhizome as a metaphor to refer to a non-hierarchal form of organisation. Vail (2007) has extended 
this metaphor, referring to rhizome as an alternative mode of human organisation consisting of a 
network of minimally self-sufficient nodes that leverage non-hierarchal coordination of economic 
activity. The two key concepts of rhizome are self-sufficiency, which eliminates the dependencies 
that characterise hierarchy, and loose but dynamic networking that uses the "small worlds" theory 
of network information processing to allow rhizome networks to overcome information processing 
burdens typical of hierarchies. Rhizome therefore refers to an organisational pattern characterised 
by interconnected but independent networks of entities. See Figure 5.3 for an illustration of a 
rhizome network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Rhizome network 
The rhizome network provides application possibilities for both the cognitive and technological 
elements of information warfare. This includes using cyber networks for malicious software 
applications and for cyber mobilisation. Cyber mobilisation is a process of mobilising support to 
concentrate force against critical points. In essence, cyber mobilisation is a form of conflict 
requiring popular participation; is not the normal cyber-related activities that aim to disrupt 
websites. Cyber mobilisation requires public participation for success. Cyber mobilisation offers 
non-state and state actors three main advantages: reach, discretion and movement-building. 
Followers who are unable to directly participate in a struggle, such as Diaspora groups, are now 
given the ability to contribute and strengthen their bonds to causes such as participating in 
psychological operations or carrying out crude hacking attacks. As the efforts of many different 
geographically dispersed users are incorporated, cyber mobilisation also allows movements and 
states to multiply the effectiveness of their actions (Elkus, 2009). 
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The environmental scan also highlighted the strategic and tactical risks that are ingrained in the 
information-relevant issues in the TWEPS macro environments. The three cross-cutting trends are 
compatible to rhizome-like behaviour increasing the threats posed by information warfare to 
national security. A crucial next step is to focus on the identification of the targets of information 
warfare and on how information warfare currently occurs.  
5.4 INFORMATION WARFARE TARGETS   
Information warfare targets are multi-dimensional, focusing on tactical and strategic targets. The 
environmental scan highlighted the significance of growing interdependence and globalisation in 
economic prosperity, exposing the commercial networks and the global service sector as highly 
vulnerable to all constituent elements of information warfare, namely netwar, cyberwar and 
information operations.  
In Chapter 4, two different but related broad targets of information warfare were identified, namely 
the cognitive and the technological structures that manage modern society. Netwar and 
psychological operations target networked relationships and decision-making processes. These 
targets are accessed mainly by influencing perceptions. Cyber warfare, on the other hand, targets 
information systems with the intention to alter data and information.  
Information warfare is primary targeted at the power structures in any state. These structures are 
part of the complex and inter-related processes and services underlying the information structures 
in society. In this regard, see Figure 5.4 for an illustration of the pillars of an information society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The pillars of an information society 
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Source: Own Compilation 
Power structures in the information society include the following: 
-  Structures and processes ensuring the diffusion of high technology in the 
economy. 
-  The effective management of physical, digital, financial and knowledge 
infrastructures. 
-  Planning and forecasting to ensure good governance and development. 
-  Leadership with the aim of overcoming challenges pro-actively, not reactively. 
-  Infrastructure functioning effectively, especially in terms of ICT infrastructure. 
-  An education system that produces the skills levels appropriate for a knowledge 
society. 
-  Grand/strategic vision for the future and progress. 
-  The effective management of energy resources to ensure sustainable growth. 
-  The legitimacy of the government and other role-players in society. 
All of these pillars present potential targets for information warfare related actions. In the case of 
developed and developing states, all the pillars are fairly vulnerable to current and potential future 
disruption. In an information society, these pillars represent three types of assets which could be 
identified as information warfare targets, namely physical assets, soft assets and psychological 
assets (Cronin & Crawford, 1999:258). The physical assets which can be targeted include the 
adversary or enemy’s information and communications systems using conventional warfare 
techniques. The soft assets can be degraded by using external actors and corrupt insiders to break 
firewalls and degrade the targeted information systems using malicious software. The 
psychological assets can be negatively influenced by the silent penetration of the target’s 
information and communication system to manage perceptions, shape opinions and foster 
deception.  
In this study, kinetic energy, or the use of military firepower to eliminate targets such as 
communication or computer nodes, will not be regarded as information warfare as this is not 
materially different from attacks on infrastructure during war. Information warfare is not directly 
lethal and thus in essence non-lethal. The increased utilisation of sensors, especially in terms of 
the IoT, might make some information warfare actions lethal in the future, but this will probably not 
become a central information warfare capacity. A layered view of information warfare targets is 
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presented by Taipale, stretching from national leadership at the core to the military structure at the 
outer layer, as illustrated in Figure 5.5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Warden’s five targeting rings 
Source: Taipale, 2006: Slide 23. 
While the risk of information warfare posed to states may be generally regarded currently as low to 
medium, taking into account the growing interest and spending by governments, groups and 
individuals on such a capacity, this risk is rising. The medium and long-term threat assessment of 
information warfare is significant. Already the World Economic Forum (WEF) identified cyber 
attacks as well as data fraud and theft among the 10 most likely global risks (World Economic 
Forum, 2015:3).  
Even a cursory survey reveals that developing states possess highly developed information 
warfare capabilities, and they continue to develop a new and more sophisticated information 
warfare arsenal. Most of the developed and some developing countries have at least tested their 
capabilities, if they are not already using them in actual attacks against their adversaries. 
Therefore, it would be prudent to assume that these capabilities have been tested and even used 
in the recent past (Singer & Friedman, 2014:31). 
In most developed and developing countries, five key vulnerable access points exist which, if 
intruded, abused, manipulated or destroyed, could cause serious damage to society, namely: 
- Critical infrastructural components regulated by information-driven electronic 
communication systems: These include all computer-managed systems affecting 
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routine daily life, such as the ICT systems, media, electricity, water and transport, 
particularly in large metropolitan areas. 
- The computerised financial world: Due to unauthorised intrusions, large sums of 
money are electronically diverted internationally. Institutions like the World Bank are 
constantly investigating measures to curb this. 
- The communication systems of government departments. 
- The military/intelligence environment: The management of sophisticated countries’ 
military infrastructure is computerised and dependent on centrally coordinated 
electronic communication. 
- The internet: The internet is increasingly becoming central to public, economic and 
social activities within society. Disruption represents a significant power projection 
capability. 
 
The manifestation of information warfare related attacks on government and business networks 
during conflict situations are compelling cases of state-sponsored governmental information 
warfare power projection activities. As information technology is constantly advancing and as 
information warfare can be carried out anonymously with a high probability of success, state-
sponsored information warfare attacks on networks are expected to rise in frequency and 
sophistication. 
5.5 THE MANIFESTATION OF INFORMATION WAR 
While the concept of information warfare has largely been developed on a theoretical level, based 
on the start of the Information Age and the resulting technological change, it has also manifested 
as a distinct power projection instrument in the contemporary international system. It is necessary 
in this chapter to provide an overview of how information warfare has recently manifested globally 
before using futures methodologies to identify the most significant driving forces leading to the 
possible future manifestation of information warfare. 
Information warfare has become so prevalent that incidents are reported in the international media 
on a daily basis. In order to illustrate this contemporary manifestation of the constituent elements of 
information warfare – namely netwar, psychological operations and cyber warfare – its 
manifestation from the early 1990s to 2015 will be briefly discussed. As indicated in Chapter 4, 
some elements of information warfare, in particular those related to netwar and psychological 
operations, have been part of warfare since the earliest times. Cyber warfare, however, is new. 
Cyber warfare is associated with the large-scale use of ICT during the Information Age, while the 
capacity for both netwar and psychological operations have also increased exponentially as a 
result of modern technological innovation, high levels of inter-connectivity and general progress 
within the ICT sector. 
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5.5.1 Overview of information warfare manifestation from 1990 to 2015 
The 1991 Gulf War led to widespread realisation of the importance of information superiority in 
modern conflict. This war was regarded as the first information war (Campen, 1992:vii). During this 
conflict the USA significantly relied on information superiority in terms of both operations and 
weapon systems. In the USA, this realisation had an almost euphoric quality (Eriksson, 1999:57), 
resulting in interest in the notion of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA, it is claimed, is the 
result of the interaction between technological change, system development, operational 
innovation and organisational adoption. These developments combine to fundamentally change 
the character and execution of war in general (Larsdotter, 2005:135). The notion that conflict 
reflects the nature of society is not new, but the insight that information society warfare may be 
quite different from its industrial society counterpart is significant (Eriksson, 1999:57). RMA, which 
is developed because of the application of recent technological developments to the whole range 
of weapon systems, information-gathering, communication and surveillance, regard the global 
information environment as having become a “battlespace in which … technology is used to deliver 
critical and influential content in order to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control 
behaviour” (Kuehl, 2004:4). 
One of the first active utilisations of the internet for advancing a political agenda during a conflict 
situation was the so-called Zapatista rebellion in Mexico. On 1 January 1994, rebel leader Marcos 
led Zapatista19 (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, or EZLN for short) rebels in a series of 
attacks in the Mexican state of Chiapas. What made this unrest unique was the fact that the 
Zapatistas in Mexico were among the first to supplement their actions with psychological 
operations, extensively using the internet. Long after all military operations ceased, news of the 
Zapatistas and their struggle was distributed through the internet to media around the world. While 
the Zapatistas have not gained from military operations their internet strategy proved far more 
successful in obtaining political concessions from the Mexican government (Mayer-Schoenberger 
& Brodnig, 2001:24). The Zapatistas caught the Mexican government unprepared for cyber-
mobilisation. The Zapatistas showed how effective networking using the new media could be. In so 
far as these networks can influence and constrain the actions of governments at all levels, they 
become an important element in power projection beyond the traditional influence that a small local 
insurrection could have (Riordan, 2003:6).  
During the mid-1990s, netwar and psychological operations were used during the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation led (NATO-led) operations in the former Yugoslavia as Western leaders 
responded to the use of the media by Bosnian, Serb and Croatian political leaders to mobilise 
                                               
19  The Mexican rebels, drawing support from the indigenous (Indian) population, called themselves “Zapatistas” after Emiliano 
Zapata, a prominent figure in the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) (Ziegler, 2000:122). 
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support. Originally, the Serbs used government-controlled media to target only Serb citizens with 
its messages (rather than the international community) (Richter, 2009:104).  
After the USA deployment as part of the Dayton Accord Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 
1995, USA commanders soon found that the Information Operations (IO)20 doctrine failed to 
recognise the effect that public information had on local populations. Local and international news 
media, as well as the growing online community, had a remarkable influence on the population that 
IFOR was attempting to stabilise. Given IFOR’s mission to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords and 
public information’s predominance on the populace, it became virtually impossible to completely 
separate public diplomacy from information warfare (Richter, 2009: 104). While not ignoring the 
role of technology, these lessons emphasise the human dimension and the need to develop an 
understanding of social and cultural structures, both formal and informal (Richter, 2009:105). 
Public diplomacy has become a significant part of both combating and conducting the 
psychological operations part of information warfare. 
Although only revealed in 2010, the first known case of confirmed physical damage caused by a 
cyber warfare related action was Stuxnet, the sophisticated digital weapon the USA and Israel 
launched against industrial control systems in Iran in late 2007 or early 2008 to sabotage 
centrifuges at a uranium enrichment plant. Since then experts have warned that it was only a 
matter of time before other destructive attacks would occur. Industrial control systems were found 
to be rife with vulnerabilities, since they manage critical systems in the electric grid, water 
treatment plants, chemical facilities and even in hospitals and financial networks (Zetter, 2015). 
In 2007, the first known incidence of a cyber warfare assault on a state also took place. During 
May 2007, Estonia was the victim of a sustained cyber attack which lasted for three weeks. The 
attacks were provoked by the removal of a war memorial statue of a Soviet soldier from a location 
in central Tallinn, the capital of Estonia (Kobilnyk, 2008). This attack, which temporarily brought 
down Estonian ICT networks, began with a flood of bogus messages targeting government servers 
through "distributed denial of service" or DDOS attacks.21This approach harnessed “botnets” 
(massive networks of interconnected computers) to bombard targeted networks with information 
requests while masking the location of the primary attacker. This is done by hackers who took 
control of tens of thousands of computers around the world without the knowledge of their owners 
and directed computer traffic at Estonian servers (Bruno, 2008). Estonian ministers blamed the 
Russian government for instigating the attacks, an accusation Russia denied. Only one person has 
ever been charged over the attack, a member of Estonia's ethnic Russian minority (Leyden, 2009). 
                                               
20  In the USA the term information operations is used for information warfare.  
21
          Most of the ICT infrastructure in Estonia was built after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the infrastructure is 
heavily dependent on the internet, more so than most other states. In addition, because Estonia is a smal l state, internet access 
to the entire country can easily be disrupted. The flow of consumer staples such as food was hampered in Estonia when the 
internet went down (Richards, 2009). 
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Following the Estonia experience, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) began to 
recognise that cyberwar and information warfare in general have become a new sphere of conflict 
and that they needed to develop strategies to counter it. The growing significance of the internet 
and connectivity for the global economy will increase the potential negative impact of hackers 
launching devastating attacks on the world economy. In order to counter such threats, a group of 
NATO members, including the USA and Germany, in 2008 established an internal cybersecurity 
think tank in Estonia. The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence analyses emerging 
viruses and other threats, and passes on alerts to sponsoring NATO governments (Morozov, 
2009). Cyber defence is now part of NATO’s core task of collective defence (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, 2015). 
Although, as stated earlier, for the purposes of this study, the kinetic aspects of war are not 
regarded as part of information warfare, it should be noted that, in practice, information warfare can 
be used in conjunction with kinetic operations. An example of this was the use of cyber warfare 
techniques and bombing by the Israel military prior to its 6 September 2007 strike on an alleged 
nuclear facility at Dayr az-Zawr, Syria. This was done to blind Syrian air defences. Unnamed USA 
intelligence and Israeli military sources stated that the main attack by the Israeli Defence Forces 
(IDF) was preceded by an engagement with a single Syrian radar site at Tall al-Abuad near the 
Turkish border. The radar station "was assaulted with what appears to be a combination of 
electronic attack and precision bombs", causing the whole Syrian air defence radar system to go 
offline "for a period of time that included the raid". The sources said the Israeli attack "involved both 
remote air-to-ground electronic attacks and penetration through computer-to-computer links" (UPI, 
2007).  
Preparations for future larger-scale cyber warfare are being increased in developed countries in 
particular. During a war game that the USA Department of Homeland Security sponsored in March 
2008, called Cyber Storm II, a large, coordinated attack against the USA, Britain, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand was envisioned. It studied a disruption of chemical plants, rail lines, oil 
and gas pipelines and private computer networks. This exercise and similar studies concluded that 
when attacks go global, the potential economic repercussions increase exponentially (Sanger, 
Markoff & Shanker, 2009). 
The Georgian-Russian war of 2008 illustrated that information warfare has also become an integral 
part of inter-state conflict. This war started when Georgian forces at midnight of 7 to 8 August 2008 
launched a heavy artillery barrage against the breakaway South Ossetia and sent at least two 
battalions into the capital of Tskhinvali. Russian forces responded with a full-scale invasion and air 
war (Hahn, 2008). The cyber aspect of this conflict started soon after the invasion of South Ossetia 
with Georgian web pages being defaced and servers crashing as a result of dedicated DDOS 
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attacks. Pro-Georgian hackers responded, attacking local government sites in South Ossetia and 
Russia (Thomson, 2008). There were, however, no reports of attacks against critical infrastructure, 
such as the electronic jamming of stock exchanges (Antonopoulos, 2008). Georgia also launched a 
significant psychological operation aimed at drawing the West into the war (Hahn, 2008). 
Both netwar and psychological operations have also been extensively used in Iraq. The decrease 
of hostilities in early 2008 has been attributed to the USA military dropping its mainly techno-centric 
approach to conducting the war and starting to focus on psychological approaches linked to Iraq’s 
social, political, tribal and cultural networks instead (Mediatechno Blog, 2008).  
The social network dimension of this phenomenon is, however, probably even more important for 
the future manifestation of information warfare. The creation of social networking groups is 
sometimes supported by governments. In this regard the USA government, for example, supported 
the creation of the Alliance of Youth Movements (AYM) launched in December 2008 with a summit 
in New York; the AYM gathered together an ensemble of media corporations, presidential 
consultants, social network entrepreneurs and youth organisations, under the auspices of the State 
Department. The USA State Department focused specifically to harness the power of social media. 
The AYM produced a Field Manual and a series of How-to videos (How to Create a Grassroots 
Movement Using Social-Networking Sites, How to Smart Mob, How to Circumvent an Internet 
Proxy). The goal was to have youth leaders from around the world learn, share and discuss how to 
build powerful grassroots movements (Bratich, 2009).  
These initiatives are neither completely emerging from below (grassroots) nor purely invented by 
external forces (the astroturfing22 done by public relations groups). However, these emergent 
groups are seeded (and influenced) to control the direction of the movement. Methods used 
extensively in the election of President Obama in the USA presidential election are being used for 
sanctioned “democracy” movements elsewhere in the world (Bratich, 2009). The development of 
the so-called coloured revolutions (popular uprisings which resulted in governments falling or 
placed under pressure) which started in Georgia, has a strong information warfare base, 
encompassing netwar, psychological operations and sometimes even elements of cyber warfare. 
During these uprisings the use of communication technology and the psychological operations to 
mobilise opposition against governments have been central to its successes.  
During 2009, the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza expanded the use of social media as an instrument 
to support conflict-related actions in especially cyberspace. In Gaza, after a provisional ceasefire 
has been declared in February 2009, the information warfare related to the cyberwar, netwar and 
                                               
22  Astroturfing is a term describing formal political, advertising or public relations campaigns, especially within the blogosphere, 
seeking to create the impression of being spontaneous "grassroots" behaviour, hence the reference to the artificial grass, As troTurf 
(Webopedia, 2009). 
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psychological operations continued for some time. Israel and its opponents have taken to the 
internet to wage cyberwar against each other, deploying especially crowd-sourced information 
“militias”. The Israeli IDF and Foreign Ministry extensively utilised YouTube and Twitter to advance 
their positions. A group of Israeli supporters set up a botnet that allowed users to add their 
computers to create a substantial launch pad for disrupting pro-Hamas servers (Elkus, 2009). The 
Israeli government also launched a campaign to dominate the blogosphere, while the Israeli 
military kept the international press off the battlefield to minimise negative publicity (Hodge, 2009). 
Opposing Israel, a pro-Hamas group with the moniker “Team Evil” launched attacks against pro-
Israeli hacker groups using DDOS attacks. Anti-Israeli protests were also organised through 
Twitter, Facebook and other participatory social networks (Elkus, 2009).  
Increasingly, states and non-state entities are expanding the scope of intelligence collection using 
the internet. For example, in early 2009, cyber experts based at the Munk Center for International 
Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada, have discovered that since 2007, the Tibetan 
government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India, was the focal point of a computer monitoring network 
called GhostNet, which has penetrated the computer systems of the private offices of the Dalai 
Lama and other Tibetan targets. GhostNet was the biggest cyber-espionage network discovered 
up to that stage, as it infiltrated 1 295 computers in 103 countries over a period of 22 months. 
According to the study, close to 30% of computers infiltrated can be regarded as high-value 
diplomatic, political, economic and military targets, including computers of the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and NATO. These targeted computers were in the USA, Germany, India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Although the Munk Center experts refrained from naming the 
Chinese government as the perpetrator of these attacks, the report stated that their discoveries 
were the result of an investigation into alleged Chinese cyber espionage against Tibetan 
institutions. A study of the computer systems of the Tibetan government-in-exile led them to 
GhostNet computers, most of which were located in China (Basu, 2009). 
During June 2009 the Iranian government “turned off” the internet right before, right up to and 
during the election. As soon as it was restored there were DDOS attacks on then President 
Ahmadinejad’s personal website and several government sites in which an estimated 500 000 
botnet computers participated (Coleman, 2009). In the aftermath of the Iranian election, Web 2.023 
and social media technology played a vital role in organising protest actions in the wake of a media 
blackout by the Iranian government (Dale, 2009). Online sites have been uploading amateur 
pictures and video, and Twitter, Facebook and blogs have been platforms for protesters to 
                                               
23  Web 2.0 refers to a perceived second generation of web development and design that facilitates communication, secure 
information sharing, interoperability and collaboration on the internet. Web 2.0 concepts have led to the evolution of web-based 
communities, hosted services and applications such as social-networking sites, video-sharing sites, wikis and blogs. The term Web 
2.0 was first used by Eric Knorr, executive editor of InfoWorld, in the December 2003 special issue of the business IT magazine 
CIO, in an article titled "Fast Forward 2010 - The Fate of IT". The term Web 2.0 refers not to a specific development but to the 
cumulative changes in the ways software developers and end-users use the web (Balagangadharan, 2009).  
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coordinate and exchange information (BBC News, 2009). With the authorities blocking text 
messaging on cell phones, Twitter became an alternative source of information and coordination of 
activities. While the Iranian government endeavoured to block Twitter posts, opposition supporters 
used proxy sites or other methods to circumvent the official barriers (Landler & Stelter, 2009). The 
value of Web 2.0 for information warfare includes user participation, dynamic content, metadata, 
web standards and scalability. Further characteristics, such as openness, freedom and collective 
intelligence by way of user participation, can also be viewed as essential attributes of Web 2.0 
(Balagangadharan, 2009).  
During July 2009, the Chinese government disconnected Xinjiang, China’s far western province, 
from the internet. This followed when a protest in the capital Ürümqi by young Uighur men (of the 
area’s indigenous Turkic population) turned into a riot against the Han Chinese, in which at least 
197 people were killed. This action resulted in a change in information strategy from Uighur 
dissidents by not pursuing mobilising activities on the internet. The Uighur continued to consume 
digital media, but increasingly in off-line form, by using DVDs, CD discs and flash drives (Palmer, 
2015). 
A series of coordinated cyber attacks were also launched during July 2009 against major 
government, news media and financial websites in South Korea and the USA. The attacks also 
involved botnet computers, causing websites to crash. The South Korean National Intelligence 
Service (NIS) estimated that approximately 20 000 hijacked computers, most of them in South 
Korea, had been used to conduct a DDOS attack on the USA and South Korean websites. The 
timing and targeting of the attacks have led to suggestions that they may be originating from North 
Korea, although these suggestions remain unsubstantiated (McDevitt, 2009). 
The Arab Spring brought the role of social media in political power conflict to the fore. The Arab 
Spring refers to a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests (both non-violent and violent), 
riots and civil wars in the Arab world that began on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia with the Tunisian 
Revolution, and spread throughout the countries of the Middle East. Social media and digital 
technologies played a significant role in providing citizens within areas affected by “the Arab 
Uprisings” with a means for collective activism to circumvent state-operated media channels 
(Watson, 2012). New media such as YouTube, Twitter and satellite television made a significant 
impact on the Arab Spring (Van Notten, 2014:2). Social media use more than doubled in Arab 
countries during the protests. Collective intelligence and the dynamics of the crowd in participatory 
systems such as social media have immense power to support a collective action, such as the 
fomenting of political change (SiReBi, 2011). 
The rise of social media has opened up unique opportunities to influence large numbers of people, 
as illustrated by the USA’s psychological operations launched against Cuba. In 2010, the 
ZunZuneo platform, a “Cuban Twitter” which was text based on the cellular network, went live on 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
the island. It was in fact a programme put in place by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). It was likely a covert programme controlled by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and it ran until about 2012. At the end, ZunZuneo had about 40 000 users on the 
island. The overall aim of the project was to have the Cubans generate their own interaction 
around dissident ideas and to allow them a means to text one another outside the controls 
(ostensibly) of the Castro government. However, this was not successful; nor was the programme 
a success from the standpoint of mass demonstrations happening (Krypt3ia Blog, 2014). 
In December 2014, Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported that hackers 
had gained access to an unnamed steel mill in Germany and caused “massive” – though 
unspecified – damage. They did so by manipulating and disrupting control systems to such a 
degree that a blast furnace could not be properly shut down. The attackers gained access to the 
steel mill through the plant’s business network, then successively worked their way into production 
networks to access systems controlling plant equipment. The attackers infiltrated the corporate 
network using spear-phishing attacks, sending targeted emails that appear to come from a trusted 
source in order to trick the recipients into opening a malicious attachment or visiting a malicious 
website where malware is downloaded to their computers. Once the attackers got a foothold in one 
system, they were able to explore the company’s networks, eventually compromising a “multitude” 
of systems, including industrial components on the production network (Zetter, 2015). 
During February 2015, the global hacker collective known as Anonymous announced that it had 
taken down several Islamic State (IS) websites, Facebook and Twitter accounts linked to IS. The 
campaign against IS started in 2014 but it was intensified after the attack staged by IS militants 
that killed 12 employees of the Charlie Hebdo newspaper on 7 January 2015 in France 
(vcpost.com, 2015). 
Also during February 2015, the Australian government announced that it would launch information 
warfare related attacks on IS related targets. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) director general Duncan Lewis revealed that intelligence agencies were examining the work 
of the British Home Office which had authorised “take-downs’’ of IS websites and developed rapid 
response units to develop “counter narratives’’ to terrorist propaganda. Lewis stated that it was 
now clear that radicalisation online among young Australian Muslims was as great a threat as the 
risk of returning foreign fighters. He warned that the risk underlined the need for new laws on 
metadata to prevent agencies “going dark’’ due to a lack of information (Maiden, 2015). 
In March 2015, it became known that the Chinese government diverted from its tradition of denying 
everything related to digital espionage and network attack capabilities, and explicitly revealed that 
it had specialised units devoted to using computers as weapons. China organised its offensive 
information security groups into three categories: operational military units, teams within civilian 
organisations that have been given authorisation to operate and "external entities" (Knibbs, 2015). 
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In May 2015, the Chinese Ministry of National Defence published China’s Military Strategy, which 
inter alia discussed China’s cyber strategy. According to this strategy; “As cyberspace weighs 
more in military  security, China will expedite the development of a cyber force, and enhance its 
capabilities of cyberspace situation awareness, cyber defense, support for the country’s endeavors 
in cyberspace and participation in international cyber cooperation, so as to stem major cyber 
crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social 
stability” (FireEye, 2016). The development of both offensive and defensive cyber capacities are 
increasingly the norm in many states. 
5.6 THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
As indicated, in the current manifestation of information warfare related issues, governments 
worldwide are actively investing and researching information warfare capabilities. Most developed 
states and some developing states have conducted information warfare related exercises and 
established national monitoring entities (Bower, 2007). At the same time non-governmental entities 
are also getting involved in information warfare related activities (Cronin & Crawford, 1999:259). 
Information warfare is a global phenomenon, which makes it difficult if not impossible to evaluate in 
a domestic context. This will become even more so considering the future of information warfare.  
Despite these capacities being created by governments and interest groups, the dynamics of 
emerging emergencies and the unintended consequences of information warfare make the control 
of information-driven dynamics highly problematic. Controlling the potential power of information 
war in terms of its netwar and psychological dimensions will be difficult, if not impossible, in the 
future. The emergence of various other information warfare actors other than government 
controlled entities remains a strong possibility.  
Protest movements and/or governments are massing force in the infosphere as well as cyberspace 
for viral propaganda and debilitating DDOS attacks. As a result, there is a renewed focus on mass 
cyber-mobilisation and concentration as part of information warfare. As indicated earlier, networked 
actions, cyber-mobilisation and rhizome organisation are underpinning popular forms of conflict 
and not only lower impact cyber-related activities such as the disruption of websites. These 
activities require public participation for success and social media like viral organisations (Elkus, 
2009).  
It can be expected that in the future this form of mobilisation will even be more effective. The rise of 
artificial intelligence will probably change the nature of cyberwar in particular. Instead of relying on 
human hackers to carry out their attacks, antagonists will in the future continue to automate 
information warfare, relying on artificial intelligence systems to probe opposing defences, carry out 
attacks, and defend against opponents’ artificial intelligence. It is probable that this competition 
could eventually outstrip human control or even monitoring (Matthews, 2009). 
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In the modern field of struggle between a sovereign country and non-state actors it also becomes 
necessary to refer to the information warfare that is taking place in the new and traditional media 
as well as other technological platforms, from the internet to virtual reality and computer games. 
Such groups, including terrorist organisations, continue to invest efforts in information warfare 
tools, which enable them to bridge the physical gap between these entities and their conventional 
law enforcement and security forces. Some of these entities’ irregular capacities will probably 
outstrip the competencies of states in this regard (Gilat, 2009). 
These largely asymmetric warfare capabilities, which include information warfare, are even 
empowering the individual to conduct war. While the concept of asymmetric warfare dates back to 
ancient times, most modern conflicts have redefined the nature of such struggles. As the 
manifestation of information warfare indicates, warfare is being transformed from a closed, state-
sponsored affair to one where the means and know-how to do battle are readily found on the 
internet and social networks. This open and global access to increasingly powerful technological 
tools is in effect allowing small groups to declare war on states. Insurgent groups can be expected 
to increasingly form loose and non-hierarchical networks to pursue a common vision. United by 
that vision, they exchange information and work collaboratively on tasks of mutual interest 
(Charette, 2007). 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The environmental scan on information warfare as an upcoming national security threat focused on 
the technology, war/conflict, social, economic and political environments. Events, trends, risks and 
relationships relevant to information warfare have been analysed to highlight the phenomena that 
could impact the manifestation of information warfare in the future.  
Transformation, networking and the impact of technological innovation in all the environments 
investigated are highlighted as central to the manifestation of information warfare currently as well 
as in the future. These meta-trends influence not only the entities involved in power relations in 
society, but also enhance the potential influence and power of small and marginalised entities in 
society. New forms of network-related actions, such as the rhizome phenomenon (of small, highly 
interconnected networks) using social networks for cyber mobilisation, are identified as of particular 
use for information warfare in the future.  
When taking into account the security dimension in terms of potential information warfare targeting, 
a wide range of pillars supporting the information society could become potential information 
warfare targets. The key vulnerable access points include factors underlining the networking, 
coordination, integrating, compatibility and connectivity of the information and knowledge society.  
As most of the discussion about information warfare has been theoretical and future orientated, it is 
also useful to evaluate how this phenomenon has manifested itself in the recent past. Nearly all 
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recent conflict situations have had an information warfare dimension. While information warfare is 
enhancing military power, especially in developing countries, it is also creating new vulnerabilities. 
It can be assumed that this trend will continue and nearly all future conflict situations will have an 
information warfare dimension.  
It can, however, also be expected that the sophistication of information warfare actions will 
advance exponentially in the future. Broad individual and cooperative participation, on a world-wide 
scale, has now become possible. Artificial intelligence can also be expected to play a significant 
role in the conduct of information warfare in the future. Social media and the internet or mobile 
device platforms for such media empower most net-enabled individuals with the interest to 
participate in practically any global issue. This has created platforms for involvement and 
participation in social and political issues on a level never seen before in the history of humankind. 
Increasingly, it does not matter what the majority’s views on issues are; it matters more what the 
majority of empowered individuals are doing.  
In Chapter 6, based on the environmental scan driving forces critical for the manifestation of 
information warfare as a national security threat by the 2030s are identified. 
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CHAPTER 6 
IDENTIFYING DRIVING FORCES FOR 
INFORMATION WARFARE FUTURES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the driving forces critical for the manifestation of information warfare as a national 
security threat by the 2030s are identified. The environmental scan on information warfare as an 
upcoming national security threat done in the previous chapter, provided the basis from which the 
driving forces creating the four possible information warfare scenarios for the 2030s can be 
identified. 
Qualitative text analysis is used to evaluate and code the content of the TWEPS macro-
environmental scan. This is done by following content analytical rules and step-by-step coding, 
without rash quantification (Mayring, 2000:1). Knowledge is perceived as actively constructed with 
meanings of existence only relevant to an experiential world. The environmental scan provides a 
view on that experiential world, which is then evaluated through qualitative text analysis. Coding 
software developed by the University of Pittsburgh is used to assist with this qualitative text 
analysis process, including to create a graphical representation of the coding outcome. While 
qualitative analysis is an iterative, open process (Zickmund, 2009: Slide 10), it can also be useful 
for the building of theory by utilising grounded theory. 
The coding of text remains useful, identifying categories and subcategories vital for assisting in the 
identification of driving forces, later in formulating the scenarios but also in the development of a 
model for integrating theory and practice to develop practical foresight. 
In order to achieve this grounded theory provides analytically related structures to create 
perspectives on the actual environments in which insights are generated. Essentially, grounded 
theory is mostly applied with the aim to generate theory to provide a fresh angle on existing 
knowledge or where little is already known (Baszanger, 1998:354). In this study grounded theory is 
not used for theory building but for the creation of a model, which presents a visualisation and 
mental tool to provide a framework for identifying and understanding the dynamic driving forces 
influencing information warfare futures. 
The model reflects and provides content for the futures map for information warfare futures. This 
futures map provides the broad conceptual frame within which to discover or invent, examine and 
evaluate, and propose possible, probable and preferable futures (Bell, 2005:73). The model is built 
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on the environmental scan from which the three24 common cross-cutting trends flow that influence 
the future manifestation of information warfare.  
A significant part of this model is causal layered analysis (CLA), in order to provide depth to the 
insights and macro-driving forces within the model; it is used with the mapping horizon of the 
model. CLA allows for a multilayered and integrated analysis, which identifies the main information 
warfare related driving forces. The methodology of CLA, as discussed in Chapter 3, makes it 
possible to start to narrow down and integrate the key driving forces that will be influencing the 
manifestation of information warfare by the 2030s.  
The model assists in providing some theoretical futures study insights, which illuminates the 
systemic nature of futures studies and illustrates the layered nature of creating knowledge. These 
broader futures study insights provide input to start the process of developing probable scenarios 
on how the future could manifest. 
In order to understand the dynamic nature of the driving forces in a futurist context, one needs to 
embrace the changing contradictions that humanity is facing. This can be done by moving from 
one fault line to another as one contradiction runs out of energy because some kind of preliminary 
harmony point has been found. With this type of approach the image of the future becomes even 
more contradictory but also very open. The vision ensures that the future is viewed more 
dynamically but not necessarily less confrontationally (Galtung, 2005). 
After the prioritising and validating the driving forces identified through the Delphi study and 
opening up the future by formulating four possible information warfare scenarios for the 2030s, the 
model is again evaluated to ensure that it can serve as a useful tool that provides insight in the 
TWEPS macro environment. Using the model to examine integrated security-related issues could 
assist to make a positive contribution towards a better life in South Africa and Africa. 
6.2 CODING OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN OUTPUT  
The focus in this study is on qualitative data. Where qualitative data deals with meanings, 
quantitative data deals with numbers. This has implications for analysis because the analysis of 
meanings is done through conceptualisation whereas the analysis of numbers is done through 
statistics and mathematics (Dey, 2005:3). In this study, coding is used to facilitate 
conceptualisation.  
In qualitative inquiry, a code is mostly a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a 
summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute to a part of language-based or 
                                               
24 The three trends as identified in Chapter 5: (1) The level of integration of the world community and the rise of networks, especially 
social networks; (2) innovation, especially the spread of technology which is resulting in the simultaneous emergence of a host of new 
middle-ranking military, political and economic powers across the world while also creating significant inequality between states, 
groups and individuals; (3) societal change, which has been accelerated to new levels, resulting in transformation being a constant 
reality affecting nearly all social entities.  
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visual data (Saldaña, 2009:3). Coding thus means assigning codes to specific phenomena in the 
data material (Kuckartz, 2014: 23). Coding can be done using structured or unstructured data as 
source material. The best results are obtained by using qualitative text analysis of documentary 
source material (Kuckartz, 2015).  
In qualitative research, codes are typically words or devices used to identify themes. Coding data 
can be used as a data reduction method. However, this study does not focus on data reduction; 
instead, it focuses on coding data as a means to search for themes and eventually the driving 
forces impacting information warfare futures. As the research focuses on theme-related issues 
associated with the current and future manifestation of information warfare, thematic qualitative 
text analysis is focused on the environmental scan’s text in its entirety.  
Qualitative coding involves creating categories based on the interpretation of the data (Charmaz, 
1983:111). The term category stems from the Greek word Κατηγορίαι, which originally meant 
class, charge or even accusation, and which can be found in various scientific disciplines. Within 
the context of social sciences, the term category usually denotes a sense of class. For example, a 
category is the result of some sort of classification. In terms of knowledge systems this can refer to 
indexes, taxonomy charts and encyclopaedias (Kuckartz, 2014:38). Strauss and Corbin (1998:101) 
defined categories as concepts that stand for phenomena. Categories have properties, dimensions 
and subcategories (Kuckartz, 2014:23). These terms can be defined as follows (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998:101): 
 Properties: Characteristics of a category, the delineation of which defines and gives it 
meaning. 
 Dimensions: The range along which general properties of a category vary, giving 
specification to a category and variation to the theory. 
 Subcategories: Concepts that pertain to a category, giving it further clarification and 
specifications. 
The analytic tasks in terms of qualitative text analysis include naming concepts, defining categories 
and developing categories in terms of their properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998:102). Even after categories have been assigned, the text itself, i.e. the wording of the 
statements, is relevant and also plays an important role in the preparation and presentation of 
results (Kuckartz, 2014:66).  
After studying the text, the summative, essence-capturing codes are identified, which are 
applicable to all text in the environmental scan narrative. Three such overarching codes have been 
identified. The three coding concepts overlap to some extent but for each paragraph the essence-
capturing categories and then subcategories were conceptualised.  The source of these qualitative 
text analysis thematic coded categories, identified as Innovation, Networks and Transformation, 
is the three cross-cutting trends identified from the environmental scan.  
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Firstly, the rapid spread of technology and innovation has a major impact on states, organisations 
and individuals while also contributing to significant inequality. Secondly, the world community has 
reached a new level of integration, accompanied by the rise of networks, especially social 
networks. Thirdly, societal change has been accelerated to new levels, resulting in transformation 
as a constant reality affecting nearly all social entities. The outcome of the environmental scan is 
coded using Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT) software developed by the University of Pittsburgh’s 
Qualitative Data Analysis Program (QDAP) (University of Pittsburgh, 2015). (See Appendix A, 
Table A: 1 for a representation of the coding exercise.) 
The first step of the analysis process focuses on the initial text, during which specific text passages 
related to the main thematic categories are highlighted. During the next step, the main thematic 
categories are allocated to the text via the coding process (Kuckartz, 2014: 71). After studying the 
content, the three main categories are identified in line with the earlier identification of the three 
cross-cutting environmental scan trends, namely Innovation25, Networks and Transformation.  
While innovation at first can be understood as the introduction of new things or methods, what is 
significant includes the content (what is the innovation), creation (how has innovation been 
created), and impact (what are the effects and consequences of innovation). In many cases 
innovation can be disruptive by fundamentally changing and shaping the broader environment 
(Weis, 2015:15). As innovation is closely related to technology and science is thus linked with 
knowledge and learning (Vernardakis, 2016:25).  
A network is a series of points or nodes interconnected by communication paths 
(SearchNetworking.com, 2015). The social dimension of networks is especially relevant in the 
environmental scan. A social network is a social structure made up of a set of social actors (such 
as individuals or organizations), sets of dyadic ties, and other social interactions between actors. 
The social network perspective provides a set of methods for analyzing the structure of whole 
social entities as well as a variety of theories explaining the patterns observed in these structures 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994:1-27). 
Transformation refers to a change in form, appearance, nature or character in a modern context 
can be understood as a shift from social orders defined by stratificatory social differentiation to 
those dominated by functional differentiation. While stratification is about hierarchies of rank and 
class, it is characteristic of social orders defined by dynasticism and caste. Functional 
differentiation is about the coherence and interdependence of specialized types of activity, the 
creation of a complex division of labour, and the rise of legal, political, military, economic, scientific, 
religious and other specialized roles (Ritzer, 2007: 98-100). 
                                               
25       Although the category refers to technical innovation, the more encompassing term innovation is used as category term. 
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 After coding based on the main categories, Transformation was identified as the main category, 
followed by Networks and Innovation. See Figure 6.1 for a graphical representation of the outcome 
of the coding exercise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Qualitative text analysis of the three environmental categories 
Source: Output of CAT coding, 20 May 2015. 
The next step in a category-based analysis is highlighting the relationships between the 
subcategories and categories (Kuckartz, 2014:71-84). Three subcategories have been identified 
for the three main categories. (See Figure 6.2 for the identified subcategories for Innovation, 
Networks and Transformation.) 
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Figure 6.2: Subcategories for Innovation, Networks and Transformation 
Source: Own compilation based on coding exercise using CAT. 
Innovation is related to the subcategories of modernisation, addition and modification, all focusing 
on different aspects of innovation. Modernisation refers to a model of progressive transition 
encompassing the improvement of systems and technologies. It is more than the process of 
change as it also includes the responses to that change (Knöbl, 2003:96-97). In all environments, 
improvements brought about by technological enhancement as well as organisational and system 
efficiencies are regarded as crucial for improvements and development. In particular, rapid 
technological innovation is mentioned as a central modernisation innovation factor.  
Addition is the process of adding or joining something to something else, typically to make it larger 
or more efficient (Thefreedictionary.com, 2015). In all environments, innovative addition resulted in 
systemic and practical improvements. However, inequalities as well as the digital divide are also 
highlighted in all environments for which addition or any other innovative development does not 
always have an answer. Another negative aspect brought about by addition is increasing the 
capacity for using innovation for negative purposes. 
Modification refers to both the act of modifying as well as the condition of being modified, which 
result in mutual adjustment and change between human social systems and the environment (Lill, 
& Gräber, 2006). Modification is the way in which most innovation is taking place in practical ways 
(O'Callaghan & Evans, 1973:51). 
In all environments, methods and systems, which are the result of scientific knowledge being used 
for practical reasons, are impacting these environments in innovative ways. Pervasive 
technologies, for example include progress in economic productivity, global collaboration, e-
commerce, with all efficiencies leading to change in government and society. However, this impact 
has globalising as well as fragmenting consequences, empowering some individuals and entities 
while marginalising others. Some of the modifications have significantly increased the influence of 
the general public in terms of participating in the current political and economic dialogue while also 
expanding the broad-based threat of general instability that far exceeds that offered by the 
dissidents, terrorists and guerrillas of the past. 
Identified subcategories for networks are system, complexity and interconnection. System refers 
to a set of interacting units, forming a unitary whole (Waltz, 1979:40). Within a system, the 
elements do have mutual relationships between each other and with its environment (Dekkers, 
2015:xiii). In all environments, ICT is identified as a significant force multiplier. However, “out-of-
control” technology and fears of vulnerabilities due to dependency on technology are also recurring 
themes in the TWEPS environments. The system subcategory of networks also focuses more on 
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the intangible factors, such as the capacity to adapt relative to other role-players in the 
environment. In the war and conflict environment this manifests in so-called fourth-generation 
warfare which seeks to undermine the enemy’s political will to fight by utilising political, economic 
and social networks as well as military action. On a global level, the significance of multilateral 
approaches to manage relations promises to be the appropriate institutional policy response to 
globalisation and the growing interdependence of national economies. 
Complexity describes the behaviour of a system in which the interaction of many parts takes 
place, giving rise to difficulties in linear or reductionist analysis due to the nonlinearity of the 
inherent circular causation and feedback effects (CALRESCO, 2006). Such systems with non-
linear interactions do not necessarily behave chaotically. Often, they are characterized by 
“emergent”, i.e. spontaneous coordination or synchronisation (Helbing & Lämmer, 2008: 2). Some 
of the networked complexity currently experienced in the TWEPS environments can be ascribed to 
continuous transformative social change. Increasing technological or systemic complexity is 
impacting the decision cycle, challenging especially human institutions such as the nation state 
itself. The growth of social media has enhanced global participation, openness, conversations, 
community forming and connectedness within most environments, but these have also increased 
the vulnerability of advanced and developing states. 
Interconnection is to be meaningfully or complexly related or joined (Dictionary.com, 2015). 
Networking has been stimulated by ICT as the most potent agent of change, establishing regional 
and global interconnectedness. At the same time, some effort goes to creating a more unified 
whole out of the distinct elements. More emphasis is also placed on the greater role of system-
based approaches and enabling technologies. Globalisation results in growing economic as well as 
political, social and technological interconnectedness. This creates a pervasive knowledge set of 
connections assisting networking. Economic integration, especially the opening up of international 
trade, has helped many countries to grow far more quickly than they would otherwise have done. 
However, interconnectedness has also brought with it pervasive security challenges. 
Transformation is related to the subcategories of renewal, shift and revolution. Renewal refers in 
an organisational context to the strategic process that results in fundamental changes necessary to 
align the organisation with its operational environment (Scholtz, 2009:9). As humanity’s scientific 
understanding grows, so too does the ability to engineer instruments to manipulate and transform 
the world. Intellectual technologies do play a significant role in the changes in society’s power 
structures. Hence, while computer technology and especially the role of the internet are impacting 
a rapidly globalising world, significant differences still exist in the abilities of different countries to 
effectively make use of these transformative tools. Information technology presents humanity with 
transformative capacity to simultaneously localise and globalise (glocalisation), decentralise and 
centralise, fragment and integrate. Transformation also makes it important to separate what is 
transient from that which constitutes long-term change. Humanity is inundated with information and 
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is more engaged with the wider world than ever before. This also applies to the war/conflict 
environment, which blurs the boundaries between the civilian and military realm. 
Shift is referring to change in terms of direction, place or position (Shaughnessy, 2015: 8). 
Technology and information are interdependent, with advances in one entailing and dependent on 
advances in the other. A general shift to information or digital economics is taking place globally. 
While states will remain the dominant actor globally, they will be challenged and they will find it 
increasingly difficult to remain in control. As new military technologies emerge, the global diffusion 
of weapons and military technology is bound to confront policy-makers. As humankind is 
increasingly becoming digital data subjects, the ability for governments to build and sustain 
partnerships to combat discontents will increasingly depend on bolstering a country’s credibility 
with the broader population of the world and forging an ethic of common purpose. A much larger 
part of the population, both within and among countries, has access to the power that comes from 
information. While globalisation has not succeeded in reducing poverty in general, neither has it 
succeeded in ensuring sustained stability. 
Revolution refers to any wide-ranging change in society, instituted, perhaps, by social, political, 
economic and/or scientific/technological change, altering the distribution of power in the society, 
but also resulting in major changes in the whole social structure (Robertson, 2002:428). Many 
elements of human induced transformation can be regarded as revolutionary. The Information Age 
is also called the "age of technology". A radical transformation has occurred in the way in which the 
information sphere is used by individuals, citizens and members of cultural and social groups. The 
Information Age brought an increase in management and precision. It also reaches into new 
domains of cyberspace and space. The social media trend supports the democratisation of 
knowledge and information, transforming people from content consumers into content producers. 
However, these same technologies are also increasingly used by authoritarian governments, 
transnational crime and extremist political and religious entities. 
Using the insight gained from the systems approach, the need for a multi-dimensional perspective 
on information warfare context is evident. The limitations of coding, even when subcategories have 
been identified, become noticeable once the thematic qualitative text coding has been done. The 
subcategories provide additional insight into the environmental scan but do not promote a more 
integrated and multi-layered view of the environment within which information warfare manifests. 
Hence, it becomes necessary to develop a model for viewing the information warfare environment 
in order to ensure a more detailed and integrated production of key drivers of information warfare. 
Subcategories, however, are useful in the development of scenarios on how information warfare 
will manifest as a national security threat by the 2030s.  
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6.3 FROM GROUNDED THEORY TO A FUTURES MODEL 
In traditional social science, the researcher enters a research situation with an a priori theory. The 
purpose of data collection is therefore to “confirm” or “disconfirm” that theory, hence the phrase 
confirmatory approach to science. In grounded theory, data is not used to test an a priori theory. 
Rather, data is used to evolve a theory. Typically, the data is collected by means of qualitative 
methods (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010:256). Therefore, the careful coding of data is central to 
grounded theory (Kuckartz, 2014:23). Charmaz (2006:46) stated that: “Coding is the pivotal link 
between collecting data and developing an emergent theory to explain these data. Through coding, 
you define what is happening in the data and begin to grapple with what it means.” 
A model can be created by applying a method such as grounded theory, which is a systematic 
methodology used in the social sciences to discover theory through the analysis of data (Martin & 
Turner, 1986:141). Grounded theory, therefore, was intended as a methodology for developing 
theory that is “grounded in data” that has been systematically gathered and analysed. The theory 
evolves during the research process itself and is the result of continuous interplay between data 
collection and analysis. It requires the acknowledgment that enquiry is always context bound and 
facts should be viewed as both theory laden and value laden (Goulding, 2002:42).  
Modelling is a visualisation and mental tool developed to represent reality. A model can be helpful 
to understand the connections between factors and events, and to examine their dynamics. Models 
thus constitute a simpler version of reality even though they have a disadvantage as certain factors 
can be omitted. However, models are central to scientific thinking and essential for various kinds of 
practical problem solving. Permeated with different meanings in different contexts, the word model 
implies structure and relationships among variables while also conveying tentativeness and 
incompleteness (Bello, 2007:108). 
In this study, coding is not used to create theory per se but a model which is intended to be useful 
in providing futurist insight into the manifestation of information warfare. Coded categories should 
be linked to theoretical propositions (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010:268). Thus, the core of grounded and 
emergent model construction occurs at the level of data analysis. It is here that the insights gained 
during the act of data collection are combined with the insights gained from reading past literature, 
the environmental study and the information contained in the data to derive a model (Jaccard & 
Jacoby, 2010:269). Such approaches are orientated to identifying connections between social 
phenomena (Dey, 2005:3). 
Process-oriented perspectives in theorising remain common. Merriam-Webster (2015) defined a 
process as “a systematic series of actions directed to some end” (e.g. the process of homogenising 
milk) and as “a continuous action, operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite 
manner” (e.g. the process of decay) (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010:269). The essence of these 
definitions involves the notions of action and change situated at the centre of the proposed model. 
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6.3.1 The use of a model 
Model building is important for problem solving (Bello, 2007:110). It is important to create a 
framework showing how insight can be gained into the future manifestation of information warfare. 
The current TWEPS environments show significant complexity, as illustrated by the environmental 
scan. The model provides a visualisation and mental tool to add value to the analysis of the 
environmental scan output. 
Social scientists who want to quantify their knowledge find that it is extremely difficult to determine 
relationships among variables that are not as precise and complete as in the physical world. A 
model captures an important texture of tentativeness and incompleteness that is needed in 
describing knowledge (Little, 1993:1). Building a model allows for the use of heuristics and known 
structures. However, prior knowledge can also hide new directions in problem solving. 
Breakthroughs are facilitated by conscious efforts to bring new ideas to the problem, often in a 
sequence of intensive effort, followed by backing away, and, after a delay, the release of a fresh 
flow of ideas (Little, 1993:8). 
In social science a model represents theory as a system of related concepts to describe an idea or 
phenomenon (Little, 1993:2). Theorising actions include reaching down to fundamentals, reaching 
up to abstractions as well as probing into experience. The content of theorising opens up the core 
of studied phenomena and poses new questions about it. Value added by model-related theorising 
fosters seeing possibilities, establishing connections and asking questions. A model developed 
through grounded theory methods provides theoretical opportunities that avoid importing and 
imposing packaged images and automatic answers (Charmaz, 2006:135). 
6.4 AN INFORMATION WARFARE ENVIRONMENT FUTURES STUDIES MODEL 
A multitude of methods can be used to produce the knowledgeability that brings about insight and 
eventually foresight. In this study, a model is developed to assist in the process of the identification 
of driving forces that will be influential in how information warfare manifests as a national security 
threat by the 2030s. The model is constructed from three different but related constructs, namely 
the futures map, environmental scanning and CLA. The data collected during the environmental 
scan, which is coded in terms of the thematic qualitative text analysis method, resulted in the 
identification of three categories. In terms of grounded theory these categories may become the 
basis for new theory (Allan, 2003:1). In this model, the three categories represent the three macro-
trends influencing information warfare futures.  
Figure 6.3 is an illustration of a graphical representation of this model. The value of the model lies 
in identifying the features that will be key in creating the level of insight into the issue of information 
warfare as a future national security threat. The model is situated within the framework which is 
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related to the earlier identified futures map in which the possible, probable and preferable futures 
could manifest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Futures studies model applicable to information warfare futures 
Source: Own compilation using insights from the Futures Map (Kuusi, Cuhls and Steinmüller, 
2015:63), Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) (Inayatullah, 2008c:1) and Systems Layered Explanation 
of Reality (Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur and Schley, 2008:174). 
 
The environmental scan serves as the source of insight into the driving forces inf luencing the 
possible futures of information warfare. In the case of information warfare as an upcoming threat 
the Technological, War/Conflict, Economical, Political and Social (TWEPS) macro-environmental 
hexagon is used instead of the frequently used STEEP (Social, Technological, Economic, 
Environmental and Political) sectors (Kurian & Molitor, 1996:814).  
Based on the environmental scan, the mentioned three interrelated trends which influence 
information warfare futures have been identified. In the contemporary world, these three trends are 
manifesting at a significantly increased pace and intensity – unlike anything in past human 
experience. The first trend is the integration of the world community and the rise of networks, 
especially social networks. The second trend is the impact of innovation, especially technological 
innovation resulting in the emergence of a host of new middle-ranking military, political and 
economic powers across the world, but also great inequality between states, groups and 
individuals. The third trend is societal transformation that has been accelerated to new levels, 
resulting in transformation being a constant reality affecting nearly all social entities. The outcome 
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of the analysis of these trends has produced the required forecasting and futures insight, which 
forms the basis of the futurist dimension around which future scenarios can be constructed. 
The trends provide the input and sketches out the planning horizon. The planning horizon is linked 
to the concept and method of a roadmap (Kuusi, Cuhls & Steinmüller, 2015:64). The roadmap 
highlights the trends influencing the future manifestation of information warfare. (See Figure 6.4 for 
an illustration of the trend planning horizon roadmap.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Trend planning horizon roadmap 
Source: Own compilation. 
The mapping horizon is the anticipation horizon of a futures map and consequently of possible 
futures (Kuusi, Cuhls & Steinmüller, 2015:64). This is the space in the futures map where 
scenarios are formulated. Before scenarios can be compiled, the output of the environmental scan 
(inclusive of the three trends) must be evaluated on multiple levels. In this model, the mapping 
horizon provides an opportunity to evaluate the futures impact of the trends by using a four-layered 
approach. This four-level systematic explanation of inter alia security-related issues is based on 
proposals by Senge, Smith, Kruschwitz, Laur and Schley (2008:173-176) to provide a guideline for 
a layered structure which can be used to gain more insight into the phenomena that are been 
studied. (See Figure 3.6 in Chapter 3 for an illustration of this.) The first level identifies events of 
concern. The second level goes beyond the immediate event by focusing on the underlying 
structural aspects within which these events occur. The third level refers to the mental models, 
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which are the core beliefs within the system, especially related to the authoritative granting of 
values by the decision-makers within the system. The fourth level focuses on the narratives which 
are based on the myths and metaphors influencing trends. Human activities result in "systematic 
relationships” (e.g. governments, corporations, universities, armies, churches) that are interacting 
with each other to create a multi-layered social reality, which is the focus of study (Searle, 
1995:97). 
These layers are intimately related to the futures-orientated layered method that Inayatullah called 
(2008c:1) causal layer analysis (CLA). In Chapter 3, CLA has been identified as a tool to 
categorise diverse views of and concerns about the future, allowing for more effective thinking 
about the future (World Future Society, 2005:4). While CLA involves the four levels of knowing –  
the litany, social causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor levels of knowing – the 
challenge remains to conduct research that moves up and down these layers of analysis in order to 
be inclusive of different ways of knowing (Inayatullah, 2000:1). CLA has matured since its 
development by Inayatullah and developed into a generalized system for viewing the world as 
made up of distinct layers of reality. Voros (2006: 45) describes the four levels as four major 
‘‘bands’’ or ‘‘strata’’ of depth which sit ‘‘below’’ the default ‘‘surface’’ view of discrete events and 
occurrences. These layers are highlighting; constructs of thinking; contents of thinking; capacities 
of thinking; and conditions of existence.  
The next step is thus the evaluation of the environmental scan of each environment by way of 
using CLA. 
6.5 CLA ASSESSMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN 
The value of CLA is that it explicitly acknowledges that futures relevant factors influencing society 
can be viewed from different levels; it also facilitates analysis on these different levels. CLA serves 
both as a theoretical and research framework which deepens analysis and foresight processes. It 
can also serve as a tool for the redirection of policies which increases the extent of possible   
solutions (Milojević, 2014:1). 
The evaluations done during the environmental scan in Chapter 5 serve as source material (input) 
for this CLA assessment. CLA is thus used to identify key trends in all the environmental sectors 
identified as relevant for this study, namely the social, technological, economical, war/conflict and 
political sectors. Trends can be defined as trajectories, extrapolations, projections, and possibly 
even predictions, which are continuous and usually monotonic (Walton, 2001:1). Trends refer to 
the general direction in which something tends to move (Agostini, 2010: Slide 3). Identifying trends 
is a necessary first step in the process to analyse the potential impact of the current manifestation 
of human activity on the future. While it is obvious from the environmental scan that various and 
sometimes contradictory trends can be identified, it is more productive in terms of a futures 
approach to focus on those with strategic implications.  
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It is necessary to differentiate between trends and driving forces. Although the two concepts are 
related, trends do not equate to driving forces (Agostini, 2010: Slide 5). A driving force refers to the 
impetus, power or energy behind something in motion (Dictionary.com, 2015). Driving forces are 
theoretical but also practical exercises of thought identified by using the scientific method and 
systems approach. Thus, developments, especially clusters of developments that precipitate shifts 
within society so great that they cause significant shifts in other sectors, are identified as driving 
forces relevant to the creation of the future. Understanding driving forces is important for strategic 
planning or scenario building (or any other activity that involves anticipating the future) (Caldwell, 
2003). In this study, driving forces related to the manifestation of information warfare are collated 
from the CLA layered analysis of causal factors potentially influencing the future. However, 
attention should also be paid to potential strategic disruptors. These disruptors are known as “wild 
cards” in the context of scenarios. Wild cards refer to relatively abrupt changes of particular 
significance. These include potential catastrophes and other high-impact, low-probability events 
that would severely impact the human condition were they to occur (Walton, 2001:1).  
The CLA assessments of the environmental scan focus on the technology environment (Table 6.1), 
the war/conflict environment (Table 6.2), the political environment (Table 6.3), the social 
environment (Table 6.4) and the economic environment (Table 6.5). All of these environments, as 
presented in Chapter 5, are assessed according to the four CLA levels, namely the litany, social 
causes, discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor levels of knowing. The CLA process is built on 
the qualitative text analysis, identifying the core analytical insights on the four levels. These 
assessments are then collated and integrated to identify the main driving forces influencing the 
future manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat. 
6.5.1 CLA assessment of the technology environment 
In the context of this study, technology is regarded as more than mere artefacts (devices, 
equipment, machines or material objects) as it is also about knowing how to achieve practical 
purposes in the world. The manifestation of technology in especially the communication, 
information and management fields enhances the domination in society of signs and the systems 
that produce them to the level where the symbolic is increasingly impacting behaviour. This 
ensures that technology is at the core of changes in the socio-economic and political 
environments. Progress in the technological environment, for example, resulted in global 
communication becoming instantaneous. The outcome of this is that information and 
communication technology is increasingly embedding itself as a crucial part of nearly all levels in 
society. 
Table 6.1: CLA assessment of the technology environment 
CLA layers Assessment 
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Litany Technology is the panacea of all humanities problems versus 
technology as the root of all evil. 
Technological change is a dominating force in human 
endeavours driving continuing innovation, consumption, 
economic growth and human development.  
Social systems and 
structures 
 
World-wide, progress in terms of communication technology is 
impacting most societies, creating geographically diverse 
connections and social networks enhancing the general public’s 
influence on events and policies in many societies. 
Technological development is inter alia driven by the need to 
expand new relationships and links between individuals and 
entities.  
Power relations are directly and significantly altered by 
technology that creates new and improved infrastructures in 
society. This is taking place on two levels with communication 
options for populations expanding but also increasing the 
potential for authoritarian governments to expand societal 
controls.  
Technology has enhanced the shift in society from exploitation 
and profit to domination by the signs and systems that produce 
them. 
Worldview 
 
Despite continuing global poverty and inequality, technology is 
creating economic and political opportunities for traditionally 
marginalised societies by changing their perceptions about the 
possibilities to change these societies. As a factor that influences 
the distribution of power in society, technology empowers 
individuals, entities and societies. While technology creates 
opportunities for more freedom on the one hand, it also enhances 
the options for control on the other. 
Myth The transcending of man and the creation of a so-called 
singularity versus a future of a technological global dictatorship 
by a small elite or even an artificial intelligence creation. 
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Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
6.5.2 CLA assessment of the war/conflict environment 
While the prevalence of war in the world has decreased, it remains highly unlikely that it will 
disappear. The environmental analysis suggests that it has become more ingrained in the world 
with the blurring of boundaries between combatants and non-combatants as well as shifting 
centres of global power, providing some opportunities for conflict that has not existed before. This 
increasingly hybrid nature of war has become evident in a variety of operating environments, has 
synchronous effects across multiple battlefields, and is marked by asymmetric tactics and 
techniques. Part of this shift is related to enhancing the political, social and economic impact of 
individuals and sub-state entities in the world during conflict and war. These changes in the 
character of warfare and conflict are impacting security by increasingly turning security into a more 
encompassing, globally influenced and network-related phenomenon. 
Table 6.2: CLA assessment of the war/conflict environment 
CLA layers Assessment 
Litany The modernisation of military capacities, especially the 
digitalisation of systems, high-technology weapons and 
modernisation of information management, is needed for military 
and strategic success. 
While armed and security forces are increasingly relying on high 
technology, such forces still remain highly vulnerable to 
asymmetric threats. 
Social systems and 
structures 
 
Contemporary conflicts contribute to the blurring of differentiation 
between combatant and civilian in conflict situations. 
Technological advances have strengthened the system-based 
nature of war and conflict.  
Changes in terms of technology and media influence are 
empowering the previously powerless, enabling individuals and 
small groups to perpetrate violent actions with significant 
strategic consequences. 
The shifting COG strengthens the relevance of information 
warfare in the Information Age. 
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Worldview 
 
Increasing progress in capacities and technology are making it 
progressively more feasible to target higher-level decision-
making entities and the management systems of the enemy. The 
potential value of political, economic and social networks, as 
entities to undermine the enemy’s political will to fight, is 
increasing. 
Despite technology’s impact on war and conflict as well as the 
globalisation of conflict, the vast majority of modern conflicts 
have been civil wars fought with relatively unsophisticated 
weapons. 
Myth 
 
The exponential growth of military technology creates an 
undeniable position of power for a superpower such as the USA. 
Dystopian conflict visions based on movie industry depictions 
create visions of artificial intelligence (AI) threatening the future of 
humanity. 
 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
6.5.3 CLA assessment of the political environment 
Non-state actors are increasing their influence on the domestic as well as international political 
milieu. The national security element within the political environment is closely related to 
government control, and is made much more complex by the growing political influence of 
individual and smaller actors. While technology also provides the government with increased 
capabilities to control the flow of information, total control is becoming more elusive as technology 
and social networks are integrating globally. Globalisation is spreading transformation, technology 
and know-how worldwide but it is also highlighting and boosting inequalities. At the same time 
most states, especially world powers, will be under increasing pressure to seize strategic 
opportunities and make inequality and sustainable development their top national priority or face 
political marginalisation. 
Table 6.3: CLA assessment of the political environment 
CLA layers Assessment 
Litany Government control is enhanced through the implementation of 
more sophisticated management systems.  
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 Globalisation ensures that local-level political action can now be 
linked to global actions more easily. 
Knowledge and information are progressively more 
omnipresent in society, making it difficult for governments to 
unilaterally control populations.  
Social systems and 
structures 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the global international relations 
system’s traditional principles are being challenged and remain 
in a transformative stage.  
Worldview 
 
Multilateral politics is growing in importance. However, despite 
efforts to impede sovereignty, multilateralism has not yet been 
able to overcome the sovereignty principle and is not likely to 
do so in the near future.  
The political relevance of individual and smaller actors is 
enhanced as the global communications infrastructure expands.  
Governments and global actors are increasingly exposed to 
domestic and international public pressure.  
Myth 
 
A world government is to be created in the future. 
Severe global economic, social and political inequality will fuel 
future political instability. 
 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
6.5.4 CLA assessment of the social environment 
Significant components of society are excluded from information and knowledge while other 
components function within pervasive information/knowledge environments. Within the pervasive 
information components information overload is a significant challenge. Therefore, information 
filtering has become crucial in the social environment. In addition, the exponential growth in 
communication is enhancing the opportunity to expand social networks globally. In this, social 
media has become a significant part of communication and social media’s influence is expected to 
grow even more in the future. Social media provides opportunities for social and economic growth 
but also new avenues for the misuse of these networks for negative purposes. Polarising and 
integrating forces are contesting on many social levels. 
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Table 6.4: CLA assessment of the social environment 
CLA layers Assessment 
Litany 
 
Information overload is a growing problem. 
Pervasive information will be available to 
people with the technical means to access 
it.  
Social systems and structures A large plethora of communities are 
created as social media continues to 
develop. Disparity in wealth and access to 
knowledge continues to grow.  
Worldview 
 
Social networks are becoming a major 
factor with communities establishing 
themselves as dominant actors in society. 
Myth 
 
Society has become a truly global 
community in which real-time interaction is 
now a reality. 
Many injustices will be ended through 
concerted social actions. 
Increased social networking across 
international borders will increase the 
ability of these groups to undermine 
sovereignty. 
 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
6.5.5 CLA assessment of the economic environment 
The global economic environment is being transformed at a fast pace with growing 
interdependence, the shift of the economic centre and globalisation as major trends. Technological 
innovation is also influencing changes in the economic environment. The centre of the global 
economy is shifting to be based on information and cultural production. Cheap communication is 
increasingly becoming prevalent built on inexpensive processors with high computation 
capabilities, which are interconnected in a pervasive network, such is currently the case with the 
internet. Despite the technological progress, expanding communication and growing international 
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economic integration, unequal economic outcomes remain a global reality. This inequality 
endangers progress in the long term as parts of the population might be economically marginalised 
while their access to power instruments might be enhanced on the other hand.  
Table 6.5: CLA assessment of the economic environment 
CLA layers Assessment 
Litany 
 
The global economic system is truly 
interrelated and interdependent. 
Social systems and structures 
 
Global interdependence is a reality. 
However, at the same time economic 
vulnerabilities have also increased 
significantly. 
Information and cultural production fuelled 
by easy and cheap communication is 
growing in significance as economic 
activities. 
Worldview 
 
Globalisation has increased the mutual 
interdependence of all national economies. 
With growing interdependence the world is 
also facing growing inequality. 
Social production and exchange could 
become a major economic means of 
production next to property-based and 
market-based production.  
Myth 
 
National economies will eventually be fully 
integrated into a global economy.  
The current global economic structure is 
unable to address growing global 
inequality.  
 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
147 
6.6 INTEGRATION OF CLA ASSESSMENT WITH MODEL’S IDENTIFIED TRENDS 
The layered CLA assessments are in line with the futures model developed in this study. This 
model identifies three main trends, namely the dynamics of networks, especially social networks, 
technological innovation and the prominence of transformation, especially institutional 
transformation in human endeavours. It is possible to integrate the CLA assessments and identify 
the cross-cutting issues significant enough to bring about change. As all of these identified issues 
can precipitate shifts within society so immense that they cause other significant shifts. Hence, 
they can function as driving forces linked to the identified three main trends. In evaluating these 
environments the impact on global inequality is also highlighted. Although most of these driving 
forces can be linked to more than one of the main trends, the primary main trend has been 
highlighted in each case. (The result of this process is presented in Table 6.6 and is visually 
depicted in Figure 6.4.)  
Table 6.6: Identification and evaluation of driving forces 
Driving forces Category: Link to 
main trend 
Globally, the centre of power is shifting, enhancing the political, 
social and economic influence of individuals and sub-state 
entities in the world. 
Primary 
transformation 
Subcategory: 
shift 
Security is increasingly becoming a more encompassing, 
globally influenced and networked phenomenon.  
Primary networked 
Subcategory: 
interconnection 
The integration of systems and processes are exponential in the 
Information Age. 
Primary 
transformation 
Subcategory: 
revolution 
Despite the dominance of integration many human endeavours 
are also faced with systemic stress as challenges associated with 
centralisation and decentralisation are impacting on entities 
globally. 
Primary 
transformation 
Subcategory: 
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shift 
Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly 
impacting behaviour. 
Primary innovation 
Subcategory: 
modification 
The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous. 
Primary innovation 
Subcategory: 
modernisation 
Non-state actors are increasing their influence on international 
politics, especially in terms of national security. 
Primary networked 
Subcategory: 
complexity 
Global inequality in terms of economic, social and technological 
access continues to be a major global challenge. 
Primary 
transformation 
Subcategory: 
renewal 
ICT is embedding itself as a crucial part of society. Primary innovation 
Subcategory: 
addition 
Social media is imbedded in communication and is expected to 
grow in the future.  
Primary networked 
Subcategory: 
system 
The threshold required to exploit the advantages of information 
technology is relatively low and decreasing rapidly as the 
recursive simplicity within the ICT sector, which supports a clear 
trend of ever-expanding growth in access, availability and speed 
with a simultaneous reduction in cost and skill barriers, is 
increasing. 
Primary innovation 
Subcategory: 
modification 
 
Source: Own compilation. 
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These driving forces remain highly interdependent and influential for the creation of futures 
scenarios focusing on the manifestation of information warfare as national security threat. (The 
driving forces are illustrated in Figure 6.5.) It will, however, be necessary to scrutinise the validity of 
these driving forces by way of expert opinion through a Delphi study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Driving forces for information warfare futures 
Source: Own compilation. 
 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
The thematic qualitative text coding of the environmental scan output has been done to open up 
the text for evaluation. The summative essence-capturing categories, which have been identified 
as innovation, networks and transformation, are the three cross-cutting main trends identified from 
the environmental scan. Sub-categories have also been identified, which are useful in the 
development of scenarios on how information warfare will manifest as a national security threat by 
the 2030s. 
A framework has been created for integrating theory and practise. Grounded in data, a model has 
been developed to produce knowledgeability that brings about insight and eventually foresight 
regarding information warfare futures. Modelling is a visualisation and mental tool developed to 
add value to the analysis of the environmental scan output. 
The model is constructed from three different but related constructs, namely the futures map, 
environmental scanning and CLA. The data collected during the environmental scan and coded in 
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terms of the thematic qualitative text analysis method led to the identification of three categories 
and thus also three main trends. Driving forces related to the manifestation of information warfare 
are collated in this study from the CLA-based strategic evaluation of factors potentially influencing 
the future. Eleven such driving forces have been identified as issues which can precipitate shifts 
within society so immense that they can cause other significant shifts in context of the role of 
information as instrument of power. 
The value of the model-derived driving forces is increased when the driving forces can be 
scrutinised, integrated and validated by a panel of global and local experts knowledgeable about 
the environments identified as relevant to the futures of information warfare.  
For this purpose two Delphi studies will be conducted in the next chapter as the most appropriate 
method to arrive at an expert opinion and consensus on the most appropriate driving forces. This 
will be followed by a scenario exercise focusing on the manifestation of information warfare as a 
national security threat by the 2030s.  
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CHAPTER 7 
VERIFYING AND PRIORITISING DRIVING FORCES FOR INFORMATION 
WARFARE FUTURES  
THROUGH THE DELPHI METHOD  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The model developed in Chapter 6 assisted in identifying eleven driving forces relevant to the 
future manifestation of information warfare. These driving forces are central to the development of 
the scenarios explaining the possible manifestation of information warfare by the 2030s. The value 
of the model’s output is increased when it is scrutinised, improved and validated by local and 
global experts with knowledge of the Information Age dynamics relevant in terms of the current and 
future manifestation of information warfare. This is achieved by using the Delphi method, which is a 
structured technique employed to arrive at an expert consensus opinion on the main driving forces, 
influencing the scenarios focused on the manifestation of information warfare as a South African 
national security threat by the 2030s.  
Two Delphi studies are conducted in this chapter. The pilot Delphi study is completed with South 
African security experts as panel members. A second Delphi study is conducted with both 
domestic and international experts (knowledgeable in one or more TWEPS environments) 
participating. As illustrated in the overview of the manifestation of information war in Chapter 5, this 
is a global phenomenon that can hardly be evaluated outside its international context. Hence, the 
second Delphi study is undertaken to ensure that a more diverse group of expertise adds 
additional value and validates the driving forces.  
The Delphi method was initially developed as a methodical, interactive forecasting technique which 
depends on a panel of experts. In this study, the Delphi studies are useful to authoritatively validate 
and identify the main driving forces used to create possible future scenarios regarding the 
manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat in the 2030s (Roux, 2012). This 
method is based on a structured and democratic approach to forecasting, using the combined 
wisdom of participants (Powell, 2003:381).  
The Delphi methodology became known when the USA-based RAND Corporation (Research and 
Development Corporation) used it during the 1960s for forecasting. Since then, academics and 
forecasters have used it periodically for qualitative explorations into complex issues or domains. 
The overall purpose of Delphi studies is to facilitate formal discussion among selected experts in 
given environments around a specific topic. The method encourages the sharing of diverging 
worldviews over a few “rounds” or iterations in the hope that the views may converge into some 
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direction around the given topic. The Delphi has often been used in situations or environments that 
tend to be somewhat ambiguous, in particular when it is not possible for those experts to easily 
gather in one place and where interviews and surveys are neither timely nor appropriate 
(Wakefield & Watson, 2013:577). Delphi also prevents strong personalities from dominating the 
agenda and views regarding issues under investigation.  
7.2 VALIDATION AND PRIORITISATION OF DRIVING FORCES 
The identified eleven driving forces need to be validated and prioritised. At the same time, expert 
suggestions for improvements and additional relevant insights will also enhance the quality of the 
Delphi studies’ output. The analysis of the driving forces will be deepened by testing them against 
the insights of local and global experts with relevant knowledge on one or more of the identified 
environmental domains. The Delphi studies are done on the one hand to verify, tweak and refine 
these forces derived from the environmental analysis and on the other to prioritise the driving 
forces with the aim to assist in identifying the two key scenario drivers.  
Although a collective approach in analysing challenges might not always be the best solution, a 
managed approach such as the Delphi method has proved itself as highly constructive in 
aggregating inputs from expert and peer groups (Lanier, 2006). According to Linstone and Turoff 
(2002:4), the application of a Delphi study will usually be necessary when one or more of the 
following properties are present: 
 The problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques but can benefit from 
subjective judgements on a collective basis. 
 The individuals needed to contribute to the examination of a broad or complex problem 
have no history of adequate communication and may represent diverse backgrounds with 
respect to experience or expertise.  
 More individuals are needed than can effectively interact in a face-to-face exchange. 
 Time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible. 
 The efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a supplemental group 
communication process. 
 Disagreements among individuals are so severe or politically unpalatable that the 
communication process must be refereed and/or anonymity assured. 
 The heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assure validity of the results, i.e. 
avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of personality ("bandwagon effect"). 
In this study, all of the above properties are valid to some extent, and the Delphi studies have 
proven to be an appropriate methodology for the purposes stated. 
Additionally, a Delphi study is a valuable tool to ensure that contemporary developments are taken 
into account. This is the case, because the Delphi study facilitates a strong forecasting dynamic, 
the method also tends to be useful for staying abreast of the most recent technological advances. 
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Articles and books frequently lag behind actual research because of the time necessary for writing, 
editing and printing. A Delphi study, by contrast, can provide a more updated exchange of 
information than a literature search by drawing upon current knowledge and experiences of experts 
and rapidly reproducing it (Nielsen & Thangadurai, 2007:148). This is especially valid in terms of 
information warfare, which continues to generate daily news headlines, while technological 
developments ensure that ever more innovative uses of information warfare become possible. 
A fundamental question regarding the importance of value adding at this stage can be asked: "Is it 
possible, via structured communications, to create any sort of collective human intelligence26 
capability?" (Linstone & Turoff, 2002:5). Such a capability is necessary for validating, prioritising, 
narrowing down, improving and integrating the already identified driving forces. The most 
appropriate method to do this for the purposes of this study is by utilising the Delphi technique 
(Roux, 2012). 
7.3 BACKGROUND TO THE DELPHI METHOD 
The Delphi method originated at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s to 1960s as a systematic 
method for obtaining expert opinion on a variety of topics although it was initially used especially in 
technological forecasting (Sackman, 1974:iii). Since then it has been used extensively in social 
research as a qualitative research methodology. A Delphi study is a structured communication 
method, developed as an interactive, systematic forecasting technique that relies on a panel of 
experts (Linstone & Turoff, 1975:1). The method can also be described as a controlled debate 
(Gordon, 2003:5). The controlled debate or structured communication is created by providing 
feedback on individual contributions; offering some evaluation of the group views or judgement; 
providing some level of anonymity for the individual responses; and presenting some prospect for 
individuals to modify views (Linstone & Turoff, 2002:3). This structured communication is achieved 
through the use of questionnaires.  
A Delphi study is thus rooted in the principle that evaluations (or forecasts) from individuals in 
structured groups are more accurate than those from unstructured groups (Rowe & Wright, 
2001:124). The aim is to exploit the "collective intelligence" of knowledgeable individuals (Hiltz & 
Turoff, 1978:16). Rowe, Wright and Bolger (1991:235–251) stated that for Delphi to be of value, it 
should offer more accurate judgements or assessments than those gained either by interacting 
groups or individuals. Other techniques for obtaining consensus, such as meetings or committees, 
are generally acknowledged to be disposed to be improperly influenced by individuals. Specific 
problems include domination by powerful individuals, the biasing effects of seniority, personality 
traits as well as the reality that only one individual can speak at a time (Powell, 2003:377). While 
the standard that groups in general perform superior to the best member remains valid, Rowe, 
                                               
26  Linstone and Turoff (2002:5) indicated that "intelligence" in this situation also includes feelings and 
attitudes which are part of human actions and motivations. 
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Wright and Bolger (1991:238) also recognised that process loss can occur, which refers to the 
effect that the actions and presence of individuals in group situations may restrain the possibility of 
resolving conflicting and ambiguous issues while also constraining general creativity. However, the 
participant anonymity offered by the Delphi method and its democratic, structured approach can 
assist in a process gain. 
A Delphi study is a virtual panel of experts gathered to arrive at an answer to a challenging 
problem. Thus, a Delphi study could be considered a type of virtual meeting or group decision 
technique, though it appears to be a complicated survey (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004:19). Although 
the Delphi method has its origins in the American security community, it has since been widely 
accepted throughout the world in a diversity of domains including political science, business, 
defence, education, information technology, transportation, health care and engineering. The 
flexibility of this method is evident in its many research applications globally (Skulmoski, Hartman & 
Krahn, 2007:1).  
The Delphi study is especially useful as a communication tool for generating debate. Thus, the 
output of a Delphi study is an informed opinion and its output should be interpreted as such 
(Powell, 2003:377). However, the method does offer generalisability and reliability of its results, 
guaranteed through the repetition of rounds for data collection and analysis, directed by the 
principles of anonymity and democratic participation. A Delphi study is therefore more than a form 
of data collection; its repetitive feedback technique expands insight, which in its whole “is more 
than the sum of the parts” (Day & Bobeva, 2005:104).  
7.4 THE DELPHI STUDY PROCESS 
In a Delphi study, experts from the required disciplines are first identified and then requested to 
take part in the inquiry. The identified experts then provide inputs based on questionnaires in two 
or more rounds. After each round, the facilitator provides a summary of the experts’ inputs from the 
previous round without identifying the experts. The reasons and/or comments they provide for their 
judgments are also included. In this way the experts are encouraged to modify their earlier inputs 
based on the replies received from other members of the panel. It is expected that during this 
process, the range of the replies will become more focused and the group will move towards a 
consensus position. Finally, the process is stopped after a pre-defined stop criterion (e.g. 
achievement of consensus, stability of results or number of rounds reached) and the median or 
mean scores of the final round are used to determine the concluding results (Rowe & Wright, 
1999:353). 
A Delphi study does not (and is not intended to) generate statistically significant results, seeing that 
the number of participants is usually limited. Therefore, the results provided by any Delphi panel do 
not foresee the response of a different Delphi panel or a larger population. These results embody 
the synthesis of the particular group’s opinion, no more, no less. The value of the Delphi method 
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rests with the ideas it generates, both those that evoke consensus and those that do not. The 
arguments for the extreme positions also represent a useful product (Gordon, 2003:5). 
The foremost advantage of a Delphi study is the attainment of consensus in a particular area of 
uncertainty where there is a lack of empirical evidence (Powell, 2003:377). In this study, the 
identified driving forces of the envisaged information warfare by the 2030s provided such a focus 
area. The Delphi method also works well when the goal is to improve understanding of challenges 
and opportunities, or to develop forecasts (Skulmoski, Hartman & Krahn, 2007:1). It should, 
however, also be noted that outcome of a Delphi study unavoidably reflects the subjective bias, 
cultural attitudes and knowledge of those who formulated the outcome (Linstone & Turoff, 
2002:226).  
As a method of communication during a Delphi study, direct interaction between the facilitator and 
individual panel members can take place if the panel members are reachable. More common 
would be the use of electronic communication in the case where the panel members are from 
geographically distant places. Electronic communication allows the group to focus quickly on the 
major developments identified and communicate on those issues in detail. Additionally, because 
anonymity is used, it is compulsory for each participant to evaluate the prospects of each driving 
force on the basis of his or her understanding and the backing arguments presented. The 
predisposition to evaluate only those positions recommended by the most distinguished panellists 
is also eradicated as a result of anonymity (Enzer, 2006:189). The Delphi method is highly suitable 
for the purposes of a futurist-orientated study.  
7.5 FRAMEWORK OF THE DELPHI STUDY 
The taxonomy of Delphi designs choices is extensive. In the design of a Delphi study, additionally 
to criteria set by the subject domain, the following must be taken into account (Day & Bobeva, 
2005:104-105): 
 Purpose of the study 
 Number of rounds 
 Participants 
 Mode 
 Anonymity 
 Media 
 Concurrency. 
 
The two Delphi studies conducted on the driving forces influencing information warfare as an 
upcoming national security threat are conducted based on the above-mentioned criteria. 
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7.5.1 Purpose  
The purpose of a Delphi study can include activities such as the creation, building, exploration, 
testing and evaluation of knowledge (Day & Bobeva, 2005:104). In this research, Delphi studies 
are used to validate and prioritise the main driving forces which will impact the manifestation of 
information warfare by the 2030s. Additionally, the Delphi studies’ outcomes will also provide 
expert direction, tweak the driving forces, generate new ideas, offer base insights and provide 
additional inputs for the scenario process. 
7.5.2 Number of rounds and questionnaire 
The number of rounds in a Delphi study can vary between two and ten, but it is usually restricted to 
two or three rounds (Day & Bobeva, 2005:104). However, the decision regarding the number of 
rounds remains mainly pragmatic as it is also required to balance cost, time and possible panel 
member fatigue (Powell, 2003:378). As the aim is to find consensus on the eleven identified driving 
forces, it is calculated (based on case studies) that a maximum of three rounds will suffice in 
finding consensus among experts. If a sufficient degree of consensus cannot be reached, an 
additional round can be implemented.  
Although Delphi studies initially used open-ended questionnaires, Hsu and Sandford (2007:2) 
noted that it is both an acceptable and common modification of the Delphi process format to use 
structured questionnaires which are based upon an extensive review of the literature. Kerlinger 
(1973) noted that the use of a modified Delphi process is appropriate if basic information on the 
target issue is available and usable. Information warfare media coverage has reached high levels 
and increasingly professionals in a variety of professions are taking note of this phenomenon. 
Hence, a modified Delphi process will suit the research approach followed in this thesis. 
7.5.3 Participants and panel size 
The profile of the panel members can be defined in terms of knowledge, nationality, age, expertise, 
qualifications, background, position and/or occupation. These distinctions can be used to analyse 
both heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. Of specific importance to researchers using a 
Delphi study is ascertaining the expertise of the panel members as this affects the value of the 
outcomes (Day & Bobeva, 2005:104). The pilot Delphi study members in this investigation were 
homogeneous in terms of nationality, age, qualifications and occupation but heterogeneous in 
terms of background. The convergence was knowledge of international security issues as applied 
to South Africa.  
The second Delphi study members were heterogeneous in terms of nationality, knowledge, age, 
qualifications, expertise, background, position and occupation. The convergence was knowledge 
applicable to the manifestation of information warfare in one of more of the TWEPS environments. 
In Chapter 5, the overview of the current information warfare manifestation illustrated that it has 
become so prevalent that incidents are reported in the international media daily. Most of the Delphi 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
panel members were not experts on information warfare. Instead, they were experts on 
contemporary security and political, economic and social issues. Therefore, as a minimum, they 
had sufficient knowledge about the phenomenon of information warfare and they were in a position 
to make an informed judgement about its current and future manifestations. 
In general, Delphi studies make use of large panel sizes. Reid (1988:28), for example, referred to 
“panel sizes ranging from 10 to 1685” members. Experience suggests that the number of panel 
members will fluctuate according to the resources available and the scope of the problem. Seeing 
that experts are used as Delphi panel members and taking into account that the process calls for 
convergence of opinion, panels of approximately 10 experts are used in this study. 
An expert is defined as “a person who is very knowledgeable about or skilful in a particular area” 
(Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). This study focused on selecting a wide range of experts, preferably 
knowledgeable on at least one of the TWEPS environments. An overarching field that is relevant in 
terms of information warfare (especially for the primary Delphi) is the security field. Jairath and 
Weinstein (1994:33) proposed that panel members should be experts who reflect current 
perceptions and knowledge, yet are comparatively neutral to the findings. Powell (2003:379) stated 
that heterogeneous groups, characterised by participants with extensively differing personalities 
and significantly diverse worldviews, produce a greater proportion of high-quality, highly 
satisfactory solutions than homogeneous groups. 
A Delphi study does not require panel members to be representative samples for statistical 
purposes; therefore the quality of the expert panel is assessed on its expert representativeness 
rather than its numbers (Powell, 2003:378). The focus in this study was on experts who were 
knowledgeable about the strategic implications of information warfare as a national security threat. 
A variety of viewpoints that cover respectable controversy will also assist in generating interest and 
participation (Linstone & Turoff, 1975:15). Rowe (1994:165) supported this assertion and 
suggested that experts should be drawn from varied environments in order to guarantee a broad 
base of knowledge. Many users of the Delphi method propose that experts should be chosen for 
their credibility with the target audience and work in the appropriate field (Powell, 2003:379). 
7.5.4 Choosing the participants 
Participants in the primary Delphi, which also served as the pilot Delphi study, were chosen from 
the South African state agency responsible for foreign security. Senior analysts and management 
members with at least ten but up to thirty years of substantive security-related experience were 
requested to participate in the Delphi. These individuals were deemed as experts on the security 
challenges facing South Africa and were thus in a position to make an authoritative judgement on 
the main driving forces fundamental to information warfare’s manifestation as a national security 
threat by the 2030s. In the light of the interconnected global society and fast changing world, it 
would not be appropriate to only depend on such input as the only judgement on the future 
manifestation of information warfare. A second Delphi study was undertaken to evaluate the 
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judgements of the pilot Delphi study and to obtain additional strategic insights on driving forces 
expected to impact on the future manifestation of information warfare. 
Panel members for the second Delphi study were chosen to represent a variety of experts on one 
or more of the TWEPS environments. Individuals both domestic and international were identified 
based on their expertise in relevant TWEPS environments. Individuals who were known to the 
researcher as well as experts who were identified based on their proven practical expertise were 
selected. Each respondent was chosen based on his or her potential to contribute in terms of the 
environments covered by the environmental study. 
7.5.5 Mode  
The mode used in a Delphi study refers to how the interaction is conducted – through face-to-face 
discussions or remote access via electronic communication (Day & Bobeva, 2005:105). Both 
modes were used in these Delphi studies. Remote access can also help to ensure the anonymity 
of the participants. 
7.5.6 Anonymity 
In a Delphi study, it is common practice that all participants uphold anonymity. Even after the 
completion of the final report the participants’ identities are not revealed. The advantages of 
maintaining anonymity include the following: stopping individuals from dominating others by using 
their authority or personality, freeing participants to some extent from their personal biases, 
minimising the "bandwagon effect" or "halo effect", allowing participants to freely express their 
opinions, admitting errors by revising earlier judgements and encouraging open critique. This 
approach avoids the negative effects of face-to-face panel discussions and solves the common 
problems of group dynamics (Day & Bobeva, 2005:106). 
7.5.7 Media  
A wide variety of media can be used in Delphi studies. This includes physical paper and pen, 
phones and computerised communication. Progress in ICT is transforming society and business. 
The expediency of electronic communication has driven the development of the Delphi technique 
forward to computer-mediated studies. This translates into progress which can include support 
from multi-media, modelling and simulation tools, and increase new research prospects for the 
technique (Day & Bobeva, 2005:105). 
In this study both paper-and-pen based media and electronic media were used. The pilot study 
used hard copy questionnaires as most of the panel members worked in the same building. The 
second Delphi study was done mainly via e-mail as the panel members’ locations were 
geographically remote.  
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7.5.8 Concurrency 
Most Delphi studies use a standard chronological set of rounds or real-time online conferencing. 
ICT options such as video conferencing allow for various concurrency modes, depending upon the 
character of the issue under investigation as well as the urgency of its resolution (Day & Bobeva, 
2005:105). In this study, a sequential set of rounds was used. 
See Table 7.1 for a summary of the taxonomy used in this study. 
 
Table 7.1: The Delphi design choices in the study of driving forces                                 
impacting information warfare 
Criteria Choice for validating and identifying 
information warfare driving forces 
Purpose of the study Knowledge creation, prioritisation and 
validation of driving forces 
Number of rounds Maximum of three per Delphi study 
Participants Heterogeneous group 
Mode of operation Both remote and paper based 
Anonymity of panel Full 
Communication media Face-to-face and e-mail 
Concurrency of rounds Sequential 
 
Source: Adapted from Day and Bobeva, 2005:105. 
 
7.5.9 Evaluation criteria 
Fink, Kosecoff, Chassin and Brook (1991:78) proposed a number of prerequisites to guarantee 
credibility in Delphi findings. These prerequisites include a lucid decision trail that defends the 
suitability of the method to address the issue under investigation, the choice of expert panel 
members, the data management processes, the identification of justifiable consensus stages, and 
the means of dissemination as well as implementation. These issues are extensively addressed in 
this chapter and in the annexures. Other validity and credibility issues include biases, rigour, 
trustworthiness and expertise. 
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Qualitative evidence also needs to be analysed in order to properly acknowledge the biases of the 
participants and researchers (Day & Bobeva, 2005:112). The choice of participants takes the bias 
challenge into consideration. In this study, the choice of experience, a long track record (10 years 
plus) of working in the security environment and the seniority of the individuals ensured that this 
bias was minimised. In addition, the participants in this study represented different genders and 
races, and came from divergent backgrounds – some from the apartheid structures, some from the 
liberation structures and some from the post-transition era. They were involved in managing 
national security from a South African perspective and were indeed knowledgeable about the 
South African national interest in terms of national security. In order to counter the South African 
bias in this group, the second Delphi study was done with a combination of domestic and 
international participants. This provided different views and opened up opportunities to expand 
insight into the driving forces under investigation.  
One challenge associated with the analysis of qualitative evidence is the lack of instruments 
available to refine a significant number of unstructured, non-numerical and loaded data sets 
obtained through conducting Delphi studies (Day & Bobeva, 2005:112). As the Delphi studies in 
this study focused on prioritising the identified eleven driving forces, these Delphi studies did not 
generate such large data sets. Hence, it is possible to use qualitative text analysis to code the 
outcomes of the Delphi study and to facilitate the use of the outcome in the scenario exercise.  
The questionnaire was developed by utilising a future studies model applicable to information 
warfare futures in which CLA and qualitative text analysis coding were central. This enhanced 
confidence in the primary data in addition to the standards for validity and reliability of the 
questionnaire. Additionally, an audit trail was created, providing a sequence of evidence through 
the data analysis stages (Day & Bobeva, 2005:113), both for the pilot and second Delphi studies. 
The examination of the plausibility and consistency of panel members’ inputs assists in assessing 
the rigour of the research findings and the internal validity criteria. When managing the Delphi 
process, continuous feedback and confirmation by panel members help to ensure that tests of 
quality are maintained throughout the process. The facilitator also recognised that during the 
implementation of the rounds important contextual changes must be detected and appropriately 
acknowledged (Day & Bobeva, 2005:112). The identification of the driving forces was derived from 
the researcher’s environmental scanning, but adequate opportunity was provided for the experts to 
modify, add or reject any of the driving forces. These processes have been systematically 
documented in tables covering each driving force in each round. (See Figures 7.2 to 7.59 for panel 
member feedback and evaluation.)   
According to Flanagin and Metzger (2008:7), credibility has two key components, namely expertise 
and trustworthiness, which both have objective and subjective components. Expertise is based 
more on subjective factors, but also includes relatively objective characteristics of the source or 
message (e.g. credentials, certification or information quality). Trustworthiness can also be 
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perceived subjectively, but can include objective measurements such as established reliability. 
Scientific credibility has been defined as the extent to which science in general is recognised as a 
source of reliable information about the world (Bocking, 2004:164). 
The use of multiple participants assists in strengthening the credibility of a Delphi study. For this 
study, this meant comparing the results obtained from the pilot study with another study. The 
variations in outcomes between Delphi studies can be attributed to the ability of each person to 
comprehend the formulated driving forces from his or her own worldview, as well as to the different 
contextual settings in which the individuals function. The measure used to decrease this risk to 
plausibility is the inclusion of a reason for the survey as well as an explanation of the source of the 
driving forces. Panel members were invited to contact the researcher for further clarification. 
While the duplication of outcomes from another context is the ultimate test for external validity, this 
is not so significant for Delphi studies. Gordon (1994:1) explained this as follows: “Because the 
number of respondents is usually small, Delphis do not (are not intended to) produce statistically 
meaningful results; in other words, the results by any panel predict the response of a larger 
population or even a different Delphi panel. They represent the synthesis of opinion of the 
particular group, no more, or less.” 
In the case of a Delphi study it is more constructive and appropriate to take a qualitative viewpoint 
by investigating the outcomes of the study for their coherence, plausibility and relevancy by 
“identifying the explicit limitations upon transferability of the results to other contexts” (Day & 
Bobeva, 2005:113). 
A Delphi study permits a certain inter-subjective selection from the more or less spontaneously and 
intuitively expressed individual opinions. The method is based on the assumption that a forecast 
that can be agreed upon by the majority of those surveyed will possess a greater degree of 
credibility than the opinion of an individual expert. Consequently, the composition of the surveyed 
group will have a considerable impact on the results of the survey. Special caution is justified when 
it comes to the role extraneous motives might play in the formation and expression of the opinions 
held by the experts participating in the survey. Experts may, for instance, present a skewed view 
(i.e. overly optimistic) of the future prospects of work in their own fields, while a tendency towards 
self-fulfilling prophecies cannot be ruled out (Pillkahn, 2008:195). In the case of the two Delphi 
studies conducted in this study no extraneous motives could be identified. The participants did not 
stand to gain from the outcome of the study.  
7.6 PILOT DELPHI STUDY 
7.6.1 Aim of the pilot study 
A pilot study is a research project that is conducted to allow the researcher to get a clearer idea of 
the investigation or to fine-tune the focus of the study. It is typically used to evaluate survey 
questions and to refine the questionnaire (Crossman, 2014). A pilot study is also conducted to 
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assist in identifying ambiguities and to improve the general administration for the follow-up Delphi 
study (Powell, 2003:378). However, as this pilot study involved South African national security 
experts, the pilot study was also the primary contributor to the content and identification of the 
driving forces relevant to the South African future information warfare scenarios.  
7.6.2 Focus of the pilot study 
The pilot study was conducted taking into account all TWEPS environments included in the 
environmental scan. One of the outcomes of the environmental scan was that national security is 
an overarching issue that impacts all environments in terms of information warfare. In this regard, 
one of the main focus areas for conducting of a Delphi study is the national security environment in 
South Africa. At the same time, the study conducted in this environment also served as the Delphi 
pilot study. Hence, the pilot study results were fully incorporated in the overall results as 
participants cannot be expected to participate twice in the study.  
The pilot study utilised a South African foreign security panel providing a cross-environmental 
perspective on the proposed driving forces. In January 2014, the relevant state entity responsible 
for South African foreign security related issues granted permission for the researcher to proceed 
with a Delphi study, provided that no participants were identified and no organisational information 
was revealed in the study. These provisos had no negative impact on the outcome of the pilot 
study as this Delphi study was not intended to provide classified information. 
The Departmental Ethics Screening Committee of the University of Stellenbosch Business School 
(USB-DESC) reviewed the researcher’s application for a Delphi Study and the research as set out 
in the ethics application was approved on 23 June 2014.  
7.6.3 Participants in the pilot study 
A group of 13 senior officials working in managerial roles in the security environment were 
identified to participate in the Delphi Study on the key drivers central to the future manifestation of 
information warfare. This provided for some leeway should some of the participants not be able to 
participate in all the rounds. It is essential that expert panel members are able and will ing to make 
a significant contribution. 
As expertise in national security would be a requirement, the following factors were taken into 
account in identifying possible participants:  
 At least 10 year of experience in national security core business 
 Analytical and/or national security management experience 
 A higher degree in national security, international relations, political science or public 
administration 
 Representing a diversified group in terms of race and gender.  
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Diversity in age was not significant with most participants in the age group early 40 to late 50. This 
is in line with the requirement that the panel members should be experts. In this study, most of the 
panel members had 20 years of experience in national security related work. All participants were 
serving officials (senior analysts and/or management level) in a public foreign security 
environment. None of the individuals primarily focused on information warfare as research topic. 
However, from an analytical or operational viewpoint, all the participants were responsible for 
international, regional or thematic foreign security issues in which information warfare was 
becoming a growing issue. 
Once the potential participants had been identified, they were individually contacted and asked for 
permission to become part of the pilot Delphi panel. As they were all based in Pretoria, the initial 
contact was personal. The following was briefly discussed: It was indicated that their expertise in 
the security field will be relevant to information warfare as an upcoming national security threat. It 
was emphasised that participation would be voluntary and that individuals were free to stop 
participating at any stage. Their identities would not be revealed to other members of the study or 
identified in the final thesis. In addition, their privacy would be respected and it was confirmed that 
organisational approval had been granted for their participation.  
The guidelines for participation encouraged panel members to question anything but also to 
provide solutions, suggestions, leads and clues to possible answers. The panel members were 
requested to add value to the study. In the cover letter, some direction was provided but it was also 
carefully formulated not to limit or restrict the requested responses. As the scope must be as wide 
as possible for unhindered input an additional open-ended question was included to solicit wider 
contribution by the panel members and to obtain ideas for additional driving factors. This question 
requested panel members to identify any additional driving forces which would be relevant in the 
context of the future manifestation of information warfare. Completely off-target responses would 
rather be disregarded by researcher than preventing potential creative inputs. In this cover letter 
some insight was provided into the methodology and definitions, but it was also kept brief and 
basic not to unduly influence panel members.  
After obtaining their verbal consent, a cover letter (see Appendix C, Table C:1 for the cover letter) 
and the questionnaire were provided in hard copy or, if requested, in electronic copy. Round 1 of 
the pilot Delphi study was conducted from 4 to 29 August 2014. Questionnaires were distributed to 
13 participants and responses were received from 10. The second round was conducted from 8 
January to 12 February 2015. Questionnaires were distributed to 10 participants and responses 
were received from eight participants. 
7.6.4 Structuring of the questionnaire 
The aim of the questionnaire was to obtain an expert group evaluation, validation and prioritisation 
of the driving forces which will influence the manifestation of information warfare as an upcoming 
national security threat in the 2030s. The questionnaire was designed to be as organised and as 
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clear as possible. It was presented in landscape table format. The layout of the questionnaire was 
based on the example provided by Day and Bobeva (2005:110). The driving forces influencing the 
future manifestation of information warfare were listed as statements from one to eleven. The 
formulation of the driving forces were identical, as indicated in Table 6.6, which reflected the 
results of the CLA assessment done on the output of the information warfare environmental scan, 
framed within the futures framework model developed in Chapter 6. (See Appendix B, Table B:1 
for the  questionnaire used in the Pilot Delphi study) 
Delphi panel members were requested to measure each driving force first against its current 
significance and then against its futures relevancy (2030). A 10-point Likert scale was used for 
both current significance and futures relevancy. On the scale, 1 was coded to be the least 
feasible/desirable constituent while 10 was coded to be the most feasible/desirable driving force. 
When responding to the Likert questionnaire item, respondents were required to specify their level 
of agreement or disagreement on a symmetric agree-disagree scale for the series of 11 identified 
driving forces. Thus, the range captured the intensity of their evaluation for a given item (Burns & 
Burns, 2008:245).  
A typical five-level Likert item scale ranges from 1st level (strongly disagree) to 2nd level 
(disagree), 3rd level (neither agree nor disagree), 4th level (agree) and 5th level (strongly agree). 
This is not sufficient for the purposes of this study. In order to allow the Delphi experts to provide a 
more precise evaluation of each driving force on a scale ranging from 10% to 100%, a 10-level 
Likert item scale was used. This provided the Delphi participants with an opportunity to measure 
the impact of each driving force against the two dimensions requested, namely against its current 
significance and then against its potential relevancy in the 2030s.  
The driving forces will serve as ordering data input for the Delphi Study. Ordering data can be 
described as data in which an ordering or ranking of responses is possible but no measure of 
distance is possible (Allen & Seaman, 2007). Ordinal thus refers to quantities that have a natural 
ordering potential. With ordinal data it is impossible to state with certainty whether the intervals 
between each value are equal. On a 10-point scale, the difference between 9 and 10 is not 
necessarily the same difference as the difference between 6 and 7. 
It is widely recognised that the types of data as well as the class of problems that a researcher is 
likely to encounter vary greatly with the field of research. Consequently, methods that are useful in 
one area or discipline may be of little use or interest to research in another area. In the physical 
sciences, for example, the overwhelming proportion of the data is essentially quantitative although 
possibly measured on an arbitrary scale. In the social sciences, qualitative data is more common. 
These qualitative measurements, whether subjective or objective, usually take values in a limited 
set of categories which may be an ordinal scale (McCullagh, 1980:109).  
Next to each driving force space is provided for the panel members to make comments, suggest 
changes, raise arguments and ask questions. To allow the panel members to make overall 
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comments and to identify additional driving forces, the questionnaire ends by requesting the 
participants to “… identify any additional driving forces which would be relevant in the context of 
the future manifestation of information warfare”. 
The questionnaire was designed to present clear, unambiguous and concise statements, together 
with understandable instructions for the participants. During the pilot study some participants were 
also requested to provide general feedback on the clarity and format of the questionnaire. It has 
been observed that an easy-to-complete and aesthetically pleasing questionnaire positively 
influences a panel member's decision whether or not to take part in the Delphi study (Day & 
Bobeva, 2005:110). The questionnaire should also be designed to take no more than 30 minutes to 
complete (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004:23). 
The initial contributions from the panel members were collected in the form of answers to the 
questions and their comments on these answers. The researcher as facilitator controlled the 
interactions among the participants by processing the information and filtering out irrelevant 
content. Individually drafted second-round questionnaires were provided to the participants in 
which the comments on the analysed driving forces were consolidated, and the individual and 
group scores were provided.  
More detailed descriptions of all elements of the Delphi study are provided in the round-by-round 
discussions below. Results are analysed according to the research paradigm’s qualitative coding 
(Skulmoski, Hartman & Krahn, 2007:4). In this regard, qualitative text analysis was used as 
explained in 6.2 coding of the environmental scan output. 
7.6.5  Evaluation of Delphi Study Pilot Round 1 
The aim of the first round of the Delphi study was to add value to the evaluation in terms of the 
information warfare futures model which included the results of the environmental scan and 
subsequent CLA study, leading to the identification of 11 driving forces relevant to information 
warfare as an upcoming national security threat. In processing each driving force it was coded and 
the category / subcategory stated while a scale for measuring the driving force was included. This 
assisted in the evaluation of the driving forces and informed the scenario-processes.  
The Delphi results were verified (continuously through the Delphi) and the extent to which the 
results can be generalised was also investigated (Skulmoski, Hartman & Krahn, 2007:5). The 
questionnaire was enhanced by integrating and assimilating information. This was done primarily 
through the qualitative analysis of the results which in turn provided the foundation on which to 
create the second questionnaire (Powell, 2003:378). 
This process of value adding by a divergent expert group (represented by the Delphi group) 
entailed the following: 
 Validating the driving forces as applicable 
 Reformulating driving forces according to responses 
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 Casting doubt on any driving force and/or identifying any contrary interpretation 
 Identifying implications and adding insight into the future impact of the driving forces 
 Identifying possible wild cards which could fundamentally influence future outcomes 
 Identifying new ideas that have not been focused on during the environmental study. 
 
All responses (comments, suggested changes, arguments and questions) were collated on a 
single spreadsheet and the median Likert score was calculated for both the current and future 
impact of each driving force. Supplementary input on identifying any additional driving forces which 
would be relevant in the context of the future manifestation of information warfare was also listed.  
Based on the feedback some reformulations of driving forces were deemed to be appropriate for 
Round 2. The reformulations served to clarify the issues and not to change the essence of the 
driving force. One driving force was replaced by another based on the feedback.  
Table 7.2: Evaluation of Driving Force 1 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 1 “Globally the centre of power is shifting, enhancing the political, 
social and economic influence of individuals and sub-state’s 
entities in the world.”  
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.3 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
7.2 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“States as sovereignty bound actors are resisting this trend. The 
centre of power shift will not be too important given the short 
timeframe to 2030.  
Sentence is too broad and there are two parts of which the 
impact is different: 1) Centre of power shifting has implications for 
balance of power among states which could be a driving force. 
Not sure what you mean by sub-state entities. If you want to say 
that individuals will become driving force then put it as such 
separately. 
What was traditionally considered the centre of power is shifting. 
However, aware of that traditional power brokers will change the 
rules of the game to redefine power and with it new definition of 
what the centre of power is.” 
Evaluation The feedback received indicated that the meaning was not clear 
as two issues were addressed, namely shifting power and the 
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influence of individuals and sub-state entities in the world. Driving 
Force 7 was already referring to the role of sub-state entities. 
Based on these arguments a new formulation (see below) for this 
driving force was created for Round 2 and subsequent 
questionnaires. This will highlight a specific aspect of the shifting 
of power referred to in the original formulation. The new 
formulation will by implication include both state power and 
power associated with the other environments, addressing the 
concerns expressed about this driving force.  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 1 
Change formulation. 
The new formulation: “The centre of power is shifting from the 
traditional developed countries to the developing countries.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi Pilot Study. 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Transformation”, sub-
category “Shift”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a weak-strong axis as well 
as a static-dynamic axis. 
 
Table 7.3: Dimensions of the category “Shifting Power” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension  
Transformation Shift Weak – Strong 
Static – Dynamic 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.4: Evaluation of Driving Force 2 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 2 “Security is increasingly becoming a more encompassing, 
globally influenced and networked phenomenon.” 
 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.7 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.2 
Comments from “Increased security will make information warfare more difficult 
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panel members  
 
than in the past. Most internet users are probably more security 
aware. 
Peace and security issues are discussed at forums such as the 
BRICS, previously only an economic forum. 
I would scrap networked. 
No people will relinquish entirely their security to an outside force 
as it is primal to human existence, hence the 9 in terms of future 
relevance. 
Security is not defined to assist in understanding the use of the 
“term” and “sphere”. Increasingly, indications suggest that 
advanced conflict will be characterised by struggle over 
information systems impacting on both physical and substantial 
security. 
Particularly in Africa where states do not seem to have the 
resources to deal with their security challenges, making them 
dependant on big powers so the status quo remains.” 
Evaluation The comment that security is not defined to assist in 
understanding the use of the “term” and “sphere” is valid. The 
reference to the expected increase in struggle over information 
systems also highlights both the physical and non-physical 
elements of security. This also stresses the increasing complexity 
of security if the digital and technological advances are taken into 
account. The comment to scrap networked can be disregarded 
as this is the core concept of this driving force. The shift to 
network security is also confirmed by some of the panel 
members’ comments. The comment that increased security will 
make information warfare more difficult than in the past can be 
disregarded as increased security results in even more 
innovative efforts to counter it (Booz Allen Hamilton Inc, 2012).  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 2 
Change formulation. 
New formulation: “Security in a networked environment will 
increase in complexity as its physical and non-physical elements 
increase.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
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Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Networked”, sub-category 
“Interconnection”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low-high axis. 
 
Table 7.5: Dimensions of the category “Networked Security” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Networked Interconnection Low level of manifestation – 
high level of manifestation 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.6: Evaluation of Driving Force 3 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 3 “Integration of systems, processes are exponential in the 
Information Age.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.4 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.6 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“The dominance of integration is not necessarily ensured; 
systemic stresses may increase as centripetal and centrifugal 
forces clash. 
The more integration also means more difficulty to conduct 
information warfare in the sense that own systems could be 
accidentally harmed. 
But also more dangerous. 
Because all forms of struggle over control and dominance of 
information are components of one struggle essentially. 
True, however, this might in itself present a major future security 
challenge.” 
Evaluation The comment that the focus should be on the clash of centripetal 
and centrifugal forces clarified the impact of this driving force. By 
only focusing on the integration aspect, the driving force does not 
truly cover the complexity observed in the broader environment. 
Decision on Change formulation. 
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formulation of 
Driving Force 3 
New formulation: “Systemic stresses from clashing centripetal 
and centrifugal forces will increase exponentially.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Transformation”, sub-
category “Revolution”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a high-low axis. 
 
Table 7.7: Dimensions of the category “Clashing Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Transformation Revolution High Level – Low Level 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.8: Driving Force 4 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 4 “Despite the dominance of integration many human endeavours 
are also faced with systemic stress as challenges associated with 
centralisation and decentralisation are impacting on entities 
globally.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
6.3 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“The main role-players are not expected to have a problem in 
overcoming such challenges. 
Complex. 
Clarify challenges. 
Do not consider this as an important issue. It is only relevant in 
lower systematic challenges and not a global phenomenon. 
New formulation: Integration of systems, processes are 
exponential in the Information Age.” 
Evaluation The new formulation of Driving Force 3 essentially captures this 
idea. It can thus be removed and replaced by a driving force 
recommended in the panel member’s feedback. 
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The request for additional driving forces resulted in a panel 
member suggesting that as interstate wars decreased, 
information warfare provides an opportunity to fill that void. This 
idea can be formulated in a driving force which could replace 
Driving Force 4 which has been removed based on feedback 
during Round 1. 
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 4 
Will be replaced by a new driving force. New Driving Force 4: 
“Information warfare will become an easy alternative and safe 
option for power projection.”  
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Transformation”, sub-
category “Renewal”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low intensity to high 
intensity axis. 
 
Table 7.9: Dimensions of the category “Alternative Power Projection Instrument” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Transformation  Renewal Low intensity – High 
intensity 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.10: Driving Force 5 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 5 “Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly 
impacting behaviour.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
7.3 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Perception is now reality! 
Yes, symbols will play a bigger role to simplify messages and to 
overcome information overload. 
Very much evident in the social protests over the last couple of 
years. 
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Provide example of symbolic information. Not sure what you refer 
to. 
It is primal instinct for humans to respond to symbolism; hence, it 
would be very difficult for us to evolve sufficiently for it to have 
limited relevance. 
Psychological warfare works better with the element of surprise 
as it was the case during World War I and World War II. 
Example would assist to strengthen this question.” 
Evaluation The significance of the symbolic in terms of the manifestation of 
information warfare was accepted by panel members. However, 
the need for a definition to put the concept into perspective was 
called for. 
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 5 
Keep formulation, define symbolic: 
“Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly 
impacting behaviour.” 
“Symbolic refers to representations (media or social media) 
which become reality.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Innovation”, sub-category 
“Modification”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low-level to high-level axis. 
 
Table 7.11: Dimensions of the category “Symbolic” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Innovation Modification Low level – High level 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.12: Driving Force 6 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 6 “The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
7.4 (second 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
9.3 (highest) 
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significance) highest) relevancy) 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Once again, the system may get to a point where any more 
speed would lead to a breakdown.  
Yes, once information is out there, it is and will become more 
difficult to counter it. 
Probably most important characteristic together with 2 and 3. 
Change and technology are inextricable. 
This will increase even more particularly in Africa who is still 
lagging behind.” 
Evaluation This driving force is regarded as particularly important both for its 
current as well as future significance. The formulation is not 
grammatically correct and needs to be amended slightly.  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 6 
New formulation: 
“The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Innovation”, sub-category 
“Modernisation”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low level to a high level of 
manifestation axis. 
 
Table 7.13: Dimensions of the category “Hyper-Speed” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Innovation Modernisation Low level of manifestation – 
High level of manifestation 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.14: Driving Force 7 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 7 “Non-state actors increasing their influence on international 
politics but especially related to national security.” 
Collective Likert 6 Collective Likert 7.5 
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score (current 
significance) 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Same challenges of complexity confront non-state actors. 
Especially where non-state actors are proxies for main role-
players in information warfare. 
While it cannot be disputed, trends also point to the continued 
survival of the nation state and information warfare (I could 
argue) would be primarily contested by states, not other entities. 
Probably not only in politics. 
The character and role of those in power will definitely adapt and 
change in the future. 
The phenomena of non-state actors is overstated. It is an 
influential but not determining factor in international politics.” 
Evaluation Although states remain the most important actors in the global 
system, non-state actors in today’s world have increasing 
influence and power in international relations (Joey, 2011:4). The 
increasing influence of these actors over the past decades 
indicates that it remains likely that this will continue. Although it 
might be true that in some cases the influence of these actors 
might be overstated, it can be expected that their future influence 
cannot be discounted – as supported by the views of most panel 
members. 
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 7 
Keep formulation: 
“Non-state actors increasing their influence on international 
politics but especially related to national security.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Networked”, sub-category 
“Complexity”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low level of manifestation to 
a high level of manifestation axis. 
 
Table 7.15: Dimensions of the category “Rise of the Non-State Actor” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
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Networked Complexity Low Level of manifestation 
– High level of 
manifestation 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.16: Driving Force 8 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 8 “Global inequality in terms of economic, social and technological 
access continues to be a major global challenge.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.7 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
7.4 (second 
highest) 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“The inequality of access will decrease. 
Those who cannot keep up will become the “victims” of 
information warfare. 
This will be key. 
Global inequality will grow as resources get scarce in the future. 
As we see the emergence of the so-called Third World and the 
shift of global centre of power this challenge will diminish.” 
Evaluation Although most panel members agreed that inequality is 
significant and will continue to grow, some dissenting views 
indicated that it might decrease. In terms of its futures relevancy 
it is indicated as the second most significant driving force. While 
it is true that around the world economic growth in many 
countries is positive, deep challenges remain, including poverty, 
environmental degradation, persistent unemployment, political 
instability, violence and conflict. These problems are often closely 
related to inequality (Mohammed, 2013). 
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 8 
Keep formulation: 
“Global inequality in terms of economic, social and technological 
access continues to be a major global challenge.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
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Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Transformation”, sub-
category “Global Inequality”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low level of 
manifestation to a high level of manifestation axis. 
Table 7.17: Dimensions of the category “Global Inequality” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Transformation Global Inequality High Level – Low Level 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.18: Driving Force 9 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 9 “ICT is embedding itself as a crucial part of society.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
7.7 (highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
9.2 (second 
highest) 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Mostly in the developed world within existing systems – the 
future manifestation of ICT in developing countries/societies not 
clear. 
I expect it to be absolute by 2030. 
ICT will determine national defence strength and vulnerabilities.” 
Evaluation This driving force has been regarded as highly significant by the 
panel members. The issue of the role of ICT in the developing 
world has also been raised.  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 9 
Keep formulation: 
“ICT is embedding itself as a crucial part of society.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study 
 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Innovation”, sub-category 
“Addition”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low level of manifestation to 
high level of manifestation axis 
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Table 7.19: Dimensions of the category “Embedding of ICT” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Innovation Addition Low level of manifestation – 
High level of manifestation 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.20: Driving Force 10 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 10 “Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
7.4 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
9.3 (highest) 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“This is a major national security threat. 
But what is social media used for? To scan for information or to 
socialise. 
It will be the dominant force by 2030. 
Social media is changing the entire society, i.e. interest groups 
which span traditional boundaries.” 
Evaluation In general, panel members regarded social media as a significant 
factor related to the manifestation of information warfare. The 
future significance in this regard is acknowledged with this driving 
force attaining the top position.  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 10 
Keep formulation: 
“Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study 
 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Networked”, sub-category 
“System”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low level of penetration to a high 
level of penetration axis. 
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Table 7.21: Dimensions of the category “Rise of Social Media” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Networked System Low level penetration – 
High level of penetration 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.22: Driving Force 11 (first-round pilot Delphi) 
Driving Force 11 “The threshold required to exploit the advantages of information 
technology is relatively low and decreasing rapidly as the 
recursive simplicity within the ICT sector, which supports a clear 
trend of ever-expanding growth in access, availability, and speed 
with a simultaneous reduction in cost and skill barriers.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
7 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.8 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Very much so. 
Sentence is long and there are sections that one agrees with and 
others which can be disputed. I do not see the “recursive 
simplicity” within ICT sector nor the “reduction” in “skill barriers”. 
I do not think that we currently have the exposure to rate the 
extent to which we will use, be reliant on and be controlled by IT 
in the future. It will be a central part of everything we do. 
Continuous search for vulnerably to exploit weaknesses in 
systems and defence systems.  
This will illustrate fundamental difficulties in coming to terms with 
information warfare. 
It brought about a revolution in military affairs. 
True, however, this is true for the North but not so for the 
developing South, particularly Africa.” 
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Evaluation The formulation of the driving force is to complex and needs to 
be formulated in a more direct manner. It is also controversial 
and remains uncertain if this is the case in especially the 
developing world. This needs to be investigated further as the 
Delphi study continues.  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 11 
New formulation: “The threshold required to exploit the 
advantages of information technology is relatively low and 
decreasing rapidly.” 
Source: Round 1 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Based on qualitative text analysis, this driving force falls in the category “Innovation”, sub-category 
“Modification”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low level of manifestation to 
a high level of manifestation axis. 
Table 7.23: Dimensions of the category “Decreasing Threshold” 
Category Sub-category Specific dimension 
Innovation Modification High levels – Low levels 
Source: Coded based on Kuckartz, 2014:25. 
 
Table 7.24: Additional driving forces as suggested by the pilot Delphi panel members 
Panel members’ 
responses to: 
Identify any 
additional driving 
forces which would 
be relevant in the 
context of the future 
manifestation of 
information warfare. 
“The main ones listed here are correct. 
Internet governance? Global institutions to monitor and govern the 
internet? 
Traditional warfare is on the decline: The broad trend regarding traditional 
interstate warfare is on a decline. The reasons are complex but a key 
aspect is growing rational state behaviour based on strong historical 
evidence related to the devastating economic/human consequences of 
interstate wars, and in addition, a more mature and coordinated 
international system of conflict prevention and management. Interstate 
competition, however, is stronger than ever as resources continue to 
shrink, and as such information warfare increasingly becomes a handy 
alternative in relation to dealing with and managing adversaries. 
Within the context of the short timeframe to 2030 not much can be added, 
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however, I would have loved to include a “singularity event” (especially by 
2048) into the equation as a driving force. The forecasted “singularity” of 
2048 will impact information warfare dramatically because it would be 
“uncontrollable”.”  
Evaluation Driving Force 4 is replaced by a driving force formulated as: “Information 
warfare will become an easy alternative and safe option for power 
projection.” 
Another noteworthy suggestion in terms of identifying driving forces is the 
issue of a Black Swan27 related event such as a “singularity event” 
(especially by 2048) added to the equation as a driving force. The 
forecasted “singularity of 2048” will impact information warfare 
dramatically because it would be “uncontrollable”.  
The idea of a Black Swan event will be relevant in terms of the approach 
to building the future scenarios.  
 
All eleven driving forces were measured against two dimensions by the Delphi panel members. 
The driving forces were firstly measured in terms of their current significance. Driving Force 9 (“ICT 
is embedding itself as a crucial part of society.”) with an average score of 7.7 is the highest. The 
second highest average score of 7.4 is for Driving Force 6 (“The speed of change is increasing 
exponentially with global communication becoming instantaneous.”) and Driving Force 10 (“Social 
media is a significant part of communication and this is expected to grow in the future.”). 
Measured against its futures relevancy (2030s), Driving Force 6 (“The speed of change is 
increasing exponentially with global communication becoming instantaneous.”) and Driving Force 
10 (“Social media is a significant part of communication and this is expected to grow in the future.”) 
with average scores of 9.3 are the highest. The second highest is Driving Force 9 (“ICT is 
embedding itself as a crucial part of society.”) with an average score of 9.2. 
7.6.6  Evaluation of Delphi study pilot Round 2 
Individual questionnaires based on the feedback provided were prepared for all the participants. 
The individual Likert score as well as the aggregate Likert score are provided for each driving 
force. The panel members’ own comments, if any, are also provided as well as the comments of all 
other participants with the aim to provide more insight into the interpretation of all the driving 
forces. (See Appendix D, Table D:1 for an example of a Round 2 questionnaire.) 
                                               
27  Taleb (2007:xvii-xviii) described a Black Swan as an event with the following three attributes. ”First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside 
the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme 
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The cover letter for the second-round Delphi (See Appendix E, Table E:1 for letter)  covered the 
following: Panel members were thanked for participating in the first round of the Delphi study 
aimed at identifying the most significant contemporary driving forces which will impact the 
manifestation of information warfare by the 2030s. Feedback and ratings have been received from 
all panel members. Based on these some changes were made to the formulation of the driving 
forces. The panel members’ responses to the first-round questionnaire are included for easy 
reference. The average score for each dimension is listed as well as the score the panel member 
provided. The letter indicated that it would be appreciated if the panel member could again 
consider each driving force and make a judgement on the score the member provided in the 
context of the collective average Likert score of the Delphi group as a whole. The comments from 
the other Delphi participants are also included in the questionnaire. The panel member is told that 
his or her rating can stay the same or move closer or further away from the average rating. Any 
additional comments will also be appreciated. Eight panel members out of 10 returned the 
completed questionnaire in the second round of the pilot Delphi survey.  
 
Table 7.25: Evaluation of Driving Force 1 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 1 “The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed 
countries to the developing countries.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
5.1 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.3 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
6.1 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
7.2 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.1 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“I prefer the formulation used in Round 1 it is more accurate. 
Maybe the centre of power is shifting from traditional developing 
countries but who constitute the latter group of developing 
countries. This is also constantly shifting. 
Developed countries are actively seeking ways to dominate 
drivers of the new Information Age.” 
Evaluation The original formulation of the fist driving force was: “Globally 
the centre of power is shifting, enhancing the political, social and 
                                                                                                                                                            
'impact'. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it 
explainable and predictable.” 
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economic influence of individuals and sub-state entities in the 
world.” The formulation was changed because it included an 
element already incorporated in Driving Force 7 which is 
referring to the role of sub-state entities. Therefore, although the 
previous formulated driving force might be more comprehensive 
for the purpose of differentiating between the power shift and 
sub-state entities, the current formulation is maintained. It is also 
acknowledged that this shifting power trend remains highly 
dynamic and constantly changing in terms of actors. For this 
reason, this driving force should remain strategic in focus. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 1 
Keep formulation: 
“The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed 
countries to the developing countries.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.26: Evaluation of Driving Force 2 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 2 “Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity 
as its physical and non-physical elements increase.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
5.4 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.7 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.3 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
6.4 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8.2 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.8 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Maybe more accurate to say ... ‘physical and non-physical 
elements become more tightly interwoven’. 
The reformulation has changed the meaning of the question. In 
the first formulation the focus was on complexity. Now the focus 
is on networked. 
Due to networked character cyber threat to increase.” 
Evaluation The original formulation of Driving Force 2 was: “Security is 
increasingly becoming a more encompassing, globally 
influenced and networked phenomenon.” Although there was 
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indeed a shift of focus in the first formulation of the second 
version in terms of the network aspect, it did not fundamentally 
change the meaning of the driving force. The collective Likert 
score change for the second round is also in line with the 
changes in the other driving forces. The suggestion of a slight 
reformulation will, however, add value in explaining the driving 
force more accurately. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 2 
Minor reformulation as suggested: 
“Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity 
as its physical and non-physical elements become more tightly 
interwoven.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.27: Evaluation of Driving Force 3 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 3 “Systemic stresses from clashing centripetal and centrifugal 
forces will increase exponentially.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
4.9 
 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.4 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.5 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
6.5 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8.6 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-2.1 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Equilibrium between the two forces will keep the system 
stresses constant and there will not be an exponential increase 
of any significance.”  
Evaluation It is not necessarily the case that clashing centripetal and 
centrifugal forces will keep the system stresses constant. These 
types of clashes could have significant but unquantifiable 
consequences regarding information warfare. However, the new 
formulation did result in the highest decrease (with Driving Force 
6) in its collective Likert score in terms of its futures relevancy by 
panel members. This is a driving force that needs to be 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
184 
highlighted for further investigation in the next Delphi study. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 2 
Keep formulation provisionally: 
“Systemic stresses from clashing centripetal and centrifugal 
forces will increase exponentially.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.28: Evaluation of Driving Force 4 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 4 “Information warfare will become an easy alternative and safe option for 
power projection.” 
Collective Likert score 
(current significance) 
 
5 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
n/a 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
None 
Collective Likert score 
(futures relevancy) 
 
6.3 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
n/a 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
None 
Additional comments 
from panel members  
“Yes, currently it is easier and safer but complexity of information 
warfare will increase and make it more difficult and dangerous to project 
such power. 
Agree fully with it becoming an alternative option for power projection. 
May not necessarily be an easier option (requires a set of skills). ‘Safer’ 
is also debatable. More safe than nuclear weapons but still exposes a 
country to a huge risk (especially in the current techno-dominant 
society).  
Suggestion: ‘easy alternative and safe option’ should rather be ‘of 
growing importance’ because information warfare will be built in among 
others.” 
Evaluation Feedback indicated that information warfare could be regarded as a 
growing option for power projection. However, the descriptions “easier 
option” and “safer” are more controversial. The suggestion to rather 
refer to the growing importance of information warfare as an alternative 
option for power will enhance the gist of the driving force.  
Decision on final 
formulation of Driving 
Minor reformulation as suggested: “Information warfare will become a 
growing option for power projection.” 
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Force 4 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.29: Evaluation of Driving Force 5 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 5 “Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly impacting 
behaviour. 
Symbolic refers to representations (in the media and social media) 
which reflect perceived reality.” 
Collective Likert score 
(current significance) 
 
5.2 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.2 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1 
Collective Likert score 
(futures relevancy) 
 
5.9 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
7.3 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.4 
Additional comments 
from panel members  
“Clarification of ‘symbolic’ helps and invalidates some of the comments 
(from Round 1). The clarification also reaffirms my initial score. 
The Islamic State (IS) is successfully using psychological warfare to 
radicalise societies. This trend is likely to increase over time. 
Social media activities of IS and hacking of the USA Military’s Central 
Command (CENTCOM).” 
Evaluation The description of symbolic assisted to clear some concerns expressed 
during Round 1 regarding this driving force. 
Decision on final 
formulation of Driving 
Force 5 
Keep formulation: 
“Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly impacting 
behaviour. 
Symbolic refers to representations (in the media and social media) 
which reflect perceived reality.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.30: Evaluation of Driving Force 6 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 6 “The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
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communication becoming instantaneous.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
6 
(second 
highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
7.4 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.4 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
7.2 
(second 
highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
9.3 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-2.1 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
None 
Evaluation This driving force is regarded as the second most significant driving 
force in terms of its current as well as future importance. In terms of 
its futures relevancy it did receive the highest decrease (with Driving 
Force 6) in its collective Likert score.  
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 6 
Keep formulation: 
“The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.31: Evaluation of Driving Force 7 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 7 “Non-state actors increasing their influence on international politics but 
especially related to national security.” 
Collective Likert score 
(current significance) 
 
5.1 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.9 
Collective Likert score 
(futures relevancy) 
 
6.2 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
7.5 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.3 
Additional comments “Non-state actors’ access to the means of information warfare makes 
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from panel members  them influential, and will be more so in the future as access to better 
technology empowers them. 
The Islamic State’s utilisation of technology.”  
Evaluation The role of non-state actors in information warfare is acknowledged by 
panel members. Contemporary uses of information warfare by non-
state actors are mentioned. 
Decision on final 
formulation of Driving 
Force 7 
Keep formulation: 
“Non-state actors increasing their influence on international politics but 
especially related to national security.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.32: Evaluation of Driving Force 8 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 8 “Global inequality in terms of economic, social and technological 
access continues to be a major global challenge.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
4.9 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.7 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.8 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
5.8 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
7.4 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.6 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
None 
Evaluation No consenting views on the relevance of inequality were 
expressed by panel members. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 8 
Keep formulation: 
“Global inequality in terms of economic, social and technological 
access continues to be a major global challenge.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
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Table 7.33: Evaluation of Driving Force 9 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 9 “Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as 
a crucial part of society.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
6.1        
(highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
7.7 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.6 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
7.4 
(highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
9.2 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.8 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
Counter measures, collective action and multi-lateral structures will 
play a crucial role to strengthen defence.  
Evaluation This driving force has been regarded as the most significant driving 
force by the panel members, both in terms of its current significance 
and its futures relevance. A global regulatory framework is required 
urgently; otherwise the weak and poor will either be excluded or 
exploited. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 9 
Keep formulation: 
“Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as 
a crucial part of society.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.34: Evaluation of Driving Force 10 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 10 “Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
6 
(highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
7.4 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.4 
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Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
7.4 
(highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
9.2 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.8 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Can be a tool for information warfare. 
Will unite the driving forces mentioned in two, three and four.” 
Evaluation The use of social media for information warfare purposes can 
manifest in many formats. The futures relevancy of social media is 
especially regarded as a significant information warfare driving force. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 10 
Keep formulation: 
“Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
Table 7.35: Evaluation of Driving Force 11 (second-round Delphi pilot) 
Driving Force 11 “The threshold required to exploit the advantages of information 
technology is relatively low and decreasing rapidly.” 
Collective Likert score 
(current significance) 
 
5.6 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
7 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.4 
Collective Likert score 
(futures relevancy) 
 
6.8 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.2 
Additional comments 
from panel members  
“New formulation is debatable and ties in with the point on global 
inequality. This point is true for developed and not developing 
countries.” 
Evaluation The formulation of the driving force increasingly seems to be relevant in 
developed countries but not necessarily in developing countries. 
Although user-friendly software could be deployed by relatively 
unskilled individuals for purposes of information warfare, the high-level 
development and applications are definitely restricted to high-skill and 
advanced training levels. The veracity of the driving force as currently 
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formulated is suspect. Driving Force 8 does cover the implications of 
global inequality.  
Decision on final 
formulation of Driving 
Force 11 
Remove this driving force from the next Delphi study. 
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
Table 7.36: Additional comments by the pilot Delphi panel members for Round 2 
Panel members’ 
responses to: 
Identify any 
additional driving 
forces which would 
be relevant in the 
context of the future 
manifestation of 
information warfare. 
“Information warfare is just another type of ‘traditional’ warfare. The 
destruction to civilisation could even be worse, even though the human 
suffering might not be as gruesome as in the past, the suffering will be 
more long term and continuous.  
I disagree that traditional warfare is on the decline. Especially intra-state 
warfare. Consider current examples of the Ukraine, Libya, Sudan and the 
Central African Republic. 
Question the notion that traditional warfare is on the decline. There are a 
growing number of conflicts in the developing world.”  
Evaluation No specific proposals were made for additional driving forces. The 
arguments against the notion of the decline of conflict are not correct 
when a long-term view is taken on the frequency of conflict in the world. 
Although conflict continues, the world is currently much more peaceful 
than in the past. Statistics reveal dramatic reductions in conflict deaths, 
racism, rape and murder. The number of people killed in battle, calculated 
per 100 000 of the population, has dropped 1000-fold over the centuries 
as civilisation has evolved (Pinker, 2011:53).  
Source: Round 2 of Delphi pilot study. 
 
During Round 2 of the pilot Delphi study eleven driving forces were measured against two 
dimensions by the Delphi panel members, namely against their current significance and against 
their futures relevancy. Driving Force 9 (“ICT is embedding itself as a crucial part of society.”) with 
an average score of 6.1 was the highest. The second highest average score of 6 was for Driving 
Force 6 (“The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global communication becoming 
instantaneous.”) and Driving Force 10 (“Social media is a significant part of communication and 
this is expected to grow in the future.”). This was consistent with Round 1 of the pilot Delphi study. 
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Measured against its futures relevancy (2030s), Driving Force 9 (“ICT is embedding itself as a 
crucial part of society.”) and Driving Force 10 (“Social media is a significant part of communication 
and this is expected to grow in the future.”) with an average score of 7.4 were the highest. The 
second highest was Driving Force 6 (“The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous.”) with an average score of 7.2. This reflected a slight 
change from Round 1 in the positions of driving forces with Driving Force 6 and Driving Force 9 
switching positions. (See Appendix F and Appendix G for the pilot Delphi study’s score sheets.) 
The average scores on all driving forces were revealed to all participants. Collectively, the 
participants moderated their scores on all the driving forces on both the current and futures 
dimensions. With the panel design focusing on South African national security experts, it is easier 
to attain consensus because the panel members were deliberately selected for their homogeneity 
in professional focus (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004:25). In general, no significant changes were made 
in terms of the individual prioritisation (except for moderating scores). However, the group did 
move towards stability and consensus.  
It is necessary to distinguish between the two concepts “consensus/agreement” and “stability” in 
Delphi studies. Consensus measurement should be considered a valuable component of data 
analysis and interpretation in Delphi research. In most Delphi studies, “... consensus is assumed to 
have been achieved when a certain percentage of the votes fall within a prescribed range – for 
example, when the interquartile range (IQR) is no larger than two units on a ten-unit scale” 
(Scheibe, Skutsch & Schofer, 1975:271). In descriptive statistics, the IQR, also called the 
midspread or middle fifty, is a measure of statistical dispersion, being equal to the difference 
between the upper and lower quartiles (Upton & Cook, 1996:55). Consensus has been achieved in 
Round 2 of the pilot Delphi study. 
However, Dajani, Sincoff and Talley (1979:83) stated that consensus is meaningless if group 
stability has not been reached beforehand; group stability is thus considered the necessary 
criterion. Stability is defined as “the consistency of responses between successive rounds of a 
study” (Dajani, Sincoff & Talle, 1979:84). In the case of stability, the results of two different Delphi 
rounds are not statistically different for a certain projection (Von der Gracht, 2012:1527). The 
model did assist to provide reasonably accurate driving forces with only one driving force change 
and one removed as result of feedback from the Delphi panel. A third round would not be 
necessary as consensus and stability within the pilot Delphi study has been reached. 
7.7 SECOND DELPHI STUDY 
7.7.1 Aim of the second Delphi study 
In the pilot study, the Delphi questionnaire was tested and expert assistance was used to modify 
the top ten driving forces determining the manifestation of information warfare futures in South 
Africa in the 2030s. However, as information warfare is a global phenomenon transcending 
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national borders, a second Delphi study was undertaken making use of an expert panel of 
domestic and international panel members from the broader environment impacting on information 
warfare. The second Delphi panel aimed to provide additional insights into the future manifestation 
of information warfare as a national security threat. Additionally, the priority driving forces were 
refined to serve as the driving forces determining information warfare futures in South Africa for the 
2030s. 
7.7.2 Focus of the second Delphi study 
The pilot study used expertise in the South African security field as focal point for all relevant 
environments in which information warfare manifests. The second Delphi study focused more 
strategically on domestic and international experts knowledgeable about one or more of the 
Technological, War/Conflict, Economical, Political and Social (TWEPS) macro environments.  
7.7.3 Participants in the second Delphi study 
A group of 21 individuals was approached to take part in the second Delphi study. Eleven agreed 
to participation, representing expertise in all the TWEPS macro environments. (See Table 7.37 for 
list of participants.) The participants included a wide variety of individuals working in TWEPS 
macro environments, all with tertiary qualifications. Two individuals worked in the cyber-security 
environment; the others in one or more TWEPS-related environments.  
 
Table 7.37: List of participants in the second Delphi study 
Panel member Expertise TWEPS coverage 
Panellist 01 South African business process consultant 
and expert. Thirty years of business 
experience. Expert in strategic 
management. Master’s degree in Futures 
Studies. 
Economic environment 
Panellist 02 South African high-level technical expert in 
information management and IT field. 
Master’s degree in Futures Studies. 
Technological environment 
Panellist 03 Prominent Singapore professional futurist. 
Ten years of experience in social and 
urban development projects.  
Social environment 
Panellist 05 British management expert with law 
enforcement background, PhD candidate. 
War/conflict environment 
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Panellist 06 Canadian ICT expert. PhD candidate. Technological environment 
Panellist 14 American computer security specialist. 
PhD candidate 
Technological environment 
Panellist 15 South African academic, international 
relations. PhD in International Relations. 
Political environment 
Panellist 16 Zimbabwean financial expert. PhD in 
Business Administration. 
Economic and social 
environment 
Panellist 17 Russian ICT security expert. Technological environment 
Panellist 18 Senior South African diplomat. Political environment 
Panellist 19 Senior South African diplomat. Political environment 
Source: Own compilation based on matrix framework suggested by Gordon (1994:6). 
Despite identifying a more representative group of individuals representing all TWEPS macro 
environments, the participating group had overrepresented the technological environment and 
underrepresented the war and conflict environment. This does not represent a challenge to the 
validity of the study as the aim of the second Delphi study was “…to provide additional insights into 
the future manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat.” The pilot Delphi was 
the “… the primary contributor to the content and identification of the driving forces relevant to the 
South African future information warfare scenarios.” 
Round 1 of the second Delphi study was conducted from 3 February to 11 August 2015. Requests 
for participation were forwarded to 21 individuals of which 11 agreed to participate. The second 
round was conducted from 3 September to 23 September 2015. Questionnaires were distributed to 
11 participants and responses were received from nine participants. 
7.7.4 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire has been developed and refined during Round 1 and Round 2 of the pilot Delphi 
study. As with the pilot study, the second Delphi panel members were requested to measure each 
driving force first against its current significance and then against its futures relevancy (2030s). 
Again, a 10-point Likert scale was used, where 1 coded the least feasible/desirable constituent and 
10 for the most feasible/desirable driving force. When responding to the Likert questionnaire items, 
respondents were required to specify their level of agreement or disagreement on a symmetric 
agree-disagree scale for the series of the ten identified driving forces.  
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7.7.5  Evaluation of the second Delphi study Round 1 
The process followed in the pilot Delphi study was replicated in the first-round questionnaire of the 
second Delphi study. The evaluation of the individual driving forces are presented in table format. 
See Table 7.38 to Table 7.59 for an evaluation of the driving forces in Round 1 and Round 2. 
 
Table 7.38: Evaluation of Driving Force 1 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 1 “The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed countries to 
the developing countries.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
5.5 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
6.8 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Yes. But I think we’re in the very early stages of this shift and, if that is so, 
then the tensions between the two worlds could be high as the developing 
tries to assert power it does not yet have and the other finds it increasingly 
difficult to exert yesteryear influence. However, 2030 may be too close for 
this to be a very important factor. 
Only some developing countries - in mainly Asia - have and will have the 
necessary technological advances currently and in the near future. 
The definition of power is unclear here. Moreover, the statement contains 
a state-centric bias.” 
Evaluation Realists postulated that any political unit (such as a state) will act in such 
a way as to maximise its power, which is defined mainly in terms of the 
security of its territory (Edwards, 1969:69). Political power can be seen as 
a psychological relationship between those who exercise it and those over 
whom it is exercised. Those who exercise power gain control by actions 
which have an impact on the minds of those over whom it is exercised. 
The impact derives from three sources, according to Morgenthau 
(1973:28), namely “the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, 
and the respect or love for men and institutions”. Power may be exerted 
through orders, threats, the authority or charisma of a person or of an 
office, or a combination of any of these. Nye (2011:xv) stated “...that two 
great power shifts are occurring in this century: a power transition among 
states and a power diffusion away from all states to nonstate (sic) actors”.  
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Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 1 
Keep formulation: 
“The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed countries to 
the developing countries.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.39: Evaluation of Driving Force 2 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 2 “Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity as its 
physical and non-physical elements become more tightly interwoven.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.5 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.9 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“I think that this cannot be seriously challenged. The complexity of the 
networked world presents opportunities for criminals and other ne’er-do-
wells. In the absence of a cataclysm, this will increase and offer even 
more opportunities. 
The definition of security is unclear here.” 
Evaluation Understanding of security to be included as suggested by one panel 
member.  
Decision on 
formulation of Driving 
Force 2 
Keep formulation: 
“Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity as its 
physical and non-physical elements become more tightly interwoven. 
Security refers to being protected or safe from harm.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.40: Evaluation of Driving Force 3 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 3 “Systemic stresses from clashing centripetal and centrifugal forces will 
increase exponentially.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
5.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
6.8 
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Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Include a definition of ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ forces. I interpreted it 
as opposing forces. 
I was slightly unclear about this point but I think I understand it. The 
convergence in some matters seems to be counterbalanced by a 
balkanisation. On the principle that IW gives power to smaller players 
with a grievance – I see this point as similar to 4, 7 and 11. 
Do not really understand the question. 
I am unsure what these centripetal/centrifugal forces are. 
The definition of forces is unclear here. 
This could be constant over time, i.e. the ever-present forces of change 
– so I wouldn’t regard it as a peculiar driving force. 
Question is somewhat confusing and 5 is therefore given for both.” 
Evaluation Feedback strongly indicates that the formulation of this driving force is 
not sufficiently clear. 
Decision on 
formulation of Driving 
Force 3 
Reformulation based on comments received. 
“An increase in integration and polarisation will contribute to systemic 
stresses.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.41: Driving Force 4 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 4 “Information warfare will become a growing option for power projection.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.5 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.9 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“I think that this is the most powerful driver of its increase today but I 
believe that countermeasures will mature and in due course, other things 
will finally supplant it. 
Reference to information – rather than cyber – warfare is unclear.” 
Evaluation Disagree with remark that driving force should refer to cyber warfare and 
not information warfare. Information warfare is a more encompassing 
term than cyber warfare which is a constituent element thereof. The 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
197 
definition proposed for information warfare encompasses three forms of 
manifestation of information warfare, namely netwar, psychological 
warfare and cyber warfare. 
Decision on 
formulation of Driving 
Force 4 
Keep formulation: 
“Information warfare will become a growing option for power projection.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.42: Driving Force 5 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 5 “Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly impacting 
behaviour. 
Symbolic refers to representations (in the media and social media) which 
reflect perceived reality.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.4 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“This is more subtle and a fascinating point which possibly could be the 
subject of a PhD on its own. I think that there can be no contest that the 
point is true and it is seen in recent ISIS-related matters (and I am sure 
lots of other things).  
Do not really think it is important. 
I’m unsure what behaviour refers to here. Behaviour of the general 
public? 
Venturing into the realm of symbolism requires elaboration on the 
importance of political rituals.” 
Evaluation Behaviour refers to the way in which people conduct themselves with 
reference to others and the world in general. Society has increasingly 
moved from being dominated by the “mode of production” to one 
controlled by the “code of production”. The objective has shifted from 
exploitation and profit to domination by the signs and systems that 
produce them (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004:607-608). The symbolic is 
integrated into the conduct and utilisation of information war. 
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Decision on 
formulation of Driving 
Force 5 
Keep formulation: 
“Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly impacting 
behaviour. 
Symbolic refers to representations (in the media and social media) which 
reflect perceived reality.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.43: Driving Force 6 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 6 “The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.5 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.6 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Security vulnerability discovery (as a main driving force behind 
cyber attacks) isn’t so much a factor of the speed of 
communication, but the integrity of software. 
Change is not defined here.” 
Evaluation The comment on “integrity of software” refers to the cyber aspect, 
while the definition of information warfare also addresses power-
related influence on a cognitive continuum for which speed is a 
relevant issue. 
Change should be defined, as one panel member suggested. 
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 6 
Keep formulation but add a definition of change: 
“The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous. 
Change refers to the act or process of transforming which results 
in a change in form, appearance, nature, or character.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
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Table 7.44: Driving Force 7 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 7 “Non-state actors increasing their influence on international politics but 
especially related to national security.” 
Collective Likert score 
(current significance) 6.8 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.5 
Comments from panel 
members  
 
“I saw some link between this point and number 4. Again, the recent 
events in Iraq come to mind. The USA government also because 
involved in the recent cyber attack on Sony. 
Does the statement assume that non-state actors are influential in 
international politics but not influential in international security?” 
Evaluation The focus should be on global/national security and this should be 
reflected in the formulation. Non-state actors are influential in both 
international politics and international security (Nye, 2011:xv). The 
focus in this study is more related to the security aspect. 
Decision on formulation 
of Driving Force 7 
Minor reformulation based on feedback received. 
“Non-state actors are increasing their influence related to global 
security.” 
 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.45: Driving Force 8 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 8 “Global inequality in terms of economic, social and technological 
access continues to be a major global challenge.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.8 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
7.9 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“My problem with this was whether I thought global inequality 
was going to increase – not whether it was a driver. 
I think inequality will decrease. 
The difference in economic/social/technological gains as a 
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means of polarising nations may contribute to the increase of 
information warfare. 
Statement vague. Global inequality continues to be a major 
global challenge. But: the qualifier (“in terms of economic, social 
and technological access”) should be rephrased. 
Global and intra-regional inequality in terms of economic, social 
and technological access continues to be a major global 
challenge.” 
Evaluation Although inequality might decrease, this seems highly unlikely on 
the short to medium term as various current indicators confirm 
that global inequality remains a major problem (Ghosh, 2013). 
Thus, a driver reflecting the influence of inequality would be 
appropriate. Formulation suggestions by a panel member did 
enhance the meaning of the driver and were therefore 
accommodated in a reformulated driver.  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 8 
Reformulation based on comments received: 
“Global and intra-regional inequalities are stimulating conflict 
potential.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.46: Driving Force 9 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 9 “Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself 
as a crucial part of society.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
8.1 (highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
9.1 (highest) 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
The present-day significance is that the shift is still ongoing, from 
isolation and separation to highly integrated global connections. 
Eventually, in the mid-term future, it will be a forgone expectation 
that everything is interconnected and integrated, like the roads 
we have to getting anywhere. As a subject, ICT as it gets 
enhanced and integrated, will become less of a concern, just as 
our road infrastructure which is crucial, but not something we  
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think about. Over time, advancements become trivialised and 
decline in importance as subjects of discourse. 
I think this is undeniable in the absence of some catastrophic 
change – but catastrophic change does sometimes happen. 
Increased ubiquity implies increased opportunity for IW. 
Not all technology is related to communication. 
Evaluation Collectively, this driving force has been scored the highest in 
terms of its current as well as futurist influence. Although the 
remark that not all technology is related to communication is true, 
the focus in this study remains on the communication aspect and 
influence of technologies. However, even technologies not 
previously associated with communication are being connected 
by the expected exponential rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) 
(McKendrick, 2015). 
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 9 
Keep formulation: 
“Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself 
as a crucial part of society.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.47: Driving Force 10 (first-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 10 “Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
7.4 (second 
highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
9 (second highest) 
Comments from 
panel members  
 
“Also undeniable. 15-year-olds now will be 30 in 2030 and in 
positions of influence. 
I think social media has reached its peak. 
On a nation state conflict level, protection of classified 
information is prioritised over social media-related information.” 
Evaluation Collectively, this driving force has been scored the second 
highest in terms of its current as well as futurist influence. Social 
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media technologies have prompted radically new ways of 
interacting, with literally hundreds of different social media 
platforms created (Richard, Rohm & Crittenden, 2011:266).  
Decision on 
formulation of 
Driving Force 10 
Keep formulation: 
“Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Source: Round 1 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.48: Additional driving forces as suggested by the Delphi panel members 
Panel members’ 
response to: Identify 
any additional 
driving forces which 
would be relevant in 
the context of the 
future manifestation 
of information 
warfare. 
The World Economic Forum identified a number of trends – such as 
hyper-connectivity – in its latest Risk Report. It also referred to cyber-
security as one of the 10 main risks.  
Information can be defined as many things, including the commands and 
algorithms that drive machines. As the world progresses to a commerce-
driven economy over the next few decades and we see mass automation 
where our cars and aeroplanes function autonomously, information 
warfare of the future will be about gaining access information to the 
machines, programmes and systems for the purpose of manipulation for 
sabotage; it is a real threat that if the road transportation system is hacked 
and hijacked in the future, the very vehicles that transport us and our 
inventory will become weapons used against us. That includes passenger 
planes. Network technology allows for the remote hijacking and abuse of 
machines. In a commerce model of business, sabotage means the 
disappearance of accounts, money and information critical to the 
continuation or recovery of business. Information warfare enables nations 
to cripple other nations without deploying a single soldier. 
Some of the above seem to be about asymmetric conflicts and terrorism 
without saying so. The possibility of non-governmental groups being 
terrorist groups focuses the mind. Is the world still moving away from 
divisions around ideology and towards divisions on culture?  If so, this 
could be a driver. The embedded nature of IT is making us increasingly 
vulnerable, also to terrorism. Once upon a time terrorists could cause 
disruption and fear by means of bomb scares. Now they simply need to 
threaten a network. 
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 Access to and production of basic human needs, such as water and 
food 
 Religious fanaticism 
 Cyber security 
 Energy (electricity) required to drive technology 
 Importance of rare earth metals and minerals as conductors 
 Chinese dominance of this market.  
Evaluation The inputs on the future manifestation of technology and terrorism are 
used in the formulation of scenarios in Chapter 8. 
The five suggested driving forces are tactical in nature and implicit in the 
already identified driving forces. 
 
The second Delphi panel members measured all ten driving forces against their current and future 
significance. Driving Force 9 (“ICT is embedding itself as a crucial part of society.”) with an average 
score of 8.1 was the highest. The second highest average score 7.4 was allocated to Driving Force 
10 (“Social media is a significant part of communication and this is expected to grow in the 
future.”). 
Measured against its futures relevancy (2030), Driving Force 6 (“The speed of change is increasing 
exponentially with global communication becoming instantaneous.”) and Driving Force 10 (“Social 
media is a significant part of communication and this is expected to grow in the future.”) with 
average scores of 9.3 were the highest. The second highest was Driving Force 9 (“ICT is 
embedding itself as a crucial part of society.”) with an average score of 9.2. 
7.7.6  Evaluation of the second Delphi study Round 2 
The second round of questionnaires was prepared according to the exact procedures used in the 
second round of the pilot Delphi study. The questionnaires were distributed to 11 panel members 
of which nine completed the questionnaires.  
 
Table 7.49: Evaluation of Driving Force 1 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 1 “The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed 
countries to the developing countries.” 
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Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
5 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
5.5 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.5 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
6.7 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
6.8 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.1 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“I think a shift in power is inevitable. 
I have adjusted my thinking just slightly in the light of the other 
interesting comments and certainly there is an interesting 
change in the last year which may challenge the thinking about 
‘countries’. The growth and influence of the Islamic State 
supports the ideas put forward in ‘Clash of Civilisations’ (Samuel 
P. Huntington) and might question the importance of countries in 
2030. 
Given the current turmoil in the financial markets, and 
specifically the fact that developing countries’ currencies have 
been hit particularly hard, I am of the opinion that it will take a 
very long time before power significantly shifts towards 
developing countries. Expectations were a bit inflated.” 
Evaluation Although it is acknowledged that the pace of this shift might 
differ depending on global events such as the global economic 
crisis of 2008 and China’s stock exchange fall of 2015, the trend 
will continue. World Trade Organization (WTO) Director-General 
Lamy (2012) stated that “... the rising weight of influence of 
emerging economies has shifted the balance of power. This 
clearly implies a number of transitions to which we have not yet 
adjusted as classic Westphalia concepts of sovereignty are 
being challenged by the realities of interdependence.” 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 1 
Keep formulation: 
“The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed 
countries to the developing countries.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
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Table 7.50: Evaluation of Driving Force 2 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 2 “Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity 
as its physical and non-physical elements become more tightly 
interwoven. 
Definition of security is included as suggested in previous round:  
Security refers to being protected or safe from harm.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
6.7 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.5 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
8.8 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8.9 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.1 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“The Internet of Things, in particular, will enable access to 
process control / automation / operational technologies which 
could cause all sorts of havoc. 
I have not moved my view here. States currently seem to have 
problems protecting themselves from cyber-attack. I have no 
doubt the technology will become more complex and the 
opportunities presented to those who wish to do harm will be 
clear.” 
Evaluation The significance of this driving force, especially in terms of its 
futures relevancy, is acknowledged by panel members. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 2 
Keep formulation: 
“Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity 
as its physical and non-physical elements become more tightly 
interwoven. 
Definition of security is included as suggested in previous round:  
Security refers to being protected or safe from harm.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
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Table 7.51: Evaluation of Driving Force 3 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 3 “An increase in integration and polarisation will contribute to systemic 
stresses.” 
Collective Likert score 
(current significance) 
 
4.6 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
5.2 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-1.4 
Collective Likert score 
(futures relevancy) 
 
6 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
6.8 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.8 
Additional comments 
from panel members  
“The migrant crisis in Europe is an example of where too much 
integration (e.g. Schengen area) is causing tension. 
I have kept my position here for three reasons: 
 Polarisation appears to be increasing (see Q1) and add on     
trends in Russia and North Korea. 
 Aspects of integration are also increasing (see Q2).  
 So, opportunities and motivations are increasing.  
Possibly, I should increase my ‘future’ score to 9! 
Initially, my scores (for both) were quite far from the collective score. 
After consideration, I agree that the statement is more significant 
currently, but feel that it still warrants a higher score for “future 
relevancy”. We are currently witnessing attempts at integration (e.g. 
the African Union (AU) and its Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs); Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP)), but non-state actors or groups are playing a 
much more significant role in causing polarisation. This trend in my 
opinion will accelerate during the coming decades due to cultural, 
religious and ideological reasons and which will subsequently lead to 
an increase in systemic stresses.” 
Evaluation During Round 1 some concerns were raised regarding the formulation 
of this driving force. Consensus now exists on the current formulation. 
Scores on this issue were slightly lower for both current and future 
relevancy.  
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Decision on final 
formulation of Driving 
Force 2 
Keep formulation: 
“An increase in integration and polarisation will contribute to systemic 
stresses.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.52: Evaluation of Driving Force 4 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 4 “Information warfare will become a growing option for power 
projection.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
6.1 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.5 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.4 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
8.8 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8.9 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.1 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Improper use of AI alone is a major risk. In addition, the Internet 
of Things as mentioned above opens up systems. With larger 
populations, more serious competition for resources is 
inevitable. Organisations and countries will increasingly obtain 
competitive intelligence to understand competitors’ weak spots 
and to increase their chances to be the first mover. 
I still think this is the most important driver in relation to the 
opportunities it gives and the potential damage which can be 
caused. Developed countries now exist on the basis of their 
management of information – which is huge.” 
Evaluation The significance of this driving force, especially in terms of its 
futures relevancy, is acknowledged by panel members. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 4 
Keep formulation: 
“Information warfare will become a growing option for power 
projection.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
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Table 7.53: Evaluation of Driving Force 5 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 5 “Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly 
impacting behaviour. 
Symbolic refers to representations (in the media and social 
media) which reflect perceived reality.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
7 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.4 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.6 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
8.3 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.3 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Exactly how behaviour will change over the next 15 years is 
unclear. However, if you consider how behaviour has changed 
over the last 20 years since the WWW became generally 
available (e.g. social media, easy access to maps, making 
holiday bookings, online bullying, internet banking, Netflix, 
dating sites, online ordering), much more change in behaviour 
can be expected.  
I find the word ‘increasing’ here the difficult one to judge. This 
has always been true (consider the impact of flags in medieval 
battles, or just communities). Is the amount of information 
available today even more impactive (sic) on behaviour? 
Possibly. The world seems to be moving away from rationality 
and the scientific model which the enlightenment brought. 
Scary! 
Yes. I think we are seeing this with the Syrian refugee crisis.” 
Evaluation The increasing impact of symbolic, information-related 
phenomena is directly related to the growing inter-
connectedness of the world. The opportunities for the symbolic 
to influence the world will escalate significantly in the future. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Keep formulation: 
“Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly 
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Driving Force 5 impacting behaviour. 
Symbolic refers to representations (in the media and social 
media) which reflect perceived reality.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.54: Evaluation of Driving Force 6 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 6 “The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
7.1 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.5 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.6 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
8.8 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8.6 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.2 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Technology is increasingly driving change. New emerging 
technologies such as AI will start having drastic (good and bad) 
implications in the next 15 years. 
I stand by my scores here. It is impossible to question the driver. 
It is a fact. To what extent will this influence IW?  Significantly. 
This is one of the contributors to instability and therefore 
opportunity to destabilise.” 
Evaluation The significance of this driving force especially in terms of its 
futures relevancy is acknowledged by panel members. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 6 
Keep formulation: 
“The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
Table 7.55: Evaluation of Driving Force 7 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 7 “Non-state actors are increasing their influence related to global 
security.” 
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Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
7 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.8 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
8.6 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
8.5 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.1 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“IS is an example of a virtual state spanning across multiple 
geographical areas. 
I also see a link back to Q1 here. Can it be questioned that the 
power of non-state actors can be huge – especially in terms of 
the symbols they can create for us (which influence our 
behaviour). No-one in Britain can dismiss the power of 
NewsCorp in parliamentary elections. Why is George Osbourne 
currently in China? I bet he is accompanied by major business 
leaders. Is it really doubted the extent to which oil companies 
influence international policy?” 
Evaluation The significance of this driving force especially in terms of its 
futures relevancy is acknowledged by panel members. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 7 
Keep formulation: 
“Non-state actors are increasing their influence related to global 
security.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.56: Evaluation of Driving Force 8 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 8 “Global and intra-regional inequalities are stimulating conflict 
potential.” 
Collective Likert score 
(current significance) 
 
7.1 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
6.8 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.3 
Collective Likert score 
(futures relevancy) 
 
8.3 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
7.9 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.4 
Additional comments “The migrant crisis in Europe is an example were migrants move from 
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from panel members  conflict-ridden areas to mainland Europe. In the process new conflict 
emerges between European countries around spreading the migrants 
equally. As competition for basic resources (e.g. water) increases, 
new migration challenges and other conflicts will emerge.  
I am feeling a bit entrenched in my views – but since commenting in 
the first round I am more convinced that inequalities will increase.” 
Evaluation Consensus is that inequality will be a challenge even in terms of the 
future manifestation of information warfare. 
Decision on final 
formulation of Driving 
Force 8 
Keep formulation: 
“Global and intra-regional inequalities are stimulating conflict 
potential.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.57: Evaluation of Driving Force 9 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 9 “Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as 
a crucial part of society.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
 
8.3 
(highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
8.1 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
 
8.9 
(highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
9.1 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.4 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Artificial Intelligence, together with the Internet of Things and 
automation in particular will have a major impact on society. In 
addition, people get their news from non-traditional platforms such a 
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc. Also, more and more real-world 
aspects are encoded as symbols (e.g. genetics) which can then be 
manipulated in various ways. The convergence of AI, genetics, 
neuro-sciences, robotics, and nano-technologies will provide 
interesting opportunities and challenges. 
I think the semantic internet, Internet of Things, and big data will 
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increase this trend.” 
Evaluation This driving force is regarded the highest in terms of both the current 
significance and the futures relevancy. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Driving Force 9 
Keep formulation: 
“Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as 
a crucial part of society.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study 
 
Table 7.58: Evaluation of Driving Force 10 (second-round second Delphi) 
Driving Force 10 “Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Collective Likert 
score (current 
significance) 
7.6 
(Second 
highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1)  
 
7.4 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
+0.2 
Collective Likert 
score (futures 
relevancy) 
8.8 
(Second 
highest) 
Collective Likert 
score (Round 1) 
 
9 
Collective Likert 
score change 
 
-0.2 
Additional 
comments from 
panel members  
“Whether it will dumb down or increase average intelligence is a 
sensitive discussion point. Like all technologies, it has good uses 
and bad uses. Many risks exist as well. It will also provide a platform 
for people with similar agendas and causes to organise themselves 
very quickly.  
The popularity of social media continues to grow and its influence 
has become more important than more formal methods of 
communication. Who would have believed that the UK government 
now commonly releases policy decision using Twitter?  So this 
adds. And will continue to add to the embeddedness and complexity 
of information networks.” 
Evaluation This driving force is regarded the second highest in terms of both 
the current significance and the futures relevancy. 
Decision on final 
formulation of 
Keep formulation: 
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Driving Force 10 “Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future.” 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
 
Table 7.59: Additional comments by the second Delphi panel members for Round 2 
Panel members’ 
response to: 
Identify any 
additional driving 
forces which 
would be relevant 
in the context of 
the future 
manifestation of 
information 
warfare. 
Infrastructures, etc. are of particular concern to me. Terrorists can 
cause havoc by control systems. 
Uncontrolled AI systems can also inflict pain on financial markets, 
etc. 
Increasing polarisation between the haves and the have-nots will 
pose interesting challenges globally with the potential to 
destabilise economies should it spill over into drastic actions (e.g. 
sabotage) by unhappy parties. With social media groups with 
specific agendas can organise themselves very quickly. 
I think there will be a convergence of the semantic internet, 
Internet of Things, and big data which will cause increasing 
dramatic change. 
Evaluation The additional comments of panel members serve as inputs for 
the final formulation of scenarios in Chapter 8. 
Source: Round 2 of second Delphi study. 
 
During Round 2 of the second Delphi study Delphi panel members measured ten driving forces 
against two dimensions, namely against current and futures significance. Driving Force 9 (“ICT is 
embedding itself as a crucial part of society.”) with an average score of 8.3 was the highest. The 
second highest average score was for Driving Force 10 (“Social media is a significant part of 
communication and this is expected to grow in the future.”) with an average score of 7.6. This 
outcome is consistent with Round 1 of the second Delphi study. 
Measured against its futures relevancy (2030s), Driving Force 9 (“ICT is embedding itself as a 
crucial part of society.”) with an average score of 8.9 is the highest. The second highest average 
score, namely 8.8, was for Driving Force 10 (“Social media is a significant part of communication 
and this is expected to grow in the future.”). This outcome is consistent with Round 1 of the second 
Delphi study. (See Appendix H and Appendix I for the second Delphi study’s score sheets.) 
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During the second round the changes in positions have been marginal. The outcome reached 
consensus as well as stability. Hence, a third round was not necessary.  
7.8 FINAL DRIVING FORCES 
The two Delphi studies refined and validated the ten most significant drivers influencing the 
manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat in the 2030s. In this regard, see 
Table 7.60 for the final list. 
Table 7.60: Final driving forces 
Driving forces Category: Link to main 
trend 
The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed 
countries to the developing countries. 
Primary transformation 
Subcategory: shift 
Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity as 
its physical and non-physical elements become more tightly 
interwoven. 
Primary networked 
Subcategory: 
interconnection 
An increase in integration and polarisation will contribute to 
systemic stresses. 
Primary transformation 
Subcategory: revolution 
Information warfare will become a growing option for power 
projection. 
Primary transformation 
Subcategory: renewal 
Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly 
impacting behaviour. 
Primary technology 
Subcategory: modification 
The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global 
communication becoming instantaneous. (third highest prioritised 
driving force) 
Primary technology 
Subcategory: 
modernisation 
Non-state actors are increasing their influence related to global 
security. 
Primary networked 
Subcategory: complexity 
Global and intra-regional inequalities are stimulating conflict 
potential. 
Primary transformation 
Subcategory: renewal 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
215 
Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as a 
crucial part of society. (highest prioritised driving force) 
Primary technology 
Subcategory: addition 
Social media is a significant part of communication and this is 
expected to grow in the future. (second highest prioritised driving 
force) 
Primary networked 
Subcategory: system 
Source: Own compilation as modified by Delphi studies. 
 
7.9 CONCLUSION 
The two Delphi studies conducted used the expertise of South African security specialists and a 
diverse panel of experts on the TWEPS environments to identify the ten main drivers which will 
create possible scenarios for the manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat 
by the 2030s. The Delphi studies validated and prioritised the driving forces and assisted in this 
regard to triangulate previous findings in the study. The highest prioritised driving force was 
identified as: “Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as a crucial part of 
society”. Findings from the two Delphi studies are used to inform and enrich the more normative 
process of developing scenarios in the next chapter, by providing defensible grounds upon which 
to “build” four possible scenarios reflecting the manifestation of information warfare in South Africa 
by the 2030s.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
2030 SCENARIOS FOR INFORMATION WARFARE 
AS NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The validated driving forces underlying the future manifestation of information warfare still do not 
provide a depiction of the possible manifestation of information warfare by the 2030s. In this 
chapter, four such plausible scenarios are formulated.  
 
Van der Heijden (2005:1) stated that the ultimate purpose of scenarios is to create more adaptable 
organisations, which firstly recognise change and uncertainty, and secondly use it creatively to 
their advantage. In this study, however, the purpose is to proceed beyond these limited aims of 
adding only value to a single organization. Inayatullah (2005d:156) explained the full spectrum of 
scenario outcomes as being possible (irrespective of the laws of the universe), plausible (more 
realistic, structural considerations), probable (given historical trends and quantitative data) and 
preferred (what participants desire, the vision of the organisation). The purpose of this study is to 
create plausible scenarios within which to evaluate the manifestation of how information warfare 
could develop as a national security threat in South Africa by the 2030s. 
 
This more expansive use of scenarios is not unique and it has been used for strategic purposes in 
the past. An example of this was the positive role that the outcomes of scenario exercises played 
in the political transition in South Africa. The communication of scenarios developed by Anglo 
American, Nedcor/Old Mutual and Mont Fleur during the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, 
played a significant role in convincing decision makers to choose the high road to a negotiated 
settlement and not the low road to demise (Van Vuuren, 2011:227).  
 
The scenario process is underpinned by the assumption that central determinants or elements of 
the future are already existent in the contemporary real world. As a futures methodology, the 
scenario process can be used to access and expose these futures. It is possible to extrapolate 
from key drivers of the future and apply both qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate 
them in order to be able to wisely reflect and discuss what may someday happen in a more 
informed manner (Fourie, 2007: 97). 
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While it can be said that innovation boosting new thinking should be central to the process of 
creating the scenarios (Lindgren & Bandhold, 2003:25), a critical success factor for useful 
scenarios remains foresight, which includes the anticipation of events, discontinuities and trends, 
as well as the so-called “wild card” (Loveridge, 2009:148).  
 
Scenarios offer the prospect of embracing uncertainty in thinking. They represent thought 
experiments, facilitating trends and events that would not otherwise have become known. Thus 
scenarios are not predictions. However, as a framework, a scenario must include a plausible 
possible future state of affairs, prospects, actors and boundaries, all of which will be enveloped by 
the broader environment (Loveridge, 2009:150). Schwartz (1991:38) concurred that scenarios are 
not about predicting, but rather about perceiving futures in the present. 
 
Thinking shaped by scenarios assist in understanding the logic of developments, clarifying key 
players, key factors and driving forces as well as humanity’s own potential to exert an influence on 
the future (Lindgren & Bandhold, 2003:25). Scenarios draw pathways from the present to several 
different outcomes, thus providing analysts with the advantage of considering a full series of events 
between the present and the future (Cronje, 2014:39). 
 
Some regard scenarios as being basically learning oriented. It is seen as “... more of an art form 
than an activity with a well-established theoretical base” (Loveridge, 2009:148). Schwartz 
(1991:114) stated that scenario creation is not a reductionist process; instead it is an art, as in 
storytelling. While this is the case, a substantive amount of work has also been done on especially 
the methodological aspects of scenario exercises, both in the academic and practical fields, 
making it possible to benefit from such scenarios. Recent writings agree that good scenario work is 
both analytical (rational) and conceptual (generative). It is possible to apply all forms of logic in 
scenario work namely inductive, deductive and abductive logic. Scenario work is both an art and a 
science (Ogilvy, 2005:331). 
 
Some background on the development of scenarios, the definition of scenarios, the identification of 
the uses thereof, and an explanation of the nature of the scenario exercise will be of value before 
the scenario methodology can be implemented in this study.  
 
8.2 BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCENARIOS 
 
In order to understand the potential value of scenarios, it is useful to briefly examine the historic 
development of the scenario method. The first use of the scenario method dated back to the 
actions of RAND Corporation during and after World War II. Subsequently, it was further evolved 
by the Hudson Institute, especially by Herman Kahn after he resigned from RAND. Kahn 
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developed this method, calling it a “future-now” way of thinking (Lindgren & Bandhold, 2003:36). 
Kahn adopted the term ‘‘scenario’’, a Hollywood concept which refers to a detailed outline of a 
future movie that was fictional, reinforcing his contention that scenarios do not make accurate 
predictions, but rather develop stories to explore the future (Van der Heijden, 2005: 3). 
 
The rise of the scenario method was related to the collapse of the usual extrapolative planning 
because of the mounting uncertainties most entities “faced during the Cold War years and 
particularly from the mid-1960s onward” (Loveridge, 2009: 147). As the two superpowers, the USA 
and Soviet Union, were in a nuclear standoff, strategic planning failures in such an environment 
could evidently have had catastrophic consequences (Cronje, 2014:31-32).  
 
Originally, scenario analysis was fundamentally an addition of the traditiona l ‘‘predict-and-control’’ 
approach to planning. The most notable change was that a single-line forecast was substituted by 
a probabilistic assessment of alternative futures, resulting in a ‘‘most likely’’ projection. This did not 
provide sufficient progress over other forecasting approaches and by the end of the 1960s, the 
defects in this approach were widely known. The scenario-based method used in this study has at 
its core a completely different central idea, namely not relying on probability but on causality (Van 
der Heijden, 2005: 3). As such, it provides for the intuitive need to expand knowledge and 
understanding. 
 
In the 1970s the scenario method reached beyond the Hudson Institute and RAND. Companies 
like Royal Dutch Shell as well as consultants such as Batelle and SRI International adopted 
scenarios as part of their strategy methodologies. Consequently scenario planning became more 
closely related to business strategy. Shell is also acknowledged as the first company to use 
scenarios widely as a strategy method in the corporate setting. Kees van der Heijden, Pierre Wack 
and Arie de Gues were some of the famous scenario experts of that time (Lindgren & Bandhold, 
2003:36-37). 
 
The method used by Wack and his team in Shell’s group planning department was to examine 
rigorously forces driving change in the sectors or markets under investigation. Thereafter the team 
would, for a given set of assumptions, formulate a small number of different, internally logical 
stories (scenarios) as to how these forces could play themselves out. These stories were aimed at 
assisting managers to understand the ways in which the future would not be the same as the past 
and also to prepare them, through their enhanced grasp of the context in which they were working, 
to take better and informed decisions as the future actually unfolded (Segal, 2007:5-6). The 
scenario method was also used outside the business environment in policy and academic 
environments. 
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During the 1970s a number of national entities in the West were financed to study the future. 
Several of these entities utilised scenario planning as an essential futures examination method. 
However, this “scenario planning era” was short lived, as a result of the oil crises and recession in 
the mid and late 1970s. During the 1980s renewed interest in how planning happens led to various 
futures-orientated entities developing scenario planning methods. The changes of the 1990s as 
well as the renewed awareness in managing uncertainty through scenario planning and thinking 
have resulted in the further refinement of scenario methodologies. The scenario method still plays 
a major role in multi-national entities and has become a standard method used by most 
consultancy firms and companies over the last decade (Lindgren & Bandhold, 2003:36-37). 
 
8.3 USE OF SCENARIOS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Scenario planning with the aim to influence policy-makers and shape public opinions has played a 
significant role in South Africa’s history. This was particularly the case during the unstable political 
transition years of the 1990s. The High Road/Low Road scenarios were created by Anglo 
American in the late 1980s and early 1990s and were the original but conceivably the most well-
known of these South African examples. An Anglo American team including Pierre Wack produced 
these scenarios for the company’s internal use, but then also released the scenarios for public 
consumption. These scenarios ignited noteworthy debate about the future course of the political 
and economic development of the country (Cronje, 2013:111). The Anglo American scenarios in 
particular made some contribution to thinking during the immediate pre-transition and early 
transition period in South Africa. Segal (2007:17) stated that this contribution must be regarded as 
one of the positive factors that encouraged the government to finally embark on the political 
transition in South Africa. 
 
Senior government officials were already familiar with the Anglo American scenarios because 
structured approaches to thinking about the future had been initiated by the military and the 
security services in the late 1970s. However, their work remained tightly held within the entities 
undertaking it and was not shared across government as a whole. During the early 1980s a new 
approach to future thinking was initiated in the State Security Council (SSC), which continued for a 
decade. This was done across many departments and involved outside experts including Philip 
Spies, the doyen of South Africa’s futurists and then director of the Institute for Futures Research 
(IFR) at Stellenbosch University (SU), and Clem Sunter, the “father” of scenario planning in South 
Africa. The overall purpose was to encourage strategic thinking about the future, and scenarios 
were seen as an essential input to this end (Segal, 2007:17). 
 
The Anglo American High Road/Low Road scenarios (presented from 1986 to 1990) captured the 
imagination of corporates, professionals and other circles to an extent that had not been seen 
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previously. It became a useful and perhaps even necessary platform on which the later Nedcor/Old 
Mutual and Mont Fleur exercises could build (Segal, 2007:19). During 1990 the Nedcor/Old Mutual 
scenarios, which involved Pierre Wack, were developed and communicated to both domestic and 
foreign role-players involved in South Africa’s economic and political transition at that time (Segal, 
2007:36). The presentations, which ran from 1991 to the middle of 1992, had an aggregated 
audience of around 45 000 South Africans (Segal, 2007:37). Three scenarios were produced, 
which presented the risk of “a disengaged civil society falling victim to an interventionist state” 
(Cronje, 2013:111). 
 
The Mont Fleur scenarios differed from the other two projects in several significant respects. It was 
a project essentially of civil society and not of the corporate sector. From the outset, it was also 
well connected politically with the African National Congress (ANC – the later ruling party) in 
particular. It adopted a methodology dependent on facilitating debate and finding common ground 
among diverse perspectives, rather than being research-based (Segal, 2007:45). From August 
1992, the results were presented to the most influential economic and political role-players in 
South Africa’s transition process (Segal, 2007:47). 
 
The Anglo American, Nedcor and Mont Fleur scenarios accentuated the perils of a South Africa not 
reaching a negotiated settlement, strengthened efforts to reach a negotiated settlement and 
implemented a transition to democracy (Cronje, 2013:111). 
 
8.4 DEFINING SCENARIOS 
 
A variety of definitions describe scenarios created through a scenario method. A scenario is a 
technique of organising many assertions about the future; however, it is not a single forecast or 
prediction. It represents a plausible description of what might occur. A scenario is a narrative that 
links an account of a particular future to illustrate existence in a sequence of causal links which 
highlight the influence of consequences and decisions. Scenarios thus describe events and trends 
as they could evolve (Glenn, 2003:4). A scenario can therefore also be viewed as a narrative of an 
alternative setting in which current decisions may be played out (Ogilvy & Schwartz, 1998:2). A 
scenario presents descriptions of plausible futures (Lindgren & Bandhold, 2003:22).  
 
Additionally, scenarios can fulfil the above-mentioned roles in envisaging plausible possible futures 
by taking account of bedrock certainties, things that may or may not happen, and complete 
uncertainties (Howkins & Valantin, 1997). Scenarios are like hypotheses of different futures 
purposely designed to highlight the opportunities and risks involved in specific strategic issues 
(Ogilvy & Schwartz, 1998:2). Scenarios hold value for future studies as they can assist individuals 
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to explore what the future might look like and the likely challenges to be faced in these futures 
(Global Business Environment, 2003:8). 
 
All of above provides a broad view of what scenarios are and the contribution they can make. For 
the purposes of this study the conclusions of Cronje (2013:98) are used in this regard: “... as 
plausible extrapolations of the future, scenarios are descriptions of how trends already evident in a 
system may combine over time. Scenarios, as a concept, can therefore be defined as: A set of 
diverse but equally plausible descriptions of future events for the same system.” 
 
In Chapter 3 it was stated that despite the interconnectedness of past, present and future, any 
definitive study of the future requires an open-minded futurist approach to gain insight into the 
dynamics between the past, present and future. Such an approach may lead to foresight. In terms 
of the scenario output, it will also be necessary to identify the types of futures likely to be 
experienced.  
 
8.5 FOUR TYPES OF FUTURES 
 
According to Courtney (2001:21-33), four types of futures or diverse options are distinguished from 
one another by their comparative uncertainty. The four forms Courtney (2001:21) identified are: 
1. A clear, single view of the future 
 2. A limited set of possible future outcomes, one of which will occur 
 3. A range of possible future outcomes 
 4. A limitless range of possible future outcomes. 
 
In the case of a clear, single future, uncertainty does not have much of an impact as the range of 
possible outcomes is narrow. The future is not necessarily perfectly predictable but at least it is 
predictable enough for a primary strategy of choice to conform to all plausible outcomes (Cronje, 
2014:28). Taking into account the time frame and complexities influencing information warfare, a 
clear, single view of the future is not possible.  
 
Alternate futures become possible when it is achievable to identify a narrow set of possible 
outcomes. Courtney (2001:25) identified potential regulatory, legislative or judicial changes as 
sources of this level of uncertainty. Although regulation is one aspect of the manifestation of 
information warfare, the nature of the phenomenon as illustrated in the environmental scan is such 
that it would prove to be highly unlikely to be constrained by legislation and regulation.  
 
In the case where the future is more uncertain than a single alternate future, a range of possible 
future outcomes might be identified. In such a situation the identification of a shortlist of possible 
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outcomes is not possible. Rather, it is essential to develop an expansive series of plausible 
outcomes (Courtney, 2001:31). Information warfare futures serve as an example in this regard.  
 
Where a limitless range of possible future outcomes exist, uncertainty is increased. In such a case 
it is of value to rather categorise the different variants or kinds of futures according to their relative 
uncertainty (Cronje, 2014:29). Courtney (2001:32) regarded Level 4 situations as rare and stated 
that they tend to degrade over time to lower levels of uncertainty. The impact of major social or 
economic discontinuities, for example, result in such a future, which makes it difficult to even 
identify a series of possible future outcomes. 
 
The pace and nature of change are additional factors impacting on scenarios. Ralston and Wilson 
(2006:11) stated that the character of change itself has been adjusted. Change is becoming more 
rapid as well as complex. Furthermore, the development time for new products and new systems 
has been radically compressed from their original invention to their diffusion through society. 
Innovations in the sectors of nanotechnology, biomedical advances, nuclear power and information 
technology “... will have a more pervasive influence on human life than any other previous 
technologies in human history”. This is also an issue that was highlighted in all the environments 
during the environmental scan in Chapter 5. 
 
As a third or fourth variant future, the manifestation of information warfare is thus not easy to 
forecast. That future must still be shaped. This will be based on a diverse set of factors, including 
how technology impacts on the system, the way the role-players in the system interrelate with each 
other over the next decade, how that interaction impacts on the balance of negative and positive 
feedback entering the system, and how the regulating authorities react in trying to promote positive 
over negative feedback (Cronje, 2013:102). All of these interactions and events creating the 
information warfare future must still take place. Consequently, this future “... is too uncertain to be 
forecast to a single point in time, but must rather be presented as a spectrum of equally plausible 
future possibilities” (Cronje, 2013:102). 
 
8.6 APPROACHES TO SCENARIOS 
 
Two fundamentally diverse approaches can be used to determine the basic premises of scenarios. 
The methods are inductive and deductive. The inductive method is not as structured as the 
deductive method. It relies mainly on patience to continue with deliberations until consensus is 
reached. The general logical principles are derived from particular facts or instances. In contrast, 
the deductive approach uses uncomplicated procedures of prioritisation to conduct a two-by-two 
scenario matrix based on the two key driving forces (Schwartz & Ogilvy, 1998:61-62).  
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It is also possible to distinguish between analytical versus intuitive scenario approaches. Analytical 
scenario approaches use formal models or simulations to develop both broad alternative scenarios 
and their details. In contrast, intuitive scenario approaches centre more on qualitative visions of the 
future that reflect the “mental maps” of the scenario developers. They, too, may have considerable 
analytical detail, but intuition plays a greater role in their initial development. In practice, most 
scenario work involves both approaches (Ralston & Wilson, 2006:22). In this study, deductive and 
analytical scenario approaches (with elements of the intuitive scenario approach) are followed. 
 
8.7 IDENTIFYING DIFFERENT PURPOSES FOR SCENARIOS 
 
Based on years of experience in using scenario methodology in various projects, Lindgren and 
Bandhold (2003:24-26) identified four basic purposes for the scenario method. (See Figure 8.1 for 
a graphical presentation in this regard.) The four purposes identified are related to planning and 
feature crafting new direction (in which innovation is central), identifying prerequisites for change 
(in which learning is central), appraising current direction (in which evaluation is central) and 
planning future action (in which strategic planning is central). Thinking within a scenario structure 
assists in understanding the logic of developments; clarifying key players, key factors, and key 
driving forces, and provides the potential to exert an influence on future outcomes. Scenarios are 
powerful in challenging existing assumptions and paradigms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Different purposes and different focuses for scenarios 
Source: Lindgren and Bandhold, 2003:25). 
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The practical value of scenario building for especially decision-makers and planners is emphasised 
in most of the literature on scenario building as practical methodology. As illustrated earlier, the 
Anglo American, Nedcor and Mont Fleur scenario exercises played a positive role in the transition 
of South Africa to a democratic state. This demonstrates what Schwartz (1991:3-4) identified as 
some of the main uses of scenarios. The South African examples allowed their users to think about 
the effects that policies will have in the future rather than be concerned about immediate political 
expediency within an extremely uncertain world. It also allowed a significant number of individuals 
to appreciate the long-term repercussions of decisions made in the 1990s during uncertain times in 
South Africa (Cronje, 2013:112). Schwartz (1991:4) referred to the utilisation of scenarios for 
reasons ranging from assistance in personal decision-making to assistance in corporate decision-
making. He also remarked that scenarios sometimes make it possible to address concerns about 
complicated decisions that would otherwise be “missed or ignored”. 
 
8.7.1 Purpose of scenario method in this study 
 
In this study, the main purpose of using scenario building was to evaluate possible futures of 
information warfare. Hence, four plausible possible exploratory scenarios focused on information 
warfare as a national security threat in the 2030s were identified. This was done by highlighting the 
risks, taking note of uncertainties and using mainly qualitative inputs derived from an 
environmental analysis, an information warfare model (inclusive of CLA) and the Delphi process. 
Descriptive or exploratory scenarios portray trends and events as they could develop, based on 
different conjectures on how these trends and events may influence the future (Glenn, 2003:4). 
 
8.8 SCENARIOS AS MENTAL MODELS 
 
Scenarios serve as mental models by providing an additional or alternative approach to analyse, 
reveal and reconstruct a specific issue (Chermack, 2003:33). Mental models provide the lenses 
through which the world is viewed and incorporate values, biases and beliefs about how the world 
functions (Forrester, 1973:14). Senge (1990:8) defined mental models as “…deeply ingrained 
assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the 
world and how we take action. Very often, we are not consciously aware of our mental models or 
the effects they have on our behaviour.”  
 
Although scenarios are future-orientated mental models that form mind representations that direct 
activities in the actual world, all mental models are restricted by their partiality (Loveridge, 
2009:151). Two options are available to manage the existing mental models’ impact on scenario 
building. The one option is to acknowledge existing mental models and process their role in the 
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outcomes. The creator or creators of the scenario thus need to be explicit about assumptions 
regarding their worldviews. These assumptions constitute the mental models in use. Mental 
models can therefore be revealed by examining the underlying assumptions about the manner in 
which a process or domain of knowledge works, exists and operates (Chermack, 2003:37). 
 
Another option could be to insist on the deferral of existing mental models so that speculative ones 
can be developed in the context of the unknown future (Loveridge, 2009:151). In many thought 
experiments this is done by suspending current mental models. The extent to which this can be 
done will determine the creation of scenarios that can modify perceptions to a different dimension 
(Loveridge, 2009:151). Neither of these two options provides an ideal solution. However, the 
facilitators or creators of scenarios should be alert to this challenge and communicate whether rigid 
mental models impact on the process.  
 
In Chapter 3 it is stated that a futures map is a generic design of the various futures and a symbolic 
representation of what might unfold or be comprehended by human interventions in the material 
world (Malaska & Virtanen, 2009:69). As a futures map is therefore the all-inclusive description of 
the outcomes of a futures research process, it will encompass the scenarios envisaged for the 
manifestation of information warfare in South Africa by the 2030s. The approach in this study is to 
use the model created in Chapter 6 (see Figure 6.3 for the graphical representation) as the 
framework for the creation of scenarios. The scenarios are created within the mapping horizon of 
this model. 
    
The dominating structure for scenario building is to identify two driving forces that are considered 
together in a scenario matrix. This will result in four different scenarios, which will be developed 
within the four spaces created (Lindgren & Bandhold, 2003:66). (See Figure 8.2 for a graphical 
representation of this.) 
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Figure 8.2: Scenario matrix which constitutes four different scenarios  
based on two main driving forces 
Source: Lindgren and Bandhold, 2003:67, modified with own studies model applicable to 
information warfare futures. 
 
To add depth and breadth to the scenarios, the layered CLA approach was followed. CLA was 
identified in Chapter 3 as a tool to categorise different views of and concerns about the future, and 
then used in Chapter 6 to identify the driving forces. Using CLA to develop the scenarios assists 
with deconstruction and increasing the depth of the scenarios developed (Inayatullah, Minkkinen & 
Heinonen, 2015). 
 
The scenarios should be more than an authoritative narrative as they should also identify the 
salient points which still could be acted on. Individuals using scenarios should feel that the 
scenarios have touched their deepest, most radical concerns. They should then be willing to test 
their future decisions against each scenario. Scenarios should always connect to realistic choices 
and ultimately to decisions and action (Howkins & Valantin, 1997). Compared to a simple 
hypothesis, a scenario is a complete, carefully thought out and highly consistent picture. Scenarios 
help one to grasp and limit one’s own uncertainty as well as to detect the limits of a plausible 
future. The success of the method depends on the understanding of the result and if applicable, 
the associated course of action (Pillkahn, 2008:228). 
 
In the process of creating scenarios it is vital to find two driving forces that, combined with each 
other, will provide four substantially different scenarios that can actually assist to provide insight 
into possible and probable futures. After identifying and selecting a number of drivers to facilitate 
change, these drivers can be combined through qualitative processing (Lindgren & Bandhold, 
2003:67). Following the identification and exploration of the driving forces, it is important to uncover 
the “predetermined elements” and the “critical uncertainties” (Schwartz, 1991:113). 
                                                                   
Successful mental models within scenarios will need to focus on two aspects according to 
Ringland (2006:4):  
•  The ability to anticipate real-world behaviour (which in some cases may be unexpected) 
through investigating the constraints or changes in the external environment, or the 
relationships between driving forces.  
•  The creation of a mental model which allows the user to look for early confirming or 
disconfirming indications.  
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8.9 KEY ASPECTS OF SCENARIOS 
 
8.9.1 Boundary setting 
 
Synthesis within mental frameworks assists to establish scenarios of value, of which boundary 
setting is the first (Loveridge, 2009:151). In this study, the broad macro environment has been set 
out in Chapter 3 as the Technological, War/Conflict, Economical, Political and Social (TWEPS) 
hexagon.  
 
The role of the observer within the scenario environment is also of significance. It is not true that 
the observer is in some way external to the system. The observer becomes part of the system by 
the very act of observing. Boundary setting on this level is also done subjectively from inside the 
system. The mental and cultural worldviews of the participant(s) are thus carried along during the 
scenario exercise (Loveridge, 2009:152). 
 
Exploring the assumptions that the participant(s) currently hold about the future provide insight to 
act more effectively in the present (Global Business Environment, 2003:12). It can assist in 
recognising when assumptions are being challenged by events and knowing how to respond 
appropriately. The interplay between the context in which the phenomenon occurs and the 
developed scenarios need to be critically evaluated to identify potential inconsistencies. In this 
process the issue of the boundaries of the scenario exercise as a whole as well as the individual 
scenarios created should be taken into consideration.  
 
The outcome of the environmental study done in Chapter 5 stressed the rhizoid network nature 
which strengthen the threat posed by information warfare to national security. Three trends have 
also been identified, which are common to all environments evaluated in the scan. These are the 
rise of networks (especially social networks), rapid innovation (especially in the spread of 
technology), and transformation (as a constant reality affecting nearly all social entities). These 
trends reinforce the notion that a globalised, interconnected future (in terms of the threats posed by 
information warfare) will probably confront South Africa. The boundaries for the possible future 
scenarios will thus be global and not only limited to the domestic situation.  
 
8.9.2 Managing uncertainties 
 
Although scenarios offer the prospect to include and embrace uncertainty in thinking, the nature of 
uncertainty in terms of the scenario method needs to be clarified. It must be acknowledged that 
there are no tools to explain how today becomes tomorrow. However, it is important to clarify that 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
228 
uncertainty in this context is not knowing what tomorrow will be like. Uncertainty is not knowing 
which events, trends, issues and decisions will constitute tomorrow (Marsh, 1998: 44).  
 
The deductive approach to scenario building is used in this study. Scenarios provide a way to cope 
with uncertainties by creating the space to develop insights. Often, during the grounding phase, a 
number of drivers can be identified that have a significant impact on the central subject but that are 
not easy to predict. It thus remains uncertain what the true impact of these drivers will be (Lindgren 
& Bandhold, 2003:22). In complex systems, which have evolving properties, the deductive 
approach can assist in overcoming the risks intrinsic to such evolving properties. The scenario 
method has the potential to support efforts to overcome the conjecture and disagreements that 
accompany work to create foresight in uncertain systems (Cronje, 2013:98). 
 
In this study, the technique used to contain uncertainty in terms of the driving forces was the Delphi 
studies conducted to identify, verify and prioritise these driving forces. The Delphi studies provided 
a credible outcome based on the clear decision trail that defends the appropriateness of the 
method to address the problem selected, choice of expert panel, data collection procedures, 
identification of justifiable consensus levels and means of dissemination and implementation. 
 
Some of these drivers are so uncertain that they could be called “wild cards”. Such wild cards 
could of course have significant impact on the central subject, but their predictability is so small 
that they cannot be meaningfully used as a basis for scenarios (Lindgren & Bandhold, 2003:22). 
While scenarios are something one plans for, wild cards are things that one plans against. Wild 
cards are surprises that have the power to completely change the situation as well as the outcome 
of the scenario. Wild cards include: 
 Complete discontinuous events 
 Discontinuities that might be anticipated but which have significant unintended 
consequences 
 Catalytic developments so different in scale or degree that they are different in kind 
(Schwartz & Ogilvy, 1998:74). 
 
8.10 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE SCENARIO METHODOLOGY 
 
The scenario method is a powerful instrument for several reasons. This includes its ability to 
overcome complexity, to focus on a wide range of options, to empower participants, to create a 
coherent future vision and to integrate capacities in order to create innovative views.  
 
Lindgren and Bandhold (2003: 28-29) mentioned that the scenario method is a brain-compatible 
arrangement as scenario thinking matches the way the brain works. According to them, the 
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narrative format used for scenarios (stories and images) makes them memorable without difficulty. 
Visualisation assists in ensuring that scenarios can be regarded as believable. Scenarios remain 
one of the simplest means to deliver complex information to the scenario audience and to construct 
future possibilities which appear more authentic (Glenn, 2003:16). The strength of this method can 
also be ascribed to its inherent ability to overcome the complexity dilemma facing any forecasting 
(Cronje, 2014: 35). 
 
The future of complex systems is plural rather than singular (Cronje, 2014: 35). In this regard the 
scenario method helps to develop outcomes that are viable over the wide range of possible 
futures. Scenario-based planning has the potential to meet this strategic challenge (Glenn, 
2003:16). There is, for example, no systematic external environmental scanning capability 
permitting long-term contingency planning in most entities. Forward thinking creates a “decision 
context” in which unpleasant surprises can be minimised. It means that crises can be kept to a 
minimum (but of course, never eliminated entirely). As the stakes mount globally, so it becomes 
increasingly important to invest human and material resources in all forms of forward thinking 
(Slaughter, 2005a). 
 
The development of scenarios is an intense process that includes speculation, reflection, 
discussion, rejection, comparison and analysis, to name but a few of the related activities. 
Scientific methods and logic alone are not enough. Knowledge, creativity, fantasy, powers of 
imagination and experience are fundamentally important to shape the future. It would be more 
suitable to describe the activity behind the development of provocative, refreshing and challenging 
scenarios as an art rather than as a science (Pillkahn, 2008:227-228). 
 
The process of developing scenarios with individuals who have a stake in the future assists them 
to strengthen anticipatory consciousness. Plans can change as transformation continues to gain 
momentum. The scenario creation process itself can fundamentally change the way those 
partaking in the process think about the future. A balanced evaluation of the range of strategies 
that may be required can be developed. The process changes the participants’ perceptions and 
evaluations of trends and the full range of events that may occur in reality. As an alternative to 
each possibility is a potential threat to an inflexible plan, these trends and events tend to be 
evaluated as sign posts, indicating pathways along the way to anticipated and alternative futures 
(Glenn, 2003:16). 
 
A weakness of scenarios is that critics of this method sometimes argue that scenario planning is 
not very useful if it presents a significant number of plausible but different extrapolations of the 
future (Cronje, 2013:107). According to Cronje (2013:107), this criticism can be answered in one of 
two ways. Firstly, it must be remembered that certainty is an illusion when dealing with the 
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emergent characteristics of complex systems over the long term. This cannot ever be achieved as 
the future of such systems is still to be determined. Over time, relatively minor amendments in the 
present conditions of such a system may result in momentous changes in the future. Secondly, 
critics can be reminded that scenarios are not forecasts. Unlike forecasts, the value of scenarios 
does not depend on whether they are correct. Instead, what scenarios endeavour to present is “... 
a number of different descriptions of how the future may evolve based on how key events in the 
time leading up to the scenario interact with each other and how that interaction changes”. These 
central interactions and events develop into “a roadmap to the future.”  
 
Non-participants might regard scenarios as the “official set of possible futures” and therefore 
limiting or controlling their thinking to an extent. Scenarios have the capacity to influence the 
consumer in subtle ways because of the creator’s assumptions about cause and effect (Glenn,  
2003:16). Therefore, the purpose and limitations of scenarios should be explicitly stated. 
 
8.11 THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING SCENARIOS 
 
While it can be stated that a scenario-based exercise is a practitioner’s art (Van der Heijden, 
2005:155), the approach should be carefully structured. However, the real key is not so much 
about perfecting a particular method, but rather about satisfying the conditions, namely diversity, 
decentralisation and independence (Surowiecki, 2004:22). 
 
In general, the development of scenarios is a group activity. Chermack (2011:218-219) stated that 
the right team’s involvement is important for the success of a scenario project as team members 
can provide valuable information about the history, issues, context and politics of the case being 
investigated. He also suggested that such a team should be cross-functional and multi-levelled. 
Ideally, a diverse group of individuals should be used to assist in developing the content of 
scenarios. However, this study followed a process in which group input was integrated into whole 
scenario creation process backed by an extensive literature review. The key driving forces were 
identified through processes involving an environmental scan, qualitative text analysis, model 
inclusive of CLA, Delphi studies and an impact analysis. Although the author was the primary 
developer of the four scenarios, he extensively consulted and brainstormed with a diverse range of 
individuals to obtain input and guidance and undertook an extensive literature survey on scenarios. 
Additionally, the author also used a range of inputs obtained from two Delphi studies. These 
procedures ensured that the diversity, decentralisation and independence criteria were fulfilled in 
terms of the scenario process.  
 
Steps have been identified to build a scenario. Based on the insights of Schwartz (1991) and 
Cronje (2014:45-52), the following steps were used in implementing the scenario study: 
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8.11.1 Establish the aim of scenario creation  
 
The outcome of the scenario exercise is the compilation of four possible future scenarios 
highlighting the impact of information warfare as a South African national security threat in the 
2030s. Cronje (2014:51) described scenarios as follows: “The scenarios in the four quadrants of 
the scenario matrix are outlines, or wire frames, of four possible futures, based on the interplay of 
the two most important and most uncertain trends.” 
 
8.11.2   Define the key concepts 
 
In Chapter 4, information warfare was defined as actions focused on destabilising or manipulating 
the core information networks of a state or entity in society with the aim to influence the ability and 
will to project power as well as efforts to counter similar attacks by an opposing entity and/or state. 
In Chapter 4, the components of information warfare – namely netwar, psychological operations 
and cyber warfare – were also defined. National security refers to all government-sanctioned 
actions and measures driven by the application of national will.28 National security measures are 
taken with the aim to create an environment in which the country’s population, state structures, 
territorial integrity, interests and sovereignty are protected.  
 
8.11.3 Analyse the environment 
 
In Chapter 5, the environment scan was completed focusing on the TWEPS macro-environmental 
hexagon within which information warfare is manifesting. Transformation, networking and the 
impact of innovation in all the environments investigated were highlighted as central trends in the 
manifestation of information warfare currently as well as in the future. 
 
8.11.4  Evaluate the driving forces  
 
In Chapter 6, the key driving forces critical for the manifestation of information warfare as a 
national security threat by the 2030s were identified. This was done by using a model which assists 
in creating futurist insight into the manifestation of information warfare as a future national security 
threat. The model uses qualitative text analysis and a layered mode of evaluating the environment 
                                               
24   In this context, national will refers to the “paradoxical trinity” as formulated by Von Clausewitz (see Figure 
4.2). 
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in the search for the driving forces. (Table 6.6 in Chapter 6 presents the driving forces identified by 
way of the mentioned information warfare futures model.)  
 
The two Delphi studies conducted in Chapter 7 verified the final ten main driving forces. (Table 
7.60 in Chapter 7 presents the final driving forces.)  
 
8.11.5 Identify the two key drivers 
 
The two Delphi studies identified three driving forces as the most significant, namely ICT 
Embedding, Social Media and the Speed of Change. These three drivers, however, are related and 
do not provide the required content contrast to create four distinct scenarios. Based on the 
outcome of the Delphi Studies, the ICT Embedding driver (“Information communication technology 
(ICT) is embedding itself as a crucial part of society”) is used as the one key driver for purposes of 
compiling the scenarios.  
 
In Chapter 7 qualitative text analysis was used on this driving force, which falls in the category 
“Innovation”, subcategory “addition”, in which the specific dimensions can be measured on a low 
level of manifestation to a high level of manifestation axis. The low level axis does not necessarily 
imply that ICT embedding should be at a lower level than is currently the case, but implies a future 
where the level of ICT embedding is the same as currently without taking advantage of the growth 
potential that currently exists. The causes of low levels of ICT embedding include economic, social 
or political setbacks or even technology implementation obstacles caused by policy and regulation. 
The high level axis refers to the situation where ICT embedding reaches exponential levels, 
implying the linking of most manufactured items in society to an ICT network. 
 
Cross-impact analysis provides a method which could be used to identify the second key driving 
force. This technique can be used to measure the influence of all drivers. This is done by 
juxtaposing the individual driving forces in order to identify their respective mutual 
interrelationships. The central question during this whole process is: “How do the different driving 
forces behave in relation to each other?“ Impact analysis is consequently used as a means to 
systematically identify interactions and dynamics. The driving forces are listed in a matrix of 
columns and rows, in both cases in the same order of succession. In this way, each factor is 
juxtaposed with each of the others. For each pair of driving forces, the question is then asked: “To 
what extent does a direct relationship take effect between these driving forces?” To quantify the 
influence, the following scale is used: 0 = No influence; 1 = Weak relationship; 2 = Medium 
relationship; 3 = Strong relationship. All combinations are evaluated while the centre diagonal of 
the matrix remains empty. It is then possible to calculate the sums of the lines and columns, which 
serve as a measure of the degree of networked interrelationships.  
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The “line sum” of any driving force represents the so-called “Active Sum” (AS) and indicates how 
strongly that driving force affects other factors. The “column sum” of a driving force, on the other 
hand, represents the so-called “Passive Sum” (PS) which shows how strongly that factor is 
influenced by other factors (Kosow & Gassner, 2008: 51-52). (See Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 for the 
influence matrix, legend and outcome of the driving forces.)  
 
Table 8.1: Influence matrix for driving forces 
 DF:1 DF:2 DF:3 DF:4 DF:5 DF:6 DF:7 DF:8 DF:9 DF:10 
DF:1 xxx 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DF:2 1 xxx 2 3 1 2 1 2 0 1 
DF:3 1 2 xxx 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 
DF:4 1 2 3 xxx 2 0 3 3 1 2 
DF:5 1 1 1 2 xxx 1 3 2 1 2 
DF:6 1 3 3 2 2 xxx 2 3 3 3 
DF:7 1 3 2 2 2 0 xxx 1 1 1 
DF:8 1 1 1 1 3 0 3 xxx 1 1 
DF:9 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 xxx 3 
DF:10 1 2 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 xxx 
 
Own compilation based on Kosow and Gassner, 2008: 51.29 
 
Table 8.2: Legend and outcome of the influence matrix for driving forces 
 
Designation Driving force Active 
Sum 
(AS) 
Passive 
Sum 
(PS) 
DF:1 
The centre of power is shifting from the traditional 
developed countries to the developing countries. 
9 10 
DF:2 
Security in a networked environment will increase 
in complexity as its physical and non-physical 
elements become more tightly interwoven. 
13 18 
DF:3 
An increase in integration and polarisation will 
contribute to systemic stresses. 
20 17 
                                               
29  The cross-impact analysis was done on 24 August 2015 by the author and Professor André Roux during a brainstorming session in 
Cape Town. In processing each driving force it was coded, the category and subcategory stated and then measured against the 
stated scale. The criteria for the scale were agreed during the brainstorming session as judging  the level to which the driving force 
under consideration is being connected but also influencing the driving force it was measured against. The cross-impact analysis 
has assisted in the evaluation of the driving forces and informed the scenario-processes. 
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DF:4 
Information warfare will become a growing option 
for power projection. 
17 19 
DF:5 
Symbolic, information-related phenomena are 
increasingly impacting behaviour. 
14 18 
DF:6 
The speed of change is increasing exponentially 
with global communication becoming  
instantaneous. 
22 11 
DF:7 
Non-state actors are increasing their influence 
related to global security. 
13 21 
DF:8 
Global and intra-regional inequalities are 
stimulating conflict potential. 
12 19 
DF:9 
Information communication technology (ICT) is 
embedding itself as a crucial part of society. 
24 10 
DF:10 
Social media is a significant part of 
communication and this is expected to grow in the 
future. 
15 16 
 
 
The priority outcomes of the three most significant drivers based on their Active Sums are ICT 
Embedding, Speed of Change and Integration/Polarisation. The third driving force is formulated as 
follows: “An increase in integration and polarisation will contribute to systemic stresses.” This 
driver is a possible candidate for a second key driver. Using qualitative text analysis on the driving 
force, this driving force falls in the category “Transformation”, subcategory “Revolution”, in which 
the specific dimensions can be measured on a high level of integration to a low level of integration 
axis (thus high level of polarisation). 
 
The level of impact of all driving forces is measured by way of cross-impact analysis. An issue 
which has not yet been addressed in the analysis is the certainty or uncertainty of the driving 
forces. In this regard, an impact-uncertainty matrix can be useful as it systematically evaluates the 
certainty-uncertainty dimension of the driving forces (see Figure 8.3). The high-medium-low 
scoring system allows for each driving force to be positioned on a matrix (Wilson 1998:89). 
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Figure 8.3: Illustrative impact-uncertainty matrix 
Source: Wilson, 1998:89. 
 
The rating of the impact of each driver was done during the cross-impact analysis. An evaluation of 
the degree of uncertainty in terms of pace, direction and the actuality of its future course is useful 
(Wilson 1998:88-89). The outcome of an evaluation based on the analytical insights gained during 
the environmental scan, qualitative text analysis, model development, CLA and Delphi studies led 
to the identification of four driving forces classified as critical scenario drivers, namely Integration/ 
Polarisation, Speed of Change, ICT Embedding and Social media. (See Table 8.3 for the full 
outcome of the impact-uncertainty matrix for driving forces.) 
 
Table 8.3: Legend and outcome of the impact-uncertainty matrix for driving forces 
Designation Driving force Impact-uncertainty matrix 
outcome 
DF:1 
The centre of power is shifting from the traditional 
developed countries to the developing countries. 
Important Planning Issue 
DF:2 
Security in a networked environment will increase 
in complexity as its physical and non-physical 
elements become more tightly interwoven. 
Important Scenario Driver 
DF:3 
An increase in integration and polarisation will 
contribute to systemic stresses. 
Critical Scenario Driver 
DF:4 
Information warfare will become a growing option for 
power projection. 
Important Scenario Driver 
DF:5 
Symbolic, information-related phenomena are 
increasingly impacting behaviour. 
Important Scenario Driver 
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DF:6 
The speed of change is increasing exponentially 
with global communication becoming instantaneous. 
Critical Scenario Driver 
DF:7 
Non-state actors are increasing their influence 
related to global security. 
Important Scenario Driver 
DF:8 
Global and intra-regional inequalities are 
stimulating conflict potential. 
 
Important Scenario Driver 
DF:9 
Information communication technology (ICT) is 
embedding itself as a crucial part of society. 
Critical Scenario Driver 
DF:10 
Social media is a significant part of communication 
and this is expected to grow in the future. 
Critical Scenario Driver 
 
The integration-polarisation driving forces thus present a viable second main driving force for the 
creation of scenarios. The ICT embedded driving force and integration-polarisation driving force 
will provide four possible and feasible scenarios. (See Table 8.4 for the two key drivers creating the 
four scenarios.) 
 
Table 8.4: Final two driving forces for information warfare scenarios 
Driving force Specific dimension 
An increase in integration and polarisation will 
contribute to systemic stresses. 
Low level of integration to high level of 
integration. 
Information communication technology (ICT) is 
embedding itself as a crucial part of society. 
Low level of ICT embedding to high level 
of embedding.  
 
 
8.11.6 Produce a basic scenario matrix 
 
The horizontal axis of the scenario matrix embodies a spectrum measuring the level at which 
information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as a crucial part of society. The 
upper side of this spectrum represents an environment in which ICT is highly embedded in 
society resulting in high connectivity. The lower side of the axis embodies an environment in 
which ICT is poorly embedded in society resulting in lower connectivity. The key horizontal axis 
driver provides a continuum on which social technology participation by the society members are 
evaluated from low to high. 
 
The vertical axis represents a spectrum measuring the level at which integration and polarisation 
will contribute to societal systemic stresses. The right-hand side of this axis represents an 
environment where society experiences high levels of integration. The left-hand side of this axis 
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represents an environment where society experiences high levels of polarisation. The key vertical 
axis driver evaluates the level of social cohesion within society between the two opposites of highly 
polarised to highly integrated. (See Figure 8.4 for an illustration of the scenario matrix defining the 
scenario possibilities.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Information warfare 2030s scenario matrix 
 
The four quadrants of the matrix each reveal a scenario for a possible future within which 
information warfare could manifest as a national security threat set in the 2030s. As information 
warfare is so ingrained in society and as it is difficult to restrict it only to South Africa the broad 
summary of scenarios represents a global perspective. The later full explanation of the scenarios is 
focussed on the South African case. The scenarios are based on how the identified ten driving 
forces may combine over the next decade and a half. It must be emphasised that the purpose at 
first is mainly structural to identify a diversity of possible scenarios based on how the most 
uncertain and important driving forces for the manifestation of information warfare interact over 
time. More detailed descriptions of these scenarios, down to the CLA levels, are presented 
later in the chapter. 
 
Scenario 1 represents a technology-driven cooperative society in which information warfare is 
present and relevant on all levels and in all forms. Scenario 2 is a divided society in which 
technology empowers and entities individuals. Information warfare is widespread and a significant 
part of the struggle for resources between entities and individuals. Scenario 3 represents a 
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polarised but also a relative technologically disconnected society in which netwar and 
psychological operations dimensions from information warfare are rife. Scenario 4 represents a 
society in which high levels of social integration with low levels of technological participation ensure 
relative stability. The intensity of the information warfare is lower but netwar and psychological 
operations continue to be instruments for power enhancement in society. 
 
8.11.7 Provide a rationale for the scenario names 
 
This study has adopted metaphors from African traditional religion and myth for the identified 
scenarios with the aim to advance creative thinking about the content of the scenarios and setting 
it within a South Africa / Africa milieu.  
 
Shango is from Yoruba tradition in Nigeria. As an earth deity he was once a mortal man, the king of 
Oyo, who transformed himself into an immortal. According to tradition, during his life he breathed 
tongues of fire. He then ascended into the sky by climbing a golden chain and became the god of 
thunder and lightning. He is also god of justice, punishing thieves and liars (Jordan, 2004:282). 
Shango Rejuvenated illustrates a scenario in which a high level of ICT embeddedness and high 
levels of integration boost assimilation, cooperation and technological advancement but also 
provide the ideal staging area for the use of information warfare as power projection method.  
 
Gaunab is malevolent god of darkness from the Khoi culture in Namibia. This deity is the chief 
adversary of the creator god Tsunigoab. He was engaged in a primordial struggle for supremacy 
during which Tsunigoab was wounded but eventually triumphed, consigning Gaunab to the so-
called “dark heaven” (Jordan, 2004:102-103). Gaunab Rising does not necessarily reflect the rise 
of authoritarian societies but rather highlights the possible consequences of international, regional 
and even national polarisation in an environment in which high levels of ICT embeddedness will 
enhance the capabilities of the role-players involved.  
 
Inkanyamba is a Zulu Storm god from South Africa. The deity is specifically responsible for 
tornados and perceived as a huge snake coiling down from heaven to earth (Jordan, 2004:139). 
Inkanyamba Reduced reflects a polarised environment in which the embeddedness of ICT 
remains at a low level. Although the technological element of information warfare such as cyberwar 
could be constrained, high levels of potential conflict are experienced.   
 
Tsunigoab is the creator god in the Khoi tradition in Namibia. Tsunigoab walks with a limp, 
because of an injury sustained in a primordial battle with his arch rival Gaunab, the god of 
darkness, who was eventually driven away to live in the dark heaven. Tsunigoab is invoked at 
dawn each day (Jordan, 2004:323).  Tsunigoab Revived reflects a scenario in which a high level 
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of social, political and economic integration is achieved but this is not supported by a high level of 
ICT embeddedness in society overall, resulting in general stability but difficulty in maximising 
technological opportunities in society. 
 
8.11.8 Produce the scenarios 
 
The scenarios developed are stories about possible futures. Scenarios offer multiple creative 
pathways into a future that is basically unknown. While constrained by the rules of the game and 
driven by key uncertainties, they endeavour to evoke awareness and emotion in the narrative. 
Each scenario has a simple, vivid theme which is logically consistent, but differs from the other 
scenarios in the set. It provides a compelling title which ideally enters the common vocabulary of 
the target audience (Ilbury & Sunter, 2003:87). The outlines identified above are now turned into 
fully fledged scenarios focused on four possible manifestations within the TWEPS environments, 
namely the information warfare / national security, technology, economic, political and social 
environments. In order to enhance the layered view of each scenario, a CLA analysis is also done 
for each scenario. The scenario descriptions provided some of the litany insight into the possible 
scenarios. The other CLA layers are presented in Table 8.4 to Table 8.7. 
 
8.12 SCENARIO 1: “SHANGO REJUVENATED”  
 
The first scenario is one in which technological progress takes place in an increasingly 
cooperative and networked global society. This scenario is formed in the quadrant where both 
the two main driving forces – ICT embeddedness and societal integration – are high. This provides 
for a highly technological driven South African society in which the consumer and business 
demand for technological solutions are elevated. Information warfare is seen as a common but 
also practical and useful instrument for the projection of power by many entities within South 
Africa. In South Africa the government and other prominent local and international role-players are 
forcing commercial values on the country, creating a largely homogeneous landscape, with main 
stream diversity decreasing and some sub-cultures forced to the margins. Information warfare is 
regarded by many domestic but also foreign role-players as a legitimate method for dissent and 
conflict. The government but even larger corporate entities invest significant resources into both 
defensive and offensive capabilities.  
 
8.12.1 Information warfare and national security manifestation 
 
The high levels of social cohesion play a role in limiting both international as well as domestic 
conflict and war. However, competition, especially competition leading to conflict, remains 
common. Because of the high level of ICT embeddedness in South African society, information 
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warfare remains a useful as well as viable instrument of influence and power projection. The South 
African state continues to survive challenges against its legitimacy. However, powerful non-state 
entities such as corporations and ideological or religious groups continue to challenge the 
sovereignty of the South African state.  
 
As interconnected high technology and especially the digital economy are central to stability and 
wealth creation in South Africa, society is highly vulnerable to information warfare. It also occurs on 
all levels and in all of its manifestations as cyberwar, netwar and psychological operations. 
Information warfare is regarded as a major national security issue in South Africa. It is also being 
developed by the government and other entities as offensive power projection tools. At the same 
time counter measures against threats are highly specialised and evolving fast. Networked security 
is seen in South Africa as of major significance and substantial resources are invested in this.  
 
The relevance of information warfare is strengthened by the systemic nature of conflict because of 
the high levels of ICT embeddedness. Conflict is highly complex with growing interaction between 
technological change, system development and operational innovation. Within South Africa the 
deployment of autonomous weapons and security systems are common. Asymmetric action forms 
part of conflict in South Africa but is somewhat restrained because of high levels of global 
integration and the focus on multi-level defensive capabilities.  
 
South Africa’s multi-lateral security cooperation is strengthened and assists in the overall 
maintenance of order in the international system. South Africa is exposed to less inter-state conflict 
while the occurrence of intra-state conflict within the country is increasing in which information 
warfare will increasingly become the method of choice for dissent. The added value of high level 
anonymity provided by technology, especially with cyberwar, is also exploited by non-government 
institutions and the government alike. Globally the borders between military and civilian conflict 
weakens partly because of the proliferation of power projection opportunities brought about by 
information warfare options. This leads to the expansion of a technological arms race between 
governments and non-government groups. Despite the information warfare related challenges in 
general, a balance of power within South Africa as well as between South Africa and foreign 
competitors in terms of this phenomenon exists as counter measures are largely in place or are 
developed quickly. 
 
Terrorism presents a threat in South Africa but increases in the non-physical (information warfare) 
part thereof. Crime and terrorism are increasingly also in South Africa been combated by way of 
algorithms and big data. In South Africa crime and terrorism groups use advanced technology that 
is basically matched by the advanced technology of the government entities opposing them. The 
high levels of integration in South Africa will also result in the expansion of the reach and 
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innovativeness of disruptive and terrorist means. The Centre of Gravity (COG) for power projection 
in South Africa will be strongly centred in intangibles such as the general population’s morale. 
 
8.12.2 Technology manifestation 
 
Large-scale integration of technologies takes place in South Africa economic activities as well as in 
daily life. This spans the globe and extends even into developing countries and communities, 
although at a slower pace. While both the globalising and fragmenting consequences of technology 
are present in South Africa, the emphasis is on the integration-related aspects. Digital networking 
is pervasive in South Africa. Big data is also exploited in South Africa for predictive purposes to 
streamline efficiency, innovation and productivity. Artificial intelligence (AI) plays a significant part 
in the lives of the population and the economy in general. Robotics expands beyond manufacturing 
in South Africa and becomes prevalent in the service sector with huge consequences for 
employment. Nanotechnology becomes a significant part of economic activity finding applications 
in most sectors.  
 
The internet and mobile networks in South Africa are compatible and unified, while the IoT 
develops at full potential to link the majority of manufacturing, service and general infrastructure to 
the internet. South Africa is fully linked to the global ICT networks. The internet or its successor is 
vibrantly expanding into all realms of human life in South Africa. Technology becomes a major 
driver in South Africa which activates advances in education, but some inequalities continue to 
challenge full education for everyone. Dark Net or Deep Web grows exponentially and is a 
resource for South Africans for both positive and negative uses. Inequality is still an issue of 
concern in South Africa but technological leaps ensure continued development even in the poorer 
regions. Despite the high level of social cohesion South Africa remains technologically highly 
vulnerable to the use of information warfare as instrument for power projection and/or disruption.  
 
8.12.3 Economic manifestation 
 
The South African economy is highly networked but significantly influenced by interdependence, 
automation, collaboration, integration and globalisation as major trends. Commercial values are 
appreciated with South African elites strongly pushing for continued innovation and global 
cooperation. Technological advances – especially in the fields of digital integration, IoT, AI and 
nanotechnology – have a significant impact on South African and global economic activity. This 
adds to a manufacturing revolution where additive manufacturing (3D printing) becomes common 
and widespread, with devastating consequences for countries and regions currently dependent on 
basic manufacturing. South African governmental regulation and policies are poised to promote 
national and global sustainable equality and stability but will face challenges in this regard partially 
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because it would be vulnerable to information warfare or an incapability to effectively address the 
ingrained problems facing the world. If not managed inclusively and effectively, these 
developments could have a significant negative impact on equality and consequently stability in 
South Africa. A potentially growing divide between the haves and the have-nots will leave many 
individuals in South Africa and the developing world in dire poverty.  
 
Furthermore, the collective outcome of trends such as growing automation, digitalisation, stagnant 
wages, the rise of AI and globalisation potentially contributes to unemployment becoming a 
momentous challenge in South Africa. However, opportunities are provided by inexpensive 
communication technologies constructed on inexpensive processors with high computation 
capabilities, interconnected in a pervasive global network, for some South African marginalised 
individuals and communities to become part of the mainstream economy. Manipulation of symbols 
is expected to grow as a part of South Africa’s economy. Production that is radically decentralised 
and nonmarket-orientated emerges at the core, rather than the periphery, especially in the more 
advanced economies. Focussed efforts within South Africa increase the use of alternative energy 
sources in South Africa, especially renewable sources, although climate changes still require long-
term global efforts to address these challenges.  
 
8.12.4 Political manifestation 
 
Globally opposing centres of power exist but a high level of cooperation between prominent actors 
in the world ensures strategic stability. A shift in the balance of power in the global system occurs 
where collective security is becoming increasingly significant and where non-compliant states are 
isolated. On the strategic level, fixation on geo-political priorities shifts towards global geo-
economic challenges. Multi-lateralism is vibrant and South Africa is an active participant as the 
levels of global cooperation is high. Processes to build legitimate global and national political 
entities continue to assist in ensuring stability. Dictatorships will be less viable, with democratic to 
benevolent authoritarian governments more successful in ensuring legitimacy. In South Africa 
democracy will be operational but challenges from non-state entities continuing. Because of 
pervasive connectivity as well as extremely high penetration of social media, the South African 
citizens’ input on governance-related issues is high. Trends towards the implementation of multi-
party democracy in many developing states strengthen local and global good governance. 
However, the enhanced technological capacity of governments is also a significant negative 
influence for non-connected minority interests in some parts of the world including in South Africa. 
Non-state actors capable of mobilising support are in a position to also challenge the government 
in South Africa. E-governance is being implemented in South Africa and spreads exponentially 
across the world. Big data assist both government and commercial interests in South Africa to high 
regulate the social order in the country. The media is owned by a few corporations in South Africa 
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and mostly represents the ruling elite. Diverse alternative South African and global media exists 
which disseminates more independent news online.  
 
8.12.5 Social manifestation 
 
As it is a highly interconnected and integrated world, social participation is high also in South Africa 
on many issues deemed significant in people’s lives. The world of high connectively empowers the 
individual to an unprecedented level in human history. This is the case because of the functioning 
of a pervasive knowledge network to which South Africa is fully connected. Despite this there are 
still limits to what marginalised individuals and groups are able to accomplish. The media is largely 
digital but controlled by few big players in South Africa but also globally. Independent voices are 
vocal but find it difficult to influence and establish traction outside the mainstream memes. 
However, social media and social networking are pervasive in South Africa and a key factor in 
managing communication as well as individual and group aspirations in society. Social openness 
and transparency are in general high which makes control over social media interaction by the 
South African government much more difficult. In South Africa as in the rest of the world social 
media provides a wide range of entities with significant leverage, while also ensuring that 
psychological operations could be used as power projection instrument through social media. 
 
8.12.6 CLA evaluation of scenario “Shango Rejuvenated” 
 
Table 8.5: CLA assessment of the scenario “Shango Rejuvenated” 
CLA layers Assessment 
Social systems and 
structures 
 
Technology’s legitimacy and usefulness are generally accepted and 
promoted as the main conduit of addressing the strategic 
challenges in society. These challenges include poverty, inequality, 
crime and corruption. 
 
Despite high levels of integration, the variety and potential ease of 
the deployment of information warfare ensures that it will be a 
significant national security risk. ICT embeddedness and innovative 
technology are making it possible to target higher-level decision-
making entities and the management systems of opponents. 
 
The value of information warfare as instrument of power and 
finances is appreciated and fully exploited by especially the political 
and economic elite in society. 
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Militaries/security entities are significant spenders on information 
warfare related capabilities as well as high-technology solutions in 
terms of drones, deep learning technology, nanotechnology, 
miniaturisation, swarm options, automated systems and human 
enhancing technologies. 
 
Mega-corporations pursue the multitude of opportunities to expand 
consumerism and fast-track the life cycles of digital gadgets to 
extremely profitable levels, suffocating competition and limiting the 
opportunities of small businesses. 
 
Media ownership provides opportunities to mega-corporations (and 
governments) to stifle freedom of speech. 
 
Technology provides opportunities for communication but 
alternative messages get drowned in the commercial market place. 
Worldview 
 
 In the light of high ICT embeddedness and high levels of 
integration, technology is viewed as central to prosperity and 
progress.  
 
Popular views of the economy relate to integration and cooperation, 
and globalisation remains central to prosperity. Elites remain in a 
power position to manipulate this to their advantage.  
 
The value of social production and exchange as well as the 
symbolic drives innovation and growth prospects.  
 
Multilateral politics is appreciated for assisting to strengthen the 
expanding political, economic and social integration. 
Myth 
 
“Technology can overcome all problems” is the myth underlying the 
“Shango Rejuvenated” scenario. 
 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
 
8.13  SCENARIO 2: “GAUNAB RISING”  
 
The second scenario is one in which technological progress takes place in an increasingly 
polarised society. This scenario is formed in the quadrant where the two main driving forces –  
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ICT embedding and polarisation – are high. While technological progress and technological 
interconnectedness are high, the potential thereof cannot be realised because of divisions in 
society. This scenario represents a divisive world with increasing competition between societies 
mobilised on the grounds of status, nationality, religion and class, providing opportunities for 
authoritarian elites to expand control. Information warfare remains rife and its use is expanding on 
all societal levels. Inequality of capacities could lead to rapidly changing power configurations.  
 
8.13.1 Information warfare and national security manifestation 
 
The nation state is paramount, but non-state entities organised on religious, ideological and 
national grounds do present a growing threat to national security. Full-blown information conflicts 
and wars are common with a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic elements. In this regard virtual cyber-
based groups such as Anonymous (or its future successors) pose a major national security threat. 
Non-state actors regard information warfare as a primary tool to promote and advance their 
political agendas.  
 
In South Africa information warfare thus poses a significant national security risk and growing ICT 
embeddedness ensures that states are highly vulnerable, especially to cyberwar. The level of 
potential hostility in South Africa ensures that all methods for promoting interests in a fairly hostile 
environment are used. Both terrorism and cybercrime are serious local and global threats. 
Information warfare is regarded as a legitimate instrument of power projection by both the elite and 
the dissatisfied in South Africa. The ruling elite in South Africa manipulate and force the rest of the 
population into submission with whatever means at their disposal. However, the marginalised are 
also turning to information warfare as a practical tool to pursue their interests. Conflict becomes 
highly complex and common with growing interaction between technological change, system 
development and operational innovation. Asymmetric war and conflict options are an ingrained part 
of conflict and war globally.  
 
The broader global environment experiences an increase in inter-state and intra-state conflict. The 
threat of nuclear war will be significant as the non-proliferation system is increasingly eroded. The 
start of a Second Cold War is a potential risk, especially if authoritarian states expand their 
assertive stands and military capabilities. This leads to an escalation of an arms race with high-
technology weapons and even weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Private armies (mercenaries) 
are significant role-players in these conflicts. Drone warfare is rife and used by many governments 
and even non-government role-players. The Centre of Gravity (COG) for power projection is 
strongly centred in hard power and control but intangibles such as the general population morale 
continue to be important for ruling elites. 
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8.13.2 Technology manifestation 
 
The levels of trust between government and the civil society in South Africa are low despite high 
levels of technological development and embeddedness of ICT in society. The potential for 
cooperation supported by high levels of technological participation is actively hindered by hostility 
in the form of disruptive policies and low levels of trust between opposing elites. Alternative 
systems and even separate cyber infrastructures are created in South Africa and globally, resulting 
in the development of physical and cyber enclaves for the elites. This leads to a fragmented mobile 
network and internet, which have serious negative consequences for the further development of 
technology. Fragmentation can occur inside South Africa as well as with connectivity outside the 
country. IoT technologies function in South Africa but do not reach their full potential because 
global entities are reluctant to cooperate and agree on common standards.  
 
The government and elites actively endeavour to control digital networking and to keep it largely 
restrictive. However, the Deep Web provides alternatives without control being an absolute. Ultra-
regulated digital and physical fortresses are maintained in South Africa, while outside of these a 
general “free for all” reigns (despite efforts to regulate it). Big data is not exploited to its maximum 
potential, curbing the effectiveness of future technological innovation. Big data is, however, 
exploited by the government and corporates to expand control over the population. Robotics 
expands beyond manufacturing but with limited global cooperation, it is not such an enormous 
threat to jobs in South Africa. Nanotechnology becomes a part of economic activity in South Africa 
finding applications in many sectors, including the defence sector. Globally the pressure to deploy 
nanotechnology for military purposes is high, increasing the security and safety risks of these 
technologies substantially. The defence sector is growing in South Africa with military spending 
increasing. Technology is a driver in the South African economy but lack of global cooperation 
inhibits its potential influence. Inequality is still a global issue. However, the hope that technological 
leaps will help to overcome this inequality does not gain much traction in South Africa and 
elsewhere. 
 
8.13.3 Economic manifestation 
 
Despite high levels of technology participation, the South African economy is constrained by 
decisions which place interdependence, collaboration and globalisation under pressure. Globally 
large-scale economic competition takes place rather than cooperation, especially across the 
international divides. High levels of polarisation result in obstacles being created which limits the 
integration of the global economy. This creates a new multi-polar world with a dramatic increase in 
the diversity of cultures, religions, worldviews, economies, political regimes and legal systems but 
within a polarised framework. In general, the economy is not so vulnerable to information warfare, 
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but the South African economy faces many other challenges. Elites are successful in creating 
enclaves of haves while the have-nots remain marginalised. Tariff barriers and other trade 
impediments hamper global trade.  
 
Globally, the middle classes are under pressure while many individuals in the developing world 
continue to live in dire poverty. This also manifests in South Africa. The global economy has no 
incentives for the promotion of sustainable equality and stability, worsening the already polarised 
environment. Cheap communication technologies are available and in use in South Africa but the 
economic value remains constrained. Global trade and cooperation are constrained by 
government/corporate impediments and controls. The manipulation of symbols is not a significant 
part of the South African economy. The main source of energy will be fossil fuels although 
alternative energy sources are extensively used in parts of the world.  
 
8.13.4 Political manifestation 
 
Technological participation is not reflected on the political level as opposing centres of power are 
rising, resulting in conflict rather than cooperation. Globalisation is stunted. Large-scale political 
competition is the norm and also manifests in South Africa. Conflict increases domestically as well 
as internationally. Strategic geo-political priorities remain prominent while conflict in addressing 
geo-economic challenges increases. Multi-lateralism is under pressure, resulting in poor collective 
action on issues such as climate change, non-proliferation of WMD, arms control, free trade and 
the creation of global norms on shared global policy challenges. A shift in the balance of power in 
the global system takes place where the balance of power is becoming increasingly significant and 
backed up by “hard power”.  
 
Information warfare is regarded as a significant instrument for power projection. The nation state is 
strengthened but increasingly in conflict with other entities. The state will not be the only actor with 
significant power projection capabilities, and a power balance between state and non-state entities 
exists in some parts of the world. In South Africa non-state role-players prove to be seriously 
disruptive and influence national security negatively. In South Africa there are dominant digital 
political actors of which the government is not necessarily the most significant. Efforts to implement 
e-governance, especially in the developing world including South Africa, are struggling. Setbacks 
will occur for multi-party democracy in many developing states while global good governance 
decreases in parts of the world. It is difficult to build legitimate global and national political entities. 
Independent media continues to exist in South Africa but its influence on political processes is 
limited.  
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8.13.5 Social manifestation 
 
While the South African society is interconnected, it is prone to conflict because of high levels of 
polarisation. The potential for a pervasive knowledge network is high in South Africa but it is not 
functioning optimally. Social participation in South Africa is high but disruptive and controlled. The 
government and corporate entities in South Africa increase efforts to control media and social 
media. In the developing world this control is mostly for political reasons while in the developed 
world it is mostly for commercial reasons. Control of social media interaction by the government is 
much more difficult but provides other entities in South Africa with significant leverage. Social 
media and social networking are largely fragmented. In general, social openness is low. Mass 
protests and rioting in many parts of the world including South Africa are common. Global 
migration is a major issue and some countries take harsh measures against migration. 
Psychological operations are used by many entities and undermine media freedom. 
 
8.13.6 CLA evaluation of scenario “Gaunab Rising” 
 
Table 8.6: CLA assessment of the scenario “Gaunab Rising” 
CLA layers Assessment 
Social systems and 
structures 
 
High levels of polarisation coupled with the variety and 
potential ease of deploying information warfare ensures that it 
will be a major national security risk.  
 
The struggle for resources as well as profits in the economy is 
increasingly regarded as a zero sum game, triggering even 
more polarisation. 
 
Political, economic and social diversity are extensively used 
by the elites as popular mobilisation tools breeding even more 
polarisation.  
 
Power is viewed to be attained by mass mobilisation and not 
through reconciliation by way of utilising highly networked ICT 
capacities. 
 
The ruling elites and influential entities value the use of fear 
and exclusion as tools to establish and strengthen legitimacy. 
 
The themes for political mobilisation include nationality, race, 
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religion, social status, educational level, technological 
proficiency and wealth. 
 
The power of mega-companies, especially technology 
companies, is not limited by governments, which leads to 
these companies playing a significant governance role. In a 
polarised environment this supercharges conflict and conflict 
potential.  
 
Technology is regarded as an instrument of power and it is 
playing a subservient role in addressing the many societal 
challenges.  
 
Information warfare is recognised as a crucial instrument of 
power, and fully exploited by especially the political and 
economic elite in society for these purposes. 
 
Highly controlled and fragmented global media is used to prop 
up their owners’ positions in a polarised environment. 
Worldview 
 
In the light of high ICT embeddedness and high levels of 
polarisation, technology is viewed as central to power and 
control as well as defence against other centres of power. In 
order for the various centres of power to enhance their 
positions, economic mercantilism remains a preferred 
economic activity.  
 
The value of social interaction is regarded as a threat by the 
power elites. Significant effort is expended to control the social 
interaction and the narrative but this proves to be highly 
problematic in a highly connected environment. High levels of 
polarisation result in a fragmented, divisive and conflict-prone 
social environment.  
 
Politics is highly divisive with multi-lateralism under huge 
pressure and even being reversed in certain cases.  
Myth 
 
“Technology is able to provide the power to ensure sectarian 
interests” is the myth underlying the “Gaunab Rising” scenario. 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a) 
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8.14 SCENARIO 3: “INKANYAMBA REDUCED”  
 
The third scenario is one in which polarisation is high while technology participation is low. This 
scenario is formed in the quadrant where the ICT embedding is low but polarisation is high; 
magnifying dissent, resulting in high levels of conflict and competition for resources. The 
technological part of information warfare in the form of cyberwar is limited, but the cognitive 
aspects in the form of netwar and psychological operations remain high. Elites control resources 
and inequality is widespread.  
 
8.14.1 Information warfare and national security manifestation 
 
The potential for general anarchy is a significant national security risk resulting in security being a 
major but also expensive reality in South Africa as well as in many other countries. In most cases, 
only the wealthy in South Africa can afford security. The use of information warfare (especially 
netwar and psychological operations) is widespread. In general, the mix of kinetic and non-kinetic 
elements in war and conflict is common. Asymmetric war and conflict options form an ingrained 
part of conflict and war globally, although it is not as technology driven as it could be. Inequality 
leads to conflict and unrest in South Africa. Conflict about resources is common and hybrid warfare 
is widespread worldwide. The global non-proliferation system collapses and increases the possible 
use of WMD substantially. An arms race between states and even in some cases non-state entities 
are a reality.  
 
The nation state including South Africa is under pressure as non-state entities organised on 
religious and ideological foundations assert alternative and hybrid configurations. Ultra-regulated 
digital and physical fortresses are maintained in South Africa, while outside of these a general 
“survival of the fittest” mind-set reigns. Private armies (mercenaries) are significant role-players in 
security as well as in the conduct of conflict. The Centre of Gravity (COG) for power projection will 
be strongly centred in hard power and control but also in intangibles such as the general 
population morale. 
 
8.14.2 Technology manifestation 
 
Technological progress and innovation in South Africa are seriously under pressure and limited to 
“small islands of prosperity” in large areas of serious want. Developing societies are especially 
affected, which limits options for technological innovation. Global inequalities and socio-economic 
challenges are reflected on the technological level. Digital and network capabilities are restricted in 
South Africa with exponential growth drivers such as the IoT not functioning because of economic, 
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political and social challenges. Big data plays practically no role in the economy or society in South 
Africa. Elements of it might be used by elites to advance their own interests. Although a basic 
internet continues to exist worldwide, increasingly value-added content is only accessible to elites. 
The Deep Web is also fractured but its significance grows as it is established at the core of 
significant security, social and economic problems and competition. Robotics is limited to the 
enclaves in South Africa where elites live and is exclusively used to the advantage of these elites. 
 
8.14.3 Economic manifestation 
 
The South African economy is constrained by high levels of conflict and a general lack of ICT 
embeddedness. Mutually exclusive economic competition is rife in South Africa and elsewhere 
while cooperation, especially over the global divides, diminishes. High levels of polarisation result 
in obstacles being created that limit the integration of the South African economy in the global 
economy. A divisive, multi-polar world rises in which the diversity of cultures, religions, worldviews, 
economies, political regimes and legal systems are celebrated and promoted to the exclusion of 
minorities and “the Other”.  
 
The South African economy is not that vulnerable to information warfare, but the economy faces 
serious challenges. Inequality is a very real problem with elites creating wealthy enclaves, separate 
from the rest of the population. The poor is marginalised and paths out of poverty are limited. The 
middle classes’ position is under extreme pressure in South Africa. Tariff barriers and other trade 
impediments hamper global trade. In marginalised economies globally slave labour will be 
common. Cheap communication technologies are available but the use thereof by especially 
marginalised groups is hampered by lack of ICT embeddedness. The manipulation of symbols is 
not so significant. The main source of energy in South Africa is fossil fuels, with renewable energy 
of lesser significance.  
 
8.14.4 Political manifestation 
 
The political environment in South Africa is characterised by conflicting rather than cooperative 
behaviour. Globalisation’s influence is actively being rolled back in South Africa with insular 
policies being adopted by the government and prominent political actors. In general, the South 
African elites are empowered by security forces while the rest of the population have limited 
access to high-level security. Multi-lateralism ceases to produce legitimate international treaties 
resulting in the global rule-making system to break down. No inclusive international actions in 
terms of climate change, non-proliferation of WMD, arms control and free trade can take place.  
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Hard power used within a system striving for a balance of power is underpinning political behaviour 
both internationally and domestically. Information warfare (especially netwar and psychological 
operations) is regarded as a significant instrument for power projection. Cyberwar plays a more 
subdued role because of the lower levels of ICT embeddedness in society. Non-state actors are 
significant in the political system in South Africa. Because of the high levels of polarisation non-
state actors are also seriously disruptive influences in South Africa and elsewhere. In some parts 
of the world the nation state is under pressure as religious and ideological groups mobilise 
marginalised communities. E-government and governance are under stress in South Africa and 
collapse completely in some regions. Multi-party democracy is reversed in many developing states. 
The independent media’s influence on political options is limited in South Africa as most media 
outlets become involved in distributing mainly propaganda for the opposing elites.  
 
8.14.5 Social manifestation 
 
Low levels of social cohesion and technological participation make South Africa’s society extremely 
prone to conflict and consequently the negative social outfall thereof. A pervasive knowledge 
network is not functioning optimally in South Africa. Social media and social networking are 
fragmented in South Africa because of the low levels of ICT embeddedness and high levels of 
polarisation. Mass protest and rioting are common in South Africa. Global migration is a major 
issue and some countries take harsh measures against migration. Psychological operations are 
rife which undermines media freedom in South Africa. 
 
8.14.6 CLA evaluation of scenario “Inkanyamba Reduced” 
 
Table 8.7: CLA assessment of the scenario “Inkanyamba Reduced” 
CLA layers Assessment 
Social systems and structures 
 
The use of information warfare (especially 
netwar and psychological operations) is 
widespread because of the high levels of 
polarisation. Lower levels of technology 
participation put limits on the effectiveness of 
cyber warfare. 
 
Hard power use is very attractive to elites by 
means of controlling natural resources, food and 
military might.  
 
Mega-corporations focusing on the technology 
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field are limited and constrained by regulation 
and control. 
 
Group forming is focused on nationality, race, 
religion, social status, educational level and 
wealth.  
 
The struggle for resources is a major motivator 
in governance environment. 
 
Worldview 
 
In the light of low levels of ICT embeddedness 
and high levels of polarisation, technology is 
viewed as an instrument to promote interests 
because the polarised nature of society is 
significantly limited in what it can achieve.  
 
Popular views of the economy are closely 
associated with a struggle to survive mentality. 
The economy is regarded as primarily for the 
advancement of the group and its elite, with 
common good approaches being side-lined. 
   
The value of social interaction is regarded as a 
threat outside the power elites. Significant effort 
is expended in controlling the social interaction 
and the narrative. High levels of polarisation 
result in a fragmented and divisive social 
environment.  
 
Politics is highly divisive with multi-lateralism 
under huge pressure and even being reversed 
in certain cases. 
Myth 
 
“Protection of sectarian interests needs total 
mobilisation against the Other” is the myth 
underlying the “Inkanyamba Reduced” scenario. 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
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8.15  SCENARIO 4: “TSUNIGOAB REVIVED” 
 
High levels of social integration with low levels of technological participation ensure relative stability 
but also limit the potential value that technology could add to society. This scenario is formed in the 
quadrant where societal integration is high and ICT embeddedness is low. Levels of information 
warfare are lower but information warfare continues to be an instrument for power enhancement in 
society. Inequality continues to be a challenge.  
 
8.15.1 Information warfare and national security manifestation 
 
The South African government remains paramount while non-state entities organised on religious, 
ideological and ethnic grounds do present some level of threat to national security. Information war 
is part of the power projection instruments available to state and non-state role-players. Cyber 
warfare’s significance, however, is diminished by the lack of ICT embeddedness in society. 
Asymmetric threats and operations form part of conflict but are restrained because of high levels of 
global integration. These threats and operations are disruptive when they occur. The threats 
associated with global conflict types, such as nuclear war, are less significant as the multi-lateral 
system is more robust as a result of the high levels of international cooperation that are 
maintained. Global and national conflict continues but the risk of serious escalation is lower. The 
start of a new global Cold War is unlikely. Terrorism remains a threat but counter measures are 
more coordinated in this more cooperative global environment. The Centre of Gravity (COG) for 
power projection is partly centred on soft power. 
 
8.15.2 Technology manifestation 
 
Technological progress and innovation are under pressure in South Africa because of the low 
levels of ICT embeddedness. Developing areas in particular are negatively affected, limiting 
options for technological innovation. The internet is operating and assists in cooperative 
endeavours but is not fully integrated into the centre of the global e-commerce as technological 
cooperation between individuals is more limited. The IoT is functioning in South Africa but limited in 
significance because of low levels of technology embeddedness. Technological advances are 
more focused on productive issues and less on consumer items. Big data is not used optimally in 
South Africa because of lower levels of technological participation. Global inequalities and socio-
economic challenges are reflected on a technological level. Although the internet continues to 
exist, its influence on the broader economy is inhibited because of lower levels of ICT 
embeddedness. The Deep Web is on the margins of society and is mainly linked to criminal-related 
activities. Robotics’ role is more limited in South Africa and mainly stays within the manufacturing 
sectors.  
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8.15.3 Economic manifestation 
 
Global inequality continues to exist despite high levels of cooperation potential. Technology is not 
sufficiently developed in South Africa to maximise the opportunities brought about by the high 
levels of social cohesion. The South African economy is cooperative with a focus on 
interdependence, collaboration, integration and globalisation as trends. Integration with the global 
economy is progressing but not at optimal rate. Commercial interests in South Africa are 
competitive while innovation is more limited because of lack of effective ICT cooperation. The 
South African economy is not so vulnerable to information warfare while facing other challenges 
such as persistent inequality. Inequality continues to persist in the country but it is difficult to find 
solutions as innovation is not sufficient for these purposes. Unemployment is a problem in South 
Africa but not a crisis. The South African economy is still dependent on fossil fuel as main energy 
resource. However, the significance of alternative energy resources in South Africa grows. 
 
8.15.4 Political manifestation 
 
Political cooperation is paramount in South Africa but its full potential is not realised as society is 
not sufficiently networked. Collective security is prioritised in a global environment where multi-
lateralism is generally respected and regarded as a practical and dependable way of organising 
and managing relations. The building of legitimate global and national political entities continues. 
Shifts take place towards multi-party democracy in many developing states while efforts continue 
to strengthen national and global good governance. Globalisation is continuing but not at full 
potential. E-government and good governance are promoted in South Africa but are limited in 
effectiveness because of the lack of ICT embeddedness. Globally the nation state continues to be 
prominent. Non-state actors are prominent role-players in South Africa and elsewhere but do not 
create significant system problems because of the high levels of social cohesion. The media in 
South Africa is in a position to have some influence on political processes. 
 
8.15.5 Social manifestation 
 
South African society is interconnected but cannot reach its full potential as the expected 
cooperation cannot be achieved on technological level. The pervasive knowledge network in South 
Africa is not functioning optimally. While social openness in the country is high, social media and 
social networking is common. South African media is mostly free and fulfils a key role in society. 
Social participation in South Africa is high but not to its full potential because of technological 
constraints. The quality of life is relatively high for most in the South African society, although 
inequality persists..  
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8.15.6 CLA evaluation of scenario “Tsunigoab Revived” 
 
Table 8.8: CLA assessment of the scenario “Tsunigoab Revived” 
CLA layers Assessment 
Social systems and structures 
 
The use of information warfare (especially 
netwar and psychological operations) is 
somewhat more limited because of the high 
levels of integration. Lower levels of technology 
participation put some limits on the 
effectiveness of cyber warfare. 
 
Despite this, information warfare (especially 
netwar and psychological operations) is still 
regarded as a useful instrument of power by the 
political and economic elite in society. 
 
Larger corporations continue to be focussed on 
the technology field but are limited by lack of 
effective global interaction and technological 
constraints.. 
 
Smaller companies and communities are taking 
the lead to create localised interaction.  
 
Word view 
 
In the light of low levels of ICT embeddedness 
and high levels of integration, technology is 
viewed as an instrument to promote interests. 
However, the influence of technology remains 
limited as a result of low levels of participation in 
technologies.  
 
A market-related approach to economic activity 
is regarded by governing elites as a viable 
approach to support mutual advancement. The 
lack of full technological participation, however, 
inhibits the possible positive economic 
consequences thereof.  
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The value of social interaction is acknowledged. 
However, the full utilisation of this potential 
through options provided by ICT embeddedness 
lacks.  
 
Multilateral politics helps to strengthen 
expanding political, economic and social 
integration. 
Myth 
 
“Local integration and pursuance of shared 
values ensure global harmony” is the myth 
underlying the “Tsunigoab Revived” scenario. 
Source: Own compilation based on CLA levels (Inayatullah, 2008a). 
 
8.16 CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the outcome of the scenario exercise, information warfare will manifest as a national 
security threat by the 2030s in all possible scenarios. However, the significance of information 
warfare and the manifestation of its three components differ in each scenario. In both “Shango 
Rejuvenated” and “Gaunab Rising” information warfare is a major national security threat. In the 
case of “Shango Rejuvenated” this can be regarded as counter-intuitive as high levels of ICT 
embeddedness and social integration result in the most economically advanced scenario. 
However, in such a scenario advanced cognitive and technological capacities empower significant 
political actors – both governmental and non-state – to use information warfare as a preferred tool 
for power projection. In “Gaunab Rising”, information warfare could be somewhat inhibited in terms 
of potential success because polarisation is leading to much lower levels of trust in society. 
Although the interest in using information warfare is high in “Inkanyamba Reduced”, the low levels 
of ICT embeddedness and high distrust in society inhibit the successful employment thereof. In 
the “Tsunigoab Revived” scenario the high levels of integration combined with the lower levels of 
technology participation limit the practical threat posed by information warfare to society. 
 
In Chapter 9 propositions are identified and applied to the plausible information warfare threat 
against South Africa in the 2030s 
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CHAPTER 9 
EVALUATION 
9.1 SUMMARY 
In an age where information is increasingly positioned at the centre of society, a future in which 
information also becomes a security liability is a reality for South Africa and the world at large. 
Information in all its manifestations – from data to wisdom – has been central to institutional power 
since the dawn of humankind. Technological efficacies brought about by the digital revolution and 
enhanced global networking activities have boosted the role of information in national power. 
Technological development catapulted information to the centre of most human endeavours, 
although high levels of inequality persist as manifested in the digital divide. 
In this study the aim was to use multi-disciplinary theory from futures studies and especially 
international relations in conjunction with methodologies from mainly business studies and futures 
studies (environmental scanning, causal layered analysis, a Delphi method and a scenario study) 
to develop plausible futures regarding the potential threat that information warfare will pose to 
South Africa by the 2030s. 
The problem statement focused on the manifestation of information warfare as a national security 
concern in South Africa during the 2030s. A multi-disciplinary approach, supported by futurist 
methodologies, proved to have the capacity to create knowledge addressing this problem 
statement.  
Plausible scenarios on how information warfare will manifest as a national security concern in 
South Africa during the 2030s have been identified. Based on the results of this study, propositions 
are also identified applicable to plausible information warfare threats against South Africa in the 
2030s.                
In answering the research problem sub-problems were formulated and studied in depth. 
9.1.1 Sub-problem outcomes 
In Chapter 2 the following sub-problems were dealt with: What is the epistemological approach 
followed in this study and how does theory provide insight into information warfare as an upcoming 
national security threat? 
The study followed critical realism as epistemological approach. Information warfare is a new 
concept that has not been adequately addressed in current social science theoretical frameworks 
and it is closely linked with global power projection. Hence, in this study, information warfare was 
mainly framed within international relations theory. Overall, the philosophical approach in this study 
was a critical realist approach. Critical realism accepts the sceptical belief that humanity cannot 
have certain knowledge. Thus, knowledge can be regarded as justified true belief. Despite this, 
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critical realism is not abandoning efforts to understand and know. Knowledge is redefined as 
“conjectural knowledge”, allowing for the possibility of the fallibility of its conjectures. In this study 
foresight acts to promote knowledgeability and as such operates as a “higher-order” language. 
International political theoretical worldviews provide theoretical insights into the broader 
environment in which information warfare is currently manifesting as a national security threat. The 
worldviews according to realism, rationalism, critical realism in international relations theory, critical 
security studies and postmodernism offer comprehension regarding diverse issues relevant to 
information warfare. These issues include shifting global power, network security, system 
integration, the role of symbolism, as well as non-state actors in the international system. 
The realists’ worldview has a high regard for the value of national security, state survival, and 
international order and stability. Realists in general believe that there are no international 
obligations in the moral sense of the word (i.e. bonds of mutual duty) between independent states. 
Information warfare can thus be added to the realist’s existing assortment of power instruments. 
While this dimension has been part of the traditional power instrument in the past, it can be 
expected that its growth in scope, its sophistication and its role in information networked systems 
will increase significantly in the future. 
The rationalist’s worldview acknowledges the existence of an international society sustained by the 
role of growing international interdependence and integration as an actuality closely interlinking 
states globally. Cooperation between states dealing with national security related issues is part of 
this worldview while at the same time the scope of national security threats is expanding to include 
issues such as environmental and human security. The challenge remains the intangible nature of 
information warfare which significantly complicates efforts to address the possible containment of 
information warfare on a multi-lateral level. 
Critical realism in international relations theory and postmodernism provides some insights into the 
significance of the manipulation of the global information sphere. This has highlighted inter alia the 
influence of symbolism and networking to existence in today’s society. Opportunities are being 
created for information warfare to exponentially grow from a still upcoming issue in terms of 
national security to a substantial national security threat in the future.  
The international political theoretical worldview provides a framework within which information 
warfare is currently manifesting as a national security threat. These insights are, however, also 
linked to the macro-historical environment. During the Industrial Age realism was closely linked to 
the Cold War global political stand-offs, while rationalism focused on efforts to expand international 
political and economic relations within the global community (Smith, 2013:4). Information Age 
concerns, as described by critical realism and postmodernism, reflect increased diversity, 
inconsistency and contradictions in human activity. These Information Age related theories 
highlight some trends relevant in human activity, namely renewal, relationship shifts, continuous 
modernisation, growing complexity and interconnectness. The dominance of any one theory is the 
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result of a prior assumption about the main issues in world politics that need explaining. However, 
all of these worldviews add value to the understanding of the broader framework within which 
information warfare manifest as a national security threat. Furthermore these worldviews are not 
representing completely mutually exclusive perceptions about international relations and security 
but are highlighting diverse insights regarding the role of information warfare in international 
security relations.  
In Chapter 3, the second sub-problem was unpacked: What is futures studies’ contribution in 
providing insight into the future of information warfare? 
Information warfare is a subject intimately linked to the future because it is closely related to 
technology futures as well as the changing manifestation of warfare and conflict. Futures thinking is 
based on three interrelated inquiries into the future with the objective to create broad awareness 
about the future. These inquiries are measuring the future to obtain knowledge about the future; 
imagining the non-existing future; and purposefully designing or making the future. Measuring, 
imagining and making sustainable alternative futures should be the preferable outcome of holistic 
futures thinking and requires active interventions to realise (Spies, 2015). In this study, the focus 
was on the measuring and imagining dimensions, but it also provided insight regarding the design 
of countering information warfare futures. Thus, a futurist perspective does not entail prediction of 
the future. Instead, it strives to provide insight and foresight with the aim to promote 
knowledgeability which could assist in creating a preferable future.  
The future is not specified or prearranged. A multitude of futures are possible but only one can 
manifest in the end. Futures studies promotes enquiry into how current activities (or lack thereof) 
will become the reality of the future. This includes endeavours to analyse the causes, sources and 
patterns of stability and change with the intention to create foresight and even different futures. 
The relationship between society’s entities, their environments and the central driving forces are 
sources of complexity and interdependence. These challenges are even more acute when possible 
and plausible futures are investigated. Using a systems approach is practical and provides an 
instrument for discovering the dynamics applicable when information warfare as future national 
security threat is studied. A system is a discernible whole that interacts purposefully with its 
environment and is comprised of interacting and interrelating parts that are organised for a specific 
purpose. Constant change is maintained by connections being established and broken within and 
among systems. 
Effectively managing a system is done by visualising the possible futures by means of a futures 
map, which provides a conceptual frame for futures-related research. As extremely swift changes 
cannot be predicted and may be considered random, the focus of futures studies is mainly in the 
complex field. As the futures of information warfare largely fall within this complex field, the 
framework provided by the futures map assists in managing such complexity. 
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An additional method to manage the intricacy is by following a layered approach, which takes into 
account the vertical complexity of systems. The futures-orientated layered approach that was used 
in this study is CLA which consists of four levels of knowing: the litany, social causes, 
discourse/worldview and myth/metaphor levels of knowing. By moving up and down these layers, it 
is possible to integrate analyses, and synthesise and horizontally integrate discourses, ways of 
knowing and worldviews, thereby increasing the depth of the analysis. 
Chapter 4 deals with the third sub-problem, namely: What do the concepts information warfare and 
national security represent? 
Although information warfare is a recent concept that has only been used since the early 1990s, 
diverse and sometimes even contradictory definitions of information warfare have complicated 
study of this phenomenon. Existing definitions of information warfare have limitations. These are 
related to being too expansive or purely focusing on USA military-centric definitions, and lastly 
being limited or largely limited to attacks on the ICT infrastructure and capacities of countries 
and/or entities.  
In this study, information warfare was defined as the manipulation of networking communication by 
entities with the aim to influence power relationships between countries and the state’s governing 
capacity. Information warfare is taking place on a cognitive-technological continuum. Within the 
cognitive sphere information warfare manifests as netwar and psychological operations. Within the 
technological sphere information warfare manifests as cyberwar. 
As information warfare can occur on all levels of society, its actions have implications for the 
security of the state. A range of information warfare fundamentals has been identified. As many of 
these fundamentals are related to the mind space and cyberspace environment within which 
information warfare takes place, these are new and provide a new dimension to power projection 
and security-related activities. With national security defined as the application of national will by 
the state with the aim to create an environment in which the country’s population, state structures, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty are protected, information warfare presents a plethora of 
potential threats and risks to the modern state. The Information Age has a significant influence on 
national security. The contemporary challenge now is how to meet national security needs in this 
new and ever-changing technology environment. 
The fourth sub-problem is dealt with in Chapter 5: How does information warfare manifest in the 
current environment taking into account factors influencing its future manifestation in the 2030s? 
An environmental scan was used to evaluate the current milieu within which information warfare 
manifests with the capacity to also provide some level of insight into the driving forces which will 
influence how it might manifest in the future. The environmental scan focused on events, 
developments and manifestations related to information warfare and national security within the 
Technological, War/Conflict, Economical, Political and Social (TWEPS) macro-environmental 
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hexagon. This multi-disciplinary environmental scanning focuses on literature with the aim to 
identify current manifestations and to recognise possible trends and driving forces flowing from 
this. 
Transformation, networking and the impact of technological innovation in all the environments 
investigated were highlighted as central to the manifestation of information warfare currently as 
well as in the future. These trends influence not only the entities involved in power relations in 
society, but also enhance the potential influence and power of small and marginalised entities in 
society. New forms of network-related actions such as the rhizome phenomenon (small, highly 
interconnected networks) using social network phenomena for cyber mobilisation have been 
identified as of particular use for information warfare in the future.  
When taking into account the security dimension in terms of potential information warfare targeting, 
a wide range of pillars supporting the information society could become potential information 
warfare targets. The key vulnerable access points include factors underlining the networking, 
coordination, integration, compatibility and connectivity of the information and knowledge society.  
Based on an evaluation of the recent manifestation of information warfare, it is concluded that 
practically all recent conflict situations have had an information dimension. While information 
warfare enhances military power, especially in developing countries, it also creates new 
vulnerabilities. It can be assumed that this trend will continue and that nearly all future conflict 
situations will have an information warfare dimension.  
Social media and internet/mobile device platforms for such media empower most net-enabled 
individuals with an interest in participating in practically any global issue. This has created 
platforms for involvement and participation in social and political issues on a level never seen 
before in the history of humankind. Increasingly, it does not matter what the majority’s view on 
issues are; it matters more what the majority of empowered individuals are doing.  
In Chapter 6 the fifth sub-problem was articulated: How can the output of the environmental scan 
be processed to assist in providing foresight into the future manifestation of information warfare as 
a future national security threat?   
Thematic qualitative text coding of the environmental scan output was done to open up the text for 
evaluation and the identification of the trends influencing information warfare futures. 
The summative essence-capturing categories were identified as innovation, networks and 
transformation, which represented the three cross-cutting main trends identified from the 
environmental scan. Sub-categories were also identified, which are useful in the development of 
scenarios on how information warfare will manifest as a national security threat by the 2030s. 
Grounded in data, a model was developed to produce the knowledgeability that brings about 
insight and eventually foresight regarding information warfare futures. Modelling is a visualisation 
and mental tool developed to add value to the analysis of the environmental scan output. 
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The model was constructed from three different but related constructs, namely the futures map, 
environmental scanning and CLA. The data collected during the environmental scan, which was 
coded in terms of the thematic qualitative text analysis method, led to the identification of three 
categories and thus also the main trends. Driving forces related to the manifestation of information 
warfare were collated in this study from the CLA-based strategic evaluation of factors potentially 
influencing the future. Eleven such driving forces were identified as issues which can precipitate 
shifts within society so immense that they cause other significant shifts in the context of the role of 
information as instrument of power. 
The sixth sub-problem was dealt with in Chapter 7: What are the main driving forces which will 
influence the shaping of the future of information warfare as a national security threat? 
The value of the identified driving forces is increased when the driving forces are scrutinised, 
integrated, prioritised and validated by panels of global and local experts knowledgeable about 
information within the TWEPS environments. For this purpose two Delphi studies were conducted 
as the most appropriate method for arriving at an expert validation and consensus on the key 
driving forces impacting the manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat by 
the 2030s. 
Two separate Delphi studies were conducted. The one Delphi study used South African security 
experts while the second Delphi study used both domestic and international experts 
(knowledgeable in one or more TWEPS environments). Input from a multi-disciplinary pool of 
experts enhanced the value of the analysis already done during the environmental scan and also 
provided some additional input and insight to the development of scenarios.  
The two Delphi studies refined and validated the ten most significant drivers influencing the 
manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat in the 2030s: 
- The centre of power is shifting from the traditional developed countries to the 
developing countries. 
- Security in a networked environment will increase in complexity as its physical and 
non-physical elements become more tightly interwoven. 
- An increase in integration and polarisation will contribute to systemic stresses. 
- Information warfare will become a growing option for power projection. 
- Symbolic, information-related phenomena are increasingly impacting behaviour. 
- The speed of change is increasing exponentially with global communication becoming 
instantaneous. 
- Non-state actors are increasing their influence related to global security. 
- Global and intra-regional inequalities are stimulating conflict potential. 
- Information communication technology (ICT) is embedding itself as a crucial part of 
society. 
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- Social media is a significant part of communication and this is expected to grow in the 
future. 
 
The seventh sub-problem was explored in Chapter 8: What are the plausible scenarios in which 
information warfare would manifest as a national security threat for South Africa? 
The two most significant driving forces for scenario building were obtained by combining the 
prioritisation of the Delphi studies and a cross-impact study. These two key drivers were: 
- An increase in integration and polarisation will contribute to systemic stresses. 
- ICT is embedding itself as a crucial part of society. 
 
The horizontal axis of the scenario matrix represented the spectrum measuring the extent to which 
ICT is embedding itself as a crucial part of society. The upper side of this spectrum represented an 
environment in which ICT is highly embedded in society resulting in high connectivity. The lower 
side of the axis represented an environment in which ICT is poorly embedded in society resulting in 
lower connectivity. The vertical axis represented a spectrum measuring the extent to which 
integration and polarisation will contribute to societal systemic stresses. The right-hand side of this 
axis represented an environment in which society experiences high levels of integration. The left-
hand side of this axis represented an environment in which society experiences high levels of 
polarisation. The following South African scenarios were created: 
Scenario 1: “Shango Rejuvenated” 
Rapid technological advances, boosted by high levels of social integration, stimulate rapid 
advancement while inequality remains a challenge. Information warfare is a preferred tool for 
power projection and consolidation. This takes place in the context of relatively advanced cognitive 
and technological capacities.  
Scenario 2: “Gaunab Rising” 
Low social cohesion combined with high levels of technological participation result in a potentially 
volatile society providing opportunities for authoritarian elites to expand control. Information 
warfare remains rife and is expanding on all societal levels. Inequality of capacities could lead to 
rapidly changing power configurations.  
Scenario 3: “Inkanyamba Reduced” 
The combination of low social cohesion and low levels of technological participation magnify 
dissent, resulting in high levels of conflict and competition for resources. The technological part of 
information warfare in the form of cyberwar is limited, but the cognitive aspects in the form of 
netwar and psychological operations remain high. Elites control resources and inequality is rife.  
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Scenario 4: “Tsunigoab Revived” 
High levels of social integration with low levels of technological participation ensure relative 
stability, but also limit the potential value that technology could add to society. Levels of information 
warfare are lower but information warfare continues to be an instrument for power enhancement in 
society. Inequality continues to be a challenge. 
Information warfare manifests as a national security threat by the 2030s in all four identified 
plausible scenarios. However, the significance of information warfare for national security and the 
manifestation of its three components differ in each scenario. In both “Shango Rejuvenated” and 
“Gaunab Rising” information warfare is a major national security threat. In the case of “Shango 
Rejuvenated” this can be regarded as counter-intuitive as high levels of ICT embeddedness and 
social integration result in the most economically advanced scenario. However, in such a scenario 
advanced cognitive and technological capacities empower governmental and non-state political 
actors to use information warfare as a preferred tool for power projection. At the same time, 
information warfare could be somewhat inhibited in terms of its potential success in “Gaunab 
Rising” because of the much lower levels of trust in a polarised society. Although the interest in 
using information warfare is high in “Inkanyamba Reduced”, the low levels of ICT embeddedness 
and high distrust in society inhibit the successful use thereof. In the “Tsunigoab Revived” scenario, 
the high levels of integration coupled with the lower levels of technology participation limit the 
practical threat posed by information warfare to society. 
9.2 PROPOSITIONS 
The last question remains: What propositions can be identified applying to the plausible information 
warfare threats against South Africa in the 2030s? 
The formulation of the propositions is done from the viewpoint of endeavouring to find 
commonalities between the different information warfare scenarios. The specific scenarios in which 
the propositions could be valid are identified after each proposition. Although the propositions 
focus on South African situations similar to the scenarios, the perspective is applicable globally. 
Information warfare as national security threat is so ingrained in global society that it is difficult to 
only restrict these propositions to South Africa.  
Proposition 1 
Information warfare will be a national security threat of note by the 2030s. This will be case 
irrespective of which scenario or combination of scenarios would emerge in South Africa by the 
2030s. All driving forces identified in this study are empowering information warfare as a significant 
method to promote and protect power in society. As networked relations are growing, security in a 
networked environment will increase in complexity as its physical and non-physical elements 
become more tightly interwoven. At the same time embedded ICT is expected to play a crucial role 
in the functioning of society and will be a significant driver of future economic activity. Additionally, 
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the speed of change will increase exponentially with global communication becoming 
instantaneous and cheap. Social media will form a significant part of communication and it will 
become an influential socio-political and economic force in South African society.  
 Scenarios in which this proposition could be valid: “Shango Rejuvenated” and “Gaunab 
Rising”, somewhat more restrained in “Inkanyamba Reduced” “Tsunigoab Revived”. 
Proposition 2 
Multi-lateral measures would be ineffective to control information warfare. Many of the challenges 
that the world faces can be countered (even if only partially) by collective and multi-lateral rule 
making. International society creates an image of states articulating and agreeing upon rules, 
based upon their mutual recognition as sovereign states, that concern acceptable behaviour and 
that address global and regional challenges. Underlying this is the notion that states, by acting in 
concert, achieve international order while also laying down criteria to determine which states are to 
be accepted as legitimate members of international society. Pressure is also mounting to 
endeavour to develop multi-lateral rules limiting information warfare. However, information warfare 
remains largely incorporeal in nature. Industrial related threats such as nuclear weapons do 
provide the scope for international cooperation because of the physical dimensions of this threat, 
namely highly radioactive material for which credible containment and management processes 
could be negotiated. This is not the case with information warfare. The active role that non-state 
actors are playing in terms of information warfare is expected to further complicate any such 
efforts. Although South Africa should call for multi-lateral rules regarding information warfare (as a 
principled position) and even participate in the building of such international norms, the effective 
impact of such norms would be limited.   
 Scenarios in which this proposition could be valid:  Especially within “Gaunab Rising” and 
“Inkanyamba Reduced”, although some political will might exist within “Shango 
Rejuvenated” and “Tsunigoab Revived” to create multi-lateral norms with albeit insignificant 
impact. 
Proposition 3 
Polarisation poses a significant risk for the boosting of information warfare as a national security 
threat. The driving force linked to the polarisation – integration continuum will be significant in how 
the future pans out for South Africa and the world in general. While it is acknowledged that the 
current rapid embedding of ICT in human artefacts could also be hindered resulting in the four 
plausible information warfare scenarios, it is more likely that the polarisation integration driving 
force could harm the human future. Global divides on issues such as growth, economic wellbeing, 
political participation, group stratification and inequality have potential to guide the world on a 
divisive or cooperative road. The level of technological progress has not been reflected in terms of 
human behaviour as humanity continues to commit to policies resulting in negative consequences.  
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 Scenarios in which this proposition could be valid:  “Gaunab Rising” and “Inkanyamba 
Reduced” in particular. 
Proposition 4 
Innovative forms of network-related actions will transform information warfare into ever-changing 
manifestations in the national security threat environment. As asymmetric information warfare 
evolves, information warfare capabilities will increasingly spread to more state actors, non-state 
entities and even individuals. Although unlikely, mass societal disruption could result from the 
innovative application of information warfare. South Africa as other countries would need to deploy 
resources before the 2030s to counter the threat posed by information warfare. The vulnerability of 
future South African society can be expected to grow as the symbolic is increasingly integrated into 
the production processes and wellness of society.  
 Scenarios in which this proposition could be valid:  “Shango Rejuvenated” and “Gaunab 
Rising” in particular. 
Proposition 5 
While information warfare is a national security threat, it also potentially implies an information 
warfare threat from the state posed to the freedom of the population. Just as innovation, 
transformation and networking provide the opponents of the state with capabilities to pose an 
information warfare threat to the state, these capabilities also empower states. In the context of 
growing polarisation these capabilities will become part of the arsenal of authoritarian states in 
their endeavours to counter dissent.  
 Scenarios in which this proposition could be valid:  “Gaunab Rising” and “Inkanyamba 
Reduced” but could also be used within “Shango Rejuvenated”. 
Proposition 6 
Information warfare will become ingrained in society as the virtual and real worlds increasingly 
merge. In a network-based system, computers communicate with computers. Information is stored 
digitally in electronic databases. Because computers are connected, every digital database in the 
world is, in principle, accessible from anywhere else in the world by anyone with the authority to 
access it. This happens practically instantaneously. Thus, the location of both the individual and 
the data is irrelevant. In this “virtual world” consisting of the information and communication layers, 
proximity does not matter anymore. Delays remain minimal, with the binding economic constraint 
not so much how much information can be found, but rather how much information can be 
processed. Networked-based information technology has considerably reduced transaction costs 
(Spence, 2010:227). Based on developments in the fields of IoT, additive manufacturing (3D 
printing) and computing everywhere, the merging of the “virtual world” and the “real world” is an 
upcoming trend (Carter, 2014).  
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 Scenarios in which this proposition could be valid:  “Shango Rejuvenated” and “Gaunab 
Rising”. 
Proposition 7 
The identified four information warfare scenarios for the 2030s as well as the information warfare 
future model can serve as frameworks or mental models for wider application in the TWEPS 
environments and further research. Building on the scenario work done, conducting a variety of 
additional scenario and gaming methodologies, it is possible to produce heuristics or rules of 
thumb (Keats, 2015) to cover many uncertainties and to assist in producing preferable and 
probable information warfare scenarios. Furthermore, the value of the futures model, which also 
stresses the layered, interactive and system elements, lies in identifying the forces which will be 
crucial in creating insight into any issue within the TWEPS environments. The model can be 
applied in a wider context than only information warfare as it could also be applied to most 
upcoming issues within the TWEPS environments.  
 
9.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contributions of the study are both theoretical and practical and summarised as follows: 
- Provides a strategic and more inclusive definition of information warfare taking into 
account the technological and non-technological dimensions of this phenomenon. 
- The development of the Information Warfare Environment Futures Model is constructive 
for guiding further studies. 
- Using CLA to evaluate the outcomes of a comprehensively modelled environmental scan 
has significant methodological value for use in future studies. 
- The scenarios presented provide plausible futures which provide early warning insights on 
the manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat confronting South 
Africa during the 2030s.  
In this study the weakness of definitions of information warfare was identified as a challenge.  
Three types of definitions were identified namely broad, ICT related and military definitions.  
Although all these definitions highlight some relevant aspects of information warfare, not one of 
these definitions does justice to the full spectrum of activities, which could be regarded as 
information warfare. Information warfare is defined as actions focused on destabilising or 
manipulating the core information networks of a state or entity in society with the aim to influence 
the ability and will to project power as well as efforts to counter similar attacks by an opposing 
entity and/or state. This definition additionally assisted to gain the insight that information warfare is 
taking place on a cognitive-technological continuum, resulting in the identification of netwar, 
psychological operations and cyberwar as its three manifestations. 
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The Information Warfare Environment Futures Model stresses the layered, interactive and system 
elements underlying the current but also future manifestation of information warfare. The 
development of this model is a methodological tool designed to provide guidance for an integrated 
approach to futures analyses, especially related to most upcoming national security threats but 
also broader TWEPS macro environmental challenges and opportunities.  
CLA is an increasingly compelling analytical technique being applied in both futures research and 
social sciences. Since its development by Inayatullah, this technique has been applied to a diverse 
field of topics. The use of CLA to evaluate the outcomes of a comprehensively modelled 
environmental scan is unique and has significant methodological value for use in future studies. 
The study illustrates that the hybridisation of CLA with the development of scenarios is possible 
and create an application possibility which could lead to the development of more complex 
scenarios. 
The study is also contribution to practice by providing plausible futures that provide early warning 
insights on the manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat confronting South 
Africa during the 2030s. This study is not conveying the present and therefore soon to be 
redundant fact. Rather it is a study embedded in the continuum of time capturing past, present and 
critical future perspectives. It does not neglect the past, or soon to be past, but rigorously displays 
the future utility of the research. 
9.4 CONCLUSION 
Globalisation and a high level of interconnectedness are changing the world, creating new national 
security challenges, processes and actors. Despite optimism that multi-lateral efforts would solve 
global security problems, it is clear that significant work still needs to be done in this regard. In 
terms of containing information warfare, it is even seriously questioned if any multi-lateral 
agreement to contain this phenomenon would even be possible, as verification would be practically 
impossible. It can be expected that national security will remain a national government 
responsibility, albeit a much more complex phenomenon in which individuals, non-state actors and 
alliances of individuals and other entities will be highly relevant actors. It can be expected that with 
technological development will come many innovations and improvements in the quality of life. At 
the same time, the negative side of these technologies will also be present and will mutate to 
hamper the development of solutions. 
The two key driving forces on the continuum presented by the level of integration versus 
polarisation and the level of ICT embedding in society will be crucial in the manifestation of 
information warfare by the 2030s. On a strategic level, the management of these two driving forces 
and the countering of polarisation will be crucial in negating the threats posed by information 
warfare. However, irrespective of which scenario manifests, information warfare will become a 
national security threat of note by the 2030s. As economic, political and social life becomes more 
and more intertwined in everyday life, so does the vulnerability of humankind. 
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The study also highlights how countries are able to manage discontent through a collaborative 
ethic of common purpose namely the ability of countries to build and sustain partnerships to 
combat discontent will increasingly depend on bolstering a country’s credibility with the broader 
global population and forging an ethic of common purpose. It can be expected that political 
credibility and international esteem will probably grow in political significance in the future. The 
Western model of political development and values was dominant up to the 20th century but is 
increasingly being challenged by the rise of Asia and Africa. The political democratic models as 
conceived and developed by the West will not necessary represent the models for the political 
environment of the future.  
The threat of some form of global anarchy is an underlying theme regarding the nexus of the 
identified main driving forces namely polarisation and ICT embeddedness in the future. Therefore 
the importance of strengthening national and social will to enhance collaboration and shared 
common purpose might be that which will differentiate places of human progress from places of 
increasing inequality and increased chaos in the future.  
This study provided a basis for applying future studies to a specific futures national security threat. 
Further research can be conducted on new forms of network-related actions such as the rhizome 
phenomenon (of small, highly interconnected networks) using social network phenomena for cyber 
mobilisation, which has been identified as of particular use for information warfare in the future. 
Social media empowers most net-enabled individuals interested in participating in practically any 
global issue. This has created platforms for involvement and participation in social and political 
issues on a level never seen before in the history of humankind. Increasingly, it does not matter 
what the majority’s views are in terms of current issues; it matters more what the majority of 
empowered individuals are doing in terms of such issues. 
The viability of futures research is related to the quality of the research methods used. The viability 
of futures research is also associated with the diversity of research methods used, specifically in 
the developing world. As long as futures research is seen as a sole domain of the developed 
North, it will struggle to maintain its global position as an instrument of change and sustainable 
growth. 
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APPENDIX A: 
THEMATIC QUALITATIVE TEXT CODING OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
SCAN OUTPUT 
TABLE A: 1 Example of coding of text in categories and sub-categories done by 
using the Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT) provided and developed by the University 
of Pittsburgh’s Qualitative Data Analysis Program (QDAP) (Raw initial unedited text 
version) 
 
Category / Subcategory CAT Coding Paragraph 
Innovation: Modification Technology, in the context of this study, does not just refer 
to artefacts (devices, equipment, machines or material 
objects) but also knowing how to achieve practical purposes 
in the world.  It includes methods and systems which are the 
result of scientific knowledge being used for practical 
reasons.] 
Transformation: Renewal Material technologies are much more visible because their 
roles in change are more identifiable than the social and 
intellectual technologies (laws, institutions and theories) 
(Cornish, 2004:14– 15). As humanity’ s scientific 
understanding grows, so too does the ability to engineer 
instruments to manipulate the world (Rappert and Croft, 
2007:5).   
Transformation: Renewal Intellectual technologies do, however, play a significant role 
in the changes in society’ s power structures and remains, 
especially relevant to the use of information as a power 
instrument, in a world where there is increased 
consciousness of certain values such as human rights that 
cross national frontiers (Nye, 2005:260).  
Innovation: Modernization Technological progress provides a useful perspective for 
analysing the rapid phase of change currently experienced 
in global society. The main driving force in recent socio-
economic development seems to be the accumulation and 
use of technological knowledge. Thus changes in society 
have speeded up enormously in recent centuries due to 
rapid technological innovation and progress, which leads to 
massive change in the economy, government, and 
institutions of society (Cornish, 2004:20) 
Transformation: Revolution Through the ages technological development has been an 
indispensable trigger for change. See Table 5.1 for a 
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summary of the benefits, uses and effects of the three major 
technological revolutions experienced by humanity namely 
the agricultural, industrial and information ages. The 
previous ages (agricultural and industrial) do not go away, 
they just become layered sequentially parts of humanity’ s 
history of socio-economic and political evolution (Houle, 
2013:13).   
Transformation: Revolution The current age can also be called the "age of technology", 
but the more apt name is the information age.  The idea of 
the information age comes from the writings of Toffler 
(1970 and 1980), whose 'wave-theory' of technological and 
civilization enhancing development argues that human 
history can be seen as the unfolding of three successive and 
overlapping technological revolutions or waves (i.e. the 
agricultural, industrial and informational) 
Innovation: Modification Currently humanity is experiencing the ascendancy of the 
Third Wave, namely the informational age, with its 
associated developmental transformations (Kilibarda, 2003). 
The benefits of pervasive technologies include economic 
productivity, global collaboration, e-commerce, efficiencies 
and change in government and society, information richness, 
data-rich scientific and technological advances, political 
transparency, and societal knowledge (Pick and Sarkar, 
2015:1).  
Transformation: Shift Increasingly, in the information age, technology and 
information are interdependent, with advances in one 
entailing and dependent on, advances in the other. The 
expanding flow of information, the evolution of the global 
economy, and the creation of the internet are all factors in 
development, boosting innovation and globalisation (Masini, 
2005). Information and communication technology continues 
to remain central to continuing innovation. 
Networks: Interconnecting While computing devices are the most visible symbols of 
globalization, ICT is also proving to be one of the most 
potent agents of change. No area of the world and no arena 
of politics, economics, society, and culture are immune from 
the pervasive impact of computer technology (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 1997:251).  
 
Networks: System ICT can be regarded as a force multiplier (Bendrath, 1999).  
Miniaturization, growing capacity and software innovation 
have propelled computing devices rapid worldwide spread. 
These devices owe their growth and impact to a 
phenomenon dubbed Moore’ s Law (after Gordon Moore, 
the founder of Intel), which says that computing power and 
capacity double every eighteen months. This exponential 
growth has led to the digital revolution impacting on 
practically all spheres of life (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997: 
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251).  
Transformation: Renewal Although computer technology and especially the Internet 
are agents of a rapidly globalizing world, wide differences 
exist in different countries’  ability to shape (and be shaped 
by) a computer-driven technocratic world (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 1997:252).  
Innovation: Addition Despite overall growth a global digital divide remains 
pervasive. There remain distinct geographic patterns of 
technology utilization worldwide, and continents and 
countries have fairly persistent relative high or low levels of 
information technologies. Likewise, within states, and 
provinces, regions are uneven in geographic patterns of 
prevalence of information technologies (Pick and Sarkar, 
2015:1). Although the digital divide is a problem throughout 
the world, developing states struggle far more than 
industrialized states (Parks, 2013:8).  
Networks: Complex Focusing on the immediate future key ICT trends include: 
ongoing innovation in integrated applications, storage, 
display technology, wireless transmission media, 
omnipresence / pervasiveness of technology and continuous 
innovation with software applications (Butler, 2008:Slide 
11). Additional trends include the expansion of mobile 
applications and big data analytics growing exponentially 
(ITWeb, 2014) 
Transformation: Renewal The effects of the ICT trends and the information age in 
general are much more profound than just the explosion of 
the use of information but the significant impact on most 
aspects of modern society and economy. The decreasing 
cost and increasing performing power of computing devices 
have led to the application of information technologies in 
virtually all corners of society (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
1997:52). Information technology presents humanity with 
remarkable ability to network and to simultaneously localise 
and globalise (glocalisation), decentralise and centralise, 
fragment and integrate (Linstone, 2005).   
Transformation: Shift The information revolution is transforming the role various 
types of actors play in international relations. The 
information revolution has altered the role and operation of 
governments and their policy-makers in four ways. First, 
there is more information available to governments; indeed 
governments may have access to too much information. 
Paralysis through information overload is a real and growing 
threat and policy-makers need to prioritise. Second, global 
networks provide decision-makers with options to 
centralize or decentralise decision-making. Third, global 
networks erode the monopoly of information available to 
governments. Fourth, global networks advance transparency 
and thereby accentuate the global interest and involvement 
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regarding issues such as environmental challenges, making 
it difficult for countries unilaterally to take national policy 
decisions when the problem is global (Aronson, 2001:549). 
Although states will remain the dominant actor globally, they 
will be challenged and find it increasingly difficult to control. 
A much larger part of the population both within and among 
countries has access to the power that comes from 
information (Nye, 2011:114).   
Networks: System While technological development, especially related to the 
ICT/digital fields is exponential, this should not be viewed 
from a technology determinism vantage point. Complexity 
and change are not all new to the contemporary world, but 
were already widely discussed in the 1960s and the 1970s.  
Back then, as now, developments in the technical sphere 
continually seem to outpace the capacity of individuals and 
social systems to adapt. Thus, the notion of “ out-of-
control”  technology and fears of vulnerabilities due to 
dependency on technology are recurring themes in political 
and philosophical thought (Cavelty, 2007:21).  
Transformation: Revolution Although, fears of technology slipping out of human control 
for now or the near future are unfounded, technology is 
having a significant impact on human society in general. 
Enabled by technological change, humanity is experiencing 
a series of economic, social, and cultural adaptations that 
make possible a radical transformation of how the 
information environment is used by individuals, citizens, and 
members of cultural and social groups (Benkler, 2006:2).  
 Transformation: Renewal Technology development in the information age results 
frequently in technology competitive disruptions, if 
technological breakthroughs result in players changing the 
rules of competition. The result can be hyper competition 
and conditions that are analogous to warfare (Ashton and 
Klavans, 1997:56). This competition coupled with the 
fragmenting consequences of technology do pose significant 
challenges to government and social harmony if misused.   
Modification Changes brought about by technology and especially ICT 
related technologies have both globalising and fragmenting 
consequences. See Table 5.2 for the globalising and 
fragmenting consequences of transport, telecommunication, 
television and IT technologies. Despite the positive 
consequences of these technologies, there is also negative 
influence resulting in a potential fault lines in society. This 
consequently also had an effect on the nature of conflict and 
war in society.   
Networks: Complex The role of technology developments especially networking 
related technologies are critical elements influencing the 
global security environment in the information age.  The 
transformative power relations boosted by technology are 
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coming to the fore, especially in so far as fomenting 
transformative social change (Dator, Sweeney and Yee, 
2014:20).  
Transformation: Shift The disruptive and destructive potential of technology can 
be expected to play a noteworthy role in the future as 
individuals and entities explore the potential power 
projection related value of these technologies. While the 
technological impact have a significant effect on all 
identified environments the links between the technological 
and war/conflict environment are especially relevant for the 
manifestation of information warfare.  
Transformation: Shift Changes brought about by the advancement of technology, 
especially during the information age also had a profound 
effect on the war and conflict environment. As Toffler and 
Toffler (1993:3) state: “ A revolutionary new economy is 
arising based on knowledge, rather than conventional raw 
materials and physical labor (sic). This remarkable change 
in the world economy is bringing with it a parallel revolution 
in the nature of warfare.”  
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  APPENDIX C: 
DELPHI ADMINISTRATION: LETTER FOR FIRST ROUND DELPHI 
TABLE C: 1 Letter provided with first round Delphi questionnaire 
PARTICIPATION IN A STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
I am currently a part time PhD candidate at the Business School of the University of Stellenbosch. The topic of my 
dissertation is “Information Warfare as Future South African National Security Threat.” 
As an individual with relevant knowledge and experience applicable to how information warfare is going to manifest in 
the future, I would highly appreciate it, if you could participate in a Delphi Study on the future of information warfare. 
Information warfare is a phenomenon confronting us nearly daily in the news media. Many difficulties remains associated 
with this phenomenon including differences of definitions, marketing hype by companies with vested interests, 
sensationalized news reports, efforts by businesses not to provide information because of sensitive nature of losses. 
 It is assumed that no person has a way of knowing the future, but the aim here is to obtain expert insight on the issue of 
information warfare from individuals’ knowledgeable about a diverse range of fields. You are specifically requested to 
participate because of your knowledge and experience relevant to the possible future manifestation of information 
warfare. These inputs will serve as basis to develop broad consensus on possible future scenarios related to the 
manifestation of information warfare as a national security threat.  
The aim of the study is to identify the most significant contemporary driving forces which will impact on the manifestation 
of information warfare by 2030. (For the purpose of this study information warfare is defined as actions focused on 
destabilizing or manipulating the core information networks of a state or entity in society with the aim of influencing the 
ability and will to project power as well as efforts to counter similar attacks by an opposing entity and/or state. The 
definition proposed for information warfare encompasses three forms of manifestation of information warfare, namely 
netwar, psychological warfare and cyberwarfare.) 
Attached is a questionnaire with 11 potential driving forces statements. Please measure these driving forces’ impact on the 
manifestation of information warfare, firstly against their current relevancy and secondly against their potential impact 
by 2030. The identified driving forces stems from an environmental analysis conducted previously, but please feel free to 
add modify or reject these driving forces. Also please provide analysis and or motivations as far as possible. During the first 
round of the Delphi the aim is to generate a wide spectrum of opinions. Feedback will be provided to move towards 
consensus on these driving forces. No more than three rounds will be conducted, so participating in this Delphi Study 
would not be a burden on your time, a valuable commodity today. 
Participation in this study will be in line with the following principles: 
Informed consent: Participants must give their consent.  
Voluntary participation: Participants will be informed that, inter alia, they have the right to refuse to answer questions 
and to withdraw from participation at any time. 
Privacy: Steps will be taken to ensure that personal data of participants will be secured from improper access. 
Confidentially and anonymity: Confidentiality of information and anonymity of participants will be maintained unless 
waived by the participant. 
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APPENDIX E: DELPHI ADMINISTRATION: LETTER FOR THE SECOND 
ROUND DELPHI 
TABLE E: 1 Letter provided with second round Delphi questionnaire 
 
PARTICIPATION IN A STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE: ROUND 
TWO 
 
It is much appreciated that you participated in the First Round of the Delphi Study aimed at 
identifying the most significant contemporary driving forces which will impact on the manifestation 
of information warfare30 by 2030.  
 
Feedback and ratings have been received from all panel members. Based on these some changes 
have been made to the formulation of the driving forces. Your response to the first round 
questionnaire is included for easy reference. The average score for each dimension is listed as well as 
the score you provided. 
 
It would be appreciated if you could again consider each driving force and make a judgement on 
the score you provided in the context of the collective average Likert score of the Delphi Group. 
The comments from the other Delphi participants are also included in the questionnaire. Your 
rating can stay the same or be closer of further away from the average rating. Any additional 
comments would also be appreciated. 
 
Participation in this study will be in line with the previously stated principles: 
 
Informed consent: Participants must give their consent.  
 
Voluntary participation: Participants will be informed that, inter alia, they have the right to refuse 
to answer questions and to withdraw from participation at any time. 
 
Privacy: Steps will be taken to ensure that personal data of participants will be secured from 
improper access. 
 
Confidentially and anonymity: Confidentiality of information and anonymity of participants will be 
maintained unless waived by the participant. 
 
Thanks again for your willingness to participate in this study. 
 
Rianne van Vuuren 
8 January 2015 
 
 
 
                                               
30   For the purpose of this study information warfare is defined as actions focused on destabilizing or manipulating the core 
information networks of a state or entity in society with the aim of influencing the ability and will to project power as well as 
efforts to counter similar attacks by an opposing entity and/or state. The definition proposed for information warfare 
encompasses three forms of manifestation of information warfare, namely netwar, psychological warfare and cyberwarfare. 
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APPENDIX F: 
PILOT DELPHI STUDY: ROUND 1 RESULTS 
TABLE F: 1 Results of Pilot Delphi Study’s first round 
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APPENDIX G: 
PILOT DELPHI STUDY: ROUND 2 RESULTS 
TABLE G: 1 Results of Pilot Delphi Study’s second round 
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APPENDIX H: 
SECOND DELPHI STUDY: ROUND 1 RESULTS 
TABLE H: 1 Results of the Second Delphi Study’s first round 
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APPENDIX I: 
SECOND DELPHI STUDY: ROUND 2 RESULTS 
TABLE I: 1 Results of the Second Delphi Study’s second round 
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